FRANZ KAFKA'S MUSICAL DIET

The anxiety that Franz Kafka felt about his identity as a man, a Jew, a member of the writer’s guild, a citizen of the twentieth century, is clear. How two major focuses of his anxiety – his inability to appreciate musical high culture and his vegetarian eating practices – were linked in his world is the topic of the present paper.     

Architecture and psychoanalysis. Nathaniel Kahn and the search for the father

Abstract

This text is intended as a contribution to the study of the profound mutual relations between architecture and psychoanalysis. Architecture creates representations that conceal unconscious forms of thought; psychoanalysis helps to explain the meanings of these representations – forms of construction and forms of the psyche. The multifaceted work of psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas – his thoughts on the relationships between psychoanalysis and architecture, on the vitality of objects, on the creative implications of the Oedipal relationship – serves as a critical and decisive instrument for the authors’ inquiry. The issue of the “vitality of objects” as described by Bollas also concerns – but only in part – the architectural “object.” One modern form of architecture with an inordinate capacity empathy has to be Louis Kahn’s. Kahn’s youngest son , Nathaniel, lost his father when he was still a child and hardly had a chance to get to know him. After becoming an adult and an established film-maker, he managed to recover his father in two ways: by discovering him in his works, with their powerful affective impact; and by drawing from those very works of his father to enhance his own creative process in his filmic art. As it turns out, it is this very process that has allowed for an emblematically positive resolution of the Oedipal relationship.     

The Ecclesial Ethics of John Howard Yoder’s Abuse

In the last decade – now that his sexual abuse is no longer deniable – Christian ethicists have had to reconsider John Howard Yoder’s theological contributions in the late twentieth century. This essay considers how the witness of the women who survived his abuse exposes the sexism latent in his development of a framework for moral discernment and community discipline. Yoder designed an ecclesiology that was congruent with his pursuit of unaccountable power over the women he used as subjects for working out his exploitative sexuality. His theological contributions, I argue, cannot be separated from his behavior.     

Between Sigmund Freud and Paul Federn: culture as a shared path of sublimation

Freud’s interest in culture and its various manifestations – one could even call it a passion of his – is well known. We examine the correspondence between Freud and Paul Federn – which consists of 147 cards and letters, some of them completely new, and includes Freud’s letters to Federn’s wife – in order to show that their relationship too was based on their shared interest in culture. Federn was more than a colleague: he was both Freud’s right-hand man institutionally in Vienna and a trusted person to whom he referred some of his patients. This correspondence has not only historical significance but also brings to light the theoretical stakes in issues that continue to remain central to psychoanalysis.     

Hamlet: plea for a measure of normality

The author first considers issues in psychoanalytic interpretations of literary characters, especially the question of treating the character as fiction (the aesthetic illusion) or as a real person. The position he adopts is to interpret Hamlet as a potential person, created by Shakespeare and an expression of Shakespeare’s actual – and intuitive – view of man.

With a synopsis of the tragedy and the context of its creation as background, the author then reflects on questions concerning the play. How does Shakespeare present the characters? Is Hamlet’s madness pretended or real? Which conflicts does he handle in the course of the play? Has Oedipal dynamics a role as motivational factor in his mind?

Hamlet is irrational, impulsive, emotional, inhibited, brooding, suspicious, revengeful, condemning and much more. But, in the view of the author, he is all this in a human, ‘normal’ way. There is nothing convincingly pathological or constricted in his character. ‘Un-normal’ is his intelligence and his wit. Hamlet – an intelligent, reflected, resourceful prince in late Renaissance – who has wrestle with a madhouse of political intrigues, family murders and deceitful friends.

Hamlet in Shakespeare’s text – a fairly normal person in quite a mad world.     

Rational Action Entails Rational Desire: A Critical Review of Searle's Rationality in Action1

Abstract

In this paper I contest Searle's thesis that desire-independent reasons for action – ‘reasons that are binding on a rational agent, regardless of desires and dispositions in his motivational set’ – are inherent in the concept of rationality. Following Searle's procedure, I first address his argument that altruistic reasons for action inhere in the concept of rationality, and then examine his argument for his more general thesis. I conclude that a viable theory of rational action would be centered, not on the concept of desire-independent reasons, but rather on the concept of rational desire.     

