Representation of the numerosities 1-9 by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Three rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) were trained to respond to exemplars of 1, 2, 3, and 4 in an ascending, descending, or a nonmonotonic numerical order (1-->2-->3-->4, 4-->3-->2--1, 3-->1-->4-->2). The monkeys were then tested on their ability to order pairs of the novel numerosities 5-9. In Experiment 1, all 3 monkeys ordered novel exemplars of the numerosities 1-4 in ascending or descending order. The attempt to train a nonmonotonic order (3-->1-->4-->2) failed. In Experiment 2A, the 2 monkeys who learned the ascending numerical rule ordered pairs of the novel numerosities 5-9 on unreinforced trials. The monkey who learned the descending numerical rule failed to extrapolate the descending rule to new numerosities. In Experiment 2B all 3 monkeys ordered novel exemplars of pairs of the numerosities 5-9. Accuracy and latency of responding revealed distance and magnitude effects analogous to previous findings with human participants (R. S. Moyer & T. K. Landaeur, 1967). Collectively these studies show that monkeys represent the numerosities 1-9 on at least an ordinal scale.     

Identity concept learning in matching-to-sample tasks by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

The abstract concept of equivalence is considered one of the bases of higher-order cognition, and it has been the subject of considerable research in comparative cognition. This study examined the conditions under which tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) are able to acquire an identity concept. Six capuchin monkeys were trained to solve a visual matching-to-sample (MTS) task on the basis of perceptual identity. The acquisition of the identity rule was inferred from the subject’s ability to solve transfer tests with novel stimuli. We evaluated the ability of the capuchin monkeys to match the shape of novel stimuli after training with both several small stimulus sets (Experiment 1) and a large stimulus set (Experiment 2). Moreover, we examined the ability of capuchins to transfer the concept to novel visual dimensions, such as colour and size and to transfer to novel spatial arrangements of the stimuli (Experiment 2). We demonstrated that the ability of capuchins to match novel stimuli was improved by increasing the number of stimuli used during training (Experiments 1 and 2) and that after a widely applicable identity concept based on the stimulus shape was acquired, the capuchins were able to match stimuli according to an identity rule based on both the colour and size of the stimuli and when the spatial arrangement of the stimuli was varied (Experiment 2). This study is the first to demonstrate that the size of the training set affects the acquisition of an abstract identity concept in an MTS task in non-human primates.     

Socially learned preferences for differentially rewarded tokens in the brown capuchin monkey (Cebus apella)

Social learning is assumed to underlie traditions, yet evidence indicating social learning in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), which exhibit traditions, is sparse. The authors tested capuchins for their ability to learn the value of novel tokens using a previously familiar token-exchange economy. Capuchins change their preferences in favor of a token worth a high-value food reward after watching a conspecific model exchange 2 differentially rewarded tokens, yet they fail to develop a similar preference after watching tokens paired with foods in the absence of a conspecific model. They also fail to learn that the value of familiar tokens has changed. Information about token value is available in all situations, but capuchins seem to pay more attention in a social situation involving novel tokens.     

Rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) spontaneously generalize to novel quantities in a reverse-reward contingency task

Abstracting generalities from concrete experience allows the application of acquired knowledge to novel situations, a hallmark of primate cognition. Abstraction may also enable some animals to overcome prepotent biases, by allowing them to treat prepotent stimuli and responses more flexibly. The aim of the current study was to determine whether rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) could generalize successful performance on an executive control task with one training exemplar to novel exemplars. Three monkeys learned a reverse-reward task in which they chose between one and four food items. They had to select the smaller quantity to receive the larger one, and so had to inhibit the prepotent selection of the larger quantity. After they learned the task, a transfer test assessed whether they had learned only about the quantities experienced or whether they could generalize to novel quantities. All three rhesus monkeys spontaneously generalized to novel quantities, showing that this species has the ability to generalize significantly beyond the immediate perceptual experience and use this ability to control lower-level, prepotent responses.     

