Goethe's Faust and the Myth of Modern Man

The drama of Faust opens with an encounter of the Lord and Mephisto in negotiation about the soul of the human being; it is completed with the revelation of a transformed God-image, that is, with a hymn on the Eternal Feminine. In between a long process can be traced, full of opportunities and failures. The process is carried by the human being Faust—though, unfortunately, unconscious to him. He represents the human being whose wholeness of soul seeks realization. He is driven by a thirst for knowledge, a hunger for life, by desire for prestige in the outer world, and—last but not least—by an unappeased yearning for love. Enthralled by a creative urge, he does not see the demonic side of psychic forces with which he gets involved, and so he falls victim to them. He becomes entangled with the darkness and all possible guilt. It seems to be the task of our time to become conscious about the ambivalence of the spirit of nature—here represented by Mephisto—to realize the revealed symbols of reconciliation and to carry our necessary responsibilities. We would thereby contribute importantly to the renewal of our God-image.     

THE FAUST CHALLENGE: SCIENCE AS DIABOLIC OR DIVINE

Abstract. The Faust motif provides an opportunity to explore the spectrum of attitudes among Christians toward science and technology by placing them into a historic context. Depending on one's understanding of the relationship of God and the world, the accomplishments of a Leonardo, a Paracelsus, a Faust, an Oppenheimer, or some future scientist credited with the “production” of the first successfully cloned human being can be interpreted as divine or diabolic in origin. I use the example of Faust to demonstrate that the Christian assessment of the scientific enterprise is closely correlated to the level of doctrinaire dualism informing the particular version of Christianity that inspires the assessment. I show that, contrary to what seems obvious, Faust's damnation originated not in medieval times but in early modern northern Europe, reflecting a dualistic obsession with human sinfulness more characteristic of Reformation Germany than of Renaissance Italy. Encouraged by hellfire‐and‐brimstone preachers, the common folk saw demons, devils, and witches in every dark corner, while humanist scholars sought to recapture the brilliant past of the Greeks and the Romans. Goethe's interpretation represents a return to earlier versions of the story, while some continue to accuse contemporary Faustians of Satanic connections for seeking forbidden knowledge and daring to play God by manipulating the stuff of life.     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

Theory of science in the light of Goethe's science of nature∗

J. W. Goethe is well known as one of the world's greatest poets. Some are also aware that throughout his long and active life Goethe devoted much of his time to natural science. His theory of colour and studies in the morphology of plants are acknowledged contributions in their fields. What is much less known is that in his scientific work Goethe was attempting to elaborate and justify a new basic methodology for the natural sciences. He opposed and wished to refute the one‐sided quantitative‐mechanistic method which had been dominant since Galileo and Newton (and in principle still prevails today) and to set up against it a qualitative method. An essential characteristic of this qualitative method, according to Goethe, is that it is immune to a Humean reduction of the status of ‘natural laws’ to mere hypotheses. This claim makes Goethe's view directly relevant for current discussion of such questions as the status of scientific ‘laws’ and the correct method of theory construction. The present essay tries to show the fruitfulness of Goethe's view for such discussions, partly by means of an exposition of the view — drawn from various works — and partly by drawing consequences from it which bring it into direct contact with contemporary discussions in philosophy of science.     

Guilt,Remorse and Victims

In Shame and Necessity, Bernard Williams describes the experience of guilt in terms of fear at the anger of an internalised other, who is a “victim or enforcer.” Williams says it is a merit of his account that it shows how our guilt turns us towards the victims of our wrongdoing. I argue that his account in fact misses the most important form of guilt's “concern with victims”– the experience of remorse. I consider, and reject, one way of trying to supplement this lack in Williams's account of guilt. Finally, I sketch some features of remorse that suggest that remorse belongs to a very different moral picture from the one painted by Williams.     

Alibi Believability: The Effect of Prior Convictions and Judicial Instructions

Undergraduates (N = 339) listened to a simulated police interview with a defendant concerning his alibi. We studied the impact of (a) the strength of the alibi evidence; (b) defendant's prior convictions; (c) judge's instructions on prior conviction evidence; and (d) perceivers' need for cognition (NFC) on alibi believability and defendant guilt ratings. Defendants previously convicted of the same crime as the current charge were seen as more likely to be guilty than defendants previously convicted of a different crime. Judge's instructions did not affect guilt ratings. NFC was less influential than anticipated, but did affect participants' understanding and recall of judicial instructions. Strong alibis were seen as more believable and led to lower guilt ratings than weak alibis.     

