The Murderer at the Door: What Kant Should Have Said

Embarrassed by the apparent rigorism Kant expresses so bluntly in 'On a Supposed Right to Lie,' numerous contemporary Kantians have attempted to show that Kant's ethics can justify lying in specific circumstances, in particular, when lying to a murderer is necessary in order to prevent her from killing another innocent person. My aim is to improve upon these efforts and show that lying to prevent the death of another innocent person could be required in Kantian terms. I argue (1) that our perfect Kantian duty of self-preservation can require our lying to save our own lives when threatened with unjust aggression, and (2) that Kant's understanding of moral duty was that duties are symmetrical , such that if one has a duty to perform a given action on one's own behalf or to protect one's own rational nature, then one also has a duty to perform similar acts on other's behalf or to protect their rational nature. Thus, that the individual protected against aggression by means of deception is not oneself should be of no consequence from a Kantian perspective. Lying to the murderer is thus an extension of the Kantian requirement of self-defense.     

The Truth About Deception

The prohibition on lying is often thought to be very stringent. Some have even been tempted to think that it is absolute. In contrast, the prohibition on other forms of deception seems to be looser. This paper explores the relationship between the duty not to deceive and the duty not to lie. This discussion is situated in the context of a broadly Kantian account of morality. Kant himself infamously claimed that one ought not lie to a murderer at the door about the location of his intended victim. This paper aims to explain how a broadly Kantian view can endorse a distinctive duty not to lie without thereby being committed to this kind of conclusion.     

Respectful Lying

I argue that there are instances in which lying to an innocent and generally competent person respects her autonomy, contrary to arguments by Christine Korsgaard and Onora O’Neill. These authors say that respect for a person’s autonomy requires treating her in a way consistent with the possibility of consent, but I contend that the possibility of consent condition is unworkable. I maintain that lying can respect individual autonomy when being truthful to a person undermines her choices and lying gets her what she would reasonably see herself as having most reason to choose in the circumstances. I make my case by reflecting on lying invitations to a surprise party and on negotiation phenomena.     

The Political Philosophy of Sissela Bok

ABSTRACT  Sissela Bok's two main works, on lying and secrets, have not received all the attention they deserve. This is possibly because the underlying structure from which she is working is not, at least according to the critics, made sufficiently explicit. I believe that this structure is found in Sissela Bok's commitment to the fundamental tenets of democracy. This not only provides a framework that is clearly discernible but also gives her books an urgency, and supplies the solid basis necessary for taking up the challenges she puts forward. This is particularly important now that new democracies in Eastern Europe are looking to established democracies in the West for guidelines.     

Can a Robot Lie? Exploring the Folk Concept of Lying as Applied to Artificial Agents

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive.     

Juveniles and adults differ in their beliefs about cues to deception and strategies during a hypothetical police interview

Police officers are often trained to use the Behavior Analysis Interview (BAI) to detect deceit, but it is based on faulty indicators of lying that may be especially problematic for juveniles due to developmental immaturities. Juveniles, young adults, and adults were assigned to guilt or innocence conditions, read a criminal scenario, and self-reported their likelihood of providing truthful and deceitful responses during a hypothetical BAI. All participants indicated they would give more truthful than deceptive responses. Guilty participants reported more use of strategies to appear innocent, while innocent participants said they would behave naturally. Juveniles were more likely to choose deceitful responses and say they would use strategies to appear innocent during a police interview but endorsed fewer stereotypical cues of deception compared to adults. Juveniles may not recognize how certain behaviors could be seen as cues to deception, which could put them at risk of being misidentified as guilty.     

Early versus Late Disclosure of Evidence: Effects on Verbal Cues to Deception,Confessions, and Lie Catchers' Accuracy

The strategic use of evidence (SUE)—a method of using case information to elicit different verbal responses from guilty and innocent suspects—has been shown to increase cues to deception and lie detection accuracy. This study manipulated the timing of evidence presentation to determine its effect on cues to deception, lie detection accuracy, and confession rates. Liars were less consistent with the evidence, and SUE was associated with higher lie detection accuracy. Results showed no difference between early and late disclosure of evidence on suspects' confession rates, nor on the diagnosticity of the confessions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Partners in Crime: How Liars in Collusion Betray Themselves1

The paradigmatic task for participants in studies on deception is to assess veracity on the basis of a single statement. However, in applied contexts, lie catchers are often faced with multiple statements (reported by one or several suspects). To appreciate this mismatch, we conducted a study where each member of 10 truth‐telling pairs and 10 lying pairs (reporting fabricated alibis) was interrogated twice about an alibi. As predicted, lying pair members were more consistent between themselves than were truth‐telling pair members, and single liars and truth tellers were equally consistent over time. Furthermore, truth tellers made more commissions than did liars. Although in line with our repeat vs. reconstruct hypothesis, these findings contrast sharply with beliefs held by professional lie catchers and recommendations found in literature on deception detection. The results are translated into an applied psycholegal context.     