Intuitive probabilistic inference in capuchin monkeys

The ability to reason about probabilities has ecological relevance for many species. Recent research has shown that both preverbal infants and non-human great apes can make predictions about single-item samples randomly drawn from populations by reasoning about proportions. To further explore the evolutionary origins of this ability, we conducted the first investigation of probabilistic inference in a monkey species (capuchins; Sapajus spp.). Across four experiments, capuchins (N = 19) were presented with two populations of food items that differed in their relative distribution of preferred and non-preferred items, such that one population was more likely to yield a preferred item. In each trial, capuchins had to select between hidden single-item samples randomly drawn from each population. In Experiment 1 each population was homogeneous so reasoning about proportions was not required; Experiments 2–3 replicated previous probabilistic reasoning research with infants and apes; and Experiment 4 was a novel condition untested in other species, providing an important extension to previous work. Results revealed that at least some capuchins were able to make probabilistic inferences via reasoning about proportions as opposed to simpler quantity heuristics. Performance was relatively poor in Experiment 4, so the possibility remains that capuchins may use quantity-based heuristics in some situations, though further work is required to confirm this. Interestingly, performance was not at ceiling in Experiment 1, which did not involve reasoning about proportions, but did involve sampling. This suggests that the sampling task posed demands in addition to reasoning about proportions, possibly related to inhibitory control, working memory, and/or knowledge of object permanence.     

Ordinal-list integration for symbolic, arbitrary, and analog stimuli by rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta)

Two numeral-trained monkeys learned to produce 3 5-item lists of Arabic numerals, colors, and arbitrary signs in the correct sequence. The monkeys then responded at above-chance levels when the authors tested them with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of items from different lists, indicating their use of ordinal-position information. The authors also tested the monkeys with nonrewarded pair-wise comparisons of an analog quantity and an item from 1 of the 3 learned lists. Although the monkeys were not trained to serially order analog quantities, 1 monkey correctly integrated the analog quantities with the lists of numerals, colors, and signs. The consistent use of an ordinal rule, despite different types of training and varying degrees of experience with the 4 types of stimuli, suggested that the monkey had a robust concept of ordinality.     

Are monkeys aesthetists? Rensch (1957) revisited

Three experiments assessed whether capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) prefer regular and symmetrical visual patterns. Pictorial representations of faces were included in 1 stimulus set. When the monkeys could pick up and manipulate small cards bearing the stimuli, all preferences expressed by capuchins and most of those expressed by squirrel monkeys were for regular stimuli. Symmetry of the patterns was influential but not essential. Some preferences were also found for faces. When images of the patterns were presented on a touch screen, capuchins continued to express preferences especially for regular and symmetrical stimuli, but they showed some avoidance of faces. Squirrel monkeys responded less discriminatingly to the touch screen stimuli. The findings provide support for B. Rensch's (1957) claim that monkeys prefer visual stimuli that humans find aesthetically pleasing.     

Evaluation of third-party reciprocity by squirrel monkeys (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Saimiri sciureus</Emphasis>) and the question of mechanisms

Social evaluation during third-party interactions emerges early in human ontogeny, and it has been shown in adult capuchin monkeys who witness violations of reciprocity in object exchanges: Monkeys were less inclined to accept food from humans who refused to reciprocate with another human. A recent study reporting similar evidence in marmoset monkeys raised the possibility that such evaluations might be based on species’ inherent cooperativeness. We tested a species not renowned for cooperativeness—squirrel monkeys—using the procedure used with marmosets and found a similar result. This finding rules out any crucial role for cooperative tendencies in monkeys’ responses to unfair exchanges. We then tested squirrel monkeys using procedures more similar to those used in the original study with capuchins. Squirrel monkeys again accepted food less frequently from non-reciprocators, but unlike capuchins, they also strongly preferred reciprocators. We conclude that neither squirrel monkeys nor marmoset monkeys engaged in emotional bookkeeping of the type that probably underlies social evaluation in capuchin monkeys; instead, they employed one or more simple behavioral rules. Further comparative studies are required to clarify the mechanisms underlying social evaluation processes across species.     

How capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) quantify objects and substances

Humans and nonhuman animals appear to share a capacity for nonverbal quantity representations. But what are the limits of these abilities? Results of previous research with human infants suggest that the ontological status of an entity as an object or a substance affects infants' ability to quantify it. We ask whether the same is true for another primate species-the New World monkey Cebus apella. We tested capuchin monkeys' ability to select the greater of two quantities of either discrete objects or a nonsolid substance. Participants performed above chance with both objects (Experiment 1) and substances (Experiment 2); in both cases, the observed performance was ratio dependent. This finding suggests that capuchins quantify objects and substances similarly and do so via analog magnitude representations.     

