Winch on Moral Dilemmas and Moral Modality

Peter Winch's famous argument in “The Universalizability of Moral Judgments” that moral judgments are not always universalizable is widely thought to involve an essentially sceptical claim about the limitations of moral theories and moral theorising more generally. In this paper I argue that responses to Winch have generally missed the central positive idea upon which Winch's argument is founded: that what is right for a particular agent to do in a given situation may depend on what is and is not morally possible for them. I then defend the existence of certain genuine moral necessities and impossibilities in order to show how certain first‐person moral judgements may be essentially personal.     

Towards an Embodied Poetics of the Self: Personal Renewal in Dewey and Cavell

This paper examines the different conceptions of personal renewal offered in the writings of John Dewey and Stanley Cavell. Both conceptions, I suggest, can be seen as attempting to reconcile the quest for self-realization with democratic life through a poetic, essentially Emersonian vision of the self as a continual work-in-progress. Accordingly, the kinds of selves that Dewey and Cavell seek are in the end highly compatible. Yet it seems clear too that Dewey and Cavell also stand in a somewhat different relation to the Emersonian tradition, and thus diverge in important ways as to the most preferable means of personal renewal. While Dewey tends to focus on the extensive workings of embodied habit, Cavell's ``Emersonian Perfectionism' takes a more distinctively linguistic turn. After showing the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to personal renewal, I prevail upon the need for educational environments that recognize both the discursive and nondiscursive dimensions of reconstructing the self.     

Does intention involve belief?

Cognitivists think that intention necessarily involves belief; noncognitivists deny this claim. I argue that both sides of the debate have so far overlooked that the beliefs involved in intention are first‐personal beliefs and therefore relevantly different from ordinary beliefs that stand in need of justification through evidence. This move substantially changes the cognitivist thesis, and in such a way that the noncognitivist objections can be avoided. In Section 2, I lay out the intuitions behind cognitivism and the arguments against it that motivate noncognitivist positions. Section 3 discusses and dismisses Velleman's cognitivist response to these arguments. In Section 4, I introduce the distinction between “ordinary” and “first‐personal beliefs.” In Section 5, I argue that intention invariably involves a first‐personal belief that one will do what one intends to do. Finally, in Section 6, I return to the noncognitivist objections and show how my proposal answers them.     

Ethics and the sexual countertransference

In this paper I shall suggest that, in addition to 'conscience', the archetype of Eros plays an important part in 'benign relatedness' and that this is what constitutes an ethical attitude. I also propose that the idea of 'benign relatedness' can provide us with a workable concept for those serving on Ethics Committees especially when our Code of Ethics is unclear or limited. I attempt to show that the analytic attitude is essentially ethical and define what I see as the analytic attitude as a way of demonstrating this. By discussing the neurotic sexual countertransference and unconscious identity I hope to clarify the main reasons for unethical enactments. I use examples of ethical problems, including a personal experience, to illustrate the kinds that occur and lastly I discuss how mourning plays an important part in the resolution and avoidance of these problems.     

Introducing counselling in secondary schools: A case study with reference to frame issues

Abstract

I am a deputy headteacher in a comprehensive school. I believe that the widespread re-introduction of counselling into secondary schools offers possibilities for great benefit, both in terms of the personal well-being and emotional health of students, and also in terms of academic results and other educational indicators. It is my view that, currently, this may particularly be true for boys.

This paper is a double case study: first, of the failure of a student to cope with ordinary schooling because of his emotional difficulties; and, second, of the establishment of a counselling service which resulted from his permanent exclusion from the school.

I allude to some of the theoretical issues which meshed with the practical details of establishing the counselling service, and offer some tentative conclusions about the rationale for counselling in secondary schools and the kind of model which seems most likely to be beneficial.     

THE NATURAL GOD: A GOD EVEN AN ATHEIST CAN BELIEVE IN

Abstract. In this paper, I attempt to dissolve the theism/atheism boundary. In the first part, I consider last things, according to mainstream science. In the second part, I define the Natural God as the Force of Nature—evolving, unifying, maximizing—and consider Its relation to last things. Finally, I discuss our knowledge of the Natural God and Its relevance to our personal lives. I argue that we can know the Natural God through scientific reason combined with global intuition, and that this knowledge, from the perspective of last things, may help us achieve universal love, ethical action, and personal salvation.     

