“Memory of Water” Without Water: The Logic of Disputed Experiments

The “memory of water” was a major international controversy that remains unresolved. Taken seriously or not, this hypothesis leads to logical contradictions in both cases. Indeed, if this hypothesis is held as wrong, then we have to explain how a physiological signal emerged from the background and we have to elucidate a bulk of coherent results. If this hypothesis is held as true, we must explain why these experiments were difficult to reproduce by other teams and why some blind experiments were so disturbing for the expected outcomes. In this article, a third way is proposed by modeling these experiments in a quantum-like probabilistic model. It is interesting to note that this model does not need the hypothesis of the “memory of water” and, nevertheless, all the features of Benveniste’s experiments are taken into account (emergence of a signal from the background, difficulties faced by other teams in terms of reproducibility, disturbances during blind experiments, and apparent “jumps of activity” between samples). In conclusion, it is proposed that the cognitive states of the experimenter exhibited quantum-like properties during Benveniste’s experiments.     

Thought experiments in personal identity: A dialogue with Beck,Wagner and Wilkes

In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ criticisms and justify the use of thought experiments in the debate of personal identity. This will allow us to see why Beck and Wagner were both half right and half wrong in their discussion.     

Determinants of confirming and disconfirming responses to negative social labels

Two experiments explored the question of when people will respond to negative labels by confirming them and when they will respond by disconfirming them. In a field experiment subjects were accused of not taking advantage of the opportunities available in a nearby city, and in a laboratory experiment they were accused of having low self-confidence. After these accusations, subjects were given an opportunity to behave in ways that varied in the degree to which they were consistent with the experimenter's labels. For some subjects the experimenter's accusations included mention of the fact that the negative label also applied to many other members of their group, while for other subjects this group factor was not mentioned. The reference to the group either increased or decreased subjects' label-confirming behavior, depeding on whether the subject had provided the experimenter with evidence consistent with the label before the accusations were made. When the experimenter had this evidence, subjects subsequently confirmed the label more if the fact that the negative label applied to many group members was mentioned than if it was not mentioned. When the experimenter accused the subject without having any evidence, subjects disconfirmed the label more if the group was mentioned than if it was not.     

The source of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning.

In studies of the belief bias effect in syllogistic reasoning, an interaction between logical validity and the believability of the conclusion has been found; in essence, logic has a larger effect on unbelievable than on believable conclusions. Two main explanations have been proposed for this finding. The selective scrutiny account claims that people focus on the conclusion and only engage in logical processing if this is found to be unbelievable; while the misinterpreted necessity account claims that subjects misunderstand what is meant by logical necessity and respond on the basis of believability when indeterminate syllogisms are presented. Experiments 1 and 2 compared the predictions of these two theories by examining whether the interaction would disappear if only determinate syllogisms were used. It did, thus providing strong support for the misinterpreted necessity explanation. However, the results are also consistent with a version of the mental models theory, and so Experiment 3 was carried out to compare these two explanations. The mental models theory received strong support, as it did also in the follow-up Experiments 4 and 5. It is concluded that people try to construct a mental model of the premises but, if there is a believable conclusion consistent with the first model they produce, then they fail to construct alternative models.     

The negated conditional: a litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals.     

A connectionist model of category learning by individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) show atypical patterns of learning and generalization. We explored the possible impacts of autism-related neural abnormalities on perceptual category learning using a neural network model of visual cortical processing. When applied to experiments in which children or adults were trained to classify complex two-dimensional images, the model can account for atypical patterns of perceptual generalization. This is only possible, however, when individual differences in learning are taken into account. In particular, analyses performed with a self-organizing map suggested that individuals with high-functioning ASD show two distinct generalization patterns: one that is comparable to typical patterns, and a second in which there is almost no generalization. The model leads to novel predictions about how individuals will generalize when trained with simplified input sets and can explain why some researchers have failed to detect learning or generalization deficits in prior studies of category learning by individuals with autism. On the basis of these simulations, we propose that deficits in basic neural plasticity mechanisms may be sufficient to account for the atypical patterns of perceptual category learning and generalization associated with autism, but they do not account for why only a subset of individuals with autism would show such deficits. If variations in performance across subgroups reflect heterogeneous neural abnormalities, then future behavioral and neuroimaging studies of individuals with ASD will need to account for such disparities.     