Review Essay: The Ethical and the Epistemological

In this review of Ritual and Spontaneity in the Psychoanalytic Process, I suggest that Irwin Hoffman's claim that his proposed paradigm of constructivism is revolutionary becomes more comprehensible and substantial if we realize that constructivism not only is an epistemological stance but is a profoundly ethical and even theological position that sees construction as construction in the face of death. The pronounced dialectical approach Hoffman is espousing and developing enables us to see the underside of uncertainty not only as epistemological complexity but as the ever present potential for moral fallibility and guilt.     

The Coparticipant Field: Commentary on a Paper by Juan Tubert-Oklander

Psychoanalytic field theory is integral to relational praxis. In his study of the analytic field and its interpersonal complexities and relational intricacies, Tubert-Oklander emphasizes its clinical promise. Tubert-Oklander's field orientation, however, is a conservative and limited one. This commentary proposes a new, more radical coparticipant theory of analytic praxis.

As a unique form of clinical participation, coparticipant inquiry is marked by an emphasis on patients' and analysts' relational mutuality, coequal analytic authority, and dyadic uniqueness. Coparticipant inquiry represents both a one-person and two-person psychology—an integral of classical individualism and the social emphasis of the interpersonal/relational viewpoint. Coparticipant analysis calls for a new, multidimensional concept of the self that reconciles the seeming paradox that we are simultaneously communal and individual beings—from birth embedded in a series of social field, yet always uniquely individual. This psychoanalytic dialectic between personal, nonrelational selfic “I” processes and an interpersonal “me” pattern brings into relational play such concepts as will, self-determination, and agency. Coparticipation promotesatechnically freer, more self-expressive, and spontaneous inquiryandemphasizesthecurativeimmediacyofnewrelationalexperience.

I have believed for a long time that human

nature is a reciprocity of what is inside the skin

and what is outside; that it is definitely not

“rolled up inside us” but our way of being one

with our fellows and our world. I call this field

theory.

—Gardner Murphy     

Intuition and Nature in Kant and Goethe

Abstract: This essay addresses three specific moments in the history of the role played by intuition in Kant's system. Part one develops Kant's attitude toward intuition in order to understand how ‘sensible intuition’ becomes the first step in his development of transcendental idealism and how this in turn requires him to reject the possibility of an ‘intellectual intuition’ for human cognition. Part two considers the role of Jacobi when it came to interpreting both Kant's epistemic achievement and what were taken to be the outstanding problems of freedom's relation to nature; problems interpreted to be resolvable only via an appeal to ‘intellectual intuition’. Part three begins with Kant's subsequent return to the question of freedom and nature in his Critique of Judgment. With Goethe's contemporaneous Metamorphoses of Plants as a contrast case, it becomes clear that whereas Goethe can embrace the role of an intuitive understanding in his account of nature and within the logic of polarity in particular, Kant could never allow an intuition of nature that in his system would spell the very impossibility of freedom itself.     

Self‐Harm Focus Leads to Greater Collective Guilt: The Case of the U.S.‐Iraq Conflict

Collective guilt from harm one's group has caused an out‐group is often undermined because people minimize or legitimize the harm done (i.e., they generate exonerating cognitions). When a group action has harmed both the in‐group and an out‐group, focusing people on “self‐harm”—ways in which the in‐group has harmed itself—may elicit more collective guilt because self‐harm is less likely to be exonerated. In Study 1, American participants who focused on how the invasion of Iraq had harmed the United States expressed greater collective guilt over harm inflicted on the people of Iraq than those who focused on Iraqi suffering. Study 2 showed that this effect is due to reductions in exonerating cognitions among people focused on self‐harm. We consider the implications of these findings for intergroup reconciliation, particularly in situations where two groups have been involved in open conflict.     

Advaita Vedanta and the Repositioning of Subjectivity in the Life-writing of Christopher Isherwood, "Homosexualist"

Abstract

For British critics, Christopher Isherwood went off the literary radar when he declared himself a pacifist and de-camped to California on the eve of WWII. Nothing he wrote after the Berlin Stories (1939), when his life was barely half over, until Christopher and his Kind, in 1976, when he emerged as a kind of gay literary icon, was accorded much serious attention from Britain's literary establishment. Furthermore, what he published during his long relationship with a guru in the Ramakrishna Vedanta tradition—which culminated in the classic My Guru and his Disciple (1980)—has scarcely been taken seriously, and only a few of the more astute literary critics have detected the influence of Vedanta philosophy in his later work (e.g. Nagarajan, 1972). Yet there have been calls for Isherwood to be re-evaluated as a serious religious writer (Wade, 2001).

