What Do We Do Unconsciously? And How?

In this reply, we endorse Chartrand's (2005) taxonomy of conscious awareness for different stages of consumer decisions affected by environmental cues. In addition, we attempt to broaden the scope of this taxonomy by discussing its usefulness for consumer decisions in general. We generally support Simonson's (2005) claim that research based on consumers as conscious decision makers is indeed predictive of a wide variety of behavior. However, we also argue that the importance of consciousness should not be overstated. Conscious processes observed in a research laboratory are not representative of conscious processes in real life. The alternative model to describe effects of the environment on behavior by Janiszewski and van Osselaer (2005) may be useful to explain automaticity in goal‐directed behavior, but it poorly describes other automatic behaviors.     

On the control of automatic processes: a parallel distributed processing account of the Stroop effect

Traditional views of automaticity are in need of revision. For example, automaticity often has been treated as an all-or-none phenomenon, and traditional theories have held that automatic processes are independent of attention. Yet recent empirical data suggest that automatic processes are continuous, and furthermore are subject to attentional control. A model of attention is presented to address these issues. Within a parallel distributed processing framework, it is proposed that the attributes of automaticity depend on the strength of a processing pathway and that strength increases with training. With the Stroop effect as an example, automatic processes are shown to be continuous and to emerge gradually with practice. Specifically, a computational model of the Stroop task simulates the time course of processing as well as the effects of learning. This was accomplished by combining the cascade mechanism described by McClelland (1979) with the backpropagation learning algorithm (Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986). The model can simulate performance in the standard Stroop task, as well as aspects of performance in variants of this task that manipulate stimulus-onset asynchrony, response set, and degree of practice. The model presented is contrasted against other models, and its relation to many of the central issues in the literature on attention, automaticity, and interference is discussed.     

Beyond behaviorism: on the automaticity of higher mental processes

The first 100 years of experimental psychology were dominated by 2 major schools of thought: behaviorism and cognitive science. Here the authors consider the common philosophical commitment to determinism by both schools, and how the radical behaviorists' thesis of the determined nature of higher mental processes is being pursued today in social cognition research on automaticity. In harmony with "dual process" models in contemporary cognitive science, which equate determined processes with those that are automatic and which require no intervening conscious choice or guidance, as opposed to "controlled" processes which do, the social cognition research on the automaticity of higher mental processes provides compelling evidence for the determinism of those processes. This research has revealed that social interaction, evaluation and judgment, and the operation of internal goal structures can all proceed without the intervention of conscious acts of will and guidance of the process.     

基于直觉的亲社会性：来自社会启发式假设的思考

亲社会属性是人类的一个重要特征, 也是研究者一直关注的重点问题。大多数关于亲社会性的理论模型都有一个共同的假设：人类本能地自私, 亲社会行为是对自私进行反思控制的结果。亲社会性直觉模型却提出了相反的假设, 认为在许多情况下, 亲社会行为不需要主动控制自私冲动, 它本身就可以以直觉的(或冲动的)方式出现。亲社会性自动化的行为特征、奖赏寻求的神经特征, 以及儿童亲社会性的早期发展都为亲社会性直觉模型提供了支持性证据。社会启发式假设可以对个体的直觉亲社会性进行解释, 并从情境和个体两个方面对影响直觉亲社会性的因素进行了预测。这不仅为研究者重新思考亲社会行为的根源提供了一个新的视角, 也为未来研究提出了一些可供参考的方向。     

The links between self-determined motivations and behavioral automaticity in a variety of real-life behaviors

The different motivations postulated by the Self-Determination Theory have proved to be meaningful to predict the level of engagement in a wide variety of life domains. The present research examines the relation between the different forms of self-determined motivation and behavioral automaticity of 12 behaviors associated with different life domains. Following 1743 measurements of self-determination (using a short version of the situational motivational scale, SIMS8), behavioral automaticity (using the self-reported behavioral automaticity index, SRBAI), and behavioral frequency (self-reported number of executions in a unit of time) for 12 various common behaviors collected on 315 young adults (M_age = 20.60?±?2.87 years) through an online survey, the results of crossed linear mixed models indicated that self-determined motivations are more associated with behavioral automaticity than non-self-determined motivations (intrinsic motivation: β?=?0.13, p?<?.001, identified extrinsic motivation: β?=?0.13, p?<?.001; external extrinsic motivation : β?=?0.08, p?<?.001; amotivation: β?=?0.02, p?=?.433). Furthermore, self-determination played a moderating role between the repetition of behaviors and behavioral automaticity (β?=?0.06, p?<?.002) suggesting that self-determination facilitated automatization, as high level of behavioral automaticity was achieved with less frequent behaviors when behaviors were performed for highly self-determined (β?=?0.41, p?<?.001) than weakly self-determined reasons (β?=?0.29, p?<?.001). The applications of these findings for learning and habit formation are discussed.     