Deontic Reasoning With Emotional Content: Evolutionary Psychology or Decision Theory?

Three experiments investigated the contrasting predictions of the evolutionary and decision-theoretic approaches to deontic reasoning. Two experiments embedded a hazard management (HM) rule in a social contract scenario that should lead to competition between innate modules. A 3rd experiment used a pure HM task. Threatening material was also introduced into the antecedent, p, of a deontic rule, if p then must q. According to the evolutionary approach, more HM responses (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000) are predicted when p is threatening, whereas decision theory predicts fewer. All 3 experiments were consistent with decision theory. Other theories are discussed, and it is concluded that they cannot account for the behavior observed in these experiments.     

Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech

When young children observe pretend-play, do they interpret it simply as a type of behavior, or do they infer the underlying mental state that gives the behavior meaning? This is a long-standing question with deep implications for how “theory on mind” develops. The two leading accounts of shared pretense give opposing answers. The behavioral theory proposes that children represent pretense as a form of behavior (behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P); the metarepresentational theory argues that children instead represent pretense via the early concept PRETEND. A test between these accounts is provided by children’s understanding of pretend sounds and speech. We report the first experiments directly investigating this understanding. In three experiments, 2- and 3-year-olds’ listened to requests that were either spoken normally, or with the pretense that a teddy bear was uttering them. To correctly fulfill the requests, children had to represent the normal utterance as the experimenter’s, and the pretend utterances as the bear’s. Children succeeded at both ages, suggesting that they can represent pretend speech (the requests) as coming from counterfactual sources (the bear rather than the experimenter). We argue that this is readily explained by the metarepresentational theory, but harder to explain if children are behaviorists about pretense.     

Thought and language

Abstract

This article defends the view that nonlinguistic animals could be capable of thought (in the sense in which the mere possession of beliefs and desires is sufficient for thought). It is easy to identify flaws in Davidson’s arguments for the thesis that thought depends upon language if one is open to the idea that some nonlinguistic animals have beliefs. It is, however, necessary to do more than this if one wishes to engage with the deeper challenge underlying Davidson’s reasoning, viz., that of providing a principled account of what it takes for a representer to qualify as a thinker. Heil attempts to construct a Davidsonian account on the basis of the hypothesis that the semantic opacity essential to thought is rooted in second-order representation (which Davidson ties to language), but it can be shown that second-order representation is neither necessary nor sufficient for opacity. A reasonable non-Davidsonian account of thought in terms of which sufficiently sophisticated nonlinguistic animals qualify as thinkers is, however, possible.     

Rational Redundancy in Referring Expressions: Evidence from Event-related Potentials

In referential communication, Grice's Maxim of Quantity is thought to imply that utterances conveying unnecessary information should incur comprehension difficulties. There is, however, considerable evidence that speakers frequently encode redundant information in their referring expressions, raising the question as to whether such overspecifications hinder listeners’ processing. Evidence from previous work is inconclusive, and mostly comes from offline studies. In this article, we present two event-related potential (ERP) experiments, investigating the real-time comprehension of referring expressions that contain redundant adjectives in complex visual contexts. Our findings provide support for both Gricean and bounded-rational accounts. We argue that these seemingly incompatible results can be reconciled if common ground is taken into account. We propose a bounded-rational account of overspecification, according to which even redundant words can be beneficial to comprehension to the extent that they facilitate the reduction of listeners’ uncertainty regarding the target referent.     

The role of goal-directed behavior in intention attribution in children

In this study, we addressed the question of the nature of the information needed by 13-month-old infants to understand another agent's intentions. In two experiments, an experimenter was either unable or unwilling to give a toy to an infant. Importantly, an implement (a gutter in which the toy could roll down toward the infant) was used to make the experimenter's behavior as similar as possible in the two conditions. When the experimenter remained still in both conditions, infants did not behave differently according to the experimenter's intentions, suggesting that they did not infer them. By contrast, in a second experiment, where the experimenter performed an action directed toward the gutter in both conditions, the infants looked away from the experimental setting more often and longer in the unwilling condition than in the unable condition. They also looked more toward the experimenter in the unable condition than in the unwilling condition. Therefore, we conclude that an agent's intentional attitude can already be inferred by a 13-month-old provided that this intention is concretely shown through a goal-directed action.     

