Using nonconscious behavioral mimicry to create affiliation and rapport

Nonconscious behavioral mimicry occurs when a person unwittingly imitates the behaviors of another person. This mimicry has been attributed to a direct link between perceiving a behavior and performing that same behavior. The current experiments explored whether having a goal to affiliate augments the tendency to mimic the behaviors of interaction partners. Experiment 1 demonstrated that having an affiliation goal increases nonconscious mimicry, and Experiment 2 further supported this proposition by demonstrating that people who have unsuccessfully attempted to affiliate in an interaction subsequently exhibit more mimicry than those who have not experienced such a failure. Results suggest that behavioral mimicry may be part of a person's repertoire of behaviors, used nonconsciously, when there is a desire to create rapport.     

I am too just like you: nonconscious mimicry as an automatic behavioral response to social exclusion

ABSTRACT— Research across various disciplines has demonstrated that social exclusion has devastating psychological, emotional, and behavioral consequences. Excluded individuals are therefore motivated to affiliate with others, even though they may not have the resources, cognitive or otherwise, to do so. The current research explored whether nonconscious mimicry of other individuals—a low-cost, low-risk, automatic behavior—might help excluded individuals address threatened belongingness needs. Experiment 1 demonstrated that excluded people mimic a subsequent interaction partner more than included people do. Experiment 2 showed that individuals excluded by an in-group selectively (and nonconsciously) mimic a confederate who is an in-group member more than a confederate who is an out-group member. The relationship between exclusion and mimicry suggests that there are automatic behaviors people can use to recover from the experience of being excluded. In addition, this research demonstrates that nonconscious mimicry is selective and sensitive to context.     

Attention without awareness: Attentional modulation of perceptual grouping without awareness

Perceptual grouping is the process through which the perceptual system combines local stimuli into a more global perceptual unit. Previous studies have shown attention to be a modulatory factor for perceptual grouping. However, these studies mainly used explicit measurements, and, thus, whether attention can modulate perceptual grouping without awareness is still relatively unexplored. To clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping, the present study aims to explore how attention interacts with perceptual grouping without awareness. The task was to judge the relative lengths of two centrally presented horizontal bars while a railway-shaped pattern defined by color similarity was presented in the background. Although the observers were unaware of the railway-shaped pattern, their line-length judgment was biased by that pattern, which induced a Ponzo illusion, indicating grouping without awareness. More importantly, an attentional modulatory effect without awareness was manifested as evident by the observer’s performance being more often biased when the railway-shaped pattern was formed by an attended color than when it was formed by an unattended one. Also, the attentional modulation effect was shown to be dynamic, being more pronounced with a short presentation time than a longer one. The results of the present study not only clarify the relationship between attention and perceptual grouping but also further contribute to our understanding of attention and awareness by corroborating the dissociation between attention and awareness.

     

