Is Perception the Canonical Route to Aesthetic Judgment?

It is commonplace amongst philosophers of art to make claims that postulate important links between aesthetics and perception. In this paper, I focus on one such claim—that perception is the canonical route to aesthetic judgment. I consider a range of prima facie plausible interpretations of this claim, and argue that each fails to identify any important link between aesthetic judgment and perception. Given this, I conclude that we have good reason to be sceptical of the claim that perception is in any way privileged as a source of aesthetic judgment.     

What’s New about the New Induction?

The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, p. S12). This paper examines Stanford’s New Induction and argues that it – like the other forms of underdetermination that he criticizes – merely recapitulates familiar philosophical conundra.     

Does the Higgs Mechanism Exist?

This paper explores the argument structure of the concept of spontaneous symmetry breaking in the electroweak gauge theory of the Standard Model: the so‐called Higgs mechanism. As commonly understood, the Higgs argument is designed to introduce the masses of the gauge bosons by a spontaneous breaking of the gauge symmetry of an additional field, the Higgs field. The technical derivation of the Higgs mechanism, however, consists in a mere reshuffling of degrees of freedom by transforming the Higgs Lagrangian in a gauge‐invariant manner. This already raises serious doubts about the adequacy of the entire manoeuvre. It will be shown that no straightforward ontic interpretation of the Higgs mechanism is tenable, since gauge transformations possess no real instantiations. In addition, the explanatory value of the Higgs argument will be critically examined.     

Does the consequence argument beg the question?

The Consequence Argument has elicited various responses, ranging from acceptance as obviously right to rejection as obviously problematic in one way or another. Here we wish to focus on one specific response, according to which the Consequence Argument begs the question. This is a serious accusation that has not yet been adequately rebutted, and we aim to remedy that in what follows. We begin by giving a formulation of the Consequence Argument. We also offer some tentative proposals about the nature of begging the question. Although the charge of begging the question is frequently made in philosophy, it is surprisingly difficult to pin down the precise nature of this dialectical infelicity (or family of such infelicities). Thus we offer some new proposals about the nature of begging the question with an eye to understanding what is going on in central cases in which the charge is legitimately made. We then defend the Consequence Argument against the charge that it begs the question, so construed. We contend that, whatever the other liabilities of the argument may be, it does not beg the question against the compatibilist.     

Does Counseling Need the Mind?

In this article, the author argues that the language used in counseling practice is largely a common sense language using mentalistic words. Basic mentalistic assumptions and challenges to those assumptions are outlined. The practical consequences of retaining or discarding mentalism in counseling are discussed. The author concludes that mentalistic language persists in counseling practice because it offers a useful vocabulary, but that the counseling field could benefit from adopting a path similar to that used in the cognitive sciences.     

Does the brain calculate value?

How do people choose between options? At one extreme, the 'value-first' view is that the brain computes the value of different options and simply favours options with higher values. An intermediate position, taken by many psychological models of judgment and decision making, is that values are computed but that the resulting choices depend heavily on the context of available options. At the other extreme, the 'comparison-only' view argues that choice depends directly on comparisons, with or even without any intermediate computation of value. In this paper, we place past and current psychological and neuroscientific theories on this spectrum, and review empirical data that have led to an increasing focus on comparison rather than value as the driver of choice.     

Does Anselm beg the question?

Saint Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God, formulated nearly a millennium ago, continues to bedevil philosophers. There is no consensus about what, if anything, is wrong with it. Some philosophers insist that the argument is invalid. Others concede its validity but insist that it is unsound. A third group of philosophers maintain that Anselm begs the question. It has been argued, for example, that Anselm’s use of the name “God” in a premise assumes (or presupposes) precisely what has to be proved, namely, that God exists. Another tack is to argue that the premise that God is possible implies or presupposes the conclusion that God exists, or perhaps that, in order to know that God is possible, one must know that God exists. Just as no consensus has emerged about what, if anything, is wrong with Anselm’s argument, no consensus has emerged about whether the argument begs the question. In this essay, I focus on the second type of claim made by the third group of philosophers—the claim that Anselm’s argument begs the question by assuming, as a premise, that God is possible. In particular, I focus on the argument of the contemporary analytic philosopher William Rowe, who has claimed, since at least 1975, that Anselm’s ontological argument begs the question. I argue that Rowe’s argument fails.     

