Self-referencing, quality of argument, and persuasion

This research examines whether self-referencing and self-attention facilitate careful examination of a message, referred to as systematic processing. In Experiment 1, undergraduates (n=158) who were induced to be either high or low in self-referencing read either a strong or a weak two-sided article that discussed tuition increases. Contrary to predictions, low self-referencing participants agreed more with increasing tuition than high self-referencing participants. Participants who read strong versus weak arguments agreed more with increasing tuition. In Experiment 2 undergraduates (n=204) who were either high or low in self-attention and either high or low in self-referencing read either a strong or weak two-sided article that discussed tuition increases. Consistent with predictions, participants who were either high in self-attention or high in self-referencing were more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. Specifically, both high self-attention, low self-referencing participants and low self-attention, high self-referencing participants were significantly more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. There was a trend for high self-attention, high self-referencing participants to be more persuaded by strong than weak arguments. There were no argument quality effects for low self-attention low self-referencing participants. The results of these two studies suggest that both self-referencing and self-attention facilitate systematic processing.     

Processing of persuasive in-group messages

Two studies investigated the processes mediating the persuasive impact of messages representing in-group opinions. In the 1st study, subjects read either a strong or a weak message attributed to either an in-group member or to another group. Subjects were more persuaded by a strong message from the in-group than a weak one, suggesting content-focused processing of the in-group message. Subjects were equally unpersuaded by either a strong or a weak message from the other group, and showed little sign of message processing. In the 2nd study, Ss listened to in-group or other-group messages about issues that varied in their relevance to in-group membership. When the issue was relevant to the in-group, subjects were persuaded by a strong message from the in-group, unpersuaded by a weak message from the in-group, and equally unimpressed by strong and weak messages from the other group. When the issue was irrelevant to the in-group, subjects accepted the position advocated by the in-group regardless of message quality, and again ignored messages from the other group. These results suggest that increased message processing, and not merely the impact of source persuasion cues, can underlie in-group-mediated attitude change.     

The Influence of Source Physical Attractiveness on Advertising Effectiveness: A Functional Perspective1

High and low self-monitors heard either a physically attractive or unattractive source promote a new product with either strong or weak arguments. High self-monitors were persuaded by the physically attractive source only when she presented strong arguments. In contrast, low self-monitoring individuals were persuaded by the physically attractive source regardless of argument strength. Neither high nor low self-monitors were persuaded by the physically unattractive source, regardless of the quality of the arguments she offered. Cognitive response and recall data suggest that high self-monitors may have been systematically processing the physically attractive source's message and low self-monitors may have been more heuristically processing her message. Results are discussed in terms of their implications for advertising strategies.     

Emotion and intuition

We investigated effects of emotional states on the ability to make intuitive judgments about the semantic coherence of word triads. Participants were presented word triads, consisting of three clue words that either were weakly associated with a common fourth concept (coherent triads) or had no common associate (incoherent triads). In Experiment 1, participants in a neutral mood discriminated coherent and incoherent triads reliably better than chance level even if they did not consciously retrieve the solution word. In Experiment 2, the induction of a positive mood reliably improved intuitive coherence judgments, whereas participants in a negative mood performed at chance level. We conclude that positive mood potentiates spread of activation to weak or remote associates in memory, thereby improving intuitive coherence judgments. By contrast, negative mood appears to restrict spread of activation to close associates and dominant word meanings, thus impairing intuitive coherence judgments.     

Influence of text cohesion on the persuasive power of expository text

The present study examined how global text cohesion affects persuasion and memory for message arguments presented in expository text. Sixty-nine participants who held a neutral prior attitude towards NATO read a persuasive text about NATO that was either high or low in global cohesion. After reading, participants voted whether Finland should seek NATO membership and filled in an attitude questionnaire. After a 1-week delay they returned for a surprise recall task. The results showed that the high cohesion text was more persuasive than the low cohesion text. Moreover, attitude after reading but not text cohesion predicted later recall of the message arguments. The results show that global text cohesion increases text's persuasive power and that readers who form a positive attitude have better memory of the persuasive arguments after a delay than readers who are less persuaded.     

