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1.
Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being,
that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should
not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of
it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism
about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t
end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best
way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In
particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly,
there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the
prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising. 相似文献
2.
Mariano Rojas 《Applied research in quality of life》2011,6(3):265-276
This commentary to Carol Graham’s paper deals with the nature of the relationship between income and happiness. Carol Graham
focuses her contribution on what I call the positive-coefficient hypothesis in economic theory; which states that, on average,
well-being rises with income. The hypothesis was first questioned by Richard Easterlin’s pioneering work and it has captured
a lot of attention from happiness researchers during the last decade. My contribution deals with a related hypothesis, which
I call the close-relationship hypothesis in economic theory. The hypothesis states that a person’s income is a good predictor
of his or her well-being. I show that this hypothesis is rejected by happiness research, and I discuss the implications of
this rejection. 相似文献
3.
Jennifer S. Hawkins 《Philosophical Studies》2010,148(1):61-68
Theories of well-being are typically divided into subjective and objective. Subjective theories are those which make facts
about a person’s welfare depend on facts about her actual or hypothetical mental states. I am interested in what motivates this approach to the theory of welfare. The contemporary view is that subjectivism is devoted to honoring the evaluative
perspective of the individual, but this is both a misleading account of the motivations behind subjectivism, and a vision
that dooms subjective theories to failure. I suggest that we need to revisit and reinstate certain features of traditional
hedonism, in particular the idea that felt experience plays a role that no theory of welfare can afford to ignore. I then
offer a sketch of a theory that is subjective in my preferred sense and avoids the worst sins of hedonism as well as the problems
generated by the contemporary constraints of subjective theorists. 相似文献
4.
Derek Baker 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):37-47
Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires
conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that
there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible
world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires
creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences
over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete
theory of Humean rationality. 相似文献
5.
Garrett Thomson 《Synthese》2008,162(3):373-384
Kolak’s arguments for the thesis ‘there is only one person’ in fact show that the subject-in-itself is not a countable entity.
The paper argues for this assertion by comparing Kolak’s concept of the subject with Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity
of apperception (TUAP), which is a formal feature of experience and not countable. It also argues the point by contrasting
both the subject and the TUAP with the notion of the individual human being or empirical self, which is the main concern standard
theories of personal identity such as those of Williams, Parfit and Nozick. Unlike the empirical self, but rather like Kant’s
TUAP, the subject-in-itself cannot be counted because it is not an object or substance, despite Kolak’s thesis that there
is only one. The paper also maintains that Kolak’s contention that the subject is an entity hinges on a strong and less plausible
interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. 相似文献
6.
In Morals From Motives, Michael Slote defends an agent-based theory of right action according to which right acts are those that express virtuous
motives like benevolence or care. Critics have claimed that Slote’s view— and agent-based views more generally— cannot account
for several basic tenets of commonsense morality. In particular, the critics maintain that agent-based theories: (i) violate
the deontic axiom that “ought” implies “can”, (ii) cannot allow for a person’s doing the right thing for the wrong reason,
and (iii) do not yield clear verdicts in a number of cases involving “conflicting motives” and “motivational over-determination”.
In this paper I develop a new agent-based theory of right action designed to avoid the problems presented for Slote’s view.
This view makes morally right action a matter of expressing an optimal balance of virtue over vice and commands agents in
each situation to improve their degree of excellence to the greatest extent possible. 相似文献
7.
Bengt Brülde 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):15-49
The paper starts with a presentation of the pure happiness theory, i.e. the idea that the quality of a person’s life is dependent
on one thing only, viz. how happy that person is. To find out whether this type of theory is plausible or not, I examine the
standard arguments for and against this theory, including Nozick’s experience machine argument. I then investigate how the
theory can be modified in order to avoid the most serious objections. I first examine different types of epistemic modifications
of the theory (e.g. the idea that a person’s happiness is more valuable for her if it is based on a correct perception of
her own life), and then turn to a number of modifications which all make the value of a person’s happiness depend on whether
the evaluative standard on which her happiness is based satisfies certain requirements. In connection with this, I present
and defend my own modified version of the happiness theory. 相似文献
8.
William Lauinger 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2013,51(2):270-295
Many philosophers have claimed that we might do well to adopt a hybrid theory of well‐being: a theory that incorporates both an objective‐value constraint and a pro‐attitude constraint. Hybrid theories are attractive for two main reasons. First, unlike desire theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about the problem of defective desires. This is so because, unlike desire theories, hybrid theories place an objective‐value constraint on well‐being. Second, unlike objectivist theories of well‐being, hybrid theories need not worry about being overly alienating. This is so because, unlike objectivist theories, hybrid theories place a pro‐attitude constraint on well‐being. However, from the point of view of objectivists, hybrid theories are not objectivist enough, and this can be seen clearly in missing‐desires cases. For instance, hybrid theories entail that, if someone lacks the desire for health, then health is not a component of her well‐being. This, objectivists say, is implausible. It is obvious, objectivists say, that someone's life goes better for herself inasmuch as she is healthy, and, hence, that health is a component of her welfare. This paper focuses on the missing‐desires objection (as leveled by objectivists) to hybrid theories of well‐being. My argument is that the missing‐desires objection can be answered in a way that is generally convincing and, in particular, in a way that pays a good deal of respect to objectivist intuitions about well‐being. My hope, then, is that this paper will help to persuade objectivists about well‐being to become hybrid theorists. 相似文献
9.
