Transcendence of the Ego (The Non-Existent Knight)

I exist, but I am not a thing among things; X exists if and only if there is something such that it=X. This is consistent, and it is a view that can be supported. Calvino’s novel The Non‐Existent Knight can be read so as to illustrate this view. But what is my relation to the things there are if I am not identical with any of them – things such as my arms, my garden, the city I live in? I name this the Gurduloo problem, after the Knight’s page. This relation must be one that admits of degrees; I suggest that we say that I manifest myself through the things thus associated with me. Several pseudo‐problems, pertaining to volitional action, supervenience, observability, and the emergence of consciousness, dissolve upon inspection.     

WHY I BELIEVE IN AN EXTERNAL WORLD

Abstract: I claim in this article that if my experience is such that it seems to me that there is an external object before me, then I have reason to believe that there is an external object before me. The sceptic argues that since my having the experience is compatible both with there being and with there not being an external object before me, I have no reason to believe that the former possibility obtains and not the latter. I respond that the sceptic has ignored a relevant difference between the two possibilities: I can make sense of the former possibility but not of the latter. I examine two broad categories of sceptical possibilities (dreams and hallucinations), explain why I cannot make sense of them, and explain why my inability to make sense of them gives me reason to believe they do not obtain.     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

Naturalizing Subjective Character

When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for‐me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for‐me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for‐me‐ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.     

Psychoanalytic Opus Nigrum

This paper presents my developmental experience in becoming an analyst as the daughter of one of the first psychoanalysts in a growing city in northern Mexico. Using historical and social context, I will explain my training conditions. In medieval times, maltreatment was impossible to avoid, and competence was a personal quest. My psychoanalytic education has been widened in scope by research that afforded me the opportunity to free my “psychoanalytic spirit.” Acceptance of reality and openness to new experiences are crucial for transformation. Answers can be found by considering new, unprecedented possibilities and striving for excellence through curiosity-driven research.     

Narrative (Re)Righting: Recovering and Rebuilding a Life Rocked by Trauma

In this paper, I write about and through my recent brush with death to narrate myself out of fear and desperation and into hope and acceptance. Storytelling helps me sort through the rubble and make sense of my life repeatedly rocked by trauma. Narrative reframing takes me a step further, empowering me to rebuild and reinvent my life through the stories I choose to tell as I move forward. Through this work, I am reminded rebuilding is temporary, continual, and precarious; and not only possible, but important and necessary.     

The Vocation of Depth Psychotherapy

During the last years of my training as an analyst, from 1980 to 1985, I was in analysis with Dr. Edward Edinger. I remember well my first session; I had come to ask him if he would supervise one of my clinical cases. He told me that my father complex was in such an unconscious state, I would probably hear everything he said to me as critical. I asked if he would work with me analytically and he said that was a possibility.     

Moving on From the Suburbs

This is an account of my development as a psychoanalyst beginning in a safe but very unquestioning culture of a London suburb. Some unusual features of my childhood, as well as a natural curiosity, made me need to question the apparent certainties of my surroundings. I describe how a number of events—the death of my father, my illness as an adolescent, and an unlikely encounter with psychoanalysis shortly after, set me onto a rather slow road toward becoming a psychoanalyst several years later. I describe the influences that were important to me. I have always been most inspired by those who could explain complex ideas in a simple and straightforward way, and this has become important objective for me.     

The emperor's new clothes: A study of narcissism and delusional greatness,denial, splitting and projection in a centre for people facing the challenge of HIV and AIDS

Abstract

Last January I began work as an untrained volunteer counsellor at a drop-in centre for young adults in London. It was the first time I had done any counselling with adults, though I had worked with children, and I found myself to be extremely anxious. I was acutely aware of my untrained and inexperienced status, not to mention any other flaws in character and health I might possess, and acutely concerned about whether I could possibly discharge my responsibilities to any client who might come to me for help. I was in therapy myself, but it was not clear to me how this could help me on the spot, so to speak.     

Encounters with raven

I have been visited by Eurydice. She first came to me, unbidden, unexpected, in the way things usually first come to me–in a poem. But there was something different about how this poem happened. On one of my Fridays devoted to writing, I was suddenly hijacked by Eurydice's point of view, her voice, her demand that I speak for her. She was shrill. She was insistent. She gave me no choice but to work on the poem till I had gotten it how she wanted it. She feels she has been much neglected and misunderstood, and she let me know a poem was not enough. It was just the beginning. She wants prose. She wants essays. She wants public presentations. She wants me to tell her version of the story.     

In Retreat

I use Thich Nhat Hanh's books in ethics courses at Montana State University to stretch the minds of my generally conservative, traditional students. When I saw that Thich Nhat Hanh was offering a retreat in Colorado, I attended. The five-day retreat allowed me to witness Thich Nhat Hanh and his community of nuns and monks in action. It also provided me with ample time to ponder the phenomenon of human belief and practice. I learned much to share with students, such as the art of eating silent meals and the practice of hugging meditation. But I also learned a great deal from the imperfections and shortcomings that I encountered at this mindfulness retreat.     

Same meaning but different feelings: Different expressions influence satisfaction in social comparisons

The same social comparison information may be expressed in different ways (e.g. ‘I am better than him’ versus ‘he is worse than me’). The results of four studies indicated that the way social comparison is expressed can affect an individual's satisfaction (i.e. ‘better’ versus ‘worse’). Specifically, in upward comparisons, the expression ‘I am worse than him’ makes individuals feel less satisfied than the expression ‘he is better than me’. In downward comparisons, those who use the expression ‘I am better than him’ are more satisfied than those who use the expression ‘he is worse than me’. The motivation of information processing acted as the mediator.     

Skepticism and legal interpretation

For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.     

