Who speaks? Who looks? Who feels? Point of view in autobiographical narratives1

In this paper, the author aims to substantiate Freud's claim that neurotic illness creates gaps in autobiographical narratives in terms of the narrator's stating and inducing perspectives. He sketches out the role of narrative perspective and the joint taking of a shared perspective by analyst and patient in psychoanalytic therapy. He introduces four ways of representing perspectives in narratives. Three degrees of narrative distortion are exemplifi ed by three excerpts from life narratives and explored in terms of narrative perspective representation. The most comprehensive perspective representation is achieved in the fi rst example by explicitly stating the present perspective of the narrator as well as the past perspective of the story's protagonist by use of mental verbs. In the second narrative, exclusive use of linguistic forms for inducing the protagonist's perspective both overwhelms the narrator and gives the listener an incomplete picture of what happened. Inconsistent motives, denial of responsibility and omission of detail render the third narrative even more diffi cult to follow. The author discusses the clinical signifi cance of this exploratory analysis of perspectives in narratives in terms of claiming responsibility for one's past action and of level of defence mechanisms, and by highlighting the emotional impact on listeners, which the author suggests is the stronger the more perspectives are left out. He discusses analogies to countertransference. The analysis of narrative perspectives offers an approach for systematic research in psychoanalytic practice.     

Who Calls Friend?

Friend is a countrywide voluntary gay counselling and befriending agency. The information logged on telephone-call record sheets by Manchester Friend workers over the period May to July 1981 is analysed (a) to obtain a profile of callers, (b) to devise measures of the success of the service, (c) to explore whether the service could be improved by matching characteristics of telephone operators to those of callers, and (d) to examine whether the record-keeping system is satisfactory for its purposes within the agency.     

Who is approachable?

The consequences of social interaction can be variable, sometimes harmful, but often rewarding. The adaptive social perceiver must therefore determine which interactions are worthwhile pursuing and which are not. The present research investigated whether subtle but meaningful differences in facial expressions are perceived in terms of the affordance of approachability. Participants engaged in simulated social encounters with targets displaying enjoyment smiles, non-enjoyment smiles or neutral expressions while fluctuations in their posture were measured. The results indicated systematic differences in perceived approachability as a function of facial expression and target sex. These findings are discussed in terms of the functional coupling between social perception and action with respect to the information that specifies the affordance of approachability.     

Who Is I?

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom I refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplan's assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of I arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 Demonstratives before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle'sanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplan's identification ofutterer, agent and referent of I breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplan's picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplan's account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predelli'saccount without appealing to speakerintentions.     

Adolescent Suicidality: Who Will Ideate,Who Will Act?

Responses to the 1999 Youth Risk Behavior Survey including suicide ideation, attempt, medically treated attempt, and six problem behaviors were analysed. Youth across the spectrum ideated. Overwhelmingly, the 17% of youth with more than three problem behaviors were the youth who acted; they accounted for 60% of medically treated suicidal acts. Compared to adolescents with zero problem behaviors, the odds of a medically treated suicide attempt were 2.3 times greater among respondents with one, 8.8 with two, 18.3 with three, 30.8 with four, 50.0 with five, and 227.3 with six. A count of problem behaviors offers a reliable way to identify suicide risk.     

Who cares about winning?

Why do we so often care about the outcomes of games when nothing is at stake? There is a paradox here, much like the paradox of fiction, which concerns why we care about the fates and threats of merely fictional beings. I argue that the paradox threatens to overturn a great deal of what philosophers have thought about caring, severing its connection to value and undermining its moral weight. I defend a solution to the paradox that draws on Kendall Walton's solution to the paradox of fiction, developing his idea that it be extended to games. The solution takes games to involve make-believe: in particular, players and spectators make-believe that the outcome of the game matters. I also explore how the phenomenon extends beyond games. And I explore some moral implications: in particular, my view preserves the idea that we have reason not to impede others in their pursuit of what they care about.     

Who was Morton Prince?

Morton Prince, a Boston neurologist, founded the Journal of Abnormal Psychology in 1906 as an outlet especially for those who took a psychogenic view of neurotic disorders. Through experiments with hypnotism, he added appreciably to knowledge of subconscious and coconscious mental processes; The Dissociation of a Personality (Prince, 1905) still ranks as a classic. He early saw that studying normal people in the depth and detail with which one studied patients could make significant contributions to our whole understanding of human nature. Before his death he established and briefly directed the Harvard Psychological Clinic, devising the research environment out of which presently sprang major contributions to the study of personality.     

Who killed George Washington?

The issue of standards for professional practice ranks high among the ethical, moral, and legal concerns of guidance and counseling. We are troubled not only about what these standards shall be but also about the problem of deciding by whom and in what manner they are to be developed and enforced. This article presents one perspective on the dilemma, and suggests steps that might lead to its partial resolution.     

Who Owns the Product?

If persons fully own themselves and can acquire, by unilateral acts, unconditional full property rights to previously unowned natural resources, then by these same principles of property they also own the products of their property and of their labour. But (a) the principles of property are silent on the question of the division of joint products; (b) the market is a form of cooperation in production which makes the total social product a joint product. In the circumstances of an unrestrained fully developed market, therefore, it is not fully determinate what one's product is. Thus the holdings that each person ends up with cannot be justified merely in terms of ownership of products. I offer an explanation of why some may resist this view of the market.     

Who Are the Handicapped?

Counselors and psychologists are increasingly involved with handicapped persons. The definition of various handicapping conditions is a major source of professional concern—what constitutes a disability and in what way(s) it impairs academic, social, or occupational functioning changes in relation to several variables. The more common and widely accepted categories of disability are intended to provide the reader with a basis for better understanding of the articles in this issue.