To Live Is to Know,to Know Is to Change: Change in Personal Construct Psychology and Psychological Constructivism

This article deals with the subject of personal change. As such, one could be tempted to say that it deals with psychology as a whole: What else should psychology be concerned with? But this is not exactly how things are, as I will argue by answering a first question: Is psychology, as a discipline, mainly concerned with the study of human change? To a second question—whether personal construct theory (PCT) in particular is mainly concerned with the study of human change—I give an affirmative answer, after some necessary qualifications. I would like to dwell particularly on answering a third question: Can the way personal construct theory deals with change be regarded as centering around a peculiarity? I am convinced that the revolutionary and cutting-edge nature of PCT can be fully appreciated only by pinpointing and highlighting such a peculiarity. In discussing this, I find it convenient to answer a last question: Is the way PCT deals with change akin to the way other theories handle it? After having discussed personal change as it is treated in PCT, I give a bird's eye view of the contribution of personal construct psychology to the fields of psychology more concerned with change—namely, developmental and educational psychology. The last part of the article will focus on the role of change in clinical psychology, and on what Kelly pointed out as the focus of convenience of his theoretical construction: personal construct psychotherapy as a relational process aimed at favoring a personal change.     

Two assessments, by and for the assessor

In this article, I describe 2 assessment experiences, 1 in graduate school and the other more recently, which taught me important personal lessons. Both of the experiences helped me grow as a psychologist and helped me in my own personal life as well. Both experiences dealt with highly personal central issues in my life; the first concerning the development of empathy and the second, important issues centering around aging and death.     

Pedagogical cliff‐jumping

This article chronicles how Introduction to the Study of Religion has become my favorite course to teach. In it, I narrate my process of pedagogical reinvention and syllabus redesign. Framed by professional and personal backstories, I share my pedagogical desires, list some pedagogical cues I took, and articulate pedagogical decisions and associated wagers. (Along the way, I draw on a range of disciplinary, interdisciplinary, and pedagogical materials as guides.) Then I tell how my Intro course realized these elements in its design and its execution. By doing so, I make a case for taking pedagogical risks and for reinventing Intro courses as performative responses to the practical and disciplinary question “how might we study religion?”     

Sharing Responsibility and Holding Responsible

Who, in particular, may hold us responsible for our moral failings? Most discussions of moral responsibility bracket this question, despite its obvious practical importance. In this article, I investigate the moral authority involved and how it arises in the context of personal relationships, such as friendship or family relations. My account is based on the idea that parties to a personal relationship not only share responsibility for their relationship, but also — to some degree that is negotiated between them — for one another's lives. In sharing these responsibilities, we grant people a particular authority to respond to us. By highlighting the responsibility that we assume when we hold someone responsible, I also suggest that this analysis contains important lessons for thinking about responsibility in other contexts.     

Impartial Morality and Practical Deliberation as First‐Personal

Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents.     

Reflections for Clinical Pastoral Education Students in Psychiatric Settings

This article focuses on Donald Capps’s books on mental illness. In doing so I highlight three key insights from Capps that I have applied in my own ministry with persons with mental illness in various psychiatric hospitals. These insights, together with my own experience as a chaplain, lead to three practical lessons for clinical pastoral education students in psychiatric settings. I provide some context for my interest in mental illness and my friendship with Capps, as well as some background regarding how Capps’s writings on mental illness fit with certain broader themes in his own work as a pastoral theologian. This essay is personal throughout.     

Overcoming Initial Group-Leader Anxiety: Skills Plus Experience

Although most counselor education programs offer at least one course in group counseling, there is little evidence that a supervised group counseling practicum is a part of the training of most counselors. This article explores initial group leader anxiety and the importance of the personal involvement of the counselor in facilitating a group. Reactions of counselors to their first group leadership experience are presented to emphasize the personal, theoretical, and practical learning counselors can achieve from a supervised experience.     

