It's Not a Story

This writing presents a firsthand account of living with the certain knowledge that you can't rely on your brain the way you used to. Epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, brain tumor—what do these words really mean day by day, moment by moment? The author blends poetry and prose in her account of forging a new relationship with her own brain. Activities that were once routine are now difficult and even dangerous. No longer is her brain a silent partner as she navigates the debilitating, embarrassing, and occasionally humiliating symptoms of her disease. Can I really get through this shower? How much help do we need today, Brain? Mindfulness practice helps the author become more aware of her moment-by-moment experience. Her therapist prods her to dig into her own story, but the author resists. She resists and yet she shares her story that may not be a story.     

An Unsolved Problem for Slote's Agent-Based Virtue Ethics

According to Slote's ``agent-based' virtue ethics, the rightness orwrongness of an act is determined by the motive it expresses. Thistheory has a problem with cases where an agent can do her duty onlyby expressing some vicious motive and thereby acting wrongly. In sucha situation, an agent can only act wrongly; hence, the theory seemsincompatible with the maxim that `ought' implies `can'. I argue thatSlote's attempt to circumvent this problem by appealing to compatibilism is inadequate. In a wide range of psychologically realistic cases, an agent's effective choice will be between failingto do her duty and doing it from inferior motives. Then anythingshe can do will be wrong, according to the agent-based theory,contrary to the maxim Slote wishes to preserve.     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.     

Witnessing and Passing. Discussion of Prince's “The Self in Pain: The Paradox of Memory. The Paradox of Testimony”

The author indicates that she has two voices. One voice speaks to the patient's loneliness and detachment and her expectation to not be seen, believed, or acknowledged. This voice, housing the knowledge that events that remain unprocessed continue to have an impact, wants Dr. Prince to risk intrusion and preemption. This voice believes that it is worth it. The author's other voice considers bottomless wounds and speaks to the patient's need to build up healthy aspects of personality that is necessary to do the holocaust work. This voice holds that this is not the time for Dr. Prince to witness what happened to the patient, what the perpetrators of massive crimes did to her or what the onlookers saw and chose not to do. This voice says that the patients lead should be followed. The author elaborates on her two voices and indicates what she would have done had she been working with the patient.     

The Case of Helen D.: A Woman Who Learned to Suffer

Despite our earnest wish to be useful to patients, we sometimes fail. Part of the difficulty often has to do with the expectations that the patient brings to therapy. Another contribution to an impasse may be the psychiatrist's theoretical orientation. This review illustrates a playful distortion of the doctor-patient relationship so as to develop an alliance with a difficult patient. The involvement of part of her family in the long-term treatment facilitated her growth out of a biopsychosocial swamp.     

Internalism About Justification and the Skeptic’s Dilemma

I first argue that the skeptic needs an internalist conception of justification for her argument for skepticism. I then argue that the skeptic also needs to show that we do not have perceptual access to the world if her skepticism is to be a real threat to human knowledge of the world. This, I conclude, puts the skeptic in a dilemma, for internalist conceptions of justification presuppose that we have perceptual access to the world.     

Anscombe and “Hume and Julius Caesar”

This article analyzes Elizabeth Anscombe's short piece “Hume and Julius Caesar” from the standpoint of traditional foundationalist epistemic criteria, and concludes that while Anscombe may be right about finding a mistake in Hume, she has also failed to fill in her own arguments in the way that her overall aim requires. Special allusion is made to the work of J. L. Austin, especially insofar as that work has to do with reformulating sentences so that they appear to meet foundationalist criteria.     

Hagar: Mother of faith in the Compassionate God

I believe that Hagar is a key religious figure and that meditation on her story can enrich the understanding of Jews, Christians and Muslims concerning the nature of the God whom we worship and what it means to do God's will in contemporary societies. The image of Hagar and her child in the desert is part of today's reality. The low-born, hard-working domestic labourer, used and misused and cast out by her employers, the single mother abandoned by the father of her child, the foreigner and refugee far from her native land, desperately trying to survive, frantic in her maternal concern for the safety of her child—this Hagar I have met many times.     

