Seven Paths of the Hero in Lord of the Rings: The Path of Love

Sam's is the simplest yet the most touching of all paths: His simple loyalty and love for Frodo make him the single person who never wavers in his task throughout the book. Though all members of the Fellowship are engaged in momentous events, Sam always remembers that the sun coming up in the morning is a glorious sight, and that hobbits have to eat. When Frodo can no longer even walk, and will not let Sam carry the Ring, Sam carries Frodo. Then, when Gollum joins them, Frodo's kindness has to be balanced by Sam's stern limits. Ultimately Sam's outcome is the happiest of all those on the Quest: He has been able to see the Elves who so fascinate him, able to serve as Frodo's companion on the greatest of all Quests, and now able to return to his blessed Shire, to marry his loving Rosie, have many children and live happily ever after.     

The Therapeutic Advantage to the Family Therapist of Intervening in the Family-Clinician System

Attempting family therapy in the context of a family-clinician system poses extreme difficulties for the therapist. He cannot be effective if he diagnoses only the family system. He must broaden his analysis to include other clinicians' transactions with the family. Once he accomplishes this perceptual leap, he can intervene in the family-clinician system most effectively with paradoxical methods. He may find that a change in his own contribution to the system solves the family's problem.     

On the countertransference of the patient: Transformations of the psychoanalyst's 'theoretical self' and their possible articulations with the vicissitudes of the analytic relationship

In this paper the author examines one of the many levels of the analyst/analysand relationship: the possible interaction between the analyst's mental routes in relation to theories (also meant, but not only, as internal objects) and the vicissitudes of the psychoanalytic relationships with his patients. The author assumes that an important variable affecting the transformation of certain therapeutic relationships is the change that takes place in the relationship between the analyst and that part of his internal world where his theories find their place. He names this part of his internal world 'theoretical self', and 'precipitates of the analyst's theoretical self' those complex formations, akin to more or less cohesive conglomerates, that are formed by his relationship to theories and to psychoanalytic institutions, and by the various, 'personal' internalised objects. The psychoanalyst will relate to these precipitates in a variety of ways, and he will make use of them mostly at an unconscious level in his analytical work; and his patient is likely to 'react' to them, almost chemically. The author also offers some working indications: the psychoanalyst, despite his knowledge of some aspects of his own countertransference, is in fact lacking in knowledge, unless he constantly does some extra work focusing on how his mental position (i.e. the relationship with the precipitates of his theoretical self) may intervene in any of the therapeutic relationships that he establishes-not necessarily in the same way in each of them. The author also illustrates his reflections and conceptualisations by reporting dreams and excerpts from sessions taken from three psychoanalytic treatments in the course of several years.     

Moral Evil,Freedom and the Goodness of God: Why Kant Abandoned Theodicy

Kant proclaimed that all theodicies must fail in ‘On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, but it is mysterious why he did so since he had developed a theodicy of his own during the critical period. In this paper, I offer an explanation of why Kant thought theodicies necessarily fail. In his theodicy, as well as in some of his works in ethics, Kant explained moral evil as resulting from unavoidable limitations in human beings. God could not create finite beings without such limitations and so could not have created humans that were not prone to committing immoral acts. However, the work of Carl Christian Eberhard Schmid showed Kant that given his own beliefs about freedom and the nature of responsibility one could not account for moral evil in this way without tacitly denying that human beings were responsible for their actions. This result is significant not only because it explains an otherwise puzzling shift in Kant's philosophy of religion, but also because it shows that the theodicy essay provides powerful evidence that Kant's thinking about moral evil and freedom underwent fundamental shifts between early works such as the Groundwork and later works like the Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason.     

