The Ethical Foundations of Behavior Therapy

In this article, I am concerned with the ethical foundations of behavior therapy, that is, with the normative ethics and the meta-ethics underlying behavior therapy. In particular, I am concerned with questions concerning the very possibility of providing an ethical justification for things done in the context of therapy. Because behavior therapists must be able to provide an ethical justification for various actions (if the need arises), certain meta-ethical views widely accepted by behavior therapists must be abandoned: in particular, one must give up ethical subjectivism, ethical skepticism, and ethical relativism. An additional task is to show how it is possible to provide a nonsubjective, nonskeptical, and nonrelativistic moral justification for an ethical statement. Although this is a monumental task, I provide a rough sketch of such a model, one that is congenial to the value judgments underlying behavior therapy.     

Placement of responsibility and moral reasoning in couple therapy

Within the past two decades there has been a growing awareness of the importance of moral and ethical judgements in family and couple therapy. In this article we provide a detailed analysis of placements of responsibility related to blame in one couple therapy session. We suggest that it is important to study therapeutic interaction in situ , when searching for an understanding of moral reasoning in couple therapy and an ethical evaluation of the practice. A detailed analysis of discursive tools used by clients and therapists makes it possible to look at moral reasoning in action as it unfolds within the flow of therapeutic conversation. The findings are discussed in relation to two discourses of moral justification: autonomy and relationality. The principle guiding the therapists' actions in the studied conversation could be called 'relational autonomy'.     

Personal Identity, Autonomy and Advance Statements

abstract    Recent legal rulings concerning the status of advance statements have raised interest in the topic but failed to provide any definitive general guidelines for their enforcement. I examine arguments used to justify the moral authority of such statements. The fundamental ethical issue I am concerned with is how accounts of personal identity underpin our account of moral authority through the connection between personal identity and autonomy. I focus on how recent Animalist accounts of personal identity initially appear to provide a sound basis for extending the moral autonomy of an individual — and hence their autonomous wishes expressed through an advance statement — past the point of severe psychological decline. I argue that neither the traditional psychological account nor the more recent Animalist account of personal identity manage to provide a sufficient basis for extending our moral autonomy past the point of incapacity or incompetence. I briefly explore how analogies to similar areas in law designed to facilitate autonomous decision, such as wills and trusts, provide at best only very limited scope for an alternative justification for granting advance statements any legal or moral authority. I conclude that whilst advance statements play a useful role in formulating what treatment is in a patient's best interests, such statements do not ultimately have sufficient moral force to take precedence over paternalistic best interests judgements concerning an individual's care or treatment.     

Counseling in a Complex World: Advancing Relational Well-Being

In a globalized world, people's attempts at living a good life interfere with one another in complex ways. In particular, tension and conflict are inevitable. This confronts counselors/therapists with the ethical question of how to take into account (global) interdependence and relational complexity. In this article, I explore what moral visions—assumptions of what a person is and should be—help counselors shift their focus from individual to relational well-being. First, I examine the moral vision of narrative therapy, as an alternative to more traditional, individualistic moral visions. Then, I construct a moral vision of relational being, based on the relational being perspective of Kenneth Gergen. This vision represents an ethical stance that may, using work by philosopher Judith Butler, be understood as an ethic of recognition and nonviolence. Finally, implications of the moral vision of relational being for counseling/therapeutic practice are explored.     

The Universal Declaration’s Problematic Rights Justification

Abstract

In this paper I aim to critically analyse the underlying moral justification of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth. The aim of the critique is to highlight some of the problematic areas that underpin the Declaration’s rights and in doing so to point to ways that one can begin to rectify the problems with them and the Universal Declaration itself. The paper aims to critically examine the moral justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, which is found in the works of Thomas Berry and his commentators who use the notion of ‘subjectivity’ to justify the existence of such rights. The paper critically examines such a notion and argues that it is not strong enough to do the work required of it, and that it is too problematic to serve as a justification for the Universal Declaration’s rights, as the ethical framework it provides is too cryptic and indeterminate, and does not provide us with an adequate action- and law-guiding framework upon which to establish the Universal Declaration and its rights.     

It's for your own good: benevolent sexism and women's reactions to protectively justified restrictions

Three studies examined women's reactions to ostensibly protective restrictions. In Study 1, only benevolently sexist women accepted a protectively justified (hypothetical) prohibition against driving on a long trip, but only when imposed by a husband (not a coworker). In Study 2, when women's actual romantic partners opposed their participation in a practicum counseling dangerous men, most reacted positively to a personalized protective justification ("I am concerned for your safety"), but only benevolently sexist women reacted positively when no justification was given. In Study 3, only benevolently sexist women accepted an explicitly group-based protective justification ("It is not safe for any woman") for a partner's imagined opposition to an internship that involved interviewing criminals. By fusing benevolence with dominance, protective paternalism can lead women (especially those who are high on benevolent sexism) to accept restrictions.     

