Theology,Metaphysics, and Realism about Truth

This essay examines the theological grounds for rejecting metaphysics and the correspondence theory of truth, and argues that while there are good grounds for rejecting a certain kind of metaphysically oriented theology, metaphysics per se is neither objectionable nor avoidable in Christian theology. In the process, it also defends a realist conception of truth against some recent theological criticisms, and argues that a commitment to a modest version of metaphysical realism and realism about truth is not only philosophically tenable, but also theologically preferable to non‐realist views.     

Truth in Fiction,Impossible Worlds,and Belief Revision

We present a theory of truth in fiction that improves on Lewis's [1978] ‘Analysis 2’ in two ways. First, we expand Lewis's possible worlds apparatus by adding non-normal or impossible worlds. Second, we model truth in fiction as (make-believed) belief revision via ideas from dynamic epistemic logic. We explain the major objections raised against Lewis's original view and show that our theory overcomes them.     

Cornell Realism,Explanation, and Natural Properties

The claim that ordinary ethical discourse is typically true and that ethical facts are typically knowable (ethical conservativism) seems in tension with the claim that ordinary ethical discourse is about features of reality friendly to a scientific worldview (ethical naturalism). Cornell Realism attempts to dispel this tension by claiming that ordinary ethical discourse is, in fact, discourse about the same kinds of things that scientific discourse is about: natural properties. We offer two novel arguments in reply. First, we identify a key assumption that we find unlikely to be true. Second, we identify two features of typical natural properties that ethical properties lack. We conclude that Cornell Realism falls short of dispelling the tension between ethical conservativism and ethical naturalism.     

Alethic Pluralism,Logical Validity,and Natural Truth

Philosophia - Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as...