LYING PERSON-TO-PERSON ABOUT LIFE EVENTS: A COGNITIVE FRAMEWORK FOR LIE DETECTION

Undetected lies of prospective or current employees cost business billions of dollars annually. The ability to detect these lies would be of immense benefit. Several recent reports have called for research on new, theoretically based methods of lie detection. In response, we tested the Activation-Decision-Construction Model of lying ( Walczyk, Roper, Seeman, & Humphreys, 2003 ) according to which response time is a cue to deception. Participants were tested person-to-person. In Experiment 1, half lied to questions probing recent episodic memories. The other half answered honestly. Liar-truth teller response time differences were observed between subjects. Discriminant analyses demonstrated the value of response time for uncovering deceit. Those highest in social skills were the quickest liars. In Experiment 2, lying was shown to take longer than truth telling within subjects, and within-subject response time standard deviations were shown to be converging cues to deception. Based on these data and the ADCM, a Time-Restricted Integrity Confirmation (Tri-Con) framework for lie detection is proposed that might one day provide cost effective lie detection for business.     

Suppressing the truth as a mechanism of deception: Delta plots reveal the role of response inhibition in lying

Lying takes more time than telling the truth. Because lying involves withholding the truth, this “lie effect” has been related to response inhibition. We investigated the response inhibition hypothesis of lying using the delta-plot method: A leveling-off of the standard increase of the lie effect with slower reaction times would be indicative of successful response inhibition. Participants performed a reaction-time task that required them to alternate between lying and truth telling in response to autobiographical questions. In two experiments, we found that the delta plot of the lie effect leveled off with longer response latencies, but only in a group of participants who had better inhibitory skills as indexed by relatively small lie effects. This finding supports the role of response inhibition in lying. We elaborate on repercussions for cognitive models of deception and the data analysis of reaction-time based lie tests.     

Deception in psychotherapy: Frequency,typology and relationship

Deception in therapy has been documented anecdotally through various narratives of therapists. The investigation of its occurrence within therapy has largely been overlooked. We explored the reported frequency of deception within psychotherapy, the types of deception used within therapy, the likelihood of people lying to a therapist compared to other groups of people, and client perceptions of the types of deception that therapists use. Ninety‐one participants were provided with a series of deception examples, asked questions about the use of these types of deception within therapy, and asked generally about their use of deception in therapy. We found that a majority of the participants had been deceptive in therapy, and a majority were willing to be deceptive in future therapeutic contexts. Participants were more likely to use white lies than other forms of deception in therapy. Lastly, participants were less likely to lie to therapists compared to strangers and acquaintances. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Being Honest About Dishonesty: Correlating Self‐Reports and Actual Lying

Does everybody lie? A dominant view is that lying is part of everyday social interaction. Recent research, however, has claimed, that robust individual differences exist, with most people reporting that they do not lie, and only a small minority reporting very frequent lying. In this study, we found most people to subjectively report little or no lying. Importantly, we found self‐reports of frequent lying to positively correlate with real‐life cheating and psychopathic tendencies. Our findings question whether lying is normative and common among most people, and instead suggest that most people are honest most of the time and that a small minority lies frequently.     

Deceiving suspects about their alibi is equally harmful to the innocent and guilty

A common belief in police officers is that guilty suspects' statements are less consistent than innocent suspects'. This could leave guilty suspects more vulnerable to missing inconsistencies externally induced into their alibis. Source monitoring and cognitive load approaches suggest that untruthfulness rather than guilt should predict proneness to such deception. Manipulating both guilt and truthfulness, we tested these opposing hypotheses. One hundred twenty‐six participants were accused of stealing gift vouchers after wandering about a building. When interviewed several days later, participants rarely detected alterations in their alibi (23–29%). Unexpectedly, for one of three detection measures, untruthful participants detected more manipulations than did truthful participants. Guilt did not moderate detection rates. Manipulations were equally harmful for guilty and innocent suspects, and blindness to the alibi manipulations was not useful for discriminating innocent from guilty suspects. Because blindness effects are easy to elicit in the legal context, techniques that externally induce inconsistencies should be avoided.     

