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Timothy Chan 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):395-414
In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually
contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the
functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA),
the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean
assertions are absurd, and that BAA explains why they are. I shall argue that ATB implies that some Moorean assertions are,
in some fairly ordinary contexts, well justified. Thus BAA and ATB are mutually inconsistent. In the concluding section I
explore three possible ways of responding to the dilemma, and what implications they have for the nature of the constitutive
relationships linking belief, assent and behavioural dispositions.
相似文献
Timothy ChanEmail: |
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Stamatios Gerogiorgakis 《逻辑史和逻辑哲学》2016,37(2):101-113
This article discusses rationality gaps triggered by self-referential/cyclic choice, the latter being understood as choosing according to a norm that refers to the choosing itself. The Crocodile Paradox is reformulated and analyzed as a game—named CP—whose Nash equilibrium is shown to trigger a cyclic choice and to invite a rationality gap. It is shown that choosing the Nash equilibrium of CP conforms to the principles Wolfgang Spohn and Haim Gaifman introduced to, allegedly, guarantee acyclicity but, in fact, does not prevent self-referential/cyclic choice and rationality gaps. It is shown that CP is a counter-example to Gaifman's solution of the rationality gaps problem. 相似文献
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Philosophia - I argue that ‘Moore’s paradox for God’. I do not believe this proposition shows that nobody can be both omniscient and rational in all her beliefs. I then anticipate... 相似文献
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Michael Cholbi 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(5):495-510
Assertions of statements such as ‘it’s raining, but I don’t believe it’ are standard examples of what is known as Moore’s
paradox. Here I consider moral equivalents of such statements, statements wherein individuals affirm moral judgments while
also expressing motivational indifference to those judgments (such as ‘hurting animals for fun is wrong, but I don’t care’).
I argue for four main conclusions concerning such statements: 1. Such statements are genuinely paradoxical, even if not contradictory.
2. This paradoxicality can be traced to a form of epistemic self-defeat that also explains the paradoxicality of ordinary
Moore-paradoxical statements. 3. Although a simple form of internalism about moral judgment and motivation can explain the
paradoxicality of these moral equivalents, a more plausible explanation can be provided that does not rely on this simple
form of internalism. 4. The paradoxicality of such statements suggests a more credible understanding of the thesis that those
who are not motivated by their moral judgments are irrational. 相似文献
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Timothy Chan 《Synthese》2010,173(3):211-229
One version of Moore’s Paradox is the challenge to account for the absurdity of beliefs purportedly expressed by someone who
asserts sentences of the form ‘p & I do not believe that p’ (‘Moorean sentences’). The absurdity of these beliefs is philosophically puzzling, given that Moorean sentences (i) are
contingent and often true; and (ii) express contents that are unproblematic when presented in the third-person. In this paper
I critically examine the most popular proposed solution to these two puzzles, according to which Moorean beliefs are absurd
because Moorean sentences are instances of pragmatic paradox; that is to say, the propositions they express are necessarily false-when-believed. My conclusion is that while a Moorean
belief is a pragmatic paradox, it is not
just another pragmatic paradox, because this diagnosis does not explain all the puzzling features of Moorean beliefs. In particularly,
while this analysis is plausible in relation to the puzzle posed by characteristic (i) of Moorean sentences, I argue that
it fails to account for (ii). I do so in the course of an attempt to formulate the definition of a pragmatic paradox in more
precise formal terms, in order to see whether the definition is satisfied by Moorean sentences, but not by their third-person
transpositions. For only an account which can do so could address (ii) adequately. After rejecting a number of attempted formalizations,
I arrive at a definition which delivers the right results. The problem with this definition, however, is that it has to be
couched in first-person terms, making an essential use of ‘I’. Thus the problem of accounting for first-/third-person asymmetry
recurs at a higher order, which shows that the Pragmatic Paradox Resolution fails to identify the source of such asymmetry
highlighted by Moore’s Paradox. 相似文献
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Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Most of the theories of rights propounded by philosophers, right from the beginning till the twentieth century, conceive rights either as a... 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - In this article I assess the prospects for a particular kind of resolution to Moore’s Paradox. It is that Moore’s Paradox is explained by the existence of a... 相似文献
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《Cognitive behaviour therapy》2013,42(6):470-479
This study has explored therapists' experiences of conducting cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) online and face-to-face. Eleven therapists partook in semi-structured interviews, which were thematically analysed using an abductive approach. The results indicate that the therapists viewed face-to-face therapy as a stronger experience than Internet-based CBT (ICBT), and the latter as being more manualised, but providing more work-time control. Several participants also thought that working alliance may be achieved faster and more easily in face-to-face therapy, and might worsen with fewer modalities of communication. Clinical implications in need of investigation are whether working with ICBT might buffer therapist exhaustion, and whether this therapy form can be improved by becoming less manual dependant in order to be easier to individualise. 相似文献