Being of two minds: Switching mindsets exhausts self-regulatory resources

The human psyche is equipped with the capacity to solve problems using different mental states or mindsets. Different mindsets can lead to different judgment and decision making styles, each associated with its own perspective and biases. To change perspective, people can, and often do, switch mindsets. We argue, however, that mindset switching can be costly for subsequent decisions. We propose that mindset switching is an executive function that relies on the same psychological resource that governs other acts of executive functioning, including self-regulation. This implies that there are psychic costs to switching mindsets that are borne out in depleted executive resources. One implication of this framework is that switching mindsets should render people more likely to fail at subsequent self-regulation than they would if maintaining a consistent mindset. The findings from experiments that manipulated mindset switching in five domains support this model.     

The Commitment Account of Hypocrisy

Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular.     

Normativity and Judgement: Julia Tanney

This paper attempts to describe why it is not possible to account for normative phenomena in non-normative terms. It argues that Papineau's attempt to locate norms of judgement 'outside' content, grounded in an individual's desires or reasons, mislocates the normativity that is thought to resist appropriation within a 'world that conceives nature as the realm of law'. It agrees, however, that a theory of content that locates norms 'inside' content will not be forthcoming—at least if this is to require fashioning the norms that in some sense govern judgment or thought into individually necessary conditions for contentful states.     

Extensional Superposition and Its Relation to Compositionality in Language and Thought

Semantic composition in language must be closely related to semantic composition in thought. But the way the two processes are explained differs considerably. Focusing primarily on propositional content, language theorists generally take semantic composition to be a truth-conditional process. Focusing more on extensional content, cognitive theorists take it to be a form of concept combination. But though deep, this disconnect is not irreconcilable. Both areas of theory assume that extensional (i.e., denotational) meanings must play a role. As this article demonstrates, they also have the potential to fulfill a mediative function. What is shown is that extensional meanings are themselves inherently compositional. On this basis, it becomes possible to model semantic composition without assuming the existence of any specifically linguistic/conceptual apparatus. Examples are presented to demonstrate this direct style of modeling. Abstract connections between composition in thought and language can then be made, raising the prospect of a more unified, theoretical account of semantic composition.     

The potential for experimenter bias effects in word recognition experiments

Word recognition experiments that involve comparisons between two different matched sets of words allow for possible experimenter bias if there are many equally well-matched pairs to choose from. The possible extent of this bias depends on the experimenter's intuitive knowledge of the likely difficulty of individual items. This is assessed by asking a number of experimenters to decide which of two frequency-matched words would produce the fastest reaction time in a lexical decision experiment, and then comparing their predictions with actual data. All experimenters demonstrated substantial above-chance accuracy, which was unrelated to the amount of experience they had in the field. It was concluded that the experimenters could potentially produce spurious effect sizes ranging from 16 to 38 msec.     

Hume on Mental Transparency

This article investigates Hume's account of mental transparency. In this article, I will endorse Qualitative Transparency – that is, the thesis that we cannot fail to apprehend the qualitative characters of our current perceptions, and these apprehensions cannot fail to be veridical – on the basis that, unlike its competitors, it is both weak enough to accommodate the introspective mistakes that Hume recognises, and yet strong enough to make sense of his positive employments of mental transparency. Moreover, Qualitative Transparency is also philosophically satisfying in providing good philosophical reason for why the mental states that are incorrigible should in fact be so.     

RECONCILIATION AND REPARATIONS

Abstract: This article provides an account of the meaning of reparations and presents a brief explanation as to why African Americans believe they are entitled to reparations from the United States government. It then goes on to explain why reparations are necessary to address the distrust that is thought to exist between many African Americans and their government. Finally, it rejects the belief that reparations require reconciliation.