Attentional sensitization of unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming

Classical theories of automaticity assume that automatic processes elicited by unconscious stimuli are autonomous and independent of higher-level cognitive influences. In contrast to these classical conceptions, we argue that automatic processing depends on attentional amplification of task-congruent processing pathways and propose an attentional sensitization model of unconscious visual processing: According to this model, unconscious visual processing is automatic in the sense that it is initiated without deliberate intention. However, unconscious visual processing is susceptible to attentional top-down control and is only elicited if the cognitive system is configured accordingly. In this article, we describe our attentional sensitization model and review recent evidence demonstrating attentional influences on subliminal priming, a prototypical example of an automatic process. We show that subliminal priming (a) depends on attentional resources, (b) is susceptible to stimulus expectations, (c) is influenced by action intentions, and (d) is modulated by task sets. These data suggest that attention enhances or attenuates unconscious visual processes in congruency with attentional task representations similar to conscious perception. We argue that seemingly paradoxical, hitherto unexplained findings regarding the automaticity of the underlying processes in many cognitive domains can be easily accommodated by our attentional sensitization model. We conclude this review with a discussion of future research questions regar-ding the nature of attentional control of unconscious visual processing.     

Recognition memory of spatial location information: Another failure to support automaticity

Hasher and Zacks (1979) claimed that spatial location information is automatically encoded. Evaluation of the empirical basis for this claim, however, casts doubt on some of the evidence for the automaticity position. This evaluation led to four experiments in which five criteria for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes were examined using a recognition task. Results of these experiments clearly show thatrecognition memory for spatial location information is influenced by intention, age of subjects, competing task loads, practice, and individual differences. The reported results, which extend those reported by Naveh-Benjamin (1987) for spatial locationrecall memory, are at odds with the claim that memory for spatial location information is exclusively mediated by automatic encoding processes. The concept of automaticity and the appropriateness of the criteria suggested for testing the automaticity of cognitive processes are discussed in light of the current results and recent findings on other features of the environment (e.g., frequency of occurrence) previously claimed to be automatically encoded.     

The Role of Conscious Awareness in Consumer Behavior

Consumer behavior can be influenced by mental processes that occur outside of conscious awareness. It is argued that in each domain of automaticity, researchers should specify the aspects of which consumers are presumably unaware. Three types of awareness are identified. These include awareness of (a) the environmental features that trigger an automatic process, (b) the automatic process itself, and (c) the outcome of that automatic process. Individuals may be unaware of one or more of these stages, thereby making the process nonconscious. With additional clarity regarding which aspects are nonconscious in which domains and the specific role that awareness plays, we can begin building a more comprehensive model of nonconscious processes in consumer behavior.     

Automaticity: a theoretical and conceptual analysis

Several theoretical views of automaticity are discussed. Most of these suggest that automaticity should be diagnosed by looking at the presence of features such as unintentional, uncontrolled/uncontrollable, goal independent, autonomous, purely stimulus driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast. Contemporary views further suggest that these features should be investigated separately. The authors examine whether features of automaticity can be disentangled on a conceptual level, because only then is the separate investigation of them worth the effort. They conclude that the conceptual analysis of features is to a large extent feasible. Not all researchers agree with this position, however. The authors show that assumptions of overlap among features are determined by the other researchers' views of automaticity and by the models they endorse for information processing in general.     

Attention and preattention in theories of automaticity.

The theoretical relation between preattentive processes and automatic processes is different in different approaches to attention and automaticity. In the modal view, automatic and preattentive processes are one and the same; automatic processing is preattentive. In recent views that treat automaticity as a memory phenomenon, automatic processing is postattentive. These views are described and evidence for them is discussed. Two experiments are reported that test whether the training that makes processing automatic also makes it preattentive. The data suggest a dissociation between automatic and preattentive processes that is more consistent with the memory view of automaticity than with the modal view.     