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Jay Newhard 《Philosophical Studies》2005,126(1):1-27
Grelling’s Paradox is the paradox which results from considering whether heterologicality, the word-property which a designator
has when and only when the designator does not bear the word-property it designates, is had by ‘
ȁ8heterologicality’. Although there has been some philosophical debate over its solution, Grelling’s Paradox is nearly uniformly
treated as a variant of either the Liar Paradox or Russell’s Paradox, a paradox which does not present any philosophical challenges
not already presented by the two better known paradoxes. The aims of this paper are, first, to offer a precise formulation
of Grelling’s Paradox which is clearly distinguished from both the Liar Paradox and Russell’s Paradox; second, to offer a
solution to Grelling’s Paradox which both resolves the paradoxical reasoning and accounts for unproblematic predications of
heterologicality; and, third, to argue that there are two lessons to be drawn from Grelling’s Paradox which have not yet been
drawn from the Liar or Russell’s Paradox. The first lesson is that it is possible for the semantic content of a predicate
to be sensitive to the semantic context; i.e., it is possible for a predicate to be an indexical expression. The second lesson
is that the semantic content of an indexical predicate, though unproblematic for many cases, can nevertheless be problematic
in some cases. 相似文献
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This study explored the pictoral representation of men, women, boys, and girls in popular computer magazines through content analysis. Issues of three mass market computer magazines (total pages =2,637) were analyzed to determine numbers of men, women, boys, and girls illustrated; roles in which they were portrayed; and whether they were shown using the computer actively, standing by while others used the computer, or rejecting the computer. Many stereotypic portrayals were found: Men appeared in illustrations almost twice as often as women; women were overrepresented as clerical workers and sex objects, while men were overrepresented as managers, experts, and repair technicians. Women were shown significantly more often in a passive role vis-à-vis computers. In mixed-sex illustrations, men were most often shown in the position of authority. Only women were shown rejecting the computer or portrayed as sex objects. Also included are observations regarding the effects of stereotypic portrayals on women/girls and suggestions for further research. 相似文献
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L. Nathan Oaklander 《Philosophia》2010,38(2):229-241
In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim
of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version
of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that
his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall
demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid. 相似文献
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Quine's holistic empiricist account of scientific inquiry can be characterized by three constitutive principles: noncontradiction, universal revisability and pragmatic ordering. We show that these constitutive principles cannot be regarded as statements within a holistic empiricist's scientific theory of the world. This claim is a corollary of our refutation of Katz's [1998, 2002] argument that holistic empiricism suffers from what he calls the Revisability Paradox. According to Katz, Quine's empiricism is incoherent because its constitutive principles cannot themselves be rationally revised. Using Gärdenfors and Makinson's logic of belief revision based on epistemic entrenchment, we argue that Katz wrongly assumes that the constitutive principles are statements within a holistic empiricist's theory of the world. Instead, we show that constitutive principles are best seen as properties of a holistic empiricist's theory of scientific inquiry and we submit that, without Katz's mistaken assumption, the paradox cannot be formulated. We argue that our perspective on the status of constitutive principles is perfectly in line with Quinean orthodoxy. In conclusion, we compare our findings with van Fraassen's [2002] argument that we should think of empiricism as a stance, rather than as a doctrine. 相似文献
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Andrew Bacon 《Studia Logica》2013,101(1):1-9
In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes1. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry’s paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the ω-inconsistency in ?ukasiewicz’s continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of ukasiewicz logic which individually, but not jointly, lack the problematic feature. 相似文献
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Rafał Palczewski 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):455-478
Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how we can combine our point of view on Fitch’s paradox with the others. Next we give an answer to the question: is distributed knowability factive? At the end, we present some details concerning a construction of anti-realist modal epistemic logic. 相似文献
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Igor Douven 《Studia Logica》2007,86(2):149-182
Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable
truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The
present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists
should care for. 相似文献
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Philosophia - Numerous papers have investigated the transitivity principle of ‘better-than.’ A recent argument appeals to the principle of mereological dominance for transitivity.... 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - I argue that if we allow that Moore’s Method, which involves taking an ordinary knowledge claim to support a substantive metaphysical conclusion, can be used to... 相似文献