Kane,Luck, and the significance of free will

Abstract

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the “Intelligibility” and “Existence” questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls “The Significance Question” about free will: “Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom ‘worth wanting’... and, if so, why?” A desire for “objective worth” has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire.     

From Conceptual Analysis to Serious Metaphysics

Abstract

Habermas’s recent work in epistemology has been marked by a decisive rejection of his earlier epistemic conception of truth in which he understood truth as ‘what may be accepted as rational under ideal conditions’. Arguing that no ‘idealization of justificatory conditions’ can do justice to both human fallibility and the unconditional nature of truth, he has attempted to develop a realistic conception of truth that severs any conceptual link between truth and justification while respecting the epistemic relevance of justification for ascertaining the truth. But realizing this second goal has proved elusive for Habermas because he veers too close to a form of metaphysical realism in his epistemology. By contrast, Hilary Putnam’s recent turn to what he calls ‘natural realism’ is more successful in articulating a form of realism that, in taking its leave of an epistemic conception of truth, still manages to keep its distance from metaphysical realism.     

Theodore de Laguna’s discovery of the deflationary view of truth

ABSTRACT

Theodore de Laguna develops and argues for a deflationary view of truth well before the publication of what many have taken to be its source, or at least its inspiration, namely Frank P. Ramsey’s paper ‘Facts and Propositions’. I outline de Laguna’s view of truth and the arguments he offers for it; I also discuss its role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. My outline and discussion serve as an introduction to de Laguna’s ‘A Nominalistic Interpretation of Truth’, a paper he originally wrote in English but which has hitherto only been published in French.     

Monadic Interaction

Leibniz has almost universally been represented as denying that created substances, including human minds and the souls of animals, can causally interact either with one another or with bodies. Yet he frequently claims that such substances are capable of interacting in the special sense of what he calls ‘ideal’ interaction. In order to reconcile these claims with their favored interpretation, proponents of the traditional reading often suppose that ideal action is not in fact a genuine form of causation but instead a merely apparent influence which serves to ‘save the appearances.’ I argue that this traditional reading distorts Leibniz's thought and that he actually considers ideal action a genuine (though non-standard) form of causation.     

Organizing concepts in family therapy

Abstract

Harry Stack Sullivan (1953, p. 11) spoke fondly of the time when therapy would become “easy.” By that he meant he looked forward to the day practitioners would know precisely what to do to help their clients regardless of the symptoms they presented. He was wise enough to know, of course, that the time he anticipated would not arrive soon, for he said he would be a long-forgotten myth before it came. Those who practice in the third decade after Sullivan's demise know that we are probably no closer to the halcyon conditions he longed for than he and his associates were in the 1940's. In fact, psychotherapy is under stronger attack for lack of precision (effectiveness) now than at any time in the recent past.     

Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons,and the Conditional Fallacy

Abstract

David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams's internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ‘the view that it is the agent's subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ’ (219). Sobel's objection in fact arises from this very commitment. Internalism, he says, is incompatible with the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action—accounts that suggest that there are what he calls fragile reasons and perhaps also superfragile ones, both of which allegedly provide for counterexamples to internalism. I argue that such reasons do not in fact threaten internalism. I then briefly explore whether internalism is vulnerable to a related charge—that it commits the conditional fallacy.     

Le processus d’intervention en santé au travail : éclairer les enjeux de l’action par un exercice de formalisation de l’activité

IntroductionThe quality of action in occupational health requires attention to its dynamic, for example analysing the activity of the intervenant consultant: what he manages to do in his activity and the obstacles he encounters.ObjectiveThis article proposes to feed the knowledge on the intervention from a qualitative approach and centered on the intervention process.MethodUsing the case study, the article shows the real of the intervention, its obstacles and the adjustments it imposes. The case studied is in a journal.ResultsThis intervention process shows the effects of variation caused by lack of accession and support from management and the trade unions, the difficulty of passing from knowledge to action.ConclusionThe difficulties have a function of revelation which the evaluation of the effects of an intervention can take into account.     

Nietzsche’s Questioning

Abstract

When Nietzsche is called a radical philosopher, it is (among other reasons) because he claims to call into question what other thinkers take for granted. In the article I concentrate on the way in which Nietzsche asks his questions, and how his questions (and the vocabulary which he uses to express his questions) develop through his writings. The article points out how Nietzsche gradually discovers his guiding question and how this search reaches its climax around 1886. This guiding question turns out to be a practical or existential one: ‘To what extent can truth endure incorporation?’ (FW/GC 110 KSA 3.471).     

Research & clinical exchange

Abstract

Question: Family therapists are often called upon to do consultations to schools about children having social and educational difficulties. In what ways is the family therapist's role different when he or she is called in to consult as an “outsider’ to the school system about a particular child whom he or she does not know, compared to being called upon by the school for advice about a child who is already being seen in treatment by that therapist?     

The stigma of the self

Abstract

After recounting some personal life experiences that sensitized him to the kind of stigma that Erving Goffman systematically explored in his 1963 classic, Stigma, the author, who Is a psychoanalytic psychotherapist, introduces hit concept of the stigma of the self. Paradoxically, the stigma of the self may occur when a person is treated as merely normal, and as only a social self and when, a? a consequence, there does not seem to be any recognition of what D. W. Winnicott has termed the true self. Drawing on his studies of the self [in his recently published The Singles Scene: A Psychoanalytic Study of the Breakdown of Intimacy(Alper, 1995)] the author explores the dynamics of what he calls intimacy hunger, an unappreciated but powerful need that, especially after a sufficient period of deprivation has elapsed, cannot be satuifed by a purely social substitute.     

