A Dilemma for Calibrationism

The aim of this paper is to describe a problem for calibrationism: a view about higher order evidence according to which one's credences should be calibrated to one's expected degree of reliability. Calibrationism is attractive, in part, because it explains our intuitive judgments, and provides a strong motivation for certain theories about higher order evidence and peer disagreement. However, I will argue that calibrationism faces a dilemma: There are two versions of the view one might adopt. The first version, I argue, has the implausible consequence that, in a wide range of cases, calibrationism is the only constraint on rational belief. The second version, in addition to having some puzzling consequences, is unmotivated. At the end of the paper I sketch a possible solution.     

A Dilemma for Rule-Consequentialism

Rule-consequentialists tend to argue for their normative theory by claiming that their view matches our moral convictions just as well as a pluralist set of Rossian duties. As an additional advantage, rule-consequentialism offers a unifying justification for these duties. I challenge the first part of the ruleconsequentialist argument and show that Rossian duties match our moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. I ask the rule-consequentialists a simple question. In the case that circumstances change, is the wrongness of acts determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances? I argue that whichever answer the rule-consequentialists give the view leads to normative conclusions that conflict with our moral intuitions. Because some set of Rossian duties can avoid similar problems, rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test advocated by the rule-consequentialists.     

A Dilemma for the Doomsday Argument

I present a new case in which the Doomsday Argument (‘DA’) runs afoul of epistemic intuition much more strongly than before. This leads to a dilemma: in the new case either DA is committed to unacceptable counterintuitiveness and belief in miracles, or else it is irrelevant. I then explore under what conditions DA can escape this dilemma. The discussion turns on several issues that have not been much emphasised in previous work on DA: a concern that I label trumping; the degree of uncertainty about relevant probability estimates; and the exact sequence in which we integrate DA and empirical concerns. I conclude that only given a particular configuration of these factors might DA still be of interest.     

A Systems Dilemma

The current shift of interest, reflected in public policy, from the production of goods to the provision of services, has caused a major re-examination of the nature of the services the individual can expect from his society. This re-examination is producing a number of insights, some of them shocking. In particular, we are learning that many of the systems we have created to deliver services are, in the name of “progress” and “civilization,” contributing to the conditions of human distress they were designed to alleviate. Much has been written lately about how service systems of one kind or another subvert their announced goals—how a welfare system perpetuates poverty, or how the medical profession creates iatrogenic illness. There has not been very much written, however, about how several systems inadvertently combine in their day to day operations in such a way as to frustrate each others' activities, and how, in so doing, they destroy in varying degrees the lives of people, or render it difficult for them to improve their lives. We have all been much too tightly locked in our own niches by training, experience, and various types of private interest to see this kind of interlock. It comes into sharp perspective only when one studies the problems of a single person in terms of his total life space, his “ecology.” This paper represents an effort to describe one such situation in a family as viewed from a community health services program designed to approach human crises as ecological phenomena, and to explore and respond to them within this framework. We have found that the best way to organize our view of the environmental field people move in is according to the diverse systems which make it up, so we have labeled our theoretical base “ecological systems theory.” ( 1 ) What is of particular interest to the behavioral scientist in the situation described is that neither individual nor family diagnosis, nor the contributions of the larger systems (in this case a housing system and a system of medical care) will, if viewed separately, explain the state of the man in question. Only when the contributions of all of these systems are made clear, and their interrelationships explored, do the origins of the phenomena described begin to emerge.     

A Dilemma for Kant's Theory of Substance

This paper poses a dilemma for applying the category of substance given Kant's different conceptions of substance in the Critique of Pure Reason. Briefly stated, if the category of substance applies to an omnipresent and sempiternal substance, then although this would ensure that all experiences of empirical objects take place in a common spatiotemporal framework, one could not individuate these empirical objects and experience their alterations. If the category of substance applies to ordinary empirical objects, however, then although one could individuate these substances and experience their alterations, the category would not pick out a common spatiotemporal framework for these experiences. I will argue that this dilemma can be overcome by examining the development of Kant's conception of substance in his final work, the Opus postumum.     

A Dilemma for Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness

Higher Order theories of consciousness have their fair share of sympathisers, but the arguments mustered in their support are—to my mind—unduly persuasive. My aim in this paper is to show that Higher Order theories cannot accommodate the possibility of misrepresentation without either falling into contradiction, or collapsing into a First-Order theory. If this diagnosis is on the right track, then Higher Order theories—at least in the specific versions here considered—fail to give an account of what they set out to explain: what is distinctive of ‘conscious’ phenomena.     

Same-Sex Marriage: A Dilemma for Parish Clergy

Same-sex marriage within churches is an ongoing, highly contentious, and contested topic. A rich literature depicts dichotomised views, reflecting those of academics at denominational level, and addresses theological substance or denominational policies. Significantly less is known about the perspectives held on the issue by individual clergy at parishioner level. This paper provides a background on the subject of Christian clergy who support same-sex marriage. A review of the literature in this area reveals few sociological studies pertaining to clergy who are supportive of gay rights. No known studies in the combined sociological and psychology scholarship have yet exclusively examined clergy’s perspectives on same-sex marriage. While previous study offers some understanding on religious attitudes toward gay individuals, it should not be assumed that attitudes of religious individuals toward same-sex marriage necessarily follow the same pattern. For many religious people it is more problematic to accept same-sex marriage than same-sex partnerships, as this challenges the definition of the institution of marriage. This paper presents a literature review which identifies a gap in knowledge regarding perspectives of clergy who support same-sex marriage. These perspectives are important to understand, as clergy hold influential positions as opinion leaders impacting both at individual and social level, and influence discourses within religion and beyond.     