Double effect,all over again: The case of Sister Margaret McBride

As media reports have made widely known, in November 2009, the ethics committee of St. Joseph’s Hospital in Phoenix, Arizona, permitted the abortion of an eleven-week-old fetus in order to save the life of its mother. This woman was suffering from acute pulmonary hypertension, which her doctors judged would prove fatal for both her and her previable child. The ethics committee believed abortion to be permitted in this case under the so-called principle of double effect, but Thomas J. Olmsted, the bishop of Phoenix, disagreed with the committee and pronounced its chair, Sister Margaret McBride, excommunicated latae sententiae, “by the very commission of the act.” In this article, I take the much discussed Phoenix case as an occasion to subject the principle of double effect to another round of philosophical scrutiny. In particular, I examine the third condition of the principle in its textbook formulation, namely, that the evil effect in question may not be the means to the good effect. My argument, in brief, is that the textbook formulation of the principle does not withstand philosophical scrutiny. Nevertheless, in the end, I do not claim that we should then “do away” with the principle altogether. Instead, we do well to understand it within the context of casuistry, the tradition of moral reasoning from which it issued.     

'IT SEEMED TO HAVE TO DO WITH SOMETHING ELSE …': HENRY JAMES'S WHAT MAISIE KNEW AND BION'S THEORY OF THINKING

This article argues that what Maisie knew, as conveyed to readers of James's novel, can fruitfully be considered and interpreted in terms of Bion's theory of thinking, and especially his concepts of K and -K and the container/contained relationship. It is shown that James describes a containing relationship that Maisie, the child protagonist, has with her nurse, and the gradual growth of such a relationship in Maisie's own psyche, leading to her capacity to learn from experience. James's text is shown to contain striking instances of the creation and the destruction of meaning (K and -K) by the adults close to Maisie. It is argued that Maisie's own choice to make links and to desire knowledge is made through her complex experience of the oedipal situation, which gives her opportunities to see herself in 'the third position' (Britton, 1998). Maisie's eventual decision about her life, made by herself in the absence of any adequate parent, is based on the unconscious knowledge that destruction of meaning poisons the mind, and she must do her best to avoid it.     

At one with our actions,but at two with our bodies

Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as ‘doing’ the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of ‘agent causation’. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are ‘tryings’ that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so would be to endorse the so–called ‘standard causal story’. But Hornsby misses a possibility here, for we can insist on this identity claim without endorsing the standard story if we embrace an account which parallels the disjunctive account in the philosophy of perception. This will leave us with a picture of physical action that saves the insights of Hornsby's account without succumbing to its distortions.     

Moore’s Paradox for God

Philosophia - I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate...     

Rational Moral Ignorance

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.     

What do men and women want in a partner? Are educated partners always more desirable?

Previous research has shown that males value a potential partner’s physical attractiveness more than females do, whereas females value a potential partner’s socioeconomic status (SES) more than males do. But are men really so unconcerned about a potential partner’s SES? Five studies revealed that men do integrate information about a woman’s SES into their decisions on whether to consider her as a romantic partner or not. Results consistently demonstrated that male participants preferred women with lower SES. Female participants, in contrast, preferred men with higher SES. These sex differences were more pronounced when a long-term romantic relationship rather than a one-night stand was being considered. In addition, men’s lower reported likelihood of romantic contact with a woman with high SES was due to her high educational level rather than her high income. Mediational analyses showed that men perceived a potential partner with high educational level as less likeable and less faithful, and thus reported less likelihood of romantic contact.     

Unplanned pregnancies and abortion counselling. Some thoughts on unconscious motivations

In a climate where the numbers of abortions and repeat abortions are increasing, it is necessary to improve our understanding of the dynamics that motivate the behavior of abortion seekers. While genuine contraceptive failures do exist, many unwanted pregnancies result from unresolved conflicts carried over from the woman's early relationship with her mother. The management of any pregnancy is often accompanied by feelings of ambivalence, and abortion itself is an expression of ambivalence reflecting a previously unconscious wish for a baby and a conscious wish to end the pregnancy. How these issues are handled also reflects the position the woman occupies in her life cycle. Examination of the early mother-child relationship may shed light on what unconscious needs are being expressed through the "acting out" mechanism of repeat abortion. If the mother-child relationship failed to establish an internal representation of a caretaking function, the child will lack the capacity for self-care and may seek abortion as a deliberate mechanism of self harm. Until such conflicts are resolved, abortions may be repeated. The abortion experience may also reflect a desire for a woman to individuate from her mother. Abortion counseling offers women an opportunity to understand and work through the damage resulting from their relationship with their own mothers. One case study, of a 25-year-old undergoing her fifth abortion, provides an example of acting out psychic pain resulting from a damaging maternal relationship. This woman lacked the capacity for self-care and could only tolerate counseling sessions until she overcame the acute vulnerability imposed by her most recent abortion. Another case study, of a 27-year-old seeking counseling after experiencing overwhelming feelings of guilt, shame, and inadequacy, provides an example of a woman seeking individuation and unconditional love. This woman used counseling successfully to develop a better understanding of herself and a certainty that she could be loved despite her flaws. Such dynamics do not always inform the abortion experience, but abortion is always a distressing experience, and counseling should always be available. Abortion counselors must come to terms with their own ambivalent feelings and unconscious conflicts in order to serve their clients.     