PREPARED LIES,SPONTANEOUS LIES,MACHIAVELLIANISM, AND NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION

This study investigated cue leakage during deception of factual information for both prepared and spontaneous types of lies. Liars anticipating lying engaged in less postural shifting and shorter latencies than truth tellers prior to lying. During a prepared lie, liars engaged in shorter latencies, shorter message durations, more affirmative head nodding, less smiling, and more body adaptors than truth tellers did. During a spontaneous lie, liars engaged in more body adaptors than truth tellers. No substantive differences were obtained between truth tellers and liars after the lying behavior was completed. Cues were not leaked differently by high and low Machiavellians.     

LYING TO THE NAZI AT THE DOOR

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world.     

The many faces of lying

In this paper the author explores the psychic functions of lying and draws on Glasser's (1979) notions of self-preservative and sadistic violence to identify three selfobject configurations. Each of these is associated with specific anxieties to which the lie offers an apparent solution. The first configuration is sadistic lying. Here the intent is to attack and triumph over the duped other. The lie allows the object to be controlled and humiliated. This gratifies the self by reversing an earlier humiliation. The second and third configurations are both forms of self-preservative lying, where the lie may be best conceived as a symptom of hope (Winnicott, 1985). In the second configuration, the object is felt to be unavailable or inscrutable. The lie may be used to create an attractive self that will elicit the object's love, admiration and concern. In this way, the lie serves to eliminate doubt about the object's intentions towards the self. In the third configuration, the object is felt to be intrusive, and the dyadic relationship is overpowering. Here the lie can represent an attempt to insert a third into the relationship.     

Original Sin and the Hermeneutics of Charity: A Response to Gilbert Meilaender

Looking for a way to read the classic texts of Christian antiquity without treating them either as if they were written yesterday or as if they were archeological artefacts, the author endorses Meilaender's endeavor to develop the insights of Augustine in the modern context. He nevertheless suggests that a different way of drawing the analogy between sex and eating would better capture Augustine's distinctive way of joining theology and ethics and would enable a more vigorous defense of Augustine against modern critics of his treatment of sexuality.     

说谎行为及其识别的心理学研究

国外关于说谎行为及其识别的心理学研究主要包括对说谎时行为表现的研究、对说谎识别准确率的研究及测谎技术的开发与应用。说谎是人类社会普遍存在的现象,但研究显示人们对说谎行为的识别准确率并不显著高于随机判断的概率。说谎者通常所表现出来的与说真话时不同的特点被称为“线索”,人们对说谎线索的看法与说谎者的实际行为表现并不一致。动机、互动特点、个体差异、沟通情境等因素对说谎和识别行为都会产生影响。网络沟通方式下的说谎行为呈现出一些新的特点     

REPUBLICS AND THEIR LOVES: REREADING CITY OF GOD 191

In City of God 19.24, Augustine rejects Cicero's definition of res publica as a society founded on justice for a new definition focused on common objects of love. Robert Markus, Oliver O'Donovan, and a host of Augustinian political theologians have depicted this move as a positive gesture toward secular society. Yet this reading fails to account for why Augustine waited so long to address Cicero's definition, first discussed in Book 2, and for the radical dualism Augustine sets forth between the two cities throughout his text. I argue, in line with Rowan Williams and John Milbank, for a minority reading of Book 19 that draws upon the narrative structure of City of God. In Books 3–5, Augustine recounts the history of the earthly city according to Rome's penchant for violence and idolatry, both a function of love for temporal goods. In Book 18, Augustine traces the history of the earthly city before Rome according to the same themes, completing a narrative argument that humanity has always been divided according to differing loves. Book 19 advances the idea that such idolatry is injustice—a failure to grant God the worship he is due. With the new definition of 19.24, Augustine retains Cicero's emphasis on the importance of virtue in civic society while characteristically shifting the terms of discussion from justice to love. While such a definition means that Rome can be called a res publica, it also prompts a negative judgment upon her history according to her objects of love. Given her violence and idolatry, Rome is no better than Assyria, Babylon, Egypt, and Greece—all subject to withering critique in Book 18. Thus, Augustine's new definition does not retract but extends the polemic of City of God.     

Lying and deceiving--moral choice in public and private life

Suppose that there are good or morally defensible reasons for not responding truthfully to a question or request for information. Is a lie or a deception better as a means to avoid telling the truth? There are many situations in public and private life in which the answer to this question would serve as a useful moral guide, for instance, clinical situations involving dying patients, educational situations, involving young children and personal situations involving close friends. Intuitively, we feel that there is a moral asymmetry in favor of deceiving over lying. However, doubts have been cast on such intuition. The aim of this paper is to bolster this intuition. It will be argued that the claim of moral asymmetry in favor of deception can be supported on a consideration of the different degrees of expectation involved in communicative ethics. Two other objections to the claim of asymmetry will also be considered.