Salience Reasoning

The thesis of this essay is that social conventions of the kind Lewis modeled are generated and maintained by a form of practical reasoning which is essentially common. This thesis is defended indirectly by arguing for an interpretation of the role of salience in Lewis’s account of conventions. The remarkable ability of people to identify salient options and appreciate their practical significance in contexts of social interaction, it is argued, is best explained in terms of their exercise of what I call “salience reasoning,” a form of common practical reasoning. The more widely accepted understanding of salience competence, the “natural salience” understanding, fails as an interpretation of the notion at work in Lewis and Schelling (on whom Lewis relied) and is inadequate as an explanation of salience competence.     

Mathematical progress: Between reason and society

It is shown how the historiographic purport of Lakatosian methodology of mathematics is structured on the theme of analysis and synthesis. This theme is explored and extended to the revolutionary phase around 1800. On the basis of this historical investigation it is argued that major innovations, crucial to the appraisal of mathematical progress, defy reconstruction as irreducibly rational processes and should instead essentially be understood as processes of social-cognitive interaction. A model of conceptual change is developed whose essential ingredients are the variability of rational responses to new intellectual and practical challenges arising in the cultural environment of mathematics, and the shifting selective pressure of society. The resulting view of mathematical development is compared with Kuhn's theory of scientific paradigms in the light of some personal communications.     

On the Existence of Duties to the Self (and Their Significance for Moral Philosophy)

Contemporary philosophers generally ignore the topic of duties to the self. I contend that they are mistaken to do so. The question of whether there are such duties, I argue, is of genuine significance when constructing theories of practical reasoning and moral psychology. In this essay, I show that much of the potential importance of duties to the self stems from what has been called the “second‐personal” character of moral duties—the fact that the performance of a duty is “owed to” someone. But this is problematic, as there is reason to doubt whether a person can genuinely owe to herself the performance of an action. Responding to this worry, I show that temporal divisions within an agent's life enable her to relate to herself second‐personally, in the way required by morality. The upshots, I argue, are that we need an intra‐personal theory of justice that specifies the extent of a person's authority over herself, and that we need to rethink our theories of moral emotions in order to specify how an individual ought to respond to attacks on her interests and autonomy that she herself perpetrates.     

Is Jesus Still “ACTing Up”?

In this essay, I discuss the continuing relevance of Jesus ACTED UP in three dimensions: the pastoral, the academic, and the self-critical. Framing the essay with personal reflections, I first describe how the book continues to meet the pastoral needs of the LGBTIQ community, especially by channeling our rage in a constructive way. I then describe how the book continues to be relevant to the academic community by speaking truth to power. Finally, I describe how the book continues to speak to the LGBTIQ community by cautioning against a turning inwards of oneself (i.e. incurvatus in se). I conclude the essay with a personal note of gratitude to Bob Shore-Goss for the ways in which he personally embodies these three dimensions in his life and work.     

Nonrelativist ethical standards for goal setting in psychotherapy

In this article, I discuss two principles that can be viewed as universally applicable in psychotherapy and counseling: respect for clients' welfare and respect for their self-determination. Consideration of the practical application of these principles leads to the formulation of a set of guidelines to aid therapists and counselors in making choices about instrumental and end goals. These guidelines are intended to be applicable regardless of the particular personal and cultural values of the therapist and client.     

Belief Norms and Blindspots

I defend the thesis that beliefs are constitutively normative from two kinds of objections. After clarifying what a “blindspot” proposition is and the different types of blindspots there can be, I show that the existence of such propositions does not undermine the thesis that beliefs are essentially governed by a negative truth norm. I argue that the “normative variance” exhibited by this norm is not a defect. I also argue that if we accept a distinction between subjective and objective norms, there need be no worrying tension between doxastic norms of truth and doxastic norms of evidence. I show how a similar approach applies to the attitude of guessing. I then suggest that if we distinguish between practical and theoretical rationality, we will prefer a negative form of norm that does not positively oblige us to form beliefs. I finish by considering an alternative possible subjunctive form of norm that would also avoid problems with blindspots, but I suggest this has a nonintuitive consequence.     

E = f(P,B): The road to a radical approach to person-environment fit

The title suggests the thesis of this article: Environments are a function of the people behaving in them. I first briefly review my personal saga resulting in the idea that persons cause environments to be what they are. Then I review a new conceptualization of organizational functioning based on the attraction-selection-attrition framework. Implications of this framework for various areas of study in I/O psychology and vocational behavior are then described.