Epistemology and School Counseling

Because a counselor's interactions with his clients should be an out-growth of his philosophical commitments, he must grapple with certain epistemological questions: (a) Can human beings know the extramental world or merely their own ideas? (b) Is human knowledge a valid representation of the extramental world? (c) Can human beings reach agreement about the nature of extramental realities? The counselor can assume two possible stances. First, there is the “realist” position which states that there is an extramental world, we can achieve valid knowledge of it, and the knowledge of various observers can agree. Second is the “phenomenalist” position: There is an extramental world, but no one can achieve valid knowledge of it, nor can various observers easily agree regarding its nature. The realist counselor should help his client perceive his problem situation as it “really” is and as it appears to others. The phenomenalist counselor cannot do this instead, he can only try to enter the client's subjectivity and to help him deepen and enrich his unique perception of the problem situation.     

Field of Vision: Radical Uncertainty and the Analyst's Conduct: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

There is a relationship between biography and theory. The analyst's ideas or formulations about his patients—theories really—must be determined, to some degree, by the certain and uncertain impact of his own history. Harry Stack Sullivan brought psychoanalysis squarely into the ambit of the relational/historical world by insisting that the mind is thoroughly and inherently social. In doing so, he staked a claim for the link between history, that is, social experience, and personhood. Our personalities and our theories are social-historical constructions. In relation to this, some differences between the interpersonal/relational and Bionian concepts of field theory are provided. One important difference pertains to the role of the analyst's conduct. Two meanings of conduct—to behave or to organize behavior—are at the center of what distinguishes the interpersonal/relational view of the analyst's position in the field from the Bionian view. For the relational analyst, action in the analytic field, including enactment, is conduct, and conduct is always bidirectional. The analyst, then, is a medium to alter, to reconstruct the self. He does not provide experience, he is experience. The form of an analytic exchange gives shape to the field and its content.     

The hazards of high callings

Summary To conclude, it is the concern of this paper that a minister have enough sources of satisfaction and security in his nonprofessional life so that he is not tempted to use his parishioners for the attaining of those needs. The pastor must be free of the need to use his parishioners, else he is working, not primarily for the parishioners' well-being, but rather for his own needs for success. He must notneed to see people converted, nor counseled successfully, nor saved from divorce. This would be only using these parishioners as a means by which the pastor proves his abilities. To guard against this danger, in a work so important as the ministry, is a difficult task. But it can be done when the pastor works at having a successful and satisfying private life. Such a private life pays dividends in the mental health of the pastor, and in parish work which is well done.     

The Future of Philosophy

In this article the editor of the Philosophical Quarterly briefly outlines the editorial process at that journal; explains why it is foolhardy to attempt to predict the future of philosophy; and, finally, attempts such a prediction. Drawing on his recent book Ethics for a Broken World, he argues that climate change, or some other disaster, may lead to a broken world where the optimistic assumptions underlying contemporary philosophy no longer apply. He argues that the possibility of a broken world has deep and unexpected implications for philosophy.     

Joseph Rotblat and the Moral Responsibilities of the Scientist

Professor Sir Joseph Rotblat was one of the most distinguished scientists and peace campaigners of the post second world war period. He made significant contributions to nuclear physics and worked on the development of the atomic bomb. He then became one of the world’s leading researchers into the biological effects of radiation. His life from the early 1950s until his death in August 2005 was devoted to the abolition of nuclear weapons and peace. For this he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, together with Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (that he helped found) in 1995. His work in this area ranked with that of Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell and this article is an attempt to summarise his life, achievements, but in particular outline his views on the moral responsibilities of the scientist. He is a towering intellectual figure and his contributions to mankind should be better known and more widely understood.

Nietzsche on Nobility and the Affirmation of Life

In this paper I explore Nietzsche's thinking on the notions of nobility and the affirmation of life and I subject his reflections on these to criticism. I argue that we can find at least two understandings of these notions in Nietzsche's work which I call a 'worldly' and an 'inward' conception and I explain what I mean by each of these. Drawing on Homer and Dostoyevsky, the work of both of whom was crucial for Nietzsche in developing and exploring his notion of worldly nobility and affirmation, I then go on to argue that Nietzsche provides us with no concrete examples of worldly nobles and that, given his historicism, he cannot. Thus Nietzsche's thinking here is broken-backed. I turn, therefore, to explore the inward notions of nobility and affirmation. Discussing Montaigne and Napoleon in the context of Nietzsche's philosophy, I argue that we can make good sense in Nietzschean terms of someone's affirming his own life in an inward sense. This, however, opens up the difference between someone's affirming his own life and his affirming life überhaupt, and I argue that Nietzsche needs to be able to make sense not just of the former but also of the latter. Referring once again to Dostoyevsky, I suggest that Nietzsche can only do so by accepting the idea that all human beings possess dignity qua human beings. This thought is, however, one that he rejects. Thus Nietzsche's reflections in this area cannot be rendered finally plausible since they depend upon something which can find no room in his philosophy.     

