‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All

Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are (a) that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and (b) that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails on its own terms. ‘Ought’ and ‘can’ do not obey the negation test for presupposition, and they do not obey the calculability or the cancelability tests for conversational implicature. I diagnose these failures as partly a result of the importance of the contrapositive of ‘ought implies can’. I end with a final argument emphasizing the role the principle plays in moral thinking, and the fact that no pragmatic account can do it justice.     

是、应该与做--对解释世界、规范世界与改变世界诸问题的形上离析

检讨西方哲学史 ,我们能够清楚地发现两大平行演进的问题 :一是“是” (ｂｅｉｎｇ)的问题 ,一是“应该” (ｏｕｇｈｔ)的问题。“是”的问题也就是“事实”的问题 ,“应该”的问题也就是“价值”的问题。对“是”的问题的提问方式主要有 :是否存在“事实” ?能否以及如何认识“事实” ?对“事实”的表述何以可能 ?对“应该”的问题的提问方式主要有 :何谓“价值” ?存在着哪些价值 ?“价值”选择的前提和基准是什么 ?应当说 ,这两类问题在西方哲学史的两大传统 (古希腊传统和基督教传统 )中都同时存在 ,但古希腊传统以开掘“是”的问题见长…     

I Have Loved: Reply to Commentaries

In replying I explore in more depth the journey of reclaiming the lost love and the mourning of a relationship that could not be publicly or privately grieved. Disavowed love, in its melancholic haunting, compels identity. In agreement with the model of multiplicity proposed by Harris and Hill I delve further into our hybridic racialized identities. I also come to an understanding of our differences, including our experience of whiteness and our processes of racialization. Finally, I engage with the complex issues of anger and forgiveness.     

Even zombies Can be Surprised: A Reply to Graham And Horgan

In their paper “Mary, Mary, Quite Contrary” (2000), George Graham and Terence Horgan argue, contrary to a widespread view, that the so- called Knowledge Argument may after all pose a problem for certain materialist accounts of perceptual experience. I propose a reply to Graham and Horgan on the materialist’s behalf, making use of a distinction between knowing what it’s like to see something F and knowing how F things look.     

Critical NoticeHumanity, Authority and the Mesmeric Ought

Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory , edited by Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn     

I Believe I Am So Called: Reflections on a Vocation in Medical Education

This essay is concerned with the fulfillment of ordination commitments through a pastoral role in medical education and review of medical research with human subjects. Stylistically, it combines memoir with the genre known as “creative non-fiction.” Its major issues have to do with the identity formation and transformation of the author, the function and ethics of institutional review boards, the teaching of medical ethics to medical students, and courses involved in the doctor–patient relationship and in palliative care intended to increase the sensitivity and self-awareness of physicians-in-becoming. This essay was presented in its initial form at the Annual Fellows Meeting of the Society for Values in Higher Education in 2010.     

Reply to Gaus,Richardson, and Weber

Philosophical Studies -