Is There a Philosophy of Information?

In 2002, Luciano Floridi published a paper called What is the Philosophy of Information?, where he argues for a new paradigm in philosophical research. To what extent should his proposal be accepted? Is the Philosophy of Information actually a new paradigm, in the Kuhninan sense, in Philosophy? Or is it only a new branch of Epistemology? In our discussion we will argue in defense of Floridi’s proposal. We believe that Philosophy of Information has the types of features had by other areas already acknowledge as authentic in Philosophy. By way of an analogical argument we will argue that since Philosophy of Information has its own topics, method and problems it would be counter-intuitive not to accept it as a new philosophical area. To strengthen our position we present and discuss main topics of Philosophy of Information.     

Is a Tenseless Language Possible?

Whether it takes the form of a translation or of giving truth-conditions, any putative reduction of tensed language to tenseless language will be undermined if it can be shown that there could be no genuinely tenseless language. A similar problem faced traditional phenomenalism: it was far from clear that there could be a 'language of sense-data'. Either the imagined language was no language at all, or it was dependent upon object-language, not the other way around. A parallel dilemma faces tenseless reductionism. In spelling out what a tenseless language would be like, one either ends up with something that no creature could have as a language, or with something that is parasitic upon tensed language - not the other way around.     

Is There a Problem of Special Angelic Action?

One of the most widely discussed topics in the recent science & theology literature has been divine activity. It is odd that in this literature there has been no discussion of whether and how to accommodate special angelic action (hereafter SAA). Just as the Bible records many instances of apparent SDA, it records many instances of apparent SAA. This neglect may be due to an assumption that there is no distinct problem relating to SAA; the existing suggested solutions to the problem(s) surrounding SDA may be transferable to the angelic context. My aim is to disprove that idea.     

Is There a Double Standard of Aging?1

Elderly and college-aged subjects rated photographs of both sexes at three different ages on 10 adjective rating scales. Evidence for a double standard of aging was obtained. Although both men and women were perceived to diminish in attractiveness as they aged, the decline for women was greater. Moreover, ratings of women's femininity decreased with increasing age, whereas evaluations of men's masculinity were unaffected by age. Unexpectedly, elderly subjects, as compared to college students, discriminated less on the basis of sex and evaluated women more positively. Changes in the gender roles of the elderly were invoked to explain their more favorable conceptions of women.     

Is There a Viable Account of Well-Founded Belief?

My starting point is some widely accepted and intuitive ideas about justified, well-founded belief. By drawing on John Pollock’s work, I sketch a formal framework for making these ideas precise. Central to this framework is the notion of an inference graph. An inference graph represents everything that is relevant about a subject for determining which of her beliefs are justified, such as what the subject believes based on what. The strengths of the nodes of the graph represent the degrees of justification of the corresponding beliefs. There are two ways in which degrees of justification can be computed within this framework. I argue that there is not any way of doing the calculations in a broadly probabilistic manner. The only alternative looks to be a thoroughly non-probabilistic way of thinking wedded to the thought that justification is closed under competent deduction. However, I argue that such a view is unable to capture the intuitive notion of justification, for it leads to an uncomfortable dilemma: either a widespread scepticism about justification, or drawing epistemically spurious distinctions between different types of lotteries. This should worry anyone interested in well-founded belief.     

What Is Music? Is There a Definitive Answer?

Philosophers frequently defend definitions by appealing to intuitions and contemporary folk classificatory norms. I raise methodological concerns that undermine some of these defenses. Focusing on Andrew Kania's recent definition of music, I argue that the way in which it has been developed leads to problems, and I show that a number of other definitions of interest to philosophers of art (and others) run into similar problems.     

IFPS - Is There a Difference?

This paper tries to answer a question about the difference between IFPS and other psychoanalytical institutions. The author states that there is a linkage between the ethics of psychoanalysis and the ethics of the institution. The ethics can not be represented by rules or standards of prerequisites, but by creating a space where the unconscious as desire, singularity and difference takes place. The bureaucratic organization and the hierarchy in the categories of members of IPA institutions goes straight against the transgressor experience of the unconscious. The training analysis under such conditions leads to an identification process with the training analyst, giving as final result standardized, homogeneous, obedient analysts. The author describes a new experience in the training of analysts in his institution without any kind of interference from IFPS. Finally, he concludes that differences exists between the two institutions and that they are mainly due to the identification process typical for IPA and the process of ''choice'' in IFPS.     

Is There a Right to Be Forgiven?

Philosophia - Imagine a case of wrongdoing—not something trivial, but nothing so serious that adequate reparations are impossible. Imagine, further, that the wrongdoer makes those reparations...     

Is There a Claim to Deserved Punishment?

In this paper I defend the view that persons have a claim to deserved treatment, including many forms of punishment, against an objection resting on the principle that it is not possible to have a claim to harmful treatment. I do not challenge this principle, but argue, rather, that the harms wrongdoers typically deserve either (a) are not genuine harms at all (for reasons relevant to their being deserved) or (b) are not relevant to the content of these wrongdoers' claims.     

Is There a Problem With Cognitive Outsourcing?

To what extent can we rely on others for information without such reliance becoming epistemically problematic? In this paper, this question is addressed in terms of a specific form of reliance: cognitive outsourcing. Cognitive outsourcing involves handing over (outsourcing) one's information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The specific question that will be asked about such outsourcing is if there is an epistemic problem about cognitive outsourcing as such. To ask if there is an epistemic problem with x for S is to ask if x is a problem for S’s ability to acquire true belief and avoid false belief. To ask if there is a problem for S with x as such is to ask if it is impossible to solve the problem for S while leaving x as is. I argue that, if we consider the five most plausible candidate epistemic problems raised by cognitive outsourcing—i.e., unreliability, gullibility, irrationality, dependency, and lack of epistemic autonomy—we see for each candidate that it is either not an epistemic problem, or not a problem about cognitive outsourcing as such.     

What Is the Role of Quaker Education in a Time of Terror?

Abstract

This article presents not only the distinctive pedagogical philosophy of Quaker education, but discusses the special relevance of Friends values and educational methods in a time when America is at war. The article also includes a listing of print resources on Quaker values and education.     

The Acculturation of Community Psychology: Is There a Best Way?

In this paper I describe a community psychology perspective on acculturation and adjustment of immigrants and refugees and suggest that this field of acculturation research has in turn something to offer heuristically as we consider our identity and training for future generations of community psychologists over the next 50 years. I suggest that honoring our heritage, maintaining our disciplinary identity as community psychologists, and sustaining doctoral programs that offer training specific to community psychology are crucial for our survival as a field and is not antithetical to, and is indeed necessary for, interdisciplinary collaborations.     

Competing Conceptions of Diagnostic Reasoning – Is There a Way Out?

Diagnostic errors are more frequently a result of the clinician's failure to combine medical knowledge adequately than of data inaccuracy. Diagnostic reasoning studies are valuable to understand and improve diagnostic reasoning. However, most diagnostic reasoning studies are characterized by some limitations which make these studies seem more simple than diagnostic reasoning in real life situations actually is. These limitations are connected both to the failure to acknowledge components of knowledge used in clinical practice as well as to acknowledge the physician-patient relationship's influence on clinical knowledge and on the reasoning process itself. In addition the modes of reasoning described in these studies frequently is oversimplified. In this paper three simplistic and competing models of diagnostic reasoning are analyzed and criticized, followed by an evaluation of two alternative models proposing a combined view.