一个含有原子的自然模型∑（A）

1989年A.Blass和A.Scedrov构造了含有原子的模型V（A）（A是所有原子的集合,参见文献[1]）并证明了V（A）是ZFA（ZFA=ZF＋A,公理A断言：存在所有原子的集合）的模型。由于集合论的公理系统GB是ZF的一个保守扩充,因此,集合论的公理系统GBA（GBA=GB＋A,其中GB是集合论的含有集合和类的哥德尔－贝奈斯公理系统）也是ZFA的一个保守扩充。本文的目的是在集合论的含有原子和集合的公理系统ZFA的自然模型V（A）的基础上,为集合论的含有原子、集合和类的公理系统GBA建立模型。因此,我们首先介绍了A.Blass和A.Scedrov的含有原子的模型V（A）;第二,给出并证明V（A）具有的一些基本性质;第三,扩充了集合论的公理系统ZFA的形式语言LZFA并定义含有原子和集合的类C;第四,构造含有原子、集合和类的模型∑（A）,称它为自然模型,最后,证明了∑（A）是GBA的模型。     

A role for the perceptual representation memory system in category learning

There is growing evidence that working memory, episodic/semantic memory, and procedural memory all play important roles in at least some types of category learning. Little is known, however, about the role of the perceptual representation memory system (PRS). Two experiments are reported that provide evidence that under certain conditions, the PRS, by itself, is sufficient to mediate category learning. Both experiments compared performance in (A, not A) and (A, B) prototype distortion category-learning tasks, in which category exemplars are created by randomly distorting one category prototype in the (A, not A) conditions or two prototypes in the (A, B) conditions. Results showed that (A, not A) performance was more sensitive to prototype similarity and less affected by the removal of feedback than (A, B) performance. These results support the hypothesis that (A, not A) performance was mediated by the PRS, but that (A, B) performance recruited other memory systems.     

The suppression of Modus Ponens as a case of pragmatic preconditional reasoning

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument “If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1” where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature “there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied”, and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., “If C then A2”) will lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning.     

NECESSITY, APRIORITY, AND LOGICAL STRUCTURE

Logical structure may explain the necessity and a priori knowability of such truths as that if A is red then A is either red or green. But this explanation cannot be extended to sentences that, while necessary and knowable a priori, do not wear the appropriate logical structure on their sleeves – sentences like 'if A is a point and A is red, then A is not green,' or 'if A is a sphere, then A is not a cube.' The real origin of these sentences' necessity and a priori knowability is a relationship between the meanings of their component atomic sentences – a relationship which cannot be systematically reduced to logical structure by translating those atomic sentences into any kind of 'ideal' language. Moreover, this kind of relationship is one to which any atomic sentences are susceptible if they have a classifying, or comparison-implying, content. Arguably, then, all atomic sentences are capable of being related to others in ways that are necessary and knowable a priori.     

Philosophical Arguments Against the A‐Theory

According to the A‐theory of time some instant of time is absolutely present. Many reject the A‐theory on the grounds that it is inconsistent with current spacetime physics, which appears to leave no room for absolute presentness. However, some reject the A‐theory on purely philosophical grounds. In this article I describe three purely philosophical arguments against the A‐theory and show that there are plausible A‐theoretic responses to each of them. I conclude that, whatever else is wrong with the A‐theory, it is not obviously a philosophically suspect theory.     

Parity,Intransitivity, And A Context-Sensitive Degree Analysis of Gradability

Larry Temkin challenged what seems to be an analytic truth about comparatives: if A is Φ-er than B and B is Φ-er than C, then, A is Φ-er than C. Ruth Chang denies a related claim: if A is Φ-er than B and C is not Φ-er than B, but is Φ to a certain degree, then A is Φ-er than C. In this paper I advance a context-sensitive semantics of gradability according to which the data uncovered by Temkin and Chang leave both statements intact.     

