Fair equality of opportunity and decent minimums: a reply to Buchanan

Responding to criticism by Allen Buchanan in a Winter 1984 Philosophy and Public Affairs article on "The right to a decent minimum of health care," Daniels defends his thesis that if justice requires protecting equality of opportunity, then health care institutions should be governed by the principle of fair equality of opportunity because impairments of normal functioning, seen as impediments to opportunity, are obviated by good health care. He defines his concept of normal opportunity range, which is relative to certain social considerations, and shows that health care services affect the distribution of opportunity, but not the normal opportunity range, among individuals. He agrees with the criticism that his argument does not guarantee minimum health care or solve problems of resource allocation.     

Can a right to health care be justified by linkage arguments?

Linkage arguments, which defend a controversial right by showing that it is indispensable or highly useful to an uncontroversial right, are sometimes used to defend the right to health care (RHC). This article evaluates such arguments when used to defend RHC. Three common errors in using linkage arguments are (1) neglecting levels of implementation, (2) expanding the scope of the supported right beyond its uncontroversial domain, and (3) giving too much credit to the supporting right for outcomes in its area. A familiar linkage argument for RHC focuses on its contributions to the right to life. Among the problems with this argument are that it requires a positive conception of the right to life that is not uncontroversial and that it only justifies the subset of RHC that seeks to prevent loss of life. A linkage argument for RHC with better prospects claims that a well-realized right to health care enhances the realization of a number of uncontroversial rights.     

Health care and the prospective Pareto principle

Issues of social justice in access to health care are examined from the standpoint of the "prospective," or "ex ante," Pareto principle, an ethical principle which holds that one policy is to be preferred over another if it betters the prospects of some persons while the alternative betters no one's prospects. It is suggested that this principle may validate a form of utilitarianism in health policy decisions, with equity demanding that everyone have access to a decent minimum of care but not necessarily to all highly expensive treatments.     

Do the bishops have it right on health care reform?

The National Conference of Catholic Bishops has argued for significant government involvement in health care in order to assure respect for what they regard as the right to health care. Critics charge that the bishops are wrong because health care is not a right. In this article, it is argued that these critics are correct in their claim that health care is not a right. However, it is also argued that the premise that health care is not a right does not imply that the market is the most equitable and just system for providing health care. Natural law arguments in the tradition of Roman Catholic social teaching lead to the conclusion that a just and prosperous society has a moral obligation to provide health care even if there is no such right. Further, there are strong moral grounds for concluding that the bishops are correct in their claim that health care ought not to be considered a market commodity. It is argued that if health care ought not to be considered a commodity, then national health insurance is the best available alternative for fulfilling the social obligation to distribute health care resources justly and fairly at this time in American history. The bishops' case for government involvement can be made on the strength of the Catholic tradition in theological argumentation, independent of the claim that health care is a right.     

Why treat the wounded? Warrior care, military salvage, and national health

Because the goal of military medicine is salvaging the wounded who can return to duty, military medical ethics cannot easily defend devoting scarce resources to those so badly injured that they cannot return to duty. Instead, arguments turn to morale and political obligation to justify care for the seriously wounded. Neither argument is satisfactory. Care for the wounded is not necessary to maintain an army's morale. Nor is there any moral or logical connection between the right to health care (a universal human right) and the duty to defend one's nation (a local political duty). Once badly wounded, soldiers enjoy the same right to medical care as any similarly ill or injured individual. National health care systems grasp this point and offer few additional health care benefits to veterans. In the United States, however, lack of universal health coverage skews the debate to focus on special entitlements for veterans without considering the health care rights that other citizens enjoy.     

Rationing just medical care

U.S. politicians and policymakers have been preoccupied with how to pay for health care. Hardly any thought has been given to what should be paid for--as though health care is a commodity that needs no examination--or what health outcomes should receive priority in a just society, i.e., rationing. I present a rationing proposal, consistent with U.S. culture and traditions, that deals not with "health care," the terminology used in the current debate, but with the more modest and limited topic of medical care. Integral to this rationing proposal--which allows scope to individual choice and at the same time recognizes the interdependence of the individual and society--is a definition of a "decent minimum," the basic package of medical treatments everyone should have access to in a just society. I apply it to a specific example, diabetes mellitus, and track it through a person's life span.     