Authenticity and Heidegger's Antigone

Sophocles' Antigone is the only individual whom Heidegger names as authentic. But the usual interpretations of Heidegger's ‘authenticity’ (as being-towards-death, taking responsibility for norms, world-historical creation, and a neo-Aristotelian phronēsis) either do not apply to Antigone or do not capture what Heidegger finds significant about her. By working through these failures, I develop an interpretation of Heideggerian authenticity that is adequate to his Antigone. The crucial step is accurately identifying the finitude to which Antigone authentically relates: what Heidegger calls ‘uncanniness' (Unheimlichkeit). I argue that uncanniness names being's presencing through self-withdrawal and that Antigone stands authentically towards this in her responsiveness to the call of being and her reticence at the end of explanation. In conclusion, I consider Sophocles' own creative act, which bequeathed to the West an understanding of being and a vision of how to relate to it authentically. I argue that Sophocles' status as a world-historical creator does not provide a competing picture of authenticity but must itself be understood as responsive and reticent.     

Informational determinants of females' self-attributions and observers' judgments of them in an achievement situation.

A female (A) received feedback about both her own and a male or female other's (B's) performance on an achievement task, and then estimated the likelihood that she and B possessed each of several attributes related to competence, likeableness, and physical attractiveness. The situation was witnessed by a male or female observer who then judged B's attributes and predicted A's and B's ratings of one another. A formulation of social inference processes developed by Gollob was used to identify and compare the informational cues used by actors and observers in making these attributions. The contributions of these cues depended substantially on the type of attribute being inferred, the judge (A or the observer), and whether the judgment was made of A or of B. A's behavior (i.e., her performance on the achievement task) contributed less to her self-attributions than it did either to her predictions of how B would rate her or to observers' actual judgments of her attributes. A's self-attributions tended to be relatively more influenced by her experiences before participating in the experiment. Whereas A appeared to use B's performance as a comparative standard when judging her own competence and expected B to do likewise, observers did not use B's performance in this manner when judging A. Moreover, A did not use her own performance as a standard when judging attributes of B. The article discusses theoretical implications of these results for attribution and self-perception processes.     

Nature and Nurture: A False Dichotomy?

Nancy Tuana holds that the nature/nurture dichotomy does not accurately represent the world and hence that a whole series of assumptions about human nature is mistaken. She rejects both biological determinism and alternative interactionist views. I argue that although her arguments and political concerns do rule out any kind of simple biological determinism, they do not show that the alternative interactionist view is untenable: in fact, she uses the distinction in her attempt to demolish it. 1 argue that the assumption that “nature” implies fixity is the source of difficulties here, not the dichotomy itself.     

Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons

What is one who takes normativity seriously to do if normativity can neither be discovered lurking out there in the world independently of us nor can it be sufficiently grasped from a merely explanatory perspective? One option is to accept that the normative challenge cannot be met and to retreat to some form of moral skepticism. Another possibility has recently been proposed by Christine Korsgaard in The Sources of Normativity where she aims to develop an account of normativity which is grounded in autonomy. Furthermore, she argues that on her account reasons are "essentially public" and that this captures how it is that we can obligate one another. In this paper I argue that there is a serious tension between her account of normativity and the publicity of reasons-namely, that if reasons are essentially public, then it is not possible for individuals to legislate laws for themselves. However, I then argue that if we revise her conception of normativity such that it is understood to involve collective rather than individual legislation that it may then be possible to account for interpersonal reasons.