Precocious quantitative cognition in monkeys

Basic quantitative abilities are thought to have an innate basis in humans partly because the ability to discriminate quantities emerges early in child development. If humans and nonhuman primates share this developmentally primitive foundation of quantitative reasoning, then this ability should be present early in development across species and should emerge earlier in monkeys than in humans because monkeys mature faster than humans. We report that monkeys spontaneously make accurate quantity choices by 1 year of age in a task that human children begin to perform only at 2.5 to 3 years of age. Additionally, we report that the quantitative sensitivity of infant monkeys is equal to that of the adult animals in their group and that rates of learning do not differ between infant and adult animals. This novel evidence of precocious quantitative reasoning in infant monkeys suggests that human quantitative reasoning shares its early developing foundation with other primates. The data further suggest that early developing components of primate quantitative reasoning are constrained by maturational factors related to genetic development as opposed to learning experience alone.     

Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) choose smaller food arrays: long-term retention, choice with nonpreferred food, and transposition

Squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that had learned to reach toward 1 piece of food instead of 4 in a reverse-reward contingency were tested after an 8-month delay with no intervening relevant experiences. All monkeys except 1 continued to show inhibitory control by reliably reaching toward the smaller quantity, most of them doing so within 2 sessions. Performance was maintained when a low-preference food replaced prized foods as arrays and rewards. When the quantities 1 and 4 were replaced with different ones, there was strong evidence of transposition at group level, although individual differences in bias toward the smaller quantities became apparent. Individual differences in mastering the original task more than 8 months previously were quite stable, suggesting robustness in the operations required for this form of self-control.     

Inferences about the location of food in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) in two sensory modalities

The authors tested the ability of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) to make inferences about hidden food. In Experiment 1, we showed the content of 2 boxes, 1 of which was baited (visual condition, VC) or we shook both boxes producing noise from the baited box (auditory condition, AC). Seven subjects (out of 8) were above chance in the VC, whereas only 1 was above chance in AC. During treatment, by manipulating empty and filled objects subjects experienced the relation between noise and content. When tested again, 7 capuchins were above chance in the VC and 3 in AC. In Experiment 2, we gave visual or auditory information only about the empty box and, consequently, successful choice implied inferential reasoning. All subjects (out of 4) were above chance in the VC, and 2 in the AC. Control tests ruled out the possibility that success resulted from simply avoiding the shaken noiseless box, or from the use of arbitrary auditory information. Similar to apes (Call, 2004), capuchins were capable of inferential reasoning.     

Quantity-based judgments in the domestic dog (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Canis lupus familiaris</Emphasis>)

We examined the ability of domestic dogs to choose the larger versus smaller quantity of food in two experiments. In experiment 1, we investigated the ability of 29 dogs (results from 18 dogs were used in the data analysis) to discriminate between two quantities of food presented in eight different combinations. Choices were simultaneously presented and visually available at the time of choice. Overall, subjects chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity, but they found numerically close comparisons more difficult. In experiment 2, we tested two dogs from experiment 1 under three conditions. In condition 1, we used similar methods from experiment 1 and tested the dogs multiple times on the eight combinations from experiment 1 plus one additional combination. In conditions 2 and 3, the food was visually unavailable to the subjects at the time of choice, but in condition 2, food choices were viewed simultaneously before being made visually unavailable, and in condition 3, they were viewed successively. In these last two conditions, and especially in condition 3, the dogs had to keep track of quantities mentally in order to choose optimally. Subjects still chose the larger quantity more often than the smaller quantity when the food was not simultaneously visible at the time of choice. Olfactory cues and inadvertent cuing by the experimenter were excluded as mechanisms for choosing larger quantities. The results suggest that, like apes tested on similar tasks, some dogs can form internal representations and make mental comparisons of quantity.     

Ability of chimpanzees to respond to symbols of quantity in comparison with that of children and of monkeys

Four chimpanzees, 4 rhesus monkeys, and 11 children aged 4-9 yr were assessed under comparable conditions for their ability to make use of colors as symbols of quantity. One particular color represented the quantifier "all"; another represented "some"; another represented "one"; a fourth represented "none." These arbitrarily chosen colors retained their individual meanings when the test conditions were varied on three occasions. The ability of the subjects to continue responding appropriately to the colors immediately after a change of test condition was used as the measure of performance. The apes performed like the monkeys, having especial difficulties relative to the children with the most sensitive quantifier "some."     