Should a criminal receive a heart transplant? Medical Justice vs. Societal Justice

Should the nation provide expensive care and scarce organs to convicted felons? We distinguish between two fields of justice: Medical Justice and Societal Justice. Although there is general acceptance within the medical profession that physicians may distribute limited treatments based solely on potential medical benefits without regard to nonmedical factors, that does not mean that society cannot impose limits based on societal factors. If a society considers the convicted felon to be a full member, then that person would be entitled to at least a “decent minimum” level of care — which might include access to scarce life-saving organs. However, if criminals forfeit their entitlement to the same level of medical care afforded to all members of society, they still would be entitled to a kind of “rudimentary decent minimum” granted to all persons on simple humanitarian grounds. Almost certainly this entitlement would not include access to organ transplants.     

The genetic difference principle

In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic difference principle is the most promising of the three principles and I develop this principle so that it takes seriously the concerns of just health care and distributive justice in general. Given the strains on public funds for other important social programmes, the costs of pursuing genetic interventions and the nature of genetic interventions, I conclude that a more lax interpretation of the genetic difference principle is appropriate. This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged. Such a proposal is consistent with prioritarianism and provides some practical guidance for non-ideal societies--that is, societies that do not have the endless amount of resources needed to satisfy every requirement of justice.     

The Legal and Ethical Fiction of “Pure” Confidentiality

In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic difference principle is the most promising of the three principles and I develop this principle so that it takes seriously the concerns of just health care and distributive justice in general. Given the strains on public funds for other important social programmes, the costs of pursuing genetic interventions and the nature of genetic interventions, I conclude that a more lax interpretation of the genetic difference principle is appropriate. This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged. Such a proposal is consistent with prioritarianism and provides some practical guidance for non-ideal societies–that is, societies that do not have the endless amount of resources needed to satisfy every requirement of justice.     

The cultural moral right to a basic minimum of accessible health care

(1) The conception of a cultural moral right is useful in capturing the social-moral realities that underlie debate about universal health care. In asserting such rights, individuals make claims above and beyond their legal rights, but those claims are based on the society's existing commitments and moral culture. In the United States such a right to accessible basic health care is generated by various empirical social facts, primarily the conjunction of the legal requirement of access to emergency care with widely held principles about unfair free riding and just sharing of costs between well and ill. The right can get expressed in social policy through either single-payer or mandated insurance. (2) The same elements that generate this right provide modest assistance in determining its content, the structure and scope of a basic minimum of care. They justify limits on patient cost sharing, require comparative effectiveness, and make cost considerations relevant. They shed light on the status of expensive, marginally life extending, last-chance therapies, as well as life support for PVS patients. They are of less assistance in settling contentious debates about screening for breast and prostate cancer and treatments for infertility and erectile dysfunction, but even there they establish a useful framework for discussion. Scarcity of resources need not be a leading conceptual consideration in discerning a basic minimum. More important are the societal elements that generate the cultural moral right to a basic minimum.     

中国的安乐死观念与卫生保健

把在荷兰福利体制下狭义的安乐死概念移植到中国是不适当的.对于临终病人医疗上的缺陷不能用他们临终时的体面、尊严这一标准来衡量.这一问题的解决不是迅速地结束生命,而是要通过中国卫生医疗决策中的分配公正来提高生命的质量,需要建立一个跨国框架来讨论安乐死的特性与共性.     

Understanding equality in health care: a Christian free-market approach.

This paper examines the arguments presented by the Roman Catholic Bishops in their 1993 Pastoral Resolution, Comprehensive Health Care Reform: Protecting Human Life, Promoting Human Dignity, Pursuing the Common Good, concerning health care reform. Focusing on the meaning of equality in health care and traditional Roman Catholic doctrine, it is argued that the Bishops fail to grasp the force of the differences among persons, the value of the market, and traditional scholastic arguments concerning obligatory and extraordinary health care. To attempt to equalize the distribution of health care would be ruinous. A more traditional understanding of Christian thought reveals an acceptance of inequality in health care distribution and a bias against using the secular state to coerce a solution to such concerns for social justice.     

Mandating vaccination: what counts as a "mandate" in public health and when should they be used?

