W. I. Thomas,behaviorist ethnologist

Over the course of his academic career in the anthropology wing of the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology and Anthropology, W. I. Thomas rejected the influence of Herbert Spencer, became skeptical of the instinctual explanations for human behavior, and became increasingly Boasian. His study of Polish peasant acculturation to American cities is Boasian in its focus on texts and on culture. After his dismissal by the University of Chicago in 1918 Thomas was influenced by John B. Watson. In the national interdisciplinary conferences of the 1920s, Thomas was an advocate for behaviorism and critical of Freudian doctrines and other subjectivist approaches to human science. Recalling Thomas's behaviorism and his long-running interest in comparing cross-cultural data should call into question the enlistment of Thomas as a father of subjectivist traditions of symbolic interactionism.     

W. I. Thomas and social reform: His work and writings

W. I. Thomas was a major figure in the founding of sociology, especially symbolic interactionism. His concern with and commitment to social reform, however, is rarely recognized. This neglected aspect of his thought and activities is crucial for the interpretation and assessment of his writings and status in the profession. Examination of this facet of his work also illuminates some of the important contributions made by women to the development of his thought and career.     

Thomas vs. Thomas: A New Approach to Nagel's Bat Argument

In this paper I examine Thomas Nagel's familiar challenge to physicalism. Nagel famously uses his vivid example about the sensory apparatus of bats to illustrate the difficulty of providing a purely physical characterization of phenomenal experience. Adapting Thomas Aquinas's principle regarding the nature of divine omnipotence, I argue that the fact that we cannot know what it is like to be a bat does not threaten physicalism.     

II—Thomas E. Uebel

ABSTRACT This response considers the question whether empiricists are condemned to silence about the epistemic agency their theories attribute or presuppose. It is argued that, unlike Reichenbach or Carnap, Neurath allowed for and indeed provided specifications of the role of epistemic agency in scientific inquiry. If this is correct, it underscores once more the need to distinguish between the various strands of logical positivism which show different strengths and weaknesses.     

Problems and Possibilities of Theological Models: Responding to David Klemm and William Klink

This essay is a response to the proposals of David Klemm and William Klink concerning the construction and testing of theological models. A number of issues are raised for critical attention. (1) The exclusive attention to Christian theology, with no discussion of other religions, poses some significant problems, not the least of which is that cognitive claims of religious thinking are not universal but rather are defined by the particularities of the religious context in which they are made. (2) Although the authors wish to transcend confessionalism, their focus on Christianity and on the concept of God as a basic assumption can be construed as a kind of confessionalism. (3) The argument that theological and scientific models stand in analogy to each other requires more critical examination, particularly with respect to the issues of explanation, prediction, falsification, nesting, and openness. (4) While the argument is persuasive when referred to certain theologians, such as Paul Tillich, it requires some adjustment if it is to apply to other theological systems, such as Process theology.     

St. Thomas Aquinas on punishing souls

The details of St. Thomas Aquinas’s anthropological view are subject to debate. Some philosophers believe he held that human persons survive their deaths. Other philosophers think he held that human persons cease to exist at their death, but come back into being at the general resurrection. In this paper, I defend the latter view against one of the most significant objections it faces, namely, that it entails that God punishes and rewards separated souls for the sins or merits of something else: the (non-existent) persons to whom those souls once belonged. The objector takes this entailment to be problematic. I argue that it fits in well with St. Thomas’s views about punishment and about persons.