Abstract-concept learning and list-memory processing by capuchin and rhesus monkeys

Three capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) touched the lower of 2 pictures (same) or a white rectangle (different), increased same/different abstract-concept learning (52% to 87%) with set-size increases (8 to 128 pictures), and were better than 3 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta). Three other rhesus that touched the top picture before choices learned similar to capuchins but were better at list-memory learning. Both species' serial position functions were similar in shape and changes with retention delays. Other species showed qualitatively similar shape changes but quantitatively different time-course changes. In abstract-concept learning, qualitative similarity was shown by complete concept learning, whereas a quantitative difference would have been a set-size slope difference. Qualitative similarity is discussed in relation to general-process versus modular cognitive accounts.     

Colour versus quantity as cues in reverse-reward-competent squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

To assess the relative salience of colour and quantity cues, squirrel monkeys previously trained to reach for the smaller of two quantities of food in a reverse-reward contingency task received colour discrimination training. After initial failure to discriminate between two colours of dots under a differential reinforcement regime, they learned the task when the S- colour was associated with zero reward. The monkeys then showed good retention on the original reverse-reward task of 1 versus 4 with pairs of dots presented in S+ or S- colours. However, on "mismatch" trials of 1S- versus 4S+ , only 2 of 4 monkeys tested showed a preference--1 monkey chose based on quantity, the other based on colour. Individual differences and the possible roles of overshadowing and blocking are discussed.     

Colour versus quantity as cues in reverse-reward-competent squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus)

To assess the relative salience of colour and quantity cues, squirrel monkeys previously trained to reach for the smaller of two quantities of food in a reverse-reward contingency task received colour discrimination training. After initial failure to discriminate between two colours of dots under a differential reinforcement regime, they learned the task when the S? colour was associated with zero reward. The monkeys then showed good retention on the original reverse-reward task of 1 versus 4 with pairs of dots presented in S + or S? colours. However, on “mismatch” trials of 1S? versus 4S + , only 2 of 4 monkeys tested showed a preference—1 monkey chose based on quantity, the other based on colour. Individual differences and the possible roles of overshadowing and blocking are discussed.     

恒河猴对50以下数目的估计

本研究有６个从易到难的程序,每个程序有标准数目和比较数目,都是白卡片上的黑圆点。每次试验先呈现标准数目作为样本,强化后撤去,随后同时呈现标准数目和比较数目,令动物作二择一反应。实验结果表明,影响恒河猴数目估计的有两个主要因素,即标准数目和比较数目之间的数间距和这两个数目本身的大小。在数间距为４或大于４时,恒河猴能对５０以下的数作出估计;在数间距为２时,恒河猴能对９－２５的数作出估计,但不能对２７－４９的数作估计。作者以为,这里所进行的是一种相对的区域性的数目估计,但它仍然是一种数标签的过程。     

Categorization of above and below spatial relations by tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Using a matching-to-sample procedure, the researchers investigated tufted capuchins' (Cebus apella) ability to form categorical representations of above and below spatial relations. In Experiment 1, 5 capuchins correctly matched bar-dot stimuli on the basis of the relative above and below location of their constituent elements. The monkeys showed a positive transfer of performance both when the bar-dot distance in the two comparison stimuli differed from that of the sample and when the actual location of the matching stimulus and the nonmatching stimulus on the apparatus was modified. In Experiment 2, the researchers systematically changed the shapes of the located object (the dot) or the reference object (the horizontal bar). These manipulations did not affect the monkeys' performance. Overall, the data suggest that capuchins can form abstract, conceptual-like representations for above and below spatial relations.     

Social influences on the acquisition of tool-using behaviors in tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

To identify behaviors related to acquisition of tool-use in tufted capuchins (Cebus apella), we presented two tool-using tasks to two groups, extending findings by Westergaard and Fragaszy (1987) and Visalberghi (in press). Five Ss learned to use the tools in each task. The primary predictor of success was level of interest in the task. Observation of others at the apparatus did not facilitate exploratory behaviors or contact with the tools in the observers. Most animals performed exploratory behaviors more often when they were at the apparatus alone than when with another, whether or not the other was using a tool. Observers were quick to learn the relationship between another's activities and the appearance of food. We conclude that capuchins do not readily learn about instrumental relations by observation of others or imitate other's acts. Imitation probably plays no role in the spread of novel instrumental behaviors among monkeys.