The time for doing is not the time for change: effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change

Implicit in many informal and formal principles of psychological change is the understudied assumption that change requires either an active approach or an inactive approach. This issue was systematically investigated by comparing the effects of general action goals and general inaction goals on attitude change. As prior attitudes facilitate preparation for an upcoming persuasive message, general action goals were hypothesized to facilitate conscious retrieval of prior attitudes and therefore hinder attitude change to a greater extent than general inaction goals. Experiment 1 demonstrated that action primes (e.g., "go," "energy") yielded faster attitude report than inaction primes (e.g., "rest," "still") among participants who were forewarned of an upcoming persuasive message. Experiment 2 showed that the faster attitude report identified in Experiment 1 was localized on attitudes toward a message topic participants were prepared to receive. Experiments 3, 4, and 5 showed that, compared with inaction primes, action primes produced less attitude change and less argument scrutiny in response to a counterattitudinal message on a previously forewarned topic. Experiment 6 confirmed that the effects of the primes on attitude change were due to differential attitude retrieval. That is, when attitude expression was induced immediately after the primes, action and inaction goals produced similar amounts of attitude change. In contrast, when no attitude expression was induced after the prime, action goals produced less attitude change than inaction goals. Finally, Experiment 7 validated the assumption that these goal effects can be reduced or reversed when the goals have already been satisfied by an intervening task.     

Exploring the Valence‐Framing Effect: Negative Framing Enhances Attitude Strength

In his now‐classic research on inoculation theory, McGuire (1964 ) demonstrated that exposing people to an initial weak counterattitudinal message could lead to enhanced resistance to a subsequent stronger counterattitudinal message. More recently, research on the valence‐framing effect ( Bizer & Petty, 2005 ) demonstrated an alternative way to make attitudes more resistant. Simply framing a person's attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position such as anti‐Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as pro‐Republican). Using an election context, the current research tested whether valence framing influences attitude resistance specifically or attitude strength more generally, providing insight into the effect's mechanism and generalizability. In two experiments, attitude valence was manipulated by framing a position either negatively or positively. Experiment 1 showed that negatively framed attitudes were held with more certainty than were positively framed attitudes. In Experiment 2, conducted among a representative sample of residents of two U.S. states during political campaigns, negatively framed attitudes demonstrated higher levels of attitude certainty and attitude‐consistent behavioral intentions than did attitudes that were framed positively. Furthermore, the effect of valence framing on behavioral intentions was mediated by attitude certainty. Valence framing thus appears to be a relatively low‐effort way to impact multiple features associated with strong attitudes.     

Morningness–eveningness orientation and attitude change: Evidence for greater systematic processing and attitude change at optimal time-of-day

This study examines the relationship between morningness–eveningness orientation and time-of day on attitude change, and tests the hypothesis that people will be more persuaded when tested at their optimal time-of-day (i.e., morning for M-types and evening for E-types) than non-optimal time-of-day (i.e., evening for M-Types and morning for E-types). Two hundred and twenty participants read a message that contained either strong vs. weak quality counter-attitudinal arguments (anti-voluntary euthanasia) in the morning (9.00 a.m.) or in the evening (7.00 p.m.). When tested at their respective optimal time-of-day (for both M- and E-types) there was a reliable difference in attitude change between the strong vs. weak messages (indicating message processing had occurred) while there was no difference between strong vs. weak messages when tested at their non-optimal time-of-day. In addition, the amount of message-congruent thinking mediated the attitude change. The results show that M- and E-types pay greater attention to and elaborate on a persuasive message at their optimal time-of-day, and this leads to increased attitude change, compared to those tested at their non-optimal time-of-day.     

Affect and persuasion: Mood effects on the processing of message content and context cues and on subsequent behaviour

Two experiments are reported examining the impact of recipients' mood on the processing of simple, everyday persuasive communications and on subsequent behaviour. Consistent with the general assumption that affective states may inform an individual about the state of its current environment, it was found that positive (as compared to neutral or negative) mood reduced subjects' motivation to systematically process both content information and contextual cues. Specifically, Experiment I demonstrated that, in a field setting, the behaviour of subjects who had been put in a good mood was less likely to reflect differences in message content than the behaviour of neutral mood subjects. Experiment 2 replicated and extended these findings, showing that good mood subjects' behaviour was uninfluenced by content as well as context information, whereas bad mood subjects did make use of both types of information. Subject's cognitive responses and evaluations paralleled the behavioural data. The results are discussed in terms of their compatibility with contemporary models of persuasion, and their implications for future research on mood and persuasion and on the interplay of affect and cognition in general are considered.     

