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Whitley Kaufman 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2014,9(4):629-632
This book is the fourth volume of a series on moral psychology edited by philosopher Walter Sinnott-Armstrong. Each of these volumes is organized in debate format, with ten or so main essays each followed by responses from two critics, with an opportunity for the author of the main essay to make a final reply.The present volume takes on the question of free will and moral responsibility, and addresses the question of what implications recent discoveries in neuroscience and social psychology have for our traditional notions of moral and legal responsibility, as well as for popular and philosophical notions of free will. Given the constant barrage of media coverage of scientists declaring that science has now proven that free will is an illusion, and even that morality itself is an illusion, this volume covers a topic that is timely, relevant, and important. 相似文献
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Neal A. Tognazzini 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4):809-812
I reconcile the spatiotemporal location of repeatable artworks and impure sets with the non-location of natural numbers despite all three being varieties of abstract objects. This is possible because, while the identity conditions for all three can be given by abstraction principles, in the former two cases spatiotemporal location is a congruence for the equivalence relation featuring in the relevant principle, whereas in the latter it is not. I then generalize this to other ‘physical’ properties like shape, mass, and causal powers. 相似文献
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John Martin Fischer 《The Philosophical quarterly》1998,48(191):215-220
In The Philosophical Quarterly , 47 (1997), pp. 373–81, van Inwagen argues in a critical notice of my book The Metaphysics of Free Will that the impression that Frankfurt-type examples show that moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities results from insufficient analytical precision. He suggests various precise principles which imply that moral responsibility requires alternative possibilities. In reply, I seek to defend the conclusion I have drawn from Frankfurt-type examples: moral responsibility need not require alternative possibilities. I contend that van Inwagen's principles — the principle of possible prevention and the no-matter-what principle — are invalid, and I suggest that their plausibility comes from thinking about a proper subset of the relevant cases. 相似文献
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Saul Smilansky 《The Journal of Ethics》2012,16(2):211-239
In Part I, I reflect in some detail upon the free will problem and about the way its understanding has radically changed. First I outline the four questions that go into making the free will problem. Second, I consider four paradigmatic shifts that have occurred in our understanding of this problem. Then I go on to reflect upon this complex and multi-level situation. In Part II of this essay, I explore the major alternative positions, and defend my views, in new ways. Instead of trying to spread over many issues, I present one new argument against compatibilism, which I call ??The Trap??. This tries to explicate the main problem that I find with this position. Then I present an exposition of what we nevertheless need to follow, which I call ??the Appreciation of Agency??. This supports a measure of compatibilism in a more modest form, and opposes hard determinism. On this basis, we can confront the philosophical and practical questions, as to what we ought to believe and how we ought to live, with respect to free will and moral responsibility. This leads to what I call ??The Bubble,?? which addresses the way in which we deal with the tension between the absence of libertarian free will and The Trap, and the crucial need for the Appreciation of Agency. I conclude by reflecting upon three attributes of the free will problem that I consider central, but that have been neglected in the debate: complexity, risk and tragedy. 相似文献
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Philosophical Studies - 相似文献
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《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(4)
Book Information The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Edited by Robert Kane. Oxford University Press. Oxford. 2002. Pp. xvii + 638. 相似文献
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The aim of the paper is to prove the consistency of libertarianism. We examine the example of Jane, who deliberates at length over whether to vacation in Colorado (C) or Hawaii (H), weighing the costs and benefits, consulting travel brochures, etc. Underlying phenomenological deliberation is an indeterministic neural process in which nonactual motor neural states n(C) and n(H) corresponding to alternatives C and H remain physically possible up until the moment of decision. The neurophysiological probabilities pr(n(C)) and pr(n(H)) evolve continuously according to the different weights Jane's judgement attaches to C and H at different times during the deliberation. The overall process is indeterministic, since Jane's exact judgemental weighting would vary slightly were the process to be repeated from the same initial conditions. The weighting is however rational, and entirely under Jane's control. This controlled, rational, indeterministic process shows that libertarianism is a consistent philosophical thesis. 相似文献
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Jason A. Mahn 《Dialog》2000,39(3):238-240