Recent arguments over whether certain public health interventions should be mandatory raise questions about what counts as a "mandate." A mandate is not the same as a mere recommendation or the standard of practice. At minimum, a mandate should require an active opt-out and there should be some penalty for refusing to abide by it. Over-loose use of the term "mandate" and the easing of opt-out provisions could eventually pose a risk to the gains that truly mandatory public health interventions, such as childhood vaccines, have provided over the last 50 years. Already, confusion about what counts as a mandate, and about what criteria should be used to determine when a public health intervention should be implemented as a mandate, has led to some inappropriate public policy decisions. For instance, by any reasonable criteria, the yearly influenza vaccine should be mandatory for health care workers. To enforce this mandate, those who refuse vaccination should be required to sign a waiver, and patients - especially those at high risk from flu - should be informed when they receive care from unvaccinated practitioners.     

A right to health care? Participatory politics,progressive policy,and the price of loose language

This article begins by clarifying and noting various limitations on the universal reach of the human right to health care under positive international law. It then argues that irrespective of the human right to health care established by positive international law, any system of positive international law capable of generating legal duties with prima facie moral force necessarily presupposes a universal moral human right to health care. But the language used in contemporary human rights documents or human rights advocacy is not a good guide to the content of this rather more modest universal moral human right to health care. The conclusion reached is that when addressing issues of justice as they inevitably arise with respect to health policy and health care, both within and between states, there is typically little to gain and much to risk by framing deliberation in terms of the human right to health care.     

Should inter-collegiate football be eliminated? Assessing the arguments philosophically

Recently, there have been discussions about whether or not inter-collegiate football should be eliminated in the US. This article philosophically assesses the arguments for its elimination as well as the arguments proffered against its elimination. While a variety of arguments are discussed, a new one is brought into the foray of philosophical investigation, one that combines the unfairness and economic arguments: the health care and medical costs to others argument. It is believed that this argument is sufficient to justify the elimination of inter-collegiate football.     

AIDS AND BOWERS V. HARDWICK

During the AIDS crisis, natural law arguments have turned up again not only in relation to anti-sodomy arguments, but even as parts of important claims about AIDS prevention made by the medical and scientific community. Such arguments were invoked by the state of Georgia in the 1986 Supreme Court case, Bowers v. Hardwick , in which the Court held that the Constitution does not confer a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy. As we shall see, the Court accepted a version of legal moralism ignoring both the relevance of a right to privacy and two friend-of-the-Court briefs urging them to consider the public health implications of prohibiting homosexual sodomy. I want to argue against legal moralism both in its standard form and in a more sophisticated version that permits natural law arguments a place in legal reasoning. Natural law arguments have aggravated the AIDS crisis by contributing not only to bad law but to bad science.     

Health (care) and human rights: a fundamental conditions approach

Many international declarations state that human beings have a human right to health care. However, is there a human right to health care? What grounds this right, and who has the corresponding duties to promote this right? Elsewhere, I have argued that human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. Drawing on this fundamental conditions approach of human rights, I offer a novel way of grounding a human right to health care.     

Health care and human rights: against the split duty gambit

There are various grounds on which one may wish to distinguish a right to health care from a right to health. In this article, I review some old grounds before introducing some new grounds. But my central task is to argue that separating a right to health care from a right to health has objectionable consequences. I offer two main objections. The domestic objection is that separating the two rights prevents the state from fulfilling its duty to maximise the health it provides each citizen from its fixed health budget. The international objection is that separating a human right to health care fails the moral requirement that, for any given moral human right, the substance to which any two right-holders are entitled be of an equal standard.     

The right to preventive health care

The right to health care is a right to care that (a) is not too costly to the provider, considering the benefits it conveys, and (b) is effective in bringing about the level of health needed for a good human life, not necessarily the best health possible. These considerations suggest that, where possible, society has an obligation to provide preventive health care, which is both low cost and effective, and that health care regulations should promote citizens’ engagement in reasonable preventive health care practices.     

Catholic social justice and health care entitlement packages.

This paper explores the implications of Roman Catholic teachings on social justice and rights to health care. It argues that contemporary societies, such as those in North America and Western Europe, have an obligation to provide health care to their citizens as a matter of right. Moral considerations provide a basis for evaluating concerns about the role of equality when determining health care entitlements and giving some precision to the widespread belief that the right to health care requires equal entitlement to health care benefits.