God and Prepunishment

Abstract

The belief that some misfortunes are punishments sent from God has been affirmed by many different cultures and religions throughout human history. The belief has proved a pervasive one, and is still endorsed today by many adherents of the great western religions of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Invariably, what is believed is that a present misfortune is divine punishment for a past sin. But could a present misfortune in fact be divine punishment for a future sin? That is, could God prepunish people for their future transgressions? The aim of this paper will be to show that there are solid philosophical grounds for supposing that he could and would do so.     

Traumatic Incident Reduction

Abstract

Traumatic Incident Reduction (TIR) is a person-centered, yet intensely focused approach to trauma resolution, based on the principle that the very act of trying to repress painful memories is what holds them in place and gives them power over the individual. TIR consists of a safe and structured method for reviewing the contents of a past trauma repeatedly at a pace and with a degree of exposure determined by the client. By applying the TIR technique to a traumatic memory in a one-on-one setting with a trained facilitator, the client can discover what he or she needs to know in order to achieve a permanent reduction or elimination of the memory's traumatic aftereffects.     

Fanon and Marx Revisited

ABSTRACT

On this 200th anniversary of Marx’s birth, what can we learn from Fanon’s turn to Marx over 60 years ago? This paper reviews Fanon’s active engagements with Marx throughout his work from Black Skin, White Masks to The Wretched of the Earth; from the importance of Marx’s 18th Brumaire in Fanon’s thinking, to what he calls stretching Marxian concepts. In this moment of crisis and retrogression, what can we learn from Fanon’s creative use of Marxian categories?     

The Theory and Practice of Psychiatry by Frederick C. Redlich and Daniel X. Freedman

Abstract

The noted humorist Dave Barry, in looking back over his life and thinking of things he had learned, said one of the things he learned was that “There is a very fine line between ‘hobby’ and ‘mental illness’” (1998, p. 182).

Following in Dave Barry’s path, I would like to look back over the 45+ years I’ve been practicing group therapy and see if there is anything to be learned by what I have learned over those years.     

Restricted Diachronic Composition,Immanent Causality,and Objecthood: A Reply to Hudson

Abstract

In ‘On Making an Effort’ E. J. Coffman develops what he takes to be a fairly serious problem for Robert Kane's positive theory of free choice, where the concept of efforts of will is pivotal.¹ Coffman argues that the plausibility of Kane's libertarian account of free choice ‘is inversely proportional to the plausibility of a certain principle of agency’ (p. 12). And since the latter is quite plausible, the former is therefore ‘at best fairly implausible’ (p. 12). In what follows I will show that Coffman's objection is in fact misplaced. Kanean libertarianism not only is in accordance with the essence of the principles of personal responsibility that Coffman advocates, it also affords a more plausible and intelligible account of the sources of personal responsibility superior to the proposed principles.     

On Failing to be Cartesian: Reconsidering the ‘Impurity’ of Descartes’s Meditation

Abstract

This paper begins from the observation that in the Meditations, Descartes never achieves the ‘pure’, thoroughly decontextualized kind of thinking he famously promoted. Some commentators have used this observation to promote pure inquiry more diligently and to criticize Descartes for failing to achieve it. Other commentators have simply called for greater historical fairness and urged that we renew our efforts to understand how Descartes’s inquiry actually does operate. This paper, although sympathetic with this second group of commentators, argues that in revisiting the tensions between what Descartes actually accomplished and what he said he was trying to accomplish, we should see a contemporary lesson, not just better historical understanding. It is argued that in spite of the strong presence in his writings of the imagery of the ‘Cartesian’ ideal of a perfectly presuppositionless philosophical standpoint, not only does Descartes himself never become a Cartesian, but his own practice provides perhaps the best evidence against the very possibility of the Cartesian ‘project of pure inquiry’ to which he aspired.     

Can Compositionality Solve the Thought-or-Language Problem?

Abstract

Jerry Fodor has claimed to have a solution to the traditional problem of what comes first, thought or language. Compositionality, he says, will give us the answer, for at least one must be compositional, and if only one of them is, that is the one that has underived semantic content. He argues that natural languages are not compositional, and therefore that the content of language is derived from the content of thought. I will argue that the idea that language is not compositional conflicts with his productivity and systematicity arguments for the existence of a language of thought. I will also show that Fodor’s solution to the problem fails, as his main argument is circular. Finally, I suggest that Fodor’s argument against the compositionality of language is not decisive, and that we can still attribute at least some degree of compositionality to language.     

A Defense of Partisan-Science: An Assessment of Stenmark's Non-Partisan Science3

Abstract

In his influential book “How to Relate Science and Religion,” Mikael Stenmark argues for the legitimateness of what he calls “partisan science”: “science that is aligned with or supports a particular ideology, religion, or worldview over another.” However, he maintains that we should make an exception: the justification phase of science (phase 3) requires neutral science. Thus, he argues for “non-partisan science₃.” In this article, I assess his arguments for non-partisan science₃. I find them wanting and I will argue for partisan science₃ and maintain that we should adhere to “Augustinian” or “theistic science.”     

Maslow's Puzzle: A Reconfiguration

Abstract

A.H. Maslow (1963, 1993) characterized the “creative attitude” in ways such as giving up the past and future, loss of ego or self-forgetfulness, Taoistic receptivity, and innocence. He suggested that underlying these and related characteristics may be “certain prerequisites,” which he offered to us as a “puzzle.”

“Maslow's puzzle” may be considered in relation to what he regarded as a sine qua non of creativeness: “fusion of person and world.” The greater intimacy of such a relationship means that the individual has more fully extended self into that which lies beyond self, that is, into transpersonal realms or fields. A study of such fields, based on representations of fields in general, may provide a different insight into “Maslow's puzzle” and the enhanced creativity with which it is associated.