C. G. Jung and intuition: from the mindscape of the paranormal to the heart of psychology

Intuition is central in the work, practice, and philosophical legacy of C. G. Jung. In this paper, I will first discuss the importance of intuition for Jung in the paradigm usually designated the ‘paranormal’. Jung was attracted to intuition as an extra‐ordinary gift or function in the traditional sense, and this is considered here in relation to his 1896‐1899 Zofingia Lectures and 1902 On the Psychology and Pathology of So‐called Occult Phenomena: A Psychiatric Study. A significant development then occurred in 1913, when esotericist intuitions were turned toward psychological use with Jung's Red Book. There, his personal and private use of intuition – and we know how extraordinarily intuitive he was – led Jung to fully incorporate intuition at the core of his psychology. Not only in his practice, in the crucial intuitive form of empathy, but as we will see, also at the very heart of his theory. In 1921, Jung wrote Psychological Types, where intuition became one – the first – of the four fundamental functions and types of the psyche next to thinking, feeling, and sensation. In 1921, Jung proved to the world in rational argument that intuition was no longer a psychologist's hobby for table turning, but the most significant function of the psyche.     

Where angels fear to tread: neurophenomenology and the matter of belief

The article explores Manuel Vásquez’ treatment of cultural neurophenomenology within the broader context of his non-reductionist methodology. By paying particular attention to the context of Tibetan Buddhist monks in disapora – the primary subjects of neurophenomenological research – it is suggested that Vásquez’ neurophenomenology is not as culturally mediated as he claims. His treatment may undermine his larger contention that politics shape both religious experience and the scholarly methodologies used to explore them.     

What is wrong with religious education? A response to Philip Barnes

This article reviews Philip Barnes’ account of problems with religious eEducation (RE), and explores the practical implications of his position. Acknowledging his compelling logic – that RE is premised on an acceptance of all religions as equally theologically true – this article argues for optimism: with controversy and ambiguity moving to centre stage, a re‐orientation of RE’s attainment targets could focus RE curricula and provide a measure of direction for future progress. Equally, a focus on developing individual values for life in a plural democracy – where personal destinies often conflict both culturally and existentially – would likewise give RE a more potent purpose and the foundations for a normative agenda. Inspired by J.S. Mill, this article concludes that such RE may have to move beyond the classroom to achieve its potential as a critical, inclusive, relevant and progressive subject with coherent social and educational aims.     

Leibniz on Infinite Numbers,Infinite Wholes,and Composite Substances

Leibniz claims that nature is actually infinite but rejects infinite number. Are his mathematical commitments out of step with his metaphysical ones? It is widely accepted that Leibniz has a viable response to this problem: there can be infinitely many created substances, but no infinite number of them. But there is a second problem that has not been satisfactorily resolved. It has been suggested that Leibniz's argument against the world soul relies on his rejection of infinite number, and, as such, Leibniz cannot assert that any body has a soul without also accepting infinite number, since any body has infinitely many parts. Previous attempts to address this concern have misunderstood the character of Leibniz's rejection of infinite number. I argue that Leibniz draws an important distinction between ‘wholes’ – collections of parts that can be thought of as a single thing – and ‘fictional wholes’ – collections of parts that cannot be thought of as a single thing, which allows us to make sense of his rejection of infinite number in a way that does not conflict either with his view that the world is actually infinite or that the bodies of substances have infinitely many parts.     

Does John Henry Newman Have a Theo‐Drama?

The essay surveys Newman's work in literary drama, from an early essay on Aristotle's Poetics to his adaptation of Roman comedies for production at the Oratory School, in order to approach his affinities with Hans Urs von Balthasar's theological dramatic theory. Newman does not find a Balthasarian theo‐drama via literary drama – perhaps because he was not properly exposed to medieval religious drama – but scattered dramatic analogies in his history writing suggest that he undertakes a theo‐drama in that genre. Von Balthasar and Newman employ dramatic analogies to reject chiliastic apocalyptic and foster ‘keromatic’ apocalyptic.     

Hume and the nominalist tradition

Many of the central theses of Hume's philosophy – his rejection of real relations, universals, abstract objects and necessary causal relations – had precedents in the later medieval nominalist tradition. Hume and his medieval predecessors developed complex semantic theories to show both how ontologies are apt to become inflated and how, if we understand carefully the processes by which meaning is generated, we can achieve greater ontological parsimony. Tracing a trajectory from those medieval traditions to Hume reveals Hume to be more radical, particularly in his rejection of abstraction and abstract ideas. Hume's denial of general, abstract ideas is consistent with his philosophical principles but fails to appreciate the more sophisticated nominalist approaches to abstraction, the result of which is a theoretically impoverished account of our capacity for generalization.     