Recognition without awareness: An elusive phenomenon

Two recent studies described conditions under which recognition memory performance appeared to be driven by nondeclarative memory. Specifically, participants successfully discriminated old images from highly similar new images even when no conscious memory for the images could be retrieved. Paradoxically, recognition performance was better when images were studied with divided attention than when images were studied with full attention. Furthermore, recognition performance was better when decisions were rated as guesses than when decisions were associated with low or high confidence. In three experiments, we adopted the paradigm used in the earlier studies in an attempt to repeat this intriguing work. Our attempts were unsuccessful. In all experiments, recognition was better when images were studied with full attention than when images were studied with divided attention. Recognition was also better when participants indicated high or low confidence in their decision than when they indicated that their decision was a guess. Thus, our results conformed to what typically has been reported in studies of recognition memory, and we were unable to demonstrate recognition without awareness. We encourage others to explore this paradigm, and to try to identify conditions under which the phenomenon might be demonstrated.Declarative memory refers to the capacity to recollect facts and events, and can be contrasted with a collection of nondeclarative memory abilities, including skills, habits, and the phenomenon of priming, which are expressed through performance rather than recollection (Squire et al. 2004). Declarative memory depends on the integrity of medial temporal lobe structures, while the various forms of nondeclarative memory depend on other brain systems (Schacter and Tulving 1994; Eichenbaum and Cohen 2001; Squire 2004). The best-studied example of declarative memory is recognition memory—the ability to judge items as having been encountered previously. Successful recognition is ordinarily accompanied by a conscious experience of familiarity, and sometimes by conscious memory of the prior encounter itself (Gabrieli 1998).One interesting idea that has been explored in some detail is that recognition memory decisions based on familiarity might also benefit from priming. Priming refers to an improved ability to produce or identify an item on the basis of a recent encounter with the same item or a related item, but without a requirement that there be conscious knowledge of the prior encounter (Tulving and Schacter 1990; Schacter and Buckner 1998). In early studies, it was suggested that previously encountered items might be processed more fluently (e.g., with greater speed and with more ease), and that improved fluency might influence familiarity judgments. Specifically, items perceived with greater fluency might tend to be identified as familiar (Mandler 1980; Jacoby and Dallas 1981; Johnston et al. 1991).This idea encountered difficulty when it was found that severely amnesic patients can perform at chance on conventional recognition tests despite exhibiting intact perceptual priming (Hamann and Squire 1997; Stark and Squire 2000). If fluency facilitates recognition, severely amnesic patients who exhibit intact perceptual priming should perform better than chance on recognition memory tests. Thus, it has seemed that the perceptual fluency that mediates priming does not also support familiarity-based recognition judgments, at least not to a measurable degree. Indeed, the contribution of perceptual fluency appears to be too weak to drive recognition performance noticeably above chance (Conroy et al. 2005).Nonetheless, it remains possible that conditions might be found under which recognition decisions can benefit from perceptual fluency, and in this way be linked to nondeclarative memory. Two recent studies (Voss et al. 2008; Voss and Paller 2009) described conditions under which recognition memory appeared to be significantly driven by nondeclarative memory. Participants studied difficult-to-verbalize images (Fig. 1) with either full attention or divided attention. At test, each image was paired with a highly similar new image, and participants made a speeded forced-choice decision. The striking finding was that, under these conditions, accurate recognition memory performance occurred, but without the awareness that ordinarily accompanies successful recognition. Specifically (and paradoxically), performance was better under divided-attention conditions (which ordinarily degrade memory performance) than under full-attention conditions (Fig. 2A). Furthermore, in one study (Voss et al. 2008), recognition was better when participants reported that they were guessing than when they reported conscious memory of the images (combined high- and low-confidence trials) (Fig. 2B). Notably, this phenomenon occurred only when the test was given in a forced-choice format, and not in a yes/no format. The other study (Voss and Paller 2009) reported a similar advantage for guessing in the divided-attention condition. These two reports appear to demonstrate recognition without awareness and a significant contribution of nondeclarative memory to recognition performance.Open in a separate windowFigure 1.In the full-attention condition, participants studied 14 images for 2 sec each (1.5-sec intertrial interval). Alternatively, in the divided-attention condition, participants studied the images while deciding whether a digit heard during the previous trial was odd or even. The forced-choice recognition test probed memory for the middle 10 images presented in the study sequence. Each studied item was presented together with a highly similar new item, and participants selected the old item by responding “left” or “right.” After each response, participants indicated how confident they were in their recognition decision (G, guess; L, low confidence; H, high confidence).Open in a separate windowFigure 2.Data from Experiment 2 in Voss et al. (2008), estimated from their Figure 2. (A) When recognition was probed using a forced-choice format, performance was more accurate in the divided-attention condition than in the full-attention condition. (B) In both conditions, forced-choice recognition was more accurate in trials where participants indicated that their recognition decision was a guess (G) than in trials where participants indicated low or high confidence (L/H) in their decision. Asterisks indicate performance significantly above chance (P < 0.05). Error bars indicate SEM.These findings challenge the conventional view that recognition memory is more effective when full attention is given to a task than when attention is divided (Anderson 1980), that recognition memory is associated with a conscious experience of familiarity (Gabrieli 1998), and that recognition memory accuracy is positively correlated with ratings of confidence (Reed et al. 1997; Mickes et al. 2007). Because the reported findings are exceptional, we explored the phenomenon further in three separate experiments in an attempt to replicate it and identify its boundary conditions. We adopted the same paradigm as was used in the original study (Voss et al. 2008).     

Perception without awareness: further evidence from a Stroop priming task

In the present research, we examined the influence of prime-target stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) on Stroop-priming effects from masked words. Participants indicated the color of a central target, which was preceded by a 33-msec prime word followed either immediately or after a variable delay by a pattern mask. The prime word was incongruent or congruent with the target color on 75% and 25% of the trials, respectively. The words followed by an immediate mask produced reliable Stroop interference at SOAs of 300 and 400 msec but not at SOAs of 500 and 700 msec. The words followed by a delayed mask produced a reversed (i.e., facilitatory) Stroop effect, which reached significance at an SOA of 400 msec or longer, but never at the shorter 300-msec SOA. Such an differential time course of both types of Stroop priming effects provides further evidence for the existence of qualitative differences between conscious and nonconscious perceptual processes.     