Libertarianism,Climate Change,and Individual Responsibility

Much has been written about climate change from an ethical view in general, but less has been written about it from a libertarian point of view in particular. In this paper, I apply the libertarian moral theory to the problem of climate change. I focus on libertarianism’s implications for our individual emissions. I argue that (i) even if our individual emissions cause no harm to others, these emissions cross other people’s boundaries, (ii) although the boundary-crossings that are due to our ‘subsistence emissions’ are implicitly consented to by others, there is no such consent to our ‘non-subsistence emissions’, and (iii) there is no independent justification for these emissions. Although offsetting would provide such a justification, most emitters do not offset their non-subsistence emissions. Therefore, these emissions violate people’s rights, which means that they are impermissible according to libertarianism’s non-aggression principle.

     

Analogical Reasoning in Ethics

In this article I am concerned with analogical reasoning in ethics. There is no doubt that the use of analogy can be a powerful tool in our ethical reasoning. The importance of this mode of reasoning is therefore commonly accepted, but there is considerable debate concerning how its structure should be understood and how it should be assessed, both logically and epistemically. In this paper, I first explain the basic structure of arguments from analogy in ethics. I then discuss the diversity of analogical arguments that can be found in ethics. I analyse their structure, assess them from a logical viewpoint, and show how they can be epistemically challenged and defended. The result of this investigation is that, contrary to a commonly held view, analogical reasoning can be a logically valid type of ethical reasoning that can provide reasons for action that are not worse than the reasons provided by any other kind of practical reasoning.     

Using Scaling to Facilitate Ethical Decision-Making in Family Therapy

Ethical decision-making in family therapy is inherently complex, as it requires therapists to balance competing needs of multiple individuals and subsystems. Scaling offers a potential means of helping facilitate such decision-making, by encouraging attendance to the likely impact of various courses of action on individuals and subsystems as related to each of the core ethical principles underlying psychotherapeutic practice. This article explores the potential use of scaling in family therapists’ ethical decision-making through case examples. Benefits and risks of such an approach are reviewed.     

Legal rulings on suicide in India and implications for the right to die

In this paper I am concerned to address the question of voluntary or self‐willed death from two distinct positions—a particular community's socio‐religious practice (viz. Jaina sallekhanā) and as the matter stands in law (penal code, constitution, judicial wisdom, etc.) in India—in the light of the recent move by a bench of its apex court striking down the penal code section proscribing suicide. I also wish to draw out some implications of these deliberations for the beneficence of medical practice and related bio‐ethical ramifications in the Indian context.     

Ethical considerations in the use of nonerotic touch in psychotherapy with children

Although touch frequently occurs in psychotherapy with children, there is little written on the ethical considerations of therapeutic touch. Because physical contact does occur, therapists must consider if, how, and when it is used, for both their clients' safety and their own. In this review, I further develop the issues suggested by Aquino and Lee (2000) in the use of nurturing touch in therapy by considering many types of touch that occur in psychotherapy with children; the possible positive role of touch; clients' perception of touch in therapy; considerations related to the therapist, the child's safety, and any history of abuse in the child's and family's background; and other practical considerations. I list guidelines.     

Responsibility Allocation and Human Rights

How does morality allocate responsibility for what it requires? I am concerned here with one fundamental part of this question, namely, how morality determines responsibility when multiple agents are capable of contributing to or completing a moral task, and special relationships capable of generating duties with respect to the task are non-existent, insufficient as a moral response, or partly indeterminate. On one view, responsibility falls to the agents who can bear it with the least burden. I show why this is initially attractive and mistaken. Instead, I defend an equity-based approach that accommodates the intuitions that both support and trouble the least-cost principle. One upshot is that sometimes we ought prefer a distribution of responsibility that is more expensive and less local than needed to complete the task. I illustrate the practical significance of the argument in terms of the human rights of refugees.     

Fighting like a girl fighting like a guy: gender identity, ideology, and girls at early adolescence

In this chapter we explore the phenomenon of "girls fighting like guys" by listening to adolescent girls' justification for physical fighting with other girls. We argue that physical girlfighting is a particular kind of gendered performance--a performance of identity that expresses, at least in part, an answer to the question, "Who am I?"--that both perpetuates and challenges the usual notions of masculinity and femininity and the differential power associated with these discourses. We present a sociocultural approach to identity that we believe not only holds promise for helping us to understand girl-fighting behavior but also highlights the clear interrelationship between social identity and personal identity. We conclude by highlighting several implications of this analysis for those who work with girls (and boys) in educational and clinical settings.     

Virtue Ethics, Theory, and Warrant

Are there good grounds for thinking that the moral values of action are to be derived from those of character? This ‘virtue ethical’ claim is sometimes thought of as a kind of normative ethical theory; sometimes as form of opposition to any such theory. However, the best case to be made for it supports neither of these claims. Rather, it leads us to a distinctive view in moral epistemology: the view that my warrant for a particular moral judgement derives from my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge. This view seems to confront a regress-problem. For the belief that I am a good moral judge is itself a particular moral judgement. So it seems that, on this view, I need to derive my warrant for believing that I am a good moral judge from my warrant for believing that I am a good judge of moral judges; and so on. I show how this worry can be met, and trace the implications of the resulting view for warranted moral judgement.     

