An Autobiographical Fragment

In this article, I attempt to locate some of the personal and professional roots of my identity as a psychoanalyst. Theoretically and clinically, I have arrived at what I think of as a “radical middle-of-the-road perspective” that includes both what I see as the most important and enduring sensibilities of mainstream Freudian thinking and what I see as the most interesting contributions of the interpersonal/relational tradition. Institutionally, I advocate a kind of cacophony that encourages respectful but most likely irresolvable debate among adherents of different points of view. My training, as a psychologist interested in psychoanalysis during the 1970s, was steeped in pluralism and conceptual heterodoxy. However, I believe that my personal history prepared me to seek out and to embrace this psychoanalytic world, which was at the time and to some extent remains slightly outside the mainstream.     

The “Self”, its vicissitudes and possibilities: An essay in theological anthropology

Conclusion Some readers may be disappointed that more direct implications for practical theology have not been drawn. I do hope to draw some of these out in the future. But first another step must, in my opinion, be taken. That is an attempt to spell out the relationship between the self and the spirit. Recall that the self is a Johnnie-come-lately to the theological scene. Spirit, on the other hand, has been at the core of Christian reflection since it began, and still is the most comprehensive term for what a human being is, as well as what a human being may become, paradoxically. To this problem of self and spirit I hope to turn my attention, and then to see how the problem's perplexing practical theology looks.     

What Kind of Narcissist Are You?

We are all narcissists, and necessarily so, since healthy narcissism is one of the main routes available to us for nourishing and protecting ourselves. Like all personality traits, narcissism is dimensional. For our own good, and for that of those whose lives we touch, it is useful to know what kind of narcissist we are, and to what effect. When my own narcissism was tweaked by an event that left most people relatively nonplussed, I examined the implications of this psychic insult. I looked to the contents of my narcissistic mirror, asking who and what had contributed to that template. After this analysis, I was able to see more clearly and concretely how helpful the concept of narcissism can be when trying to understand both normal and pathological behavior.     

Huston Smith Replies to Barbour, Goodenough, and Peterson

Responses and clarifications are given to the three respondents to my recent book, Why Religion Matters , in which I discuss what I see as the drawbacks and inconsistencies of Darwinism. While certain of their criticisms are understandable, others are based on a misreading of my work. Finally, my critics fail to show that my book is mistaken in its central claim that the modern loss of faith in transcendence, basic to the traditional/religious worldview, is unwarranted, because science has not been able to disprove the metaphysical claim that transcendence exists.     

Perception is not all-purpose

I aim to show that perception depends counterfactually on the action we want to perform. Perception is not all-purpose: what we want to do does influence what we see. After clarifying how this claim is different from the one at stake in the cognitive penetrability debate and what counterfactual dependence means in my claim, I will give a two-step argument: (a) one’s perceptual attention depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal) and (b) one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s perceptual attention (everything else being equal). If we put these claims together, what we get is that one’s perceptual processing depends counterfactually on one’s intention to perform an action (everything else being equal).

     

JUSTICE AS INHERENT RIGHTS: A RESPONSE TO MY COMMENTATORS

The critical comments by my fellow symposiasts on my book, Justice: Rights and Wrongs , have provided me with the opportunity to clarify parts of my argument and to correct some misunderstandings; they have also helped me see more clearly than I did before the import of some parts of my argument. In his comments, Paul Weithman points out features of the right order conception of justice that I had not noticed. They have also prodded me to clarify in what way rights are trumps; and both his comments and Bernstein's have prodded me to clarify certain aspects of the theistic account of human rights that I offered. Attridge's comments lead me to see that I was perhaps over-zealous in emphasizing the objective aspects of the semantic range of dikaiosunê as used in the New Testament and downplaying the subjective aspects. And O'Donovan's comments have provided me with the opportunity to make clear that my account of rights is not an immunities account that presupposes nominalism, and to emphasize the ways in which it is not an asocial individualistic account.     

The most good you can do: a response to the commentaries

Anthony Skelton, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Isaacs share my view that our obligations to help people in extreme poverty go beyond what is conventionally accepted. Nevertheless, the other contributors argue that my view is too demanding, while noting some tensions between my different writings on this issue. I explain my position, drawing on Sidgwick’s distinction between what someone ought to do, and what we should praise or blame someone for doing or not doing. I also respond to the position that Skelton considers preferable to mine, drawing this time on an argument that Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and I have made in our recent book, The Point of View of the Universe. I also address Igneski’s concerns about gender inequality, and indicate my broad agreement with Isaacs’ suggestion that effective altruism could benefit from a more co-ordinated approach.     