Longer,smaller, faster,stronger: On skills and intelligence

ABSTRACT

How does practice change our behaviors such that they go from being awkward, unskilled actions to elegant, skilled performances? This is the question that I wish to explore in this paper. In the first section of the paper, I will defend the tight connection between practice and skill and then go on to make precise how we ought to construe the concept of practice. In the second section, I will suggest that practice contributes to skill by structuring and automatizing the motor routines constitutive of skilled actions. I will cite how this fact about skilled action has misled many philosophers to conclude that skills are mindless or bodily. In the third section of the paper, I will challenge this common misconception about automaticity by appealing to empirical evidence of motor chunking. This evidence reveals that there are two opposing processes involved in the automaticity of skilled action: one process that is largely associative, which I will call “concatenation,” and a second which is a controlled cognitive process, which I will call “segmentation.” As a result of this evidence, we will be in a position to see clearly why skills are minded and intelligent not merely during their acquisition and not simply in virtue of their connection to intentional states but, rather, in their very nature. I will end by reflecting on some theoretical reasons for why this is exactly what we should expect to be the case when it comes to skilled action.     

Automatic activation of individual differences: A test of the gatekeeper model in the domain of spontaneous helping

The influence of stable individual differences on behaviour need not solely rely upon deliberative processes but can also be exerted through automatic associative processes. In this contribution, three studies that illustrate the role of individual differences in automaticity are presented in the domain of helping behaviour. The first study provides evidence both for a double dissociation and for an additive pattern of implicit and explicit measures in predicting relevant altruistic behaviours. The subsequent two studies show that when the concept of altruism is subliminally primed, individual differences in implicit attitudes significantly predict behaviour. The results are in line with the gatekeeper model, and their implications are discussed focusing on the key role of individual differences in modulating automaticity effects. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

认知加工的自动化现象：从二分法到渐进观

认知自动化是人类学习和进步的必经之路。传统的二分法通过无意识等特征简单地将认知加工过程分为受控加工与自动化加工。但这些特征取决于研究者所采用的研究范式, 不具有普适性。近年来研究者根据注意资源有限理论提出自动化是一个渐进的过程, 而注意资源需求的减少是自动化发展的核心特征。相比二分法, 这种渐进观更加符合实证研究的发现。而且, 渐进观在信息加工自动化理论和技能习得理论的阶段性中都得以体现, 进一步证明了渐进观的普适性。     

Exploring automaticity in text processing: syntactic ambiguity as a test case

A prevalent assumption in text comprehension research is that many aspects of text processing are automatic, with automaticity typically defined in terms of properties (e.g., speed and effort). The present research advocates conceptualization of automaticity in terms of underlying mechanisms and evaluates two such accounts, a computational-efficiency account (underlying computational processes become more efficient with practice) and a memory-based processing account (the underlying basis of processing shifts with practice, from computing interpretations to retrieving prior interpretations). In five experiments, short texts containing either an ambiguous or unambiguous syntactic structure were presented for multiple study trials. In both conditions, reading times in target regions decreased across trials, indicating automatization. Several findings supported the memory-based processing account (e.g., practice effects were largely item-specific, reading times were longer for ambiguous versus unambiguous sentences on early trials but converged on later trials) Some evidence was also found for a contribution of gains in computational efficiency (i.e., some item-general practice effects were observed). Implications for research on automaticity and text processing are discussed.     

Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity

Dual process theorists in psychology maintain that the mind’s workings can be explained in terms of conscious or controlled processes and automatic processes. Automatic processes are largely nonconscious, that is, triggered by environmental stimuli without the agent’s conscious awareness or deliberation. Automaticity researchers contend that even higher level habitual social behaviors can be nonconsciously primed. This article brings work on automaticity to bear on our understanding of habitual virtuous actions. After examining a recent intuitive account of habitual actions and habitual virtuous actions, the author offers her own explanation in terms of goal-dependent automaticity. This form of automaticity provides an account of habitual virtuous actions that explains the sense in which these actions are rational, that is, done for reasons. Habitual virtuous actions are rational in the sense of being purposive or goal-directed and are essentially linked with the agent’s psychological states. Unlike deliberative virtuous actions, the agent’s reasons for habitual virtuous actions are not present to her conscious awareness at the time of acting.

