What is Apple-Psych?

Apple Psych, a system of software subroutines written in Apple Pascal and 6502 assembly language, was designed to run real-time psychological experiments on the Apple II, II+, and IIe microcomputers. This paper describes the minimum system requirements necessary to run Apple-Psych, the capabilities of the basic system, and the advantages and disadvantages of using Apple-Psych. Because the utility of a system to a researcher is often linked to its flexibility and expandability, this paper includes a brief discussion of hardware expansions already supported by the Apple Psych software and hardware expansions that would require additional software support.     

What is Sound?

Our standard view about sound is incoherent. On the one hand, we suppose that sound is a quality, not of the object that makes the sound, but of the surrounding medium. This is the supposition of our ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. On the other hand, we suppose that sound is the object of hearing. This too is the assumption of ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. Yet these two assumptions cannot both be right – not unless we wish to concede that hearing is illusory and that we do not listen to the objects that make sounds. To avoid these consequences we must recognize and repair the inconsistencies contained in our standard view of what sound is. I offer an account that describes sound as a quality belonging, not to the medium, but to the object that makes the sound.
email : pasnau@sju.edu     

What is psychoanalysis?

Although we are now less inclined to argue about whose treatment is entitled to be called psychoanalysis, we will understand current debates better if we revisualize what originally made psychoanalysis different from other treatments. At its birth, psychoanalysis twisted the common-sense treatments it grew out of into very peculiar shapes. In reaction to that extreme peculiarity, a process of normalizing began almost immediately and continues to this day. This process is illustrated by tracing the rise and fall of peculiarities in four aspects: medical procedure, the analyst's vision, the analyst's role, and the sense of time.     

What is Presentism?

Different versions of the A‐theory of time (according to which some instant of time is absolutely, objectively present) are traditionally defined in terms of whether everything is present, or whether there are also past and future things. In this paper I argue that the traditional way of defining A‐theories should be abandoned. I focus on the traditional definition of presentism, according to which always, everything is present (§2). First, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all the most plausible interpretations of the predicate ‘is present’ as it appears in the traditional definition of presentism (§3). It follows that there are also good reasons to reject the most plausible interpretations of the traditional definitions of the other A‐theories. I then argue that there is a better way of defining the A‐theories, in terms of the question of whether existence has a beginning and an end (§4). Finally, I argue that what goes for the traditional definition of presentism goes for the traditional definition of its modal analogue actualism, according to which necessarily, everything is actual (§5): there are good reasons to reject the traditional definition of actualism in favour of a definition in terms of contingent existence.     

What is Testimony?

C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p . I offer examples to show that Coady's conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant or directed to someone in need of evidence. I give alternative conditions. Coady was led into the stronger conditions by investigating testimony as it occurs in legal contexts, where special steps are taken to ensure that testimony provides the jury or the judge with evidence by a competent speaker that is relevant to the disputed question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.     

What is Antiphilosophy?

In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse on noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it.     

What is hope?

According to the standard account, to hope for an outcome is to desire it and to believe that its realization is possible, though not inevitable. This account, however, faces certain difficulties: It cannot explain how people can display differing strengths in hope; it cannot distinguish hope from despair; and it cannot explain substantial hopes. This paper proposes an account of hope that can meet these deficiencies. Briefly, it argues that in addition to possessing the relevant belief–desire structure as allowed in the standard account, a hopeful person must also be able to see a way in which the desired outcome can come about and to see such a way to the outcome as a genuine possibility.     

What is Said?

It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so‐called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.     

What is Stability?

Although stability is a central notion in several academic disciplines, the parallelsremain unexplored since previous discussions of the concept have been almostexclusively subject-specific. In the literature we have found three basic conceptsof stability, that we call constancy, robustness, and resilience. They are all foundin both the natural and the social sciences. To analyze the three concepts we introducea general formal framework in which stability relates to transitions between states. Itcan then be shown that robustness is a limiting case of resilience, whereas neitherconstancy nor resilience can be defined in terms of the other. Hence, there are twobasic concepts of stability, both of which are used in both the social and the naturalsciences. This congruence in the concepts of stability is of particular interest forendeavours to construct models that represent both natural and social phenomena.     

What is Externalism?

The content of the externalist thesis about the mind depends crucially on how we define the distinction between the internal and the external. According to the usual understanding, the boundary between the internal and the external is the skull or the skin of the subject. In this paper I argue that the usual understanding is inadequate, and that only the new understanding of the external/internal distinction I suggest helps us to understand the issue of the compatibility of externalism and privileged access.     

What is computation?

To compute is to execute an algorithm. More precisely, to say that a device or organ computes is to say that there exists a modelling relationship of a certain kind between it and a formal specification of an algorithm and supporting architecture. The key issue is to delimit the phrase of a certain kind. I call this the problem of distinguishing between standard and nonstandard models of computation. The successful drawing of this distinction guards Turing's 1936 analysis of computation against a difficulty that has persistently been raised against it, and undercuts various objections that have been made to the computational theory of mind.