Empathy and the responsiveness to social affordances

The direct perception theory of empathy claims that we can immediately experience a person’s state of mind. I can see for instance that my neighbour is angry with me in his bodily countenance. I develop a version of the direct perception theory of empathy which takes this perceptual capacity to depend upon recognising in what way the other person is responsive to the affordances the environment provides. By recognising which possibilities for action are relevant to a person, I can thereby understand something about the meaning they give to the world. I come to share something of their perspective on the world, and this allows me to grasp based on my perception of them something about their current state of mind. I argue that shared affect plays a central role in this perceptual capacity. Shared affect allows me to orient my attention to possibilities for action that matter to the other person. I end by briefly discuss the implications of this view of empathy for the disturbances in so-called “cognitive empathy” that are found in people diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder.     

SOME UNQUESTIONED ASSUMPTIONS

I In 1848 Frederic Bastiat wrote an article in the Journal des Debats in which he said, Man struggles against pain and suffering. However, he is condemned by nature to suffering and to privation if he does not take upon himself the effort of work. Hence he has only the choice between two evils…. Up to now, however, no remedy has been found for it, except for one man to avail himself of the work of others…so that all work is for the one and all enjoyment is for the other. Hence [we have] slavery and robbery. [Today] the oppressor no longer directly compels the oppressed through his own strength. There is still a tyrant and a victim, but now the state, i.e. the law itself, is placed as a mediator between the two. What could be better for the purpose of stifling our doubts and vanquishing all resistance? We turn to the state and say to it: I find that between my enjoyment and my work there exists no relation that satisfies me. In order to bring about the desired balance, I would like to take away a little from others. However, that would be dangerous were I to do it myself. Can you, state, facilitate matters for me? Can you not assign me to a favorable position, or assign a more unfavorable one to my competitor? Can you not grant me a special “protection” and, not without plausible reason, lend me capital which you have taken from its possessors? Or, can you not educate my children at public expense? or guarantee me a carefree life from age 50 onwards?… In this case the law would be acting for me, and I would have all the advantages of exploitation without its risks and its onus.     

Healing presence in the psychotherapist

Abstract

Throughout graduate school I felt compelled to become a fine psychotherapist. Implicit in that motivation was my curiosity about what makes a psychotherapist effective. My curiosity was inspired by my experience with one therapist who helped me activate profound transformation. After identifying intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 1998, 2000, 2004) as my research method, I explored that experience through meditation, reading, and conversation and eventually identified her healing presence as the core quality that differentiated her from other therapists I had known. Though technique and experience are important, I sensed that it was her healing presence that allowed her to use technique and experience skillfully. Throughout Cycle 1 of intuitive inquiry, the “text” that claimed me was my personal experience of her healing presence, her ability to be present, to connect with me, to see me, and even, to love me. Through intuitive inquiry, I was able to expand my understanding of the healing presence of a psychotherapist to incorporate the experiences of many others.     

New Foundations for Imperative Logic I: Logical Connectives,Consistency, and Quantifiers*

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: “kiss me and hug me” is the conjunction of “kiss me” with “hug me”. This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, I argue. “If you love me, kiss me”, a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent (“you love me”) with an imperative consequent (“kiss me”); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three‐valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic.     

‘Adolescent fantasies and the horror-film genre‘: The freud museum 1995 spring conference

Abstract

As I walked towards home across Waterloo Bridge, having left this conference in its apt setting of the National Film Theatre, I realized I had attended the day from two points of interest: firstly, from my professional position of working in a university counselling service where I encounter adolescents and their ‘phantasies’ regularly. Only the other day a young student I had been seeing started the session by telling me she had seen the film Interview with the Vampire the night before, had been sick at the end, and then casually ‘threw up’ to me that she did not think she would need to go on seeing me.     

Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal

Welfare is at least occasionally a temporal phenomenon: welfare benefits befall me at certain times. But this fact seems to present a problem for a desire-satisfaction view. Assume that I desire, at 10am, January 12th, 2010, to climb Mount Everest sometime during 2012. Also assume, however, that during 2011, my desires undergo a shift: I no longer desire to climb Mount Everest during 2012. In fact, I develop an aversion to so doing. Imagine, however, that despite my aversion, I am forced to climb Mount Everest. Does climbing Mount Everest benefit me? If so, when? A natural answer seems to be that if in fact it does benefit me, it benefits me at no particular time, and hence the desire-satisfaction view cannot accommodate the phenomenon of temporal welfare. In this paper, I argue, first, that a desire-satisfaction view can accommodate the phenomenon of temporal welfare only by accepting what I call the “time-of-desire” view: that p benefits x at t only if x desires p at t. Second, I argue that this view can be defended from important objections.     

Memoirs of a Mentor: Using Creativity for Counselors in Coping With the Loss of a Mentor

This article was inspired by my (S.S.) own personal loss. My mentor passed away during spring break of my 2nd year postgraduate school after a short battle with systemic lupus. I remember the deep sadness that I felt when it became apparent that she was coming home from the hospital for the last time. No words can describe the emotions; she had helped me through the toughest times in my academic life. How would I ever get the type of mentorship she provided again? She was there when I almost quit as a young student, back when my anger still got the best of me. She talked me down from the edge so many times; I never expected to be on this journey without her.

I dedicate this article to her and mentors like her. Equally, I dedicate this article to mentees who have lost their mentors. I offer my story (in italicized font) in the hopes that it will help others who are dealing with a similar loss. In this article, we attempt to illuminate the true power of mentorship, honor the significance of the relationship between mentor and mentee, and provide a tool useful to anyone who has lost their guide. I share my story in gratitude for my own mentor; I am so thankful that she was a part of my journey and that I can pass on to others the patience she had with me.