If such calls are to be taken seriously there are several issues that need to be addressed, not the least of which would be the dominant cultural expectations surrounding the (im)possibility of a spirituality not predicated on the denial of sexuality. "My personal approach to Vedanta was, among other things, the approach of a homosexual looking for a religion which will accept him," he wrote in 1970 (Bucknell, 2000: ix).

There is also the problem of an unreconstructed colonialist prejudice towards religious practices associated with a subject people. Here, I review important aspects of the non-dualist philosophy of his Advaita training that allowed Isherwood to integrate his sexuality and his writing with his religious practice.

Isherwood was inclined less to approach ideas as abstract principles and more as they were embodied in particular people. With this particular Swami, an exponent of the Ramakrishna Vedanta tradition, Isherwood found his lifelong guide, and the narrative of his spiritual journey is the history of a relationship that deepened over 40 years. That relationship is the other focus of this article.     

THE FAULT IN US: ETHICS,INFINITY, AND CELESTIAL BODIES

Catherine Keller's Cloud of the Impossible knits together process theology and relational ontology with quantum mechanics. In quantum physics, she finds a new resource for undoing the architecture of classical metaphysics and its location of autonomous human subjects as the primary gears of ethical agency. Keller swarms theology with the quantum perspective, focusing in particular on the phenomenon of quantum entanglement, by which quantum particles are found to remain influential over each other long after they have been physically separated—what Albert Einstein and his collaborators recklessly dismissed as “spooky action at a distance.” This spooky action, Keller suggests, reroutes process thought—classically concerned with flux—to a new concern with intransigence—particularly the intransigence of the ethical relationship. Attending to the ethical urgency of the Other, she leaves process theology in a position of susceptibility to the moral imperative posed by the marginalized, the victimized, and the oppressed. This essay argues that although the ontological work of Keller's book productively integrates quantum physics into process theology, the ethical dimension of relationality is left cold in the quantum field. This is because, contra the ethical framework of contemporary deconstruction, which, following Emmanuel Levinas, sees ethical relationships as emerging out of a dynamic of infinite distance, moral connection has nothing to do with the remote reaches of the quantum scale or the macro‐scale limits of space—nothing to do with “infinity” at all. Ethics emerges out of a much messier landscape—the evolved dynamic of fleshy, finite, material bodies. Rather than seeing ethical labor as a matter of physics, my contention (and here I think I am arguing with, rather than against Keller) is that interdisciplinary undertakings like Cloud of the Impossible are ethical disciplinary practices, re‐acquainting us with the non‐sovereignty of the self in order to open up new habits of relating rather than spotlighting ethical imperatives.     

Cosmic Commons: Contact and Community

Abstract

As we Homo sapiens on planet Earth prepare for possible contact with extraterrestrial life (ET)—especially extraterrestrial intelligent (ETI) life—we need to consider ethics. What will be the ethical posture we adopt as Earth meets space? This article advocates an ethic of praxis based upon the concept of a Cosmic Commons. Intelligent extraterrestrial beings, from their experiences in biotic and abiotic environments, should share with us a universal regard for intelligence (intellilife), respect for biotic evolution, and a sense of responsibility for shared common space in our places in the universe. As we venture from Earth into space, what will be required? Not anxiety over human dis-placement to new worlds; nor should we invest our efforts in irresponsibly exploiting the natural goods of other planets. Rather, we need an ethical transformation of terrestrial human thought and conduct prior to, during, and as a consequence of extraterrestrial explorations and engagements. We need an anticipatory Cosmic Charter.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

Art and war: Paradox of the Bhagavad Gitā

The first several chapters of the Bhagavad Gitā set themselves a daunting task: to explain how a life of action can be rendered compatible with a life of renunciation of desire. The situation, in fact, is designed to raise the issue in an excruciatingly intense form. As Krsna and Arjuna pause on the verge of the great battle, Arjuna asks how killing people—including his own teachers and members of his own family—in order to secure power and fame, can be squared with his religious and ethical convictions. This paper is an attempt to explicate Krsna's solution of the paradox, not from the point of view of Hindu tradition (in which it has, of course, driven whole movements of thought), but simply as a philosophical problem in its own right. I will argue that the paradox of the Gitā suggests a reconstrual of the way we conceive the relation of means and ends in our activities, a reconstrual that can be profitably elucidated through the concept of art. And I will argue that this reconstrual has the potential to change our relations to our world and to one another in a way that is deeply life‐affirming.     