Distracting stimuli: Do they elicit or inhibit counterargumentation and attitude shift

Studied the effects of distracting stimuli, presented simultaneously with a persuasive but counterattitudinal communication, on subvocal counterargumentation and attitude shift. All subjects were first-year undergraduate male students at Birmingham University, England. The 80 experimental Ss who formed ten different treatment groups, responded to distracting sequences of numbers by performing visual, auditory, vocal and manual tasks, and combinations thereof, while listening to the message. The base-line group of 28 Ss merely listened to the same communication, which advocated compulsory male sterilisation. After task completion, all Ss were given a six-item Likert-type attitude measurement questionnaire, a counterargumentation measurement similar to that devised by T. C. Brock (1967) and a three-item comprehension test of the arguments used in the communication. The results suggest that distracting stimuli which are greater in intensity or which require a more ‘active’ response from the recipient (up to a certain level of activity) are more likely to inhibit counterargumentation and thus elicit shift toward agreement with the message (while leaving comprehension levels unaffected) than those which are lower in intensity, or which require either a ‘passive’ or a ‘high-active’ response.     

On the Risks of Recycling Because of Guilt: An Examination of the Consequences of Introjection1

The present study sought to examine the influence of introjected beliefs on individuals’ vulnerability to counterattitudinal arguments. University students’ reasons for engaging in proenvironmental behaviors were assessed prior to their reading excerpts from a counterattitudinal article. The excerpts were written by a personally attractive or unattractive author and contained either weak or strong arguments against recycling. Our results show that individuals who were highly introjected about recycling (e.g., “I recycle because I would feel guilty if I didn't”) were influenced by the personal attractiveness of the source but not by the strength of the specific arguments. Specifically, a thought‐listing procedure revealed that introjection was associated with generating more favorable thoughts and fewer counterarguments about the anti‐recycling message when the author was personally attractive than when he was unattractive.     

Overt head movements and persuasion: a self-validation analysis

The authors report 3 experiments that examine a new mechanism by which overt head movements can affect attitude change. In each experiment, participants were induced to either nod or to shake their heads while listening to a persuasive message. When the message arguments were strong, nodding produced more persuasion than shaking. When the arguments were weak, the reverse occurred. These effects were most pronounced when elaboration was high. These findings are consistent with the "self-validation" hypothesis that postulates that head movements either enhance (nodding) or undermine (shaking) confidence in one's thoughts about the message. In a 4th experiment, the authors extended this result to another overt behavior (writing with the dominant or nondominant hand) and a different attitude domain (self-esteem).     

Self-generated persuasion: effects of the target and direction of arguments

Previous research has revealed that self-persuasion can occur either through role-playing (i.e., when arguments are generated to convince another person) or, more directly, through trying to convince oneself (i.e., when arguments are generated with oneself as the target). Combining these 2 traditions in the domain of attitude change, the present research investigated the impact on self-persuasion of the specific target of one's own persuasive attempt (i.e., others vs. oneself). We found that the efficacy of self-persuasion depended on whether people believed that they would have to put more or less effort in convincing the self or others. Specifically, we found opposite effects for self-generated arguments depending on whether the topic of persuasion was proattitudinal or counterattitudinal. Across 4 studies, it was shown that when the topic of the message was counterattitudinal, people were more effective in convincing themselves when the intended target of the arguments was themselves versus another person. However, the opposite was the case when the topic was proattitudinal. These effects were shown to stem from the differential effort perceived as necessary and actually exerted in trying to produce persuasion under these conditions.     

Attitude accessibility and message processing: The moderating role of message position

Past research suggests that pre-message attitude accessibility can influence the amount of processing of persuasives messages (with highly accessible attitudes eliciting higher levels of processing than attitudes lower in accessibility). The current research suggests that the previous conclusions are only partly true—effects of accessibility on message processing are moderated by the extent to which the persuasive message is proattitudinal versus counterattitudinal. In two experiments, pre-message attitudes and attitude accessibility were measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Study 2) prior to receiving a strong or weak persuasive message. When messages were counterattitudinal, increased pre-message accessibility was associated with greater message processing (as in past research). However, when messages were proattitudinal, increased pre-message accessibility was associated with decreased message scrutiny. Potential underlying mechanisms and implications are discussed.     

Effects of mood states on information processing strategies: Two studies of automatic and controlled processing using misattribution paradigms

To test the hypothesis that a positive mood facilitates automatic processing and a negative mood facilitates controlled processing, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, after positive or negative mood was induced, participants rated the attractiveness of products while listening to a music tape that they were told would have the effect of inducing a positive, negative, or neutral mood. As predicted, augmentation effects were clearer in the negative mood condition than in the positive mood condition. In Experiment 2, participants were first presented with lists of names of non-famous Japanese companies either once or four times. One or two days later, they were presented with these names again, together with new names, and were asked to judge whether those names were famous or-non-famous. As predicted, subjects in a positive mood showed more false fame judgments than those in a negative mood because those in a positive mood did not control their feeling of familiarity correctly. These results indicated that those in positive moods are more likely to engage in automatic processing.     