Perspectivism as a Way of Knowing in the Zhuangzi

A perspectivist theory is usually taken to mean that (1) our knowledge of the world is inevitably shaped by our particular perspectives, (2) any one of these perspectives is as good as any other, and (3) any claims to objective or authoritative knowledge are consequently without ground. Recent scholarship on Nietzsche, however, has challenged the prevalent view that the philosopher holds (2) and (3), arguing instead that his perspectivism aims at attaining a greater level of objectivity. In this essay, I attempt a structurally similar reinterpretation of Zhuangzi’s perspectivism. I argue that while the Chinese thinker sees all knowledge as perspective-dependent, he thinks that some perspectives are broader and more accurate than others. He utilizes shifts in perspective precisely in order to attain these superior perspectives, which constitute what he calls da zhi 大知, or “greater knowledge.” Whereas Nietzsche sees his perspectivism as methodologically continuous with the sciences, Zhuangzi’s “greater knowledge” has the goal of ensuring our survival and well-being in the everyday world.     

GOD OF THE GAPS OR THE GOD OF “DESIGN AND DOMINION”? RE-VISITING NEWTON'S THEOLOGY

Starting with Gottfried Leibniz, Isaac Newton's theology has often been caricatured as putting forward a “God of the gaps” argument for God's existence and continued involvement in the world. Peter Harrison has pointed out that this characterization of Newton's theology is “not entirely clear.” A closer look at Newton's letters and the drafts to the Opticks reveals that, rather than arguing God's providential ordering and care over the world, he takes these for granted and is reluctant to specify instances of this order and care based on his physical research. He certainly believes in gaps in mechanical causes but is more eager to fill those gaps with nonmechanical natural causes than with God. Further, his system does not exhibit the two most prevalent weaknesses attributed to “God of the gaps” theologies: (1) that by describing God as intervening in natural causes his skill as a designer is maligned and (2) that by describing the physical details of God's involvement in the world one puts too much weight on theories likely to be replaced as science advances. Newton avoids the former weakness because it is only God's masterfulness as designer that he ties in any way to his theories of the physical world. He avoids the latter because he never points to God as the direct cause of any specific physical processes. Newton hoped that his system would cause his readers to marvel not only at God's providence but also at humankind's inability to sufficiently understand it.     

Journal of South African Trip: January 14-March 1, 1986

This article is Carl's personal account, dictated en route, of his experiences during his trip to South Africa. He documents his extensive commitment to people and to a process leading to peace. He ends his journal with the conviction that violence can be avoided and that no group really wants violence.     

E.O. Wilson's Conquest of Earth

The publication of Edward O. Wilson's recent book, The Social Conquest of Earth, launches a new missile in the purported warfare between science and religion. The launching-pad is Wilson's embracing of group selection over kin selection to explain the evolutionary success of cooperation and even altruism in complex social groups. Rather than the selfish gene, groups of genetically diverse individuals who cooperate with one another drive evolution toward increased social organization, toward eusociality. Within the field of sociobiology, this is interesting. But Wilson does not stop here. He proceeds to engage in combat with all competing points of view, especially religious points of view. By relegating religion to a primitive stage of evolution and elevating science to an advanced stage, he provides justification for science to eliminate all its enemies and to establish hegemony in the worldview war. This article provides a critical analysis of Wilson's scientific method, especially his attempt to replace creation myths with his own scientized myths of origin. It concludes that Wilson need not do battle, because he could find among theologians allies in his understanding of human nature and his concern to make the world a better moral place.     