The Role of the Third Chakra in the Psychology of Terrorism

Abstract

In a recent dream I am with my German childhood girl friend. We are in a German town. There is an ominous feeling in the air. I have just learned that a young Jewish man who has lost his reason is running through town, seeking murderous revenge for the crimes of the Nazi Holocaust, committed almost forty years ago. Then I see lying on the sidewalk the black, charred body of a young man, a violin near his head. I know at once that this is the first victim of the young Jew's revenge, a horrible reminder of the crimes of the Nazi regime.

My girl friend buries her head on my shoulder and cries: “Will the past ever stay in the past?” I stroke her hair as I answer, “It is this poor young Jew's way of reminding us of our collective guilt.”     

Ethics,Identity and the Boundaries of the Person

Abstract

Ethical theories and theories of the person constrain each other, in that a proposition about the person may be a reason for or against an ethical proposition, and conversely. An important class of such propositions about the person concern the boundaries of the person. These boundaries enclose a person's defining properties, which constitute his identity. A person's identity may partly determine and partly be determined by his ethical judgments. An equilibrium between one's identity and one's ethical judgments is the counterpart, at the personal level, of the philosophical ideal of reflective equilibrium between a theory of the person and an ethical theory.     

An Eastern Heritage in a Western Rite: A Study of Source and Method for Archbishop Cranmer's Inclusion of ‘A Prayer of Chrysostome‘ in the English Litany of 1544

Abstract

Representing the first officially authorized printing of an English-language text, Thomas Cranmer's Litany (1544)—a direct precursor of the 1549 Book of Common Prayer—is an important historical document. It also has linguistic significance, since ‘in setting forth certain godly prayers and suffrages in our native English tongue', Cranmer went beyond simple translation of the Latin. Among his innovations was the insertion of ‘A Prayer of Chrysostome', taken directly from an Eastern Orthodox source. The English rendering of the prayer has long been considered a masterly translation. However, while beautifully executed, Cranmer's version (compared with earlier Greek and Latin texts) is peculiar at points and raises theological questions. This study reviews and critiques scholarship on the matter while offering new insights into Cranmer's connections to Christian Orthodox thought and practice.     

Michael J. Dodds,O.P. Unlocking Divine Action: Contemporary Science & Thomas Aquinas

Abstract

Philosopher and theologian William Lane Craig has argued for the past-finitude of the world, employing contemporary cosmology in support of the Kalam cosmological argument for the existence of a First Cause. However, his argument has gained little traction in the world of interdisciplinary theology. In what follows, we present Craig's argument and entertain potential objections from the perspective of interdisciplinarians. Finally, we argue that, in spite of the potential objections raised by contemporary theologians, Craig's argument remains theologically pertinent—provided his conclusion is framed within the more modest methodology of a best explanation.     

Rewriting the flesh of the world for the new human: Merleau-Ponty,Fanon, and Wynter on the ethics of futurity

This article reads Maurice Merleau-Ponty's ontology of the “flesh of the world” alongside the ontology that seems to undergird Frantz Fanon's sociodiagnostics as well as his theory of sociogeny. It argues that reading Fanonian sociogeny in terms of the ambiguity and intercorporeality of the flesh of the world renders the ethical and political imperatives of Fanon's decolonial project all the more pressing, since the “new human” is prefigured—if not totally determined—in the national consciousness obtained by “les damnés” through the decolonization process. It then examines how Sylvia Wynter's Fanonian call to (re)fashion the future of humanness through (re)conceptualizing “being human as praxis,” also seems to rely on this ontology of the flesh of the world. Bringing these arguments together, the article suggests that the conceptual content of the new human can be found in the liberation struggles of les damnés across what Wynter calls the “poverty archipelagos” wrought by colonial humanism. Hence, the “new skin” for which Fanon calls is fashioned through forming international solidarity with les damnés, with the conceptual content of the new humanism emerging sociogenically—and autopoetically—from those struggles themselves.