Superconditioning from a reduced reinforcer

In four autoshaping experiments pigeons received conditioned inhibition training of the form A++, AB-, where ++ is a strong reinforcer and - is nonreinforcement. Subsequent AB+ training, in which + is a moderate reinforcer, resulted in enhanced conditioning of A, relative to an A stimulus receiving no treatment, one receiving A+ treatment, and one receiving A++ treatment. This enhancement of conditioning to Aconstitutes a demonstration of “superconditioning”. The presence of the inhibitory B sufficiently enhanced the reinforcing power of the moderate reinforcer (+) that it was able to further increase the excitation controlled by A. This occurred even though A had previously been paired with a stronger reinforcer (++). Superconditioning was also observed when A and B were extinguished prior to treatment with + or were originally neutral stimuli followed by + in the presence of an inhibitor trained elsewhere.     

Selective inactivation of adenosine A(2A) receptors in striatal neurons enhances working memory and reversal learning

The adenosine A(2A) receptor (A(2A)R) is highly enriched in the striatum where it is uniquely positioned to integrate dopaminergic, glutamatergic, and other signals to modulate cognition. Although previous studies support the hypothesis that A(2A)R inactivation can be pro-cognitive, analyses of A(2A)R's effects on cognitive functions have been restricted to a small subset of cognitive domains. Furthermore, the relative contribution of A(2A)Rs in distinct brain regions remains largely unknown. Here, we studied the regulation of multiple memory processes by brain region-specific populations of A(2A)Rs. Specifically, we evaluated the cognitive impacts of conditional A(2A)R deletion restricted to either the entire forebrain (i.e., cerebral cortex, hippocampus, and striatum, fb-A(2A)R KO) or to striatum alone (st-A(2A)R KO) in recognition memory, working memory, reference memory, and reversal learning. This comprehensive, comparative analysis showed for the first time that depletion of A(2A)R-dependent signaling in either the entire forebrain or striatum alone is associated with two specific phenotypes indicative of cognitive flexibility-enhanced working memory and enhanced reversal learning. These selective pro-cognitive phenotypes seemed largely attributed to inactivation of striatal A(2A)Rs as they were captured by A(2A)R deletion restricted to striatal neurons. Neither spatial reference memory acquisition nor spatial recognition memory were grossly affected, and no evidence for compensatory changes in striatal or cortical D(1), D(2), or A(1) receptor expression was found. This study provides the first direct demonstration that targeting striatal A(2A)Rs may be an effective, novel strategy to facilitate cognitive flexibility under normal and pathologic conditions.     

Proper Names and the Necessity of Identity Statements

An identity statement flanked on both sides with proper names is necessarily true, Saul Kripke thinks, if it's true at all. Thus, contrary to the received view – or at least what was, prior to Kripke, the received view – a statement like(A) Hesperus is Phosphorusis necessarily true if, as certainly seems to the the case, it's true at all. The received view is that (A) is true but only contingently true, while(B) Hesperus is Hesperuswhich is also true, of course, is necesarily true. Epistemologically, however, both the tradition and Kripke have it that (A) is a posteriori and (B) a priori.There are tensions in Kripke's views concerning (A), though, and ultimately in the views of anyone who holds that (A) is necessary. In this paper I draw attention to some of them and advance an argument for thinking that (A) is contingent.     

The structure of epistemic probabilities

Philosophical Studies - The epistemic probability of A given B is the degree to which B evidentially supports A, or makes A plausible. This paper is a first step in answering the question of what...     

A titration schedule on a treadmill

A technique is presented utilizing a titration schedule to measure performance decrement as a function of continuing heavy muscular exertion. A treadmill is equipped with a reversible motor controlling the velocity control of the treadmill itself. This provides a constant acceleration of the treadmill unless a subject-controlled, spring loaded switch is depressed. If this switch is depressed, the treadmill decelerates at a constant rate. A subject is instructed to walk at maximum rate at all times, controlling the velocity of the treadmill with the switch. A performance record is obtained from a tachometer-generator on the treadmill delivering current to a recorder.     

The Balanced Pseudocomplemented Ockham Algebras with the Strong Endomorphism Kernel Property

Studia Logica - An endomorphism on an algebra $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to be strong if it is compatible with every congruence on $${\mathcal {A}}$$ ; and $${\mathcal {A}}$$ is said to have the...     

