Knowing Is Not Enough

I consider the rule of assertion according to which knowledge is sufficient for epistemically proper assertion. I examine a counterexample to this rule recently proposed by Jennifer Lackey. I present three responses to this counterexample. The first two, I argue, highlight some flaws in the counterexample. But the third response fails. The lessons I draw from examining these three responses allow me to propose two counterexamples to the sufficiency rule that are similar to Lackey’s but avoid its problems.     

Knowledge Is Not Enough

Discussions of the role of intuition in philosophical methodology typically proceed within the knowledge-centred framework of mainstream analytic epistemology. Either implicitly or explicitly, the primary questions in metaphilosophy frequently seem to revolve around whether or not intuition is a source of justification, evidence, or knowledge. I argue that this Standard Framework is inappropriate for methodological purposes: the epistemic standards that govern inquiry in philosophy are more stringent than the standards that govern everyday cognition. The experimentalist should instead view her criticisms as analogous to calls for the use of double-blinding in science.     

Behavior Activation Is Not Enough

We believe there is insufficient support for the direct perception‐to‐behavior and the direct goal‐to‐behavior explanations of nonconsciously mediated behavior. We propose a nonconscious behavioral choice model. We argue that behavioral choice depends on means activation, goal activation, and the relative value of a behavior for achieving a goal.     

The World is Not Enough*

Throughout his career, Derek Parfit made the bold suggestion, at various times under the heading of the “Normativity Objection,” that anyone in possession of normative concepts is in a position to know, on the basis of their competence with such concepts alone, that reductive realism in ethics is not even possible. Despite the prominent role that the Normativity Objection plays in Parfit's non‐reductive account of the nature of normativity, when the objection hasn't been ignored, it's been criticized and even derided. We argue that the exclusively negative attention that the objection has received has been a mistake. On our reading, Parfit's Normativity Objection poses a serious threat to reductivism, as it exposes the uneasy relationship between our a priori knowledge of a range of distinctly normative truths and the package of semantic commitments that reductivists have typically embraced since the Kripkean revolution.     

Feeling in Love Is Not Enough

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to review recent findings in neuroscience for offering suggestions for further revisions of marriage education programs. Suggestions include paying more attention to the history of each partner; understanding the attachment styles of each partner; using both explicit and implicit learning; helping couples understand the role of emotions in rational decision making; promoting activation of the left hemisphere of the brain; focusing on process instead of content; increasing religious experiences and spirituality; the use of humor, absurdity and unordered material; and creating self-directed, technologically advanced modules that can be used as periodic checkups.     

Why Only Perfection Is Good Enough

Abstract

I argue that the traditional problem of evil mislocates the problem which confronts the theist. The real problem arises not from the evil in the world, but from the non-perfection of the world. Given that a perfect God could create only a perfect world, and given that the world is not in fact perfect, I construct an argument for atheism. I show that the argument is not open to the objections which theists standardly bring against the traditional objection from evil.     

Psychology: Is It Applied Enough?

The question “Is psychology applied enough?” can be regarded in two ways. In the first place, it could refer to the distinction “pure versus applied science”, and the reproach that modern scientific experimental psychology has little to offer to the practitioner. It is argued that this distinction has lost much of its topicality in modern science, and certainly with respect to psychology. In this sense “applied psychology” is an outmoded notion. Secondly, it could refer to the question whether psychology is utilised enough in dealing with the great many pressing problems in modern society. And it is shown that this question cannot be answered in the affirmative. Too often psychological aspects of problems escape notice and too often potential psychological contributions are neglected in governmental and organisational decision‐making, also in cases where such a contribution would prove valuable indeed. A number of reasons for such a neglect are discussed and some ways of improvement are suggested. La question de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment appliquée peut être abordée de deux façons. Elle peut d’abord renvoyer à la distinction entre science fondamentale et science appliquée et à la critique selon laquelle la psychologie expérimentale moderne a peu à offrir au praticien. Nous pensons que cette distinction a perdu beaucoup de son actualité, surtout en psychologie. Dans ces conditions, la « psychologie appliquée » est une notion désuète. Ensuite, cette question peut faire référence au fait de savoir si la psychologie est suffisamment exploitée dans le traitement des nombreux problèmes sociaux qu’il est urgent de résoudre. Il apparaît qu’il n’est pas possible de répondre par l’affirmative. Trop souvent, les dimensions psychologiques des problèmes passent inaperçues et les contributions potentielles de la psychologie sont négligées dans les décisions gouvernementales et organisationnelles, même quand cet apport serait manifestement précieux. On analyse les raisons de cette négligence et l’on suggère quelques pistes en vue d’une amélioration.     

Why Pragmatics Is Probably Enough for Now

In place of aesthetic, essentialist, or foundational pursuits, family therapy might be better served by simply seeking to be helpful. Within such a perspective, ideas are valued/embraced for their functionality and utility. In the following essay, a critical discussion concerning this pragmatic emphasis is undertaken with illustrative clinical case examples from the Eastside Family Centre in Calgary, Alberta, Canada.     

Reclaiming Desire: Love Is Not Enough

How may desire be disrupted in a person's life and how may it be reclaimed in treatment? To what degree are the dynamics of therapeutic action predicated on the relational aspects of treatment versus time-honored understandings of the reconfiguration of dynamic forces within the psyche? These questions are considered in the context of a discussion of a detailed clinical case. The paper suggests that although much may be gained in the love and the “new outcome” experienced in treatment, an essential function of interpretation is to enable desire to be reclaimed from entrapment in relational demands and obligations from the past and within the treatment relationship. In this manner, analytic treatment mirrors a developmental a trajectory that begins in complex relational exchanges, but from which emerges—in the best of circumstances—an individual whose possession of his or her own mind and desire has derived from, and yet is independent of, the specific relational foundations in which desire was shaped.     

Game Logic is Strong Enough for Parity Games

We investigate the expressive power of Parikh's Game Logic interpreted in Kripke structures, and show that the syntactical alternation hierarchy of this logic is strict. This is done by encoding the winning condition for parity games of rank n. It follows that Game Logic is not captured by any finite level of the modal -calculus alternation hierarchy. Moreover, we can conclude that model checking for the -calculus is efficiently solvable iff this is possible for Game Logic