伦理氛围与亲组织非伦理行为:道德辩护的中介效应

与纯粹的私利性非伦理行为不同,亲组织非伦理行为是个体为了组织利益而实施的非伦理行为。探讨了伦理氛围对亲组织非伦理行为的影响以及道德辩护的中介作用。实证研究结果发现,自利型、关怀型伦理氛围分别对亲组织非伦理行为具有正向影响,规则型伦理氛围对亲组织非伦理行为具有负向影响,道德辩护分别在三种伦理氛围与亲组织非伦理行为关系间具有部分中介作用。     

Psychoanalytic Considerations Regarding the Occupational Therapy Setting for Treatment of the Psychotic Patient

Occupational therapists have always been concerned with the treatment of the psychotic patient. Oddly enough, the traditional setting offered to these patients in occupational therapy has not been the object of too much thought or consideration. In order to attain a therapeutic process, the therapeutic setting must be defined furst. The need for such a measure appears essential in therapy with the psychotic patient since his/her own internal structure is impaired. To understand fully the process of the therapy one must take a look at the impact of all dimensions of the setting. This paper discusses the psychodynamic consequences of the setting in occupational therapy in the treatment of psychotic patients.     

Justification and legitimacy in global civil society

As some thinkers have sought in the concept of global civil society an ethically driven site of deliberation and even resistance, so others have criticized global civil society for its lack of legitimacy and representativeness. This article attempts to answer these criticisms – at least in part – by invoking a moral commitment to the value of justification. I argue that the idea of justification, when examined, offers us a particular understanding of legitimacy which would be attainable for global civil society actors. The article begins by setting out the case for concern about the legitimacy of global civil society. I then outline a certain understanding of justification, showing how a commitment to this conception provides both a response to critics of global civil society and an ethical baseline for humane actors within global civil society. I move on to trace the significance of the moral relevance of justification for actors' strategies. Lastly, however, I highlight the difficulty of justification in a diverse world. This is to say that the issues of legitimacy and strategy facing global civil society are only made more tractable, not dissolved, by an appeal to the importance of justification.     

Perceptual Intuitionism

In the recent metaethical literature there has been significant interest in the prospects for what I am denoting ‘Perceptual Intuitionism’: the view that normal ethical agents can and do have non‐inferential justification for first‐order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual experiences, e.g., Cullison 2010, McBrayer 2010, Vayrynen 2008. If true, it promises to constitute an independent a posteriori intuitionist epistemology, providing an alternative to intuitionist accounts which posit a priori intuition and/or emotion as sources of non‐inferentially justified ethical beliefs. As it is formulated, it is plausible that a necessary condition for the view is the truth of Ethical Perception: normal ethical agents can and do have perceptual experiences (at least some of which are veridical) as of the instantiation of ethical properties. In this paper a sophisticated and promising account of Ethical Perception is offered. Extant objections are shown to fail. However, it will be argued that it is far from obvious that the account of Perceptual Intuitionism which emerges constitutes an independent alternative to other intuitionist accounts. This is because we have reason to think that ethical perceptual experience may be epistemically dependent on other epistemic sources, e.g. a priori intuition or emotion.     

Papier Mâché Problems in Epistemology: A Defense of Strong Internalism*

I attempt to persuade the reader that externalism admits of no plausible interpretation. I argue that reliability is a concept with very different contours from epistemic justification, and that attempts to explicate justification in terms of reliability must fail. I address several other forms of externalism, and also mixed forms of justification. I then argue that externalist theories of justification cannot close the gap between mere true belief and knowledge. I suggest that a fourth condition on knowledge is required, regardless of whether justification is internalist or externalist. I argue that with such a fourth condition a strong internalist theory of justification is adequate to the task that remains in making true belief knowledge. Additionally, strong internalism is more satisfying to our intuitions than externalism and mixed forms of justification. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Circularity and epistemic principles: A reply to James Keller

This paper is a reply to James Keller's criticisms of my Foundationalism, Coherentism and the Levels Gambit (Synthese 55, April 1983).Foundationalists have often claimed that, within a foundationalist framework, one can justify beliefs about epistemic principles in a mediate, empirical fashion, while escaping the charge of vicious circularity that is usually thought to afflict such methods of justification. In my original paper I attacked this foundationalist strategy; I argued that once mediate, empirical justification of epistemic principles is allowed, the foundationalist must also allow circular patterns of justification of the sort that he typically criticizes coherentists for espousing. Here I argue that Keller's reply only makes matters worse for the foundationalist. At several points, his reply turns out to be inconsistent either with reliabilism or with the foundationalist strategy he is trying to defend.I am indebted to Professor Keller for helpful correspondence.