(Inadvertently) Instructing Missionaries in (Public University) World Religions Courses: Examining a Pedagogical Dilemma,its Dimensions,and a Course Section Solution

In this article, I explore an ethical and pedagogical dilemma that I encounter each semester in my world religions courses: namely, that a great number of students enroll in the courses as part of their missionary training programs, and come to class understanding successful learning to mean gathering enough information about the world's religious “traditions” so as to effectively seduce people out of them. How should we teach world religions – in public university religious studies courses – with this student constituency? What are/ought to be our student learning goals? What can and should we expect to accomplish? How can we maximize student learning, while also maintaining our disciplinary integrity? In response to these questions, I propose a world religions course module, the goal of which is for students to examine – as objects of inquiry – the lenses through which they understand religion(s). With a recognition of their own lenses, I argue, missionary students become more aware of the biases and presumptions about others that they bring to the table, and they learn to see the ways in which these presumptions inform what they see and know about others, and also what they do not so easily see.     

Some Musings About the Limits of an Ethics That Can Be Applied – A Response to a Question About Courage and Convictions That Confronted the Author When She Woke Up on November 9, 2016

I experienced the 2016 Presidential election as a loss of innocence. For the first time in my life, the prospect of losing my most basic rights and freedoms did not feel so remote. Confronting this possibility prompted the musings in this article. I call them ‘musings' because the article is not a systematic defense of a clearly demarcated position. It is, rather, a somewhat circuitous exploration of the many questions that pressed themselves upon me as I struggled to understand what distinguishes (a) reasonable accommodations to injustice from (b) morally unacceptable accommodations. When is a commitment not really a commitment? When does reasonable fear become shameful cowardice? When does my knowledge that I can do something to resist injustice give me good enough reason to resist? Under what conditions is my reason an enemy of my ideals? What is the proper balance between valuing myself beyond price and appreciating that many, many things matter far more than my own life and security? In grappling with these questions, I have been reminded of the extent to which moral discernment does not involve applying a ‘philosophy' and the extent to which it cannot be secured by prior training.     

How to deal with your most difficult client—You

Conclusion Therapists are human-and, believe it or not, fallible humans. Ideally, they are supremely well infored, highly confident, minimally disturbed, extremely ethical and rarely under- or overinvolved with their clients/Actually, they are hardly ideal. If you, as a therapist, find yourself seriously blocked in your work, look for the same kind of irrational beliefs, inappropriate feelings, and dysfunctional behaviors that you would investigate in your underachieving clints. When you ferret out the absolutistic philosophies and perfectionist demads that seem to underlie your difficulties, ask yoursell—yes,strongly ask yourself—these trenchant questions: (a) Why do Ihave to be an indubitably great and unconditionally lowed therapist?; (b) Where is it written that my clientsmust follow my teachings and absolutelyshould do what I advise?; (c) Where is the evidence that therapymust be easy and that Ihave to enjoy every minute of it?If you persist in asking important questions like these and insist on thinking them through to what are scientific and logical answers, you may still never become the most accomplished and sanest therapist in the world. But I wager that you will tend to be happier and more effective than many other therapists I could—but charitably will not—name. Try it and see!This article is adapted from an invited address presented at the 91 st Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association at Anaheim, Calif., August 1983.     

You can get here from there

During one of the several unsuccessful admission interviews I had before finally being admitted to a graduate program, an interviewer asked me what kind of research I would like to do as a psychologist. "I plan to validate the Rorschach" was my reply. "And what will you do if you find the Rorschach isn't valid?" was the interviewer's next question. I don't recall my answer but it was obviously inadequate because such an unlikely possibility hadn't occurred to me, and I wasn't admitted to that program. Looking back, it is very clear how one thing led to another so that instead of validating the Rorschach, I ended up exploring the contribution of genetic factors to stress ulcers in rats and children's personality.     

Moving towards Soul – an alchemical journey. Rehabilitation of women suffering from ‘chronic pain’ in a clinical and Jungian context

The aim of this paper is to explore the connection between symptom and symbol in the body of women suffering from chronic pain, diagnosed as fibromyalgia. The working hypothesis has been that the symbol that emerges from the symptom in the body can bridge the gap to a deeper meaning of pain and suffering, thereby becoming the agent of change for healing of the bodymind and the experience of pain in the physical body. To explore this subject I will introduce some recent research from the field of fibromyalgia, and the concepts of agency and affect systems in the body, which are important cornerstones in my work. I will briefly present my clinical concept of ‘Form and Freedom’. From this theoretical base I give some clinical examples of what I see as an alchemical journey towards soul, presented through vignettes, images and the words of three women – Maria, Riba and Ishtar. I conclude with how I see analytical psychology taking its rightful place alongside, informing or in conjunction with, as in my case, other psychotherapeutic modalities, working in creative ways that enhance healing in patients who suffer from chronic pain.     

