Representations gone mental

Many philosophers and psychologists have attempted to elucidate the nature of mental representation by appealing to notions like isomorphism or abstract structural resemblance. The ‘structural representations’ that these theorists champion are said to count as representations by virtue of functioning as internal models of distal systems. In his 2007 book, Representation Reconsidered, William Ramsey endorses the structural conception of mental representation, but uses it to develop a novel argument against representationalism, the widespread view that cognition essentially involves the manipulation of mental representations. Ramsey argues that although theories within the ‘classical’ tradition of cognitive science once posited structural representations, these theories are being superseded by newer theories, within the tradition of connectionism and cognitive neuroscience, which rarely if ever appeal to structural representations. Instead, these theories seem to be explaining cognition by invoking so-called ‘receptor representations’, which, Ramsey claims, aren’t genuine representations at all—despite being called representations, these mechanisms function more as triggers or causal relays than as genuine stand-ins for distal systems. I argue that when the notions of structural and receptor representation are properly explicated, there turns out to be no distinction between them. There only appears to be a distinction between receptor and structural representations because the latter are tacitly conflated with the ‘mental models’ ostensibly involved in offline cognitive processes such as episodic memory and mental imagery. While structural representations might count as genuine representations, they aren’t distinctively mental representations, for they can be found in all sorts of non-intentional systems such as plants. Thus to explain the kinds of offline cognitive capacities that have motivated talk of mental models, we must develop richer conceptions of mental representation than those provided by the notions of structural and receptor representation.     

The pessimistic induction: a bad argument gone too far

In this paper, I consider the pessimistic induction construed as a deductive argument (specifically, reductio ad absurdum) and as an inductive argument (specifically, inductive generalization). I argue that both formulations of the pessimistic induction are fallacious. I also consider another possible interpretation of the pessimistic induction, namely, as pointing to counterexamples to the scientific realist’s thesis that success is a reliable mark of (approximate) truth. I argue that this interpretation of the pessimistic induction fails, too. If this is correct, then the pessimistic induction is an utter failure that should be abandoned by scientific anti-realists.     

New career, old problem: Learning from 'things gone wrong'

Escalating pressures for self-development require people of all ages to possess increasingly sophisticated levels of self-knowledge. From a career planning perspective, this means knowing more about one's strengths and weaknesses. Although some people acquire knowledge about themselves from instruments and assessment processes, many more look to their personal histories, including career histories, for evidence confirming competence. Research examining failures and setbacks recalled by a diverse sample of artists, athletes and business people is reported. It is concluded that people often hold distorted interpretations of life's disappointments, underscoring the need for informed guidance     

Recycling gone bad: When the option to recycle increases resource consumption

In this study, we propose that the ability to recycle may lead to increased resource usage compared to when a recycling option is not available. Supporting this hypothesis, our first experiment shows that consumers used more paper while evaluating a pair of scissors when the option to recycle was provided (vs. not provided). In a follow-up field experiment, we find that the per person restroom paper hand towel usage increased after the introduction of a recycling bin compared to when a recycling option was not available. We conclude by discussing implications for research and policy.     

Forgotten but not gone: The recall and recognition of self-threatening memories

When people selectively forget feedback that threatens the self (mnemic neglect), are those memories permanently lost or potentially recoverable? In two experiments, participants processed feedback pertaining either to themselves or to another person. Feedback consisted of a mixture of positive and negative behaviors exemplifying traits that were both central and peripheral to participants’ self-definition. In Experiment 1, participants exhibited poorer recall for, but unimpaired recognition of, self-threatening feedback (i.e., negative, central, self-referent), relative to both self-affirming feedback (positive, central, self-referent) and other-relevant feedback (positive/negative, central, other-referent). In Experiment 2, participants who had experienced ego-deflation, but not ego-inflation, exhibited mnemic neglect for recall, but not for recognition. Both experiments imply that, even after being self-protectively neglected, self-threatening memories can still be retrieved.     

Forgotten but not gone: savings for pictures and words in long-term memory

Five experiments examined the relearning of words, simple line-drawing pictures, and complex photographic pictures after retention intervals of 1 to 10 weeks. For those items that were neither recalled nor recognized, the identical item was relearned better than an unrelated control item, as measured by a recall test following relearning. This relearning advantage in recall held for all three classes of material and extended to the cross-modality case (i.e., picture-word and word-picture) and the same-referent case (i.e., two pictures of the same object). However, recognition tests of relearning failed to detect this same relearning advantage for apparently forgotten items. Taken together, these findings conflict with the existing account of savings. Most fundamental, the classic argument that relearning serves a trace-strengthening function is undetermined by the observed recall-recognition contrast. An alternative explanation of savings is suggested wherein relearning assists retrieval of information, thereby affecting recall in particular.     

On receiving what has gone astray, on finding what has got lost

Disturbing emotions that act as bodily cryptograms waiting to be deciphered are currently understood as intra-psychic trauma. The author briefly discusses Fordham's concepts of deintegration and primitive identity, as well as early patterns of mother-infant attunement to describe how the empathic capacity of the analyst is dramatically challenged in helping patients to give birth to unbearable emotions that remain an undifferentiated entity. Referring to Ogden's understanding of the mechanism of projective identification, the author will explore how unconscious mental processes in the analyst and the patient can work at re-activating failures in the deintegrative process. Clinical material is presented to show how unconscious psychic events that affect the patient but cannot be known consciously can be born into mind by the analytic couple.     

Forgotten but not gone: context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered--for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

Forgotten but not gone: Context effects on recognition do not require explicit memory for context

Context effects on recognition memory provide an important indirect assay of associative learning and source memory. Neuropsychological studies have indicated that such context effects may obtain even if the contexts themselves are not remembered—for example, in individuals impaired on direct tests of memory for contextual information. In contrast, a recent study indicated that the effects of temporal context reinstatement on visual recognition obtain only when the contextual information itself was explicitly recollected. Here we report that the effects of reinstatement of spatial-simultaneous context on visual object recognition memory obtain irrespective of whether those context stimuli are explicitly recognized. We suggest that spatial-simultaneous context effects might be based on ensemble unitization of target and context stimuli at encoding, whereas temporal context effects may require recollective processes.     

And all your problems are gone: religious coping strategies among Philippine migrant workers in Hong Kong

This paper provides an ethnographic account of both hardships and religious coping strategies of Philippine migrant workers in Hong Kong. It will argue that intensified coping needs that arise from the migration process may lead to a reorientation towards more charismatic religious groups, which in turn seem to promote coping strategies specifically tailored towards the (relatively homogenous) experiences of these migrants. It will also argue that, while the “disempowering” implications of religious coping rest ambiguous, it may assist the toleration of exploitative patterns in migration by reducing their emotional cost.     

Agnosticism gone awry: Why developmental robotics must commit to an understanding of embodiment and shared intentionality

We argue that developmental robotics, in its integration of developmental psychology and robotics, has the potential to encounter unexpected and unexamined conceptual difficulties. In particular, the various uses of embodiment and shared intentionality single out certain robots and behaviors as more or less relevant for the modeling of social cognition. As these terms have relatively orthogonal histories, there is no account for how their use will interact to shape methodology. We provide a brief discussion of how they may do so. Moreover, theorists often avoid explicit endorsement of some use or another. Although this agnosticism is understandable, we use the model of Dominey and Warneken (2011) as an illustrative example of why it is potentially dangerous. While Dominey and Warneken have succeeded in encouraging theorists to adopt clearer formulations of shared intentionality, their model suffers from important difficulties in interpretation, which, we argue, are a consequence of their uses of embodiment and shared intentionality respectively.