Blacks,Whites, and the New Prejudice: Does Aversive Racism Impact Employee Assessment?

This research examined how Black and White raters view Black and White employees in terms of salary, training, race, and perceptual characteristics. These characteristics were measured in a primarily Black university with a sample of 283 Black students and in a primarily White university with a sample of 258 White students. Aversive racism was used to explain the lower ratings of Black women in the White sample. Blacks' stronger rating of other Blacks was explained by relational demography, which argues that strengdi in numbers is evidenced by more positive feelings of minorities toward those of their own groups. Results are discussed with regard to changes that must occur in order for organizations to be more inclusive of Blacks and women.     

Does Externalism Entail the Anomalism of the Mental?

In 'Mental Events' Donald Davidson argued for the anomalism of the mental on the basis of the operation of incompatible constitutive principles in the mental and physical domains. Many years later, he has suggested that externalism provides further support for the anomalism of the mental. I examine the basis for that claim. The answer to the question in the title will be a qualified 'Yes'. That is an important result in the metaphysics of mind and an interesting consequence of externalism.     

How Does the Body Get Into the Mind?

In this article, we propose that gestures play an important role in the connection between sensorimotor experience and language. Gestures may be the link between bodily experience and verbal expression that advocates of embodied cognition have postulated. In a developmental sequence of communicative action, gestures, which are initially similar to action sequences, substantially shorten and represent actions in metonymic form. In another process, action sequences are based on kinesthetic schemata that themselves find their metaphoric expression in language. Again, gestures enact kinesthetic schemata that are correlated with verbal expressions. Examples from a large database are used to illustrate the various processes by means of which language arises when students conduct school science investigations.     

Does the Cover Letter Really Matter?

Many journals require a covering letter alongside the submission process. Some of them, particularly elitist journals, pay a particular attention to the cover letter to such extent an editor may decide not to send a paper out for external peer-review because of a ‘bad’ or absence of a covering letter. As stated in the instructions of many journals, the goal of the covering letter is to emphasize the novelty and to communicate the potential implications of the reported findings. Authors are also invited to tell the handling editor how the topic is related to the journal’s scope and to demonstrate how the results fit in broader context of the literature. Here, I briefly discuss if the cover letter is really necessary.     

Does a Turned-Off Light Bulb Lose its Potential to Glow?

Counselors can help discouraged people regain their sense of strength and potential to cope with their problems. Various techniques for doing this are described.     

Does the isolation effect require attention?

An item that differs from the surrounding items is remembered better than an item that is consistent with its surroundings; this is known as the von Restorff effect or isolation effect (von Restorff, Psychologische Forschung, 18, 299–342, 1933). Theoretical explanations have proposed that the isolate is processed differently from control items, though some research has suggested that this processing might require more attention for semantic than for physical isolates. To test this possibility, in the present study we examined the isolation effects for physical isolates and semantic isolates under full and divided attention. Participants viewed lists of categorized words, with some lists containing either a physical or a semantic isolate, followed by immediate written free recall. Across three experiments, divided attention eliminated the semantic isolation effect but did not impact the physical isolation effect. Furthermore, semantic isolates were output earlier in recall than controls, whereas physical isolates were output more similarly to controls. These findings suggest that semantic isolation effects require attention during encoding, whereas physical isolation effects are relatively automatic.     

Does Particularism Solve the Moral Problem?

Abstract

Moral cognitivism, internalism about moral judgements, and Humeanism about motivating reasons all possess attractions.Yet they cannot all be true.This is the so–called moral problem. Dancy offers an interesting particularist response to the moral problem. However, we argue that this response, first, provides an inadequate basis for the distinction between motivating states and states necessary for motivation although not themselves motivators; second, draws no support from considerations about weakness of the will; and third, involves an implausible account of desire.We conclude that particularism ú whatever other attractions it may have ú does not solve the moral problem.