The advantages,shortcomings, and existential issues of Zhuangzi’s use of images

Zhuangzi is considered a creative poet-philosopher because of his use of imaginative images. He used the imaginative images of his system to construct the world of the Dao. He left the essence of material things as they are to speak for the mystery of existence itself, and let them express both the state of and the dream for human freedom. Zhuangzi’s way of using images shows his own lack of the understanding about images, and his lack of adequate assessments. He used images in accord with his own personal preferences and fixed characteristics. He also had a tendency to equate the Dao which he experienced in his mind with the Dao itself. These shortcomings limit his improving and understanding of the Dao, so that his Dao failed to become more open to a wider existence.     

Bonhoeffer's Non‐Commitment to Nonviolence: A Response to Stanley Hauerwas

Stanley Hauerwas's claim that Bonhoeffer had a “commitment to nonviolence” runs aground on Bonhoeffer's own statements about peace, war, violence, and nonviolence. The fact that Hauerwas and others have asserted Bonhoeffer's commitment to nonviolence despite abundant evidence to the contrary reveals a blind spot that develops from reading Bonhoeffer's thinking in general and his statements about peace in particular as if they were part of an Anabaptist theological framework rather than his own Lutheran one. This essay shows that Bonhoeffer's understanding of peace as “concrete commandment” and “order of preservation” relies on Lutheran concepts and is articulated with explicit contrast to an Anabaptist account of peace. The interpretation developed here can account for the range of statements Bonhoeffer makes about peace, war, violence, and nonviolence, many of which must be misconstrued or ignored to claim his “commitment to nonviolence.”     

Reconciliation with Christianity and the West in Said Nursi's Thought and Practice: An Overview1

Said Nursi was a scholar and teacher who made many original contributions to contemporary thought, some of which relate to Christianity and the West. His long life spanned several historical periods, which led inevitably to there being differences in his stance towards the West. This article focuses on the last twenty years of Nursi's life, which included the Second World War and post-war period, during which, within the framework of revealed religion, Nursi advocated reconciliation with the West and cooperation with pious Christians in combating the spiritual and moral depredations of aggressive atheism. He posited that such an approach was foreseen in hadiths about the end of time. A second theme of the article is Nursi's desire to bring together, and present as a new way of teaching the essential qur'anic ‘truths of faith’, various traditional Islamic sciences and modern science. The reconciliation of science and religion, the recombining of these two branches of knowledge, was one of Nursi's lifelong aims, which he intended to achieve with the Risale-i Nur (the body of work that reflects his mature thought), and which in his later years he looked on as a sort of reconciliation with Western civilization in principle. Thus, reconciliation between Muslims and Christians and between Islam and the West, as advanced by Nursi, should be seen in the wider context of his thought generally. Also mentioned is Nursi's concern that ‘awakened humanity’ would find the peace and prosperity it yearned for in Islam, and his hope that the Risale-i Nur, which embodies his thought and methods, would contribute to the achievement of this.     

On memory

Abstract

Locke, in the seventeenth century, postulated (and rejected) an impossible language in which each individual thing, each stone, each bird and each branch, would have its own name; Funes once projected an analogous language, but discarded it because it seemed too general to him, too ambiguous. In fact, Funes remembered not only every leaf of every tree of every wood, but also every one of the times he had perceived or imagined it. He decided to reduce each of his past days to some seventy thousand memories, which would then he defined by means of ciphers. He was dissuaded from this by two considerations: his awareness that the task was interminable, his awareness that it was useless. He thought that by the hour of his death he would not even have finished classifying all the memories of his childhood. —Jorge Luis Borges, “'Funes the Memorious”     

Williamson on Vagueness and Context-Dependence

Several philosophers offer explanations of linguistic vagueness by appealing to the referential context-dependence of vague terms. Timothy Williamson argues pre-emptively that any such approach must fail, on the grounds that context-dependence is neither necessary nor sufficient for vagueness. He supports this claim, in turn, by example. This paper argues that his examples fail to show that context-dependence is either unnecessary or insufficient for vagueness, and hence that he has failed by his own lights to show that it cannot explain vagueness.