CAN THERE BE A KANTIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM?

In On What Matters Derek Parfit argues that we need to make a significant reassessment of the relationship between some central positions in moral philosophy, because, contrary to received opinion, Kantians, contractualists and consequentialists are all 'climbing the same mountain on different sides'. In Parfit's view Kant's own attempt to outline an account of moral obligation fails, but when it is modified in ways entirely congenial to his thinking, a defensible Kantian contractualism can be produced, which survives the objections which are fatal for Kant's own theory. This form of contractualism would then lead rational agents to choose consequentialist moral principles. I argue that Parfit significantly misrepresents Kant's project in moral philosophy, and that no genuinely Kantian moral theory could issue in a form of consequentialism.     

MUST THERE BE A TOP LEVEL?

I first explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it is a proper part. I then explore the notion of the world's being such that everything in it both is and has a proper part. Given two well recognized assumptions, I argue that both notions represent genuine metaphysical possibilities. Finally I consider, but dismiss, some possible objections.     

PROGRESS IN PSYCHOMETRICS: CAN INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY CATCH UP?

Murphy and DeShon (2000) show that interrater correlations do not provide reasonable estimates of the reliability of job performance ratings, and suggest that better estimates can be obtained by applying the methods of generalizability theory. Schmidt, Viswesvaran, and Ones (2000) criticize our suggestions as radical, and argue that: (a) the reliability of ratings should be evaluated using the parallel test model rather than the more general and more realistic generalizability model, (b) reliability and validity are distinct concepts that should not be confused, and (c) measurement models have little to do with substantive models of the processes that generate scores on a test or measure. All three of these ideas were once part of the psychometric mainstream, but progress in psychometrics over the last 3 decades has moved the field well beyond these assumptions and approaches. Modern psychometric theory calls for close linkages between measurement models and substantive models of the phenomena being measured.     

CAN INSTRUMENTAL VALUE BE INTRINSIC?

In this article, I critique a common claim that instrumental value is a form of extrinsic value. Instead, I offer an alternative dispositional analysis of instrumental value, which holds that instrumental value can, in certain circumstances, be an example of intrinsic value. It follows, then, that a popular account of the nature of final value – or value as an end – is false: the Moorean identification of final value with intrinsic value cannot properly distinguish between value as an end and value as a means.     

CAN NATURE TRULY BE OUR FRIEND?

Abstract. The question of whether nature can embody love or be considered in this sense as "friend" is a thorny problem for Christian theology. The doctrines of finitude and sin argue against nature as a realm of love, whereas the doctrine of creation out of nothing, which links God and the creation so forcefully, would seem to argue for such a view of nature. This paper explores the thesis that Western culture has not offered a concept of nature rich enough to allow for an understanding of it as a domain of gracious-ness. From pre-Socratic times through the Enlightenment and the rise of modern science, nature was conceived of as a realm of defect or lacking in creative possibilities. Christian theology has consistently spoken of nature in terms that defy the limitations of the authorized views proposed by the ambient Western cultures. The present times, under the influence of the sciences, have furnished for the first time an authorized concept of nature that is large enough and dynamic enough to entertain the dimension of grace. Consequently, ours is a time of great promise for developing a more adequate theology of nature.     

WHAT CAN PIAGET OFFER LONERGAN'S PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY?

In Insight, Bernard Lonergan provides, albeit schematically, a unique philosophy of biology which he takes as having “profound differences” with the world view presented by Darwin. These turn on Lonergan's idea of “schemes of recurrence” and of organisms as “solutions to the problem of living in an environment.” His lapidary prose requires some deciphering. I present the broad lines of his philosophy of biology and argue that Jean Piaget's structuralism can shed light on Lonergan's intentions in virtue of his use of cybernetics and the isomorphism between biology and knowledge. In turn, Piaget draws on Waddington's restatement of epigenesis and I suggest that the result, “process structuralism,” is a viable alternative to the modern Darwinian synthesis.     

CAN IMITATION IN PIGEONS BE EXPLAINED BY LOCAL ENHANCEMENT TOGETHER WITH TRIAL-AND-ERROR LEARNING?

Abstract— Zentall Sultan and Sherburne (1996) reported that pigeons observing a conspecific demonstrator either step on or peck at a treadle to obtain food subsequently showed a significant tendency to manipulate the treadle as had their demonstrator. Zentall et al suggested this finding showed observer pigeons had learned by imitation to peck at or step on the treadle. However, the same result might have been obtained of pigeons had learned to step on the treadle by trial and error, and pigeons exposed to a treadle-pecking demonstrator had come to peck at the treadle as a result of nonimitative social learning processes such as local enhancement or contagion. Here we report the results for two control groups showing that pigeons do not learn to step on or peck at a treadle for food reward unless they observe a relevant demonstrator. These results considerably strengthen the original conclusion. Future research using the two action method to demonstrate imitative learning should include similar controls.     

HOW IS APPLIED PHILOSOPHY TO BE APPLIED?*

Without in the least teaching common reason anything new, we need only to draw its attention to its own principle, in the manner of Socrates, thus showing that neither science nor philosophy is needed in order to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous.     

WHEN CAN THE SUBJECT BE TRUSTED NOT TO THINK?

Sjöberg , L. When can the subject be trusted not to think?Scand. J. Psychol., 1968, 9, 274–276.—Many tasks can be approached either in an intuitive or an analytical mode. Hence, problems of interpretation may arise. Such problems are particularly pressing in cases where the results can be explained as the outcome of a trivial, analytic process. Certain recent work is discussed where such a risk appears to be present.