John Deigh 《The Journal of Ethics》2006,10(4):383-418
This is a critical study of Martha Nussbaum’s Hiding from Humanity. Central to Nussbaum’s book are arguments against society’s or the state’s using disgust and shame to forward the aims of
the criminal law. Patrick Devlin’s appeal to the common man’s disgust to determine what acts of customary morality should
be made criminal is an example of how society might use disgust to forward the aims of the criminal law. The use of so-called
shaming penalties as alternative sanctions to imprisonment is an example of how society might use shame for this purpose.
I argue that despite Nussbaum’s own view to the contrary, her arguments against such uses of disgust and shame are best understood
as criticisms of programs of conservative political philosophy like Devlin’s and not of the emotions themselves. 相似文献
10.
William Sin 《Philosophical Studies》2012,157(2):163-175
How should we assess the burden of moral demands? A predominant assessment is provided by what Murphy calls the baseline of
factual status-quo (FSQ): A moral theory is demanding if the level of agents’ well-being is reduced from the time they begin
to comply perfectly with the theory. The aims of my paper are threefold. I will first discuss the limits of the FSQ baseline.
Second, I suggest a different assessment, which examines moral demands from a whole-life perspective. My view is that even
if agents’ compliance with a moral theory will not cause a substantial reduction to their existing level of well-being, the
total quality of life that they may obtain from complying with this theory may still be lower than what they could have obtained
by following some other moral theories. The third aim of this paper is that, through this investigation, I hope to explicate
the relation between agents’ acceptance of a moral theory and the burden of demands that is created by it. I believe that
we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of the nature of moral demands by paying attention to the psychological
development of agents as they accept and internalize a moral theory. 相似文献
11.
Michael Watts 《Studies in Philosophy and Education》2009,28(5):425-436
Adaptive preferences are both a central justification and continuing problem for the use of the capability approach. They
are illustrated here with reference to a project examining the choices of young people who had rejected higher education.
Jon Elster, Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have all criticised utilitarianism on the grounds that a focus on preference-satisfaction
fails to acknowledge the human tendency to adapt preferences under unfavourable circumstances and that self-assessments of
well-being are therefore likely to be distorted by deprivation. Elster’s addresses preference deformation through the sour
grapes phenomenon and retroactive rationalisation. Sen and Nussbaum are more concerned with adaptation as self-abnegation.
The capability approach developed by Sen and Nussbaum seeks to address the problem of adaptive preferences by taking into
account not only what individuals value but what they have reason to value. However, clear distinctions need to be made between
adaptations to the means of achieving well-being and adaptations to its ends. If Elster’s formulations are to be used in capability
assessments, they need to articulate with the relative weightings given to relevant functionings and freedoms. This enables
a more nuanced understanding of adaptive preferences that can account for the subtleties of the constraints they place upon
individual freedoms. 相似文献
12.
Mark Navin 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(5):533-547
Oppression can be unjust from a luck egalitarian point of view even when it is the consequence of choices for which it is
reasonable to hold persons responsible. This is for two reasons. First, people who have not been oppressed are unlikely to
anticipate the ways in which their choices may lead them into oppressive conditions. Facts about systematic phenomena (like
oppression) are often beyond the epistemic reach of persons who are not currently subject to such conditions, even when they
possess adequate information about the particular consequences of their choices. Second, people may be (much) less responsible
for remaining in oppressive conditions, even if they are responsible for entering circumstances of oppression. Oppression
that results from a person’s choice may cause or contribute to dramatic changes in that person, and these changes may be sufficient
to undermine the person’s responsibility for the results of her earlier choice. 相似文献
13.
Christians commonly speak of and to God as ‘a person’. The propriety of such talk depends on how the concept of a person is
being used and understood, and that concept is much contested in contemporary analytic philosophy. In this article, I note
the presuppositions of one current debate about what it is to be a human person, and then propose an alternative approach
to persons—both human and divine—that draws upon the Thomistic philosophical and theological tradition. In this tradition,
‘person’ is neither an essence-determining kind term, nor a merely nominal or functional kind term, but is applicable analogously
to entities of various ‘kinds’ (e.g. humans, angels and God). The origins of this account in Aquinas’ theology of the Trinity
will be examined, and I will conclude by noting a recent development of Thomas’ thought in relation to what it is to be a
human person. 相似文献
14.
