Conceptualising humiliation

Humiliation lacks an empirically derived definition, sometimes simply being equated with shame. We approached the conceptualisation of humiliation from a prototype perspective, identifying 61 features of humiliation, some of which are more central to humiliation (e.g. losing self-esteem) than others (e.g. shyness). Prototypical humiliation involved feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation in which one was brought down and in which an audience was present, leading the person to appraise the situation as unfair and resulting in a mix of emotions, most notably disappointment, anger, and shame. Some of the features overlapped with those of shame (e.g. looking like a fool, losing self-esteem, presence of an audience) whereas other features overlapped with those of anger (e.g. being brought down, unfairness). Which specific features are present may determine whether the humiliation experience becomes more shame- or anger-like (or a combination thereof).     

Seeing and being seen: Narcissistic pride and narcissistic humiliation

Seeing and being seen are important aspects of narcissism, where self-consciousness is always a feature, and one which becomes acute when a patient loses the protection of a narcissistic relationship and is obliged to tolerate a degree of separateness. Having felt hidden and protected, he now feels conspicuous and exposed to a gaze which makes him vulnerable to humiliation. This often has a devastating and unbearable quality to it, particularly when it is felt to arise in retaliation to the patient's own use of gaze to establish a superiority which allowed the patient to look down on others. The need to avoid or cut short such humiliation may be so acute that the patient cannot deal with guilt and other emotions connected with loss which might otherwise be bearable. The author argues that development is impeded unless the patient is able to gain support to make the humiliation better understood and hence better tolerated. He describes some sessions from an analysis to illustrate how, in some analytic situations, much of the patient's concern and many of his defensive manoeuvres aim to reduce or to reverse experiences of humiliation. An understanding of the mechanisms involved seemed to enable some development to proceed.     

The unforgivable humiliation: A Dilemma in couples' treatment

Therapists sometimes encounter cases of intense marital discord in which the disaffected spouse seems unable to specify the reason for his or her discontent except in the vaguest, most general terms. Such cases may be extraordinarily difficult to treat, as the disaffected partner may seem impervious to any attempt at negotiation, to the point of dissolution of the marriage. The reason for the disaffected spouse's intransigence may seem unclear to the other spouse, to the therapist, and even to herself/himself. We hypothesize an explanation for this phenomenon in terms of the disaffected partner's experience of having suffered humiliation at the hands of the other spouse and offer a plan for treatment, citing case materials.     

Gaze,dominance and humiliation in the Schreber case1

In this paper the author reviews Freud's study of Schreber's Memoirs and the Memoirs themselves from a perspective of nearly 100 years. He argues that Schreber's illness began as a melancholic depression but quickly developed paranoid features which subsequently escalated into a gross paranoia which nevertheless retained its depressive and hypochondriacal base. Finally the chaotic fragmentation became organized under the dominance of an omnipotent narcissistic organisation which led to a clinical improvement without any relinquishment of his delusional beliefs. As a subsidiary theme he examines the role of gaze in Schreber's object relations and argues that gaze was used to project into his objects, then to scrutinise the object to see if the projections had been received and tolerated, and finally as an expression of dominance. His urgent demand for relief provoked an omnipotence in his objects which he was then able triumphantly to frustrate and which ushered in a struggle over dominance in the course ofwhich Schreber was abused and humiliated. He was unable to find an object who could contain his distress and these factors contributed to the failure to tolerate guilt and to work through his depression.     

Fear of contamination

Compulsive cleaning is an attempt to remove feelings of contamination that threaten one's physical health, mental health or ability to function socially. The fear of becoming contaminated can be complex, powerful, persistent and easily spread. Contamination is defined, the main types of contaminants set out and the characteristics of the fear are described. The distinction between normal and abnormal feelings of contamination is considered, and abnormal beliefs about contamination are analysed. Attention is drawn to the fact that contamination can occur without any physical contact, and the concept of mental pollution is used to elucidate this process. The causes and consequences of contamination fears are described, and some connections between fear and disgust are considered. The concept of cognitive co-morbidity is applied to an analysis of associations between the fear of contamination and obsessions, social fears and phobias. It is suggested that applying cognitive analyses and tactics may improve our ability to treat these powerful and tenacious fears.     

Political humiliation, object use, and psychological changes in the life of Malcolm X

This article examines and describes the traumatic effects of political humiliation in the life of Malcolm X, and the psychosocial changes exhibited in his moving from being snared by the talons of racism to a greater sense of freedom and flexibility in working with a wide variety of people. Malcolm X's suffering and psychosocial changes are framed in terms of object relating and use, as well as by his search for a transformational object that would restore and secure his self-worth and efficacy.     

The Fear of Death

Taking a somewhat indirect route that includes some autobiographical reflection, I address three questions. One is what it might mean to say, with Socrates, that philosophy is "studying for death". The second is why Christians should fear death at all, if the good of Heaven is really what they believe is beyond it. The third is the question what difference it makes to your philosophical view of death if you are a believer.     

心理恐惧的背后

我受雇于闹市区一家金店已有十多年之久,在过去那是绅士贵族们经常光顾的地方,金店门前的地毯上,踩上去的全是那些个脚面上打着光腊,像镜子一样透出主人潇洒风姿的昂贵皮鞋印痕。现在的情形可是与十多年前不再一样,尽管金银首饰还是那么昂贵,购买者已经不仅仅是绅士富姐,多了出双入对的情侣,赚了钱的私人企业家,爱美心切的普通人。这些金家的姊妹们,芳名金戒指、金项     

Fear of the Dark

Meditating on the liturgy of Holy Week, Aemiliana Lohr insisted that “the real Christian Pasch remains the mysterium of night”. The Christian mysterium is “always entire”, but its entirety we can never directly state or see; the darkness of our circumstance wans and waxes. We fear the dark, but what kind of fear is compatible with the command to “fear not”? Exploring this question in relation to Mark's passion narrative, the paper considers the kinds of context in which such reassurance as the first Christians sought might still be needed, for what is required of Christians is “patience”: the of staying awake in the dark. The paper concludes with remarks on the trinitarian grounds and christological character of patience.