A1 is not a conservative extension of S4 but of S5

In [1], D. W. Hart and C. Mcginn considered two logics A1 and A2. These logics embody part of a tradition about a priori knowledge and necessity. They proved that A2 is a conservative extension of a well-known modal logic S5 but left the problem whether A1 is a conservative extension of S4 open. In this note, we shall show that A1 is not a conservative extension of S4 but of S5, and also correct an inadequate proof.     

The Unique Groundability of Temporal Facts

The A‐theory and the B‐theory advance competing claims about how time is grounded. The A‐theory says that A‐facts are more fundamental in grounding time than are B‐facts, and the B‐theory says the reverse. We argue that whichever theory is true of the actual world is also true of all possible worlds containing time. We do this by arguing that time is uniquely groundable: however time is actually grounded, it is necessarily grounded in that way. It follows that if either the A‐theory or the B‐theory is actually false, then it is necessarily false.     

Beliefs,points of view,and multiple environments

The paper describes a system for dealing with nestings of belief in terms of the mechanism of computational environment. A method is offered for computing the beliefs of A about B (and so on) in terms of the systems existing knowledge structures about A and B separately. A proposal for belief percolation is put forward: percolation being a side effect of the process of the computation of nested beliefs, but one which could explain the acquisition of unsupported beliefs. It is argued that the mechanism proposed is compatible with a general least effort hypothesis concerning human mental functioning.     

The Relevance of Beta-Amyloid on Markers of Alzheimer’s Disease in Clinically Normal Individuals and Factors That Influence These Associations

Aberrant accumulation of beta-amyloid (Aβ) is thought to be an early event in a biological cascade that eventually leads to Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Along these lines, many clinically normal (CN) older individuals have evidence of beta-amyloid (Aβ) accumulation, which may be indicative of preclinical AD. However, relationships between Aβ and “downstream” AD markers are often inconsistent across studies. These inconsistencies may be due to the presence of other age-related processes that also influence AD markers, as well as additional risk factors that interact with Aβ to influence downstream changes. For instance, it is possible that the effect of Aβ is modified by neurodegeneration, genetics, sex-differences and cognitive reserve. Thus, a multivariate approach to determining risk of AD within CN participants may be more appropriate than reliance on Aβ status alone. An understanding of how additional risk factors interact with Aβ to influence an individual’s trajectory towards AD is essential for characterizing preclinical AD and has implications for prevention trials.     

Understanding quantified categorical expressions

A model of categorical inference (Revlis, 1975b) claims that a conversion operation participates in the encoding of quantified, categorical expressions. As a consequence, a reasoner is said to interpret such sentences as “All A are B” in a way that permits it to also be the case that “All B are A.” The present study examines this conception of encoding using a sentence-picture verification task. In two experiments, students were asked to judge whether one of five possible Euler diagrams was true or false of a categorical expression (e.g., All A are B, No A are B, Some A are B, Some A are not B). Verification errors support a three-stage verification model whose major component is access to a “meaning stack” representing the progressive analysis of categorical relations; at the top of that stack is a converted reading of the input sentence. These findings have implications for current conceptions of categorical inference and semantic retrieval.     

An asymptotic partial correlation test for the Goodman‐Kruskal λ

Goodman and Kruskal introduced a measure of predictive association when predicting the category of a variable A from a category of a variable B. This measure, denoted λ, is the asymmetric proportional reduction in error measure in predicting an individual's A category that can be eliminated by using knowledge of the B classification. It takes values on the unit interval, with a zero value meaning no predictive gain, while a value of unity indicates a perfect predictive association between A and B. A test of H₀: λ = 0 versus H₁: λ > 0 is analogous to a test for the significance of the correlation coefficient. A test of the partial λ coefficient, which is analogous to a test of the partial correlation coefficient, answers the question of whether knowledge of an additional third (or higher) classification or categorical variable results in a significant increase in predicting the variable A. Suich and Turek developed an exact test for the partial λ coefficient, but only for the situation where the predicted categorical variable A is dichotomous. The present paper completes the previous work by developing an asymptotic test where the predicted category A is any polytomous variable.