Relational learning with and without awareness: Transitive inference using nonverbal stimuli in humans

Learning complex relationships among items and representing them flexibly have been shown to be highly similar in function and structure to conscious forms of learning. However, it is unclear whether conscious learning is essential for the exhibition of flexibility in learning. Successful performance on the transitive inference task requires representational flexibility. Participants learned four overlapping premise pairs (A > B, B > C, C > D, D > E) that could be encoded separately or as a sequential hierarchy (A > B > C > D > E). Some participants (informed) were told prior to training that the task required an inference made from premise pairs. Other participants (uninformed) were told simply that they were to learn a series of pairs by trial and error. Testing consisted of unreinforced trials that included the non-adjacent pair, B versus D, to assess capacity for transitive inference. Not surprisingly, those in the informed condition outperformed those in the uninformed condition. After completion of training and testing, uninformed participants were given a postexperimental questionnaire to assess awareness of the task structure. In contrast with expectations, successful performance on the transitive inference task for uninformed participants does not depend on or correlate with postexperimental awareness. The present results suggest that relational learning tasks do not necessarily require conscious processes.     

Perception without awareness in a dichoptic viewing situation

One way of investigating perception without awareness is to utilize the phenomenon of binocular rivalry. The dichoptic viewing situation can be so arranged that a stimulus may be above identification level (when presented alone) but masked by contiguous stimulation, i.e. a brighter image to the other eye. This experimental situation was used to replicate an experiment of Smith et al. (1959) which claimed to demonstrate that differences in meaning between words registered below recognition threshold could affect associated conscious thoughts. In the two experiments reported here, a neutral face was paired with affect words presented subliminally and subjects were asked to rate its expression using a forced-choice indicator. Additional controls to those of Smith et al. were used. In Expt. I it was established that words presented outside of awareness had an effect on semantically related judgements, which was at least as great as that with the same words presented supraliminally. In Expt. II this was confirmed and it was found that increasing the similarity of contour between critical and control words of different meaning suggested differences between subliminal and supraliminal sessions. Responses tended to be meaning-related in the former and structure-related in the latter. It was suggested that the experiments have relevance to current theories of selective attention.     

Self-monitoring at work: a motive-based perspective

It is argued that the recent study of personality in industrial and organizational (I-O) psychology is characterized by two limitations: (a) almost complete reliance on the Big Five to the exclusion of other personality variables (most notably, self-monitoring) and (b) insufficient theoretical attention paid to the criteria in work-related personality research. In an attempt to overcome both of these limitations, we review theoretical and empirical evidence for the relevance of self-monitoring in organizational life, with particular attention paid to the criteria grounded in socioanalytic theory of getting along, getting ahead, and making sense. Extant research indicates that high self-monitors are particularly good at getting along (e.g., meeting others' social expectations) and getting ahead (e.g., job performance and leadership emergence), but the evidence is more mixed with regard to making sense. We conclude with a discussion of practical concerns in considering the use of self-monitoring for managerial selection and a research agenda for the future to further elaborate a theory of self-monitoring at work.     

Positive affect as implicit motivator: on the nonconscious operation of behavioral goals

Recent research has revealed that nonconscious activation of desired behavioral states--or behavioral goals--promotes motivational activity to accomplish these states. Six studies demonstrate that this nonconscious operation of behavioral goals emerges if mental representations of specific behavioral states are associated with positive affect. In an evaluative-conditioning paradigm, unobtrusive linking of behavioral states to positive, as compared with neutral or negative, affect increased participants' wanting to accomplish these states. Furthermore, participants worked harder on tasks that were instrumental in attaining behavioral states when these states were implicitly linked to positive affect, thereby mimicking the effects on motivational behavior of preexisting individual wanting and explicit goal instructions to attain the states. Together, these results suggest that positive affect plays a key role in nonconscious goal pursuit. Implications for behavior-priming research are discussed.     

Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology

Four basic approaches that have been used to demonstrate perception without awareness are described. Each approach reflects one of two types of experimental logic and one of two possible methods for controlling awareness. The experimental logic has been either to demonstrate a dissociation between a measure of perception with awareness and a measure that is sensitive to perception without awareness or to demonstrate a qualitative difference between the consequences of perception with and without awareness. Awareness has been controlled either by manipulating the stimulus conditions or by instructing observers on how to distribute their attention. The experimental findings based on all four approaches lead to the same conclusion; namely, stimuli are perceived even when observers are unaware of the stimuli. This conclusion is supported by results of studies in which awareness has been assessed with either objective measures of forced-choice discriminations or measures based on verbalizations of subjective conscious experiences. Given this solid empirical support for the concept of perception without awareness, a direction for future research studies is to assess the functions of information perceived without awareness in determining what is perceived with awareness. The available evidence suggests that information perceived without awareness both biases what stimuli are perceived with awareness and influences how stimuli perceived with awareness are consciously experienced.     