A Dilemma for Non‐Analytic Naturalism

In recent years, an impressive research program has developed around non‐analytic reductions of the normative. Nevertheless, non‐analytic naturalists face a damning dilemma: either they need to give the same reductive analysis for epistemic and practical reasons, or they can give a different analyses by treating epistemic and practical reasons as a species of the larger genus, reasonhood. Since, for example, a desire‐based account of epistemic reasons is implausible, the reductionist must opt for the latter. Yet, if the desire‐based account of practical reasons is merely a species of the larger genus, then, due to a violation of irreflexivity, the reduction fails.     

A Dilemma About Necessity

The problem of the source of necessity is the problem of explaining what makes necessary truths necessarily true. Simon Blackburn has presented a dilemma intended to show that any reductive, realist account of the source of necessity is bound to fail. Although Blackburn's dilemma faces serious problems, reflection on the form of explanations of necessities reveals that a revised dilemma succeeds in defeating any reductive account of the source of necessity. The lesson is that necessity is metaphysically primitive and irreducible.

Decision-Making: A Dilemma and a Purpose for Counseling

A goal of counseling is to help decision makers make good decisions. But what is meant by “good”? Two views are discussed: outcome and process. The former is concerned with real-life results after the decision is made, the latter with the quality of the deliberations during the decision-making process. The counselor's interaction occurs during the process and is in terms of the decision maker's statements about reality (rather than reality itself). These statements are often unrealistic in that they inaccurately reflect conditions in real life. Counselors should help decision makers change their inaccurate perceptions so that (1) process deliberations are more likely to lead to expected outcomes, and (2) the decision maker is more likely to be prepared for whatever outcomes occur.     

A Dilemma For Skeptical Theists

Philosophia - The aim of this paper is to defend the evidential Argument from Evil from the challenge brought against it by skeptical theists. That challenge is rooted in skeptical theism's...     

Utopian Vision: A Grand Solution for a Scholarly Dilemma

Reconciling the Zen‐like paradox on the back of every red penny—“out of many, one”—is not for the faint of heart. It is a diversity motto, and a lofty desire that the United States claims to covet. But can its citizens, undocumented or otherwise, even agree on what it is? Is not the desire to maintain a strong sense of community in conflict with a Noah's Ark conception of diversity? Using my personal experience in an intentional community determined to foster racial integration, I explore the complicated possibility of having it both ways. To do so, however, we must construct a notion of community, diversity, and The Good Life that will make us believe and work for this synthesis. Our reactions to the word “utopia” offer a glimpse of the challenges ahead.     

A Way Out of Pettit's Dilemma

Philip Pettit has argued, in 'Non-consequentialism and Universalizability', PQ , 50 (2000), pp. 175–90, that there is a tension between non-consequentialism and universalizability. In response I argue that Pettit's argument begs the question against the non-consequentialist, because it falsely assumes that the non-consequentialist must follow the consequentialist in neglecting the crucial distinction between promoting goods and respecting them.     

False Dilemma: A Systematic Exposition

False dilemma is a specific form of reasoning: despite the fact that it is based on a deductively valid argument form, it is rightly depicted as fallacy. A systematic exposition of false dilemma is missing in theoretical approaches to fallacies. This article formulates six criteria for a well-grounded exposition of a fallacy, suggesting also a systematic exposition of false dilemma. These criteria can be used to both explain, and categorise, the various false dilemma fallacies. The article introduces distinction between four types of false dilemma (and the respective subtypes): (1) False quandary, (2) Defeasible sound quandary, (3) False obstruction and (4) Defeasible sound obstruction. The types of criticism appropriate for each variant of false dilemma are suggested. Being able to discover false dilemma in situations when it is important to make good and free choices is a significant dimension of critical thinking. It may liberate us from accepting the consequences that necessarily follow from prearranged alternatives, when these are not the only alternatives possible. It may also liberate us from refraining from actions on the basis of obstructive disjunctive statements. In that respect, the faculty of critical thinking directed at uncovering reasoning based on false dilemma may also initiate the discovery of new alternatives, or discover the ways of unifying seemingly opposing alternatives. Thus, a well-developed ability to understand the tricky argumentative moves of false dilemma may be a good step towards initiating some features of creative thinking.     

Information and Counseling: A Dilemma

The revolutionary changes in data processing, and the resulting increases in the quantity and quality of information about counselees and their prospective environments, will make the work of the counselor more difficult in several ways. The one problem that is highlighted is the difficulty of maintaining a true counseling process and relationship while at the same time collecting necessary information about the client and about the environments regarding which he must make decisions. 2 solutions and their relative merits are discussed, one involving separation of the information and counseling functions, and the other requiring an integration of the functions by a single counselor.