The forest and the trees

Decency requires that a discussion as lengthy as the preceding be handily brought to a close. The seriousness of Siegel's complaints against me do, however, call for a response. In what follows I will address what I take to be Siegel's main criticisms, roughly in the order that they are presented. My responses will be limited to, at most, a few paragraphs. They can do no more than indicate how I would counter the thrust of his critical remarks. As both Siegel and myself readily admit, our positions exhibit deep agreements. As I shall attempt to indicate in what follows, much of what Siegel sees in my arguments as evidence of confusion, or worse, may point to equally deep differences of opinion. Our agreements, as he graciously acknowledges, are relevant to issues at the center of recent philosophy, but, as should be apparent from what follows, so are our possible differences.     

Reply to Kevin Carnahan and Erik A. Anderson

In my response to Kevin Carnahan, I explain the concept of religion that I have been working with in my writings on the place of religious reasons in public political discourse. While acknowledging that religion is often privatized, my concern has been with religion as a way of life. It is religion so understood that raises the most serious issues concerning the role of religion in public discourse. In my response to Erik A. Anderson, I go beyond what I have previously said about the role of religious reasons in public discourse. As an alternative to Rawlsian public reason, I argue that the essence of liberal democracy is that every citizen is to have equal political voice. I go on to consider what it is to exercise one’s equal political voice as a moral engagement.     

Wittgenstein, Dreaming and Anti-Realism: A Reply to Richard Scheer

I have argued that Wittgenstein's treatment of dreaming involves a kind of anti-realism about the past: what makes "I dreamed p " true is, roughly, that I wake with the feeling or impression of having dreamed p . Richard Scheer raises three objections. First, that the texts do not support my interpretation. Second, that the anti-realist view of dreaming does not make sense, so cannot be Wittgenstein's view. Third, that the anti-realist view leaves it a mystery why someone who reports having dreamed such-and-such is inclined to report what she does. The Reply defends my reading of Wittgenstein against these objections.     

Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism

Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John Rawls, is also known for being one of the first advocates of reflective equilibrium, which is clearly a coherentist approach to theory construction and justification. I will begin in Park I by making my charge against an almost embarrassingly crude presentation of the liberal position. Then in Part II I will leap to Rawls' version of liberalism, obviously by far the most sophisticated working out of the position, and try to see whether anything remains of my criticism.     

Becoming a person—Part II

Conclusion I have tried to tell you what has seemed to occur in the lives of people with whom I have had the privilege of being in a relationship as they struggled toward becoming themselves. I have endeavored to describe, as accurately as I can, the meanings which seem to be involved in this process of becoming a person. I am sure that I do not see it clearly or completely, since I keep changing in my comprehension and understanding of it. I hope you will accept it as a current and tentative picture, not as something final.One reason for stressing the tentative nature of what I have said is that I wish to make it clear that I amnot saying: This is what you should become; here is the goal for you. Rather, I am saying that these are some of the meanings I see in the experiences that my clients and I have shared. Perhaps this picture of the experience of others may illuminate or give more meaning to some of your own experience.I have pointed out that the individual appears to have a strong desire to become himself; that given a favorable psychological climate he drops the defensive masks with which he has faced life, and begins to discover and to experience the stranger who lives behind these masks—the hidden parts of himself. I have pictured some of the attributes of the person who emerges—the tendency, to be more open to all elements of his organic experience; the growth of trust in one's organism as an instrument of sensitive living; the acceptance of the fearsome responsibility of being a unique person; and finally the sense of living in one's life as a participant in a fluid, ongoing process, continually discovering new aspects of one's self in the flow of experience. These are some of the things which seem to me to be involved in becoming a person.     

The Mainline Sidelined: The Sociology of Religion Unbound

This paper examines an expanding focus in the content of what members of SSSR study and show how this change is reflected in the publications in the journal. I offer four factors that might effect what we study: changes in the world, changes in who we are, changes in funding sources, and changes in the theoretical frames. I discuss the “cultural turn” as new theoretical frame, which has had important implications for the study of religion. 1 then return to the question of changes in the world. I end with my expectation that we will see greater yet inclusiveness in the future.     

The Relational Use of Self and Space in Creation: Commentary on Paper by Frank Summers

In this discussion I address some of the ways in which psychoanalytic theory and technique have advanced, taking as my starting point Dr. Summers' chosen schools of thought. I then go on to elaborate what I see as a difference in our understanding of Philip Bromberg's and Donnel Stern's ideas about therapeutic action, suggesting that they actually contribute in bolstering Summers' argument.