The honest mirror: Morality as a moderator of spontaneous behavioral mimicry

Two studies examined whether morality-related information has a greater impact than sociability- or competence-related information upon the spontaneous mimicry of an interaction partner. Participants were video recorded during an interaction with a confederate previously presented as moral versus lacking morality, or sociable versus lacking sociability (Study 1), or competent versus lacking competence (Study 2). Two coders rated the extent to which participants imitated the gestures of the confederate, participants’ postural openness, and the general smoothness of the interaction. When the confederate lacked moral qualities, mimicry and postural openness were lower, and the interaction was less smooth than when the confederate was highly moral, unsociable, or incompetent. Moreover, our findings showed that global impression is the key mediating mechanism driving such an effect. Indeed, knowing that another person behaved immorally resulted in a negative impression, which in turn hindered behavioral mimicry.     

Attention capture without awareness in a non-spatial selection task

Distractors presented prior to a critical target in a rapid sequence of visually-presented items induce a lag-dependent deficit in target identification, particularly when the distractor shares a task-relevant feature of the target. Presumably, such capture of central attention is important for bringing a target into awareness. The results of the present investigation suggest that greater capture of attention by a distractor is not accompanied by greater awareness of it. Moreover, awareness tends to be limited to superficial characteristics of the target such as colour. The findings are interpreted within the context of a model that assumes sudden increases in arousal trigger selection of information for consolidation in working memory. In this conceptualization, prolonged analysis of distractor items sharing task-relevant features leads to larger target identification deficits (i.e., greater capture) but no increase in awareness.     

Contingency learning without awareness: evidence for implicit control

The results of four experiments provide evidence for controlled processing in the absence of awareness. Participants identified the colour of a neutral distracter word. Each of four words (e.g., MOVE) was presented in one of the four colours 75% of the time (Experiments 1 and 4) or 50% of the time (Experiments 2 and 3). Colour identification was faster when the words appeared in the colour they were most often presented in relative to when they appeared in another colour, even for participants who were subjectively unaware of any contingencies between the words and the colours. An analysis of sequence effects showed that participants who were unaware of the relation between distracter words and colours nonetheless controlled the impact of the word on performance depending on the nature of the previous trial. A block analysis of contingency-unaware participants revealed that contingencies were learned rapidly in the first block of trials. Experiment 3 showed that the contingency effect does not depend on the level of awareness, thus ruling out explicit strategy accounts. Finally, Experiment 4 showed that the contingency effect results from behavioural control and not from semantic association or stimulus familiarity. These results thus provide evidence for implicit control.     

Taking a closer look: On the operation of nonconscious impression formation

In this article, we analyzed the information processing that underlies nonconscious impression formation. In the first experiment, the nonconscious activation of the impression formation goal led to a faster analysis of the trait implications of behaviors, compared with a control group. In Experiment 2, participants who were nonconsciously primed with an impression formation goal were more likely than those in a control condition to form associations in memory between behaviors and implied traits. In Experiment 3, nonconsciously primed participants were more sensitive than those in a control condition to whether inconsistent trait information was relevant or irrelevant to the actor’s disposition. Moreover, in Experiments 2 and 3, those with a nonconscious goal showed just as much evidence of impression formation as those who were consciously and intentionally trying to form an impression. Implications for nonconscious goal-pursuit and impression formation are discussed.     

Semantic priming without awareness: Some methodological considerations and replications

Previous studies of subliminal semantic priming effects are considered. The distinction between subjective and objective detection thresholds proposed by Cheesman and Merikle (1984) is accepted, and it is concluded that no convincing evidence has been adduced to support or deny the existence of semantic priming effects at or below objective threshold. New criteria for the assessment of objective thresholds are proposed, and four experiments are reported in each of which pattern-masked primes were presented 10% below objective threshold. The first three experiments presented primes, mask, and targets binocularly; the fourth used dichoptic presentation. Data were analysed using both conventional F ratios and the quasi F ratio advocated by Clark (1973). Results showed that significant subliminal semantic priming effects occurred in each experiment when conventional F ratios were used, and significant effects occurred in all but the first experiment when quasi F was used. Binocular and dichoptic presentation of stimuli gave semantic priming effects whose magnitudes did not differ significantly. It is concluded that semantic priming effects can be obtained below objective detection threshold. It is also concluded that replication with different participants and different stimuli is preferable to the use of quasi F ratios in investigations where verbal stimuli are used.