Alcohol and Aggression: Perspectives on Controlled and Uncontrolled Social Information Processing

This paper reviews the main current social cognitive explanations of the effects of acute alcohol consumption on aggression: the cognitive disruption model, the attributional model, and model of automaticity. The cognitive disruption model posits that intoxication affects controlled processing arising from the impairment of executive cognitive functions by alcohol's pharmacological properties. The individual consequently focuses on the most salient and proximal situational factors, thereby spoiling self‐regulatory processes. According to the attributional model, drinkers expect alcohol to mitigate social sanctions following aggression by shifting blame to alcohol. These explicit expectations represent an extrapharmacological cause of the alcohol–aggression link. Finally, the model of automaticity implies that alcohol meanings stored in long‐term memory and activated in drinking contexts automatically trigger aggressive thoughts and behavior without the individual's awareness. The explanation of intoxicated aggression should integrate these co‐etiological social cognitive models that take into account pharmacological as well as extrapharmacological consequences of alcohol consumption.     

Problem restructuring processes for ill-structured verbal analogies

The processes involved in analogy solving have been an important investigative area in cognitive psychology. Although problem restructuring has been a central construct in problem solving theory, no restructuring processes have been proposed for analogical reasoning. Yet, the stimulus terms for analogies, as they appear on ability tests, are often ill-structured. That is, they are ordered in a way that does not permit direct problem comprehension. In the current study, both perceptual and semantic problem restructuring processes were hypothesized for analogy solving. The independence, stage of execution, and susceptibility to strategic control of the two processes were examined. The results from two experiments indicated that (1) ill-structured analogies are restructured during problem solving, (2) perceptual and semantic restructuring processes are independent and executed at different stages of analogy solving, and (3) both processes exhibited automaticity since repetition of analogy solution attenuated but did not eliminate either restructuring process. A model of analogical reasoning that incorporated both restructuring processes and their execution sequences was proposed. The nature and automaticity of perceptual and semantic analogy restructuring processes were disscussed.     

The cerebellum in thought and action: a fronto-cerebellar aging hypothesis

Normal aging is associated with deficits in both memory and executive control. While a number of theories of cognitive aging have proposed that decrements in frontally mediated executive control processes can account for many of the age-related changes observed, the models proposed to date have not adequately accounted for age changes in processing speed, intra-individual variability and automaticity of information processing. These basic aspects of information processing efficiency may be of central importance for our understanding of age-related cognitive changes and more elaborate neurological models are needed that incorporate explanatory mechanisms which account for their influence. In this paper, it is proposed that the dual role played by frontal and cerebellar degeneration and the disruption of fronto-cerebellar feedback and feedforward control loops may be of central importance for a model of age-related changes in processing speed, intra-individual variability, automaticity, and higher level cognitive functions like memory and executive control.     

Evaluative conditioning: Recent developments and future directions

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is generally considered to be one of the routes via which likes and dislikes are acquired. We identify recent trends in EC research and speculate about the topics that will dominate future research on EC. Many of the recent developments in EC research were shaped by functional definitions of EC that refer only to environmental conditions, but not to mental processes and representations. These functional definitions stimulated the development of and debates between theories about the mental processes that mediate EC. These trends, as well as greater methodological and conceptual sophistication, inspired meta-conditional studies that aim at determining the conditions under which EC is characterized by certain properties. The question of whether EC depends on contingency awareness remains a central topic, albeit with a stronger link to theorizing about underlying mental processes. Other automaticity features have gained enhanced interest, as can for example be seen in research investigating whether EC is goal-independent and whether EC is resource-independent. We argue that future research would benefit from a sharper distinction between processes that operate during acquisition (i.e., when CS–US pairs are presented) and processes that operate during measurement (i.e., when the effects of CS–US pairings are assessed). We conclude with a short summary of all articles in this Special Issue, relating them to the identified trends in EC research.     

A Piagetian approach to infant referential behaviors

Near the end of the first year of life, infants begin producing referential behaviors that in adults indicate joint attention, or coordinating shared attention to an object with another person. These behaviors have been interpreted in the social cognitive literature as an indication that infants realize they are sharing attention to an object with another person. In this paper, we address theory and research on infant referential behaviors described as joint attention and offer an alternative explanation for the presence of these behaviors. Using Piaget's constructivist theory, we show how research in this area can be interpreted without assuming that infants have advanced social cognitive abilities. We argue that infants’ referential behaviors are motor signifiers of thought and that infants recognize humans as particularly relevant objects for their goal-directed behaviors. Finally, we describe how the field of infant joint attention research should proceed if a comprehensive understanding of infant cognitive processes is to be desired.