Beyond the New perspective

Krister Stendahl’s famous 1963 Harvard Theological Review article, “The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West”, is often seen as the kick-starter of the New Perspective on Paul. According to Stendahl, Protestantism could not trace its theological roots to the Pauline correspondence. Dogmatic reflections on the human condition had to await a figure like Augustine, whose elaborate theology complied with the new situation of the church as the official religion of the Empire. Nevertheless, in order to argue his case as a missionary among Jews and Gentiles, Paul was informed by the discussions of the human condition that characterized Hellenistic Judaism. A glance at Philo’s writings will help us to identify the problems to which Paul saw the Christ-event as the solution. Scholars are aware that in De opificio mundi – in his interpretation of the generation of the first woman and her fatal encounter with the snake (Opif. 152, 161) – Philo engages with the discussions among the various philosophical schools of his time about the character of the primary driver of human action. In this exposition, which links the desire for pleasure with generation – and consequently with the flesh – we find a preconception of Augustine’s doctrine of original sin. The present essay argues that anthropological ideas similar to those found in Philo’s treatises also influenced the arguments in Paul’s letters – above all Rom 7 and Gal 2. Consequently, some of the “truisms” of the New Perspective – and, especially, those of the radical branch of it – must be revisited and revised.     

CAUSATION AND THE CANBERRA PLAN

David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure.     

Adorno and Schelling on the art–nature relation

When it comes to the relationship between art and nature, research on Adorno’s aesthetics usually centres on his discussion of Kant and Hegel. While this reflects Adorno’s own position – his comprehension of this relationship is to a large extent developed through a critical re-reading of both the Kantian and the Hegelian position – I argue that we are able to gain important insights into Adorno’s aesthetics and the central art–nature relation by reading his ideas in the light of Schelling’s conception of this relationship. The article focuses on the similarities between Schelling’s notion of nature’s productivity and Adorno’s understanding of natural beauty. It concludes with a discussion on Adorno’s re-evaluation of the reconciliatory power of the exemplary unity of the artwork in conjunction with Schelling’s comparison between artwork and organism, as well as his concept of the construction of nature.     

QUASI‐NATURALISM AND MORAL REALITY

In his recent book Moral Reality, Paul Bloomfield has put forward an original set of arguments for moral realism. Central to his treatment is an argument for the reality of moral properties, one which models them on the property of being healthy. The paper is a critical examination of Bloomfield's central line of argument. It is contended that his proposed method of grounding moral realism fails, inasmuch as his Distinction Test criterion for property reality – essentially the claim that a property exists if its existence is required for distinctions that we make and must make – is inadequate. An alternative approach toward properties is suggested, which has the result, inter alia, that Bloomfield's quasi‐naturalistic approach is unnecessary for the defense of moral realism.¹     

Zum Matching bei ambulanter Psychotherapie mit Psychosepatienten

In an outpatient setting the matching of patient and psychotherapist is essential as there is – in most cases – no protecting institutional frame. Because of the disturbance in his symbolic function the psychotic patient tends to act out his basic conflict between self- and object-related tendencies. As the patient strives for differentiation and separation, naturally, struggle is involved on various levels. The therapist must feel up to all aspects of this struggle including the more concrete ones. Also psychotic patients always induce an intricate interplay of narcissistic transference and countertransference. The psychotherapist should have the capacity to gain distance from his narcissistic countertransference, which as a rule should find support through supervision. It is necessary that in the patient there exist remnants of relatedness to his fellow-men and also a minimum amount of ego-strength and structure that enables him to cope with a cycle of more or less periodical appointments.     

Mill’s act-utilitarian interpreters on Utilitarianism chapter V paragraph 14

In the fourteenth paragraph of the fifth chapter of Utilitarianism, J. S. Mill writes that ‘We do not call anything wrong, unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow-creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.’ I criticize the attempts of three commentators who have recently presented act-utilitarian readings of Mill – Roger Crisp, David Brink, and Piers Norris Turner – to accommodate this passage.     

Mein Konzept der Supervision

The reflections on supervision presented in this paper were written against the background of a psychoanalytic training. The paper describes what – in the author's view – characterizes a patient in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, a psychoanalytic therapist, and a supervisor. In addition, the author reports on his personal experiences which he has made with supervision in the course of his activity as a psychoanalyst in the roles of supervised and supervisor. In this context, he presents some actual memories from supervisory experiences with M. Balint, H. Argelander and F. Morgenthaler.