Thinking straight while seeing red: the influence of anger on information processing

Because angry people apparently rely on heuristic cues when making judgments, anger has been claimed to trigger superficial, nonanalytic information processing. In three studies, the authors found that induced anger promoted analytic processing. Experiment 1 showed that angry participants were more likely to discriminate between weak and strong arguments than participants in neutral moods. Experiment 2 demonstrated that anger overrode dispositional preferences not to process, causing even those low in need for cognition to process analytically. Experiment 3 reconciled these findings with previous work by showing that angry people used accessible, valid, and relevant heuristics but otherwise processed analytically, as indicated by attitude change and elaboration data. Together, these experiments showed that angry people can have both the capacity and motivation to process and that their selective use of heuristics reflects the cue's perceived validity and not the failure to process analytically.     

Influences on current mood of eliciting life-satisfaction judgments

Subjective well-being (SWB) has attracted a plethora of cross-disciplinary research in recent years. As measured in this research, SWB includes a cognitive and an affective component. We hypothesize that eliciting the cognitive component by means of life-satisfaction judgments activates thoughts about positive and negative life circumstances that influence the affective component (current mood or memory of the frequency of past positive and negative affects). Experiment 1 demonstrates an expected asymmetrical carryover effect in that current mood correlates higher with life-satisfaction judgments performed before than after the measurements of current mood. In Experiment 2, it is found that inducing current mood by means of rewarding performance does not influence the life-satisfaction judgments. In contrast and consistent with Experiment 1, Experiment 3 shows such an influence when current mood is induced by thinking about positive and negative life circumstances.     

Physiological arousal, dissonance, and attitude change: evidence for a dissonance-arousal link and a "don't remind me" effect

Two experiments replicated and extended research by Croyle and Cooper (1983) indicating that cognitive dissonance involves physiological arousal. In Experiment 1, subjects wrote counterattitudinal essays under conditions of high or low choice, and, to assess arousal effects owing to effort, with or without a list of arguments provided by the experimenter. In high-choice conditions only, and regardless of effort, subjects showed both arousal (heightened galvanic skin response) and attitude change. Arousal, however, did not decline following attitude change. The more effortful task (no arguments provided) produced increased arousal but not greater attitude change. In Experiment 2, the opportunity to change one's attitude following a freely chosen counterattitudinal essay was manipulated. As in Experiment 1, arousal increased following the essay but did not decline following a postessay attitude change opportunity. When subjects were not given an attitude change opportunity, however, arousal did decline. Thus, dissonance seems to create arousal, but attitude change sustains rather than reduces the arousal. It is suggested that if dissonance is a drive state, drive reduction typically may be accomplished through gradual cognitive change or forgetting.     

Affect and stereotyping: the effect of induced mood on distinctiveness-based illusory correlations.

In 2 studies, the effects of mood on the formation of distinctiveness-based illusory correlations were examined. After exposure to stimuli inducing positive, neutral, or negative mood, Ss read information about behaviors performed by members of 2 groups in an illusory correlation paradigm. In both experiments, only Ss in a neutral mood formed illusory correlations. In addition, Experiment 2 assessed Ss' processing latencies as a means of investigating differential attention to distinctive behaviors. Only Ss in a neutral mood differentially attended to the minority group's infrequent behaviors. Induced mood apparently interfered with the processing necessary to differentially encode distinctive stimuli, undermining the illusory correlation effect.     

Influence of mood on health-relevant cognitions

Three experiments assessed the effects of mood on symptom appraisal, health behavior self-efficacy, outcome expectations, and perceptions of vulnerability. Ss in Experiments 1 and 2 were acutely ill, whereas Ss in Experiment 3 were healthy. In each experiment, happy, sad, and neutral moods were induced. In Experiment 1, Ss who experienced sadness reported more aches and pains and greater discomfort than happy Ss. Sad Ss were less confident that they could carry out illness-alleviating behaviors. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that mood's influence on vulnerability perceptions is moderated by health status. Although mood had little impact on perceptions of vulnerability among ill Ss, probability estimates of future negative health-relevant events among healthy Ss were mood sensitive. Seeing oneself as invulnerable to future negative events was accentuated among happy Ss and attenuated among sad Ss. Mood may be an important determinant of care seeking, adherence, and recovery from illness.