Eugen Fischer 《Synthese》2008,162(1):53-84
The later Wittgenstein advanced a revolutionary but puzzling conception of how philosophy ought to be practised: Philosophical
problems are not to be coped with by establishing substantive claims or devising explanations or theories. Instead, philosophical
questions ought to be treated ‘like an illness’. Even though this ‘non-cognitivism’ about philosophy has become a focus of
debate, the specifically ‘therapeutic’ aims and ‘non-theoretical’ methods constitutive of it remain ill understood. They are
motivated by Wittgenstein’s view that the problems he addresses result from misinterpretation, driven by ‘urges to misunderstand’.
The present paper clarifies this neglected concept and analyses how such ‘urges’ give rise to pseudo-problems of one particular,
hitherto little understood, kind. This will reveal ‘therapeutic’ aims reasonable and ‘non-theoretical’ methods necessary,
in one clearly delineated and important part of philosophy. I.e.: By developing a novel account of nature and genesis of one
important class of philosophical problems, the paper explains and vindicates a revolutionary reorientation of philosophical
work, at the level of both aims and methods. 相似文献
15.
Rogério Passos Severo 《Synthese》2008,161(1):141-165
Quine’s thesis of underdetermination is significantly weaker than it has been taken to be in the recent literature, for the
following reasons: (i) it does not hold for all theories, but only for some global theories, (ii) it does not require the
existence of empirically equivalent yet logically incompatible theories, (iii) it does not rule out the possibility that all perceived rivalry between empirically equivalent theories might
be merely apparent and eliminable through translation, (iv) it is not a fundamental thesis within Quine’s philosophy, and
(v) it does not carry with it the anti-realistic consequences often associated with the thesis in recent debates. The paper
analyzes Quine’s views on the matter and the changes they underwent over the years. A conjecture is put forth about why Quine’s
thesis has been so widely misrepresented: Quine’s writings up to 1975 tackled primarily the formulation and justification
of the thesis, but afterwards were concerned mostly with the question whether empirically equivalent rivals to the theory
we hold are to be considered true also. When this latter discussion is read without bearing in mind Quine’s earlier formulation
and justification of the thesis, his thesis seems to have stronger epistemic consequences than it actually does. A careful
reading of his later writings shows, however, that the formulation of the thesis remained unchanged after 1975, and that his
mature and considered views supported only a very mitigated version of the thesis. 相似文献
16.
The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. 相似文献
17.
Mariano Rojas 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2010,11(2):225-241
This paper studies the nature of intra-household arrangements in Mexico on the basis of the relationship between a person’s
economic satisfaction and her household income. It also studies different theories of the family. The main results support
the argument that Mexican families are mostly altruistic and communitarian, with the evidence rejecting a cooperative-bargaining
model in Mexican families. Special consideration is given to the situation in low-income families, where marginalization from
the household’s economic resources may expose a person to substantially severe economic deprivation. Intra-household arrangements
may vary across countries and cultures. Thus, their understanding is crucial for making cross-country comparisons based on
household income and per-capita income measures. 相似文献
18.
19.
Karen Bennett has recently argued that the views articulated by Linsky and Zalta (Philos Perspect 8:431–458, 1994) and (Philos
Stud 84:283–294, 1996) and Plantinga (The nature of necessity, 1974) are not consistent with the thesis of actualism, according
to which everything is actual. We present and critique her arguments. We first investigate the conceptual framework she develops
to interpret the target theories. As part of this effort, we question her definition of ‘proxy actualism’. We then discuss
her main arguments that the theories carry a commitment to actual entities that do not exist. We end by considering and addressing
a worry that might have been the driving force behind Bennett’s claim that Linsky and Zalta’s view is not fully actualistic.
相似文献
Edward N. ZaltaEmail: |
20.
Vani K. Borooah 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2006,7(4):427-465
Using data on over 3000 individuals in Northern Ireland, this paper conducts an econometric investigation into what makes people happy. It draws a distinction between “objective” (income, marital status) and “subjective” (satisfaction with one’s standard of living (SoL); money worries; experience of poverty) factors determining happiness. In so doing, it takes a broader view of “economic status” than one defined solely by income: occupational class, mortgage status, financial worries, rural/urban residence, poverty experience, and, of course, income coalesce to form this, more complex, concept of economic status. Juxtaposed against this, is the concept of “context-free” and “context-specific” well-being. A particular example of the latter is the degree of satisfaction with one’s SoL and an important point of focus of the paper is the relationship between SoL satisfaction and happiness. A complementary point of focus is an analysis of the determinants of context-free and context-specific well-being. The paper also examines the effects of non-economic factors on happiness in particular on specific aspects of the ill-health of respondents and upon the quality of the areas in which they live. Having analysed these effects, it places a money value on each of the diversity of effects that act upon a person’s level of happiness.The analysis in this paper is based on the Poverty and Social Exclusion in Northern Ireland (PSENI) Project’s data and I am grateful to the Project leaders – Paddy Hillyard, Eithne McLaughlin and Mike Tomlinson – for permission to use these data. Thanks are due to Andrew Oswald, to one of the Editors of JOHS, and to two anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Needless to say, the usual disclaimer applies. 相似文献