Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer

In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against my critique.     

Accommodating Counterfactual Attitudes: A Further Reply to Johansson

Here we respond to Johansson’s main worry, as laid out in his, “Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.” We show how our principle BF*(dd*) can be adjusted to address this concern compatibly with our fundamental approach to responding to Lucretius.     

Zebras,Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics

Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and doesn’t do what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.     

Embarrassment: Actual vs. typical cases,classical vs. prototypical representations

Abstract

Theories of embarrassment were investigated by having subjects either recall an occasion when they were embarrassed or describe their idea of a typical instance of embarrassment. Subjects then rated their account on a questionnaire designed to measure five theoretical approaches to embarrassment: dramaturgic theory, social anxiety theory, and three decreased self-esteem theories. Patterns of means and of covariation for actual embarrassment best supported the dramaturgic theory. In contrast, subjects' accounts of typical embarrassment contained elements of all five theories. The written accounts were analysed to produce a prototype of embarrassment, which consisted mostly of elements of the dramaturgic and social anxiety theories. We propose that the concept of embarrassment is necessarily linked to dramaturgic difficulties, whereas it is contingently linked to social anxiety and decreased self-esteem.     

Counterfactual reasoning: From childhood to adulthood

The objective of this study was to describe the developmental progression of counterfactual reasoning from childhood to adulthood. In contrast to the traditional view, it was recently reported by Rafetseder and colleagues that even a majority of 6-year-old children do not engage in counterfactual reasoning when asked counterfactual questions (Child Development, 2010, Vol. 81, pp. 376–389). By continuing to use the same method, the main result of the current Study 1 was that performance of the 9- to 11-year-olds was comparable to that of the 6-year-olds, whereas the 12- to 14-year-olds approximated adult performance. Study 2, using an intuitively simpler task based on Harris and colleagues (Cognition, 1996, Vol. 61, pp. 233–259), resulted in a similar conclusion, specifically that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not fully developed in all children before 12 years of age. We conclude that children who failed our tasks seem to lack an understanding of what needs to be changed (events that are causally dependent on the counterfactual assumption) and what needs to be left unchanged and so needs to be kept as it actually happened. Alternative explanations, particularly executive functioning, are discussed in detail.     

Counterfactual and prefactual conditionals.

We consider reasoning about prefactual possibilities in the future, for example, "if I were to win the lottery next year I would buy a yacht" and counterfactual possibilities, for example, "if I had won the lottery last year, I would have bought a yacht." People may reason about indicative conditionals, for example, "if I won the lottery I bought a yacht" by keeping in mind a few true possibilities, for example, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht." They understand counterfactuals by keeping in mind two possibilities, the conjecture, "I won the lottery and I bought a yacht" and the presupposed facts, "I did not win the lottery and I did not buy a yacht." We report the results of three experiments on prefactuals that examine what people judge them to imply, the possibilities they judge to be consistent with them, and the inferences they judge to follow from them. The results show that reasoners keep a single possibility in mind to understand a prefactual.     

Dispositional Affectivity and Work-Related Outcomes: A Meta-Analysis

This study meta-analytically reviews the influence of individuals' dispositional negative affectivity (NA) and positive affectivity (PA) on a broad range of work-related outcomes grouped into 3 categories: (a) work attitudes; (b) workplace experiences; and (c) work behavior. Across cumulative studies, it was found that NA and PA demonstrated significant effects on most of these outcomes. Moreover, we found some interesting differences in NA's and PA's relationships with work outcomes. Specifically, while NA had more influence on variables pertinent to work stressors (e.g., role problems), PA demonstrated a stronger effect on variables related to positive job and organizational context (e.g., job autonomy, procedural justice). Implications for theory advancement and future research in this area are discussed.     

Pornography's Many Meanings: A Reply to C.M. Concepcion

C.M. Conception's review of “Pornography: An Uncivil Liberty ¹ 1 See Steinem (1986, 250); discussed in Carse (1995, 175-76, n. 15).
” ( Carse 1995 ) fundamentally misconstrues the position defended in that article. This paper examines possible sources of this misconstrual, focusing critical attention on the narrowly crafted, morally loaded notion of “pornography” that figures centrally in the original argument under review. Pornography is not a category of speech that can be charaC' terized as having one crucial meaning or message, nor is the message of pornography easily identifiable in instances of pornographic speech. This raises the problem of interpretive privilege, which haunts many of the antipomography arguments being offered in the contemporary debate, including the author's own earlier argument.     

A Dispositional Theory of Love

On a naive reading of the major accounts of love, love is a kind of mental event. A recent trend in the philosophical literature on love is to reject these accounts on the basis that they do not do justice to the historical dimension of love, as love essentially involves a distinctive kind of temporally extended pattern. Although the historicist account has advantages over the positions that it opposes, its appeal to the notion of a pattern is problematic. I will argue that an account of love as disposition, suitably construed, is superior to the historicist account in that it has the advantages the historicist account has without its problems. In addition, the dispositional account has advantages of its own.