How to Individuate Universals—Or Not

In a recent article in this journal, J. P. Moreland (2013) extends his theory of individuation to include universals. In this note, I show how Moreland’s novel proposal leads to the unwanted conclusion that every concrete particular exists of necessity and has but a single essential property.     

To Recycle or Not to Recycle? An Intergenerational Approach to Nuclear Fuel Cycles

This paper approaches the choice between the open and closed nuclear fuel cycles as a matter of intergenerational justice, by revealing the value conflicts in the production of nuclear energy. The closed fuel cycle improve sustainability in terms of the supply certainty of uranium and involves less long-term radiological risks and proliferation concerns. However, it compromises short-term public health and safety and security, due to the separation of plutonium. The trade-offs in nuclear energy are reducible to a chief trade-off between the present and the future. To what extent should we take care of our produced nuclear waste and to what extent should we accept additional risks to the present generation, in order to diminish the exposure of future generation to those risks? The advocates of the open fuel cycle should explain why they are willing to transfer all the risks for a very long period of time (200,000 years) to future generations. In addition, supporters of the closed fuel cycle should underpin their acceptance of additional risks to the present generation and make the actual reduction of risk to the future plausible.     

What's Not to Love? Rethinking Appeals to Tradition in Contemporary Debates in Trinitarian Theology

Contemporary discussions of the doctrine of the Trinity are sometimes centered on debates between ‘Social Trinitarians’ and ‘Classical Trinitarians.’ Those who align with ‘Social Trinitarianism’ usually insist that an adequate doctrine of the Trinity demands an affirmation of intra-Trinitarian mutual love – and thus reject the doctrine of divine simplicity and numerical sameness out of a commitment to being fully Trinitarian. Meanwhile, those who want to recover ‘Classical Trinitarianism’ insist that the doctrine of divine simplicity is true and salutary – and thus reject any notion of love shared between the Father and Son within the divine life. I argue that both alternatives are profoundly out of step with the theological tradition they claim to retrieve and represent, for simultaneous affirmations of divine simplicity and mutual love are found all across the tradition of Latin scholastic theology. Constructive Trinitarian theology that makes appeal to the ‘classical’ tradition should take this diversity and complexity into account.     

To Buy or Not to Buy? Introducing Philosophy of Religion

Books reviewed in this article:
Beverley Clack and Brian R. Clack, The Philosophy of Religion: A Critical Introduction
Brian Davies OP (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject     

How Not to Write a Biography… Perhaps: A Preface

Writing a biography can take on a life of its own. The twists and turns of capturing another's personal history often result in the author's deepening sense of the pitfalls and triumphs animating his or her own life. Consequently in a biography can be found much of the biographer. Though sources are the resources informing “the story,” the effort to illuminate decisions and actions casts a shadow inward, prompting questions and concerns, uncertainties and fears about how much can truly be discovered about another we do not know.     

The Structure’s Legacy: Not from Philosophy to Description

In the paper I consider how empirical material, from either history or sociology, features in Kuhn’s account of science in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and argue that the study of scientific practice did not offer him data to be used as evidence for defending hypotheses but rather cultivated a sensitivity for detail and difference which helped him undermine an idealized conception of science. Recent attempts in the science studies literature, appealing to Wittgenstein’s philosophy, have aimed at reducing philosophy to multifaceted empirical research in relation to science. I discuss how this turn which is at odds with Wittgenstein’s philosophy, cannot be a continuation of Kuhn’s project which bears similarities to Wittgenstein’s.     

Supportive When Not Supported? Male Responses to Negative Climates for Women

This study examined the relationship between perceived climate for women and job satisfaction in a male-dominated context, focusing on moderating variables which may augment or decrease this relationship for men. Specifically, it was predicted that job satisfaction will be lower for women and men in a male-dominated context when they perceive a negative climate for women, but that this relationship will be moderated for men based on the levels of support and exclusion they experience. Using a sample of 239 (75.7% male) professors, staff, graduate assistants, and undergraduate assistants in a male-dominated science department of a large Midwestern university, we found that perceptions of a negative climate for women were significantly related to lower reports of job satisfaction for both women and men. However, perceived organizational support moderated this relationship, such that the job satisfaction of men who felt highly supported by the organization were unaffected by the perceived climate for women. Discussion and implications of results are included.     

Peirce-Suit of Truth – Why Inference to the Best Explanation and Abduction Ought Not to be Confused

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded.     

To Die or Not to Die: Zhuangzi’s Three Immortalities

While it is known that the problem of death is a central topic animating the author/s of the Inner Chapters of the Zhuangzi, leading Chinese and Western interpretations of this Chinese classic have usually focused much more on other themes and aspects. Even more problematic in the author’s view is the fact that the Zhuangzi has been closely associated with one death philosophy, the set of concepts, arguments and figures present in chapter 6. This study puts death back at the very center of the Zhuangzian philosophical project yet insisting at the same time on the difficulties of defending one philosophy of death since different passages introduce new concepts, imagery, nuances and perspectives. The Zhuangzi’s focus on death is being situated within a discussion of the “immortality” ideal––accepting a total death (“to die”) or find refuge in immortality ideals (“not to die”). Different passages from the Inner Chapters are being presented as proposing three distinct immortality projects or strategies––personal, social and cosmic––to address the problem of death. E. Becker’s reflections on the challenge of mortality and the psychological need of a “beyond” in order to cope with the consciousness of death provide the basic theoretical framework underlying the discussion of the Zhuangzi in this essay.     

Defining Creativity: Don't We Also Need to Define What Is Not Creative?

I argue that any attempt to define creative ideas cannot fully succeed without also defining uncreative ideas. This argument begins by defining three parameters that characterize a potentially creative thought: the idea's initial probability (p), the final utility (u), and the creator's prior knowledge of that utility (v). The three parameters then lead to a three‐criterion multiplicative definition of personal creativity, namely, c = (1 ? p)u(1 ? v), where the first factor indicates originality and the third factor surprise. Although creativity can only maximize as originality, utility, and surprise all approach unity, the same definition indicates that there are seven different ways that creativity can minimize. These alternatives were identified as (a) routine, reproductive, or habitual ideas, (b) fortuitous response bias, (c) irrational perseveration, (d) problem finding, (e) rational suppression, (f) irrational suppression, and (g) blissful ignorance. If the third parameter v is omitted, then the number of creative and noncreative outcomes reduces to just four, making creativity indistinguishable from irrational suppression. The alternative outcomes are then illustrated using the classic two‐string problem. Besides providing a more finely differentiated conception of creativity failures, the definition has critical implications regarding the processes and procedures required to generate highly creative ideas.     

Ignoring Easterlin: Why Easterlin’s Correlation Findings Need Not Matter to Public Policy

Many believe that the lack of correlation between happiness and income, first discovered by Richard Easterlin in 1974, entails the conclusion that well-being policies should be made based on happiness measures, rather than income measures. I argue that distinguishing between how well-being is characterized and how that characterization is measured introduces ways of denying the conclusion that policies should be made based on happiness measures. It is possible to avoid the conclusion either by denying that well-being hedonism is true or by denying that happiness measures are a better way of operationalizing hedonism than income measures are. By making these possibilities explicit, we find that less hinges on whether income and happiness are correlated than is often thought.