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1.
This paper is a reply to Frank Hindriks’ paper “A Modest Solution to the Problem of Rule-Following”. Hindriks claims to find
room for what he calls a modest solution to the Kripkensteinian problem of rule-following, different from both straight and sceptical solutions. Hindriks
criticises Philip Pettit’s “ethocentric” solution and goes on to provide his own, “modest” one. My paper is in two parts.
In the first part, I argue that there is no room for a “modest” solution to sceptical problems: depending on how one reads
Kripke, Hindriks’ “modest” solution is always going to turn out either straight or sceptical. In the second part, I defend
the ethocentric solution against Hindriks’ arguments. In particular, I argue that the topic-neutral specifications of favourable
conditions which Pettit uses are superior to Hindriks’ topic-specific ones.
*I want to thank Frank Hindriks for comments on an earlier version, but I take full responsibility for any remaining errors
or misunderstandings. This work has been financially supported by the Academy of Finland (project 202513). 相似文献
2.
Identifying and Dissolving the Non-Identity Problem 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Rivka Weinberg 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):3-18
Philosophers concerned with procreative ethics have long been puzzled by Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem (NIP). Various solutions
have been proposed, but I argue that we have not solved the problem on its own narrow person-affecting terms, i.e., in terms
of the identified individuals affected by procreative decisions and acts, especially future children. Thus, the core problem
remains unsolved. This is a nagging concern for all who hold the common intuition that actions that harm no one are permissible.
I argue against Harmon’s and Woodward’s direct, narrow person-affecting solutions, and in favor of a new solution to the NIP.
My solution, or, rather, dissolution, is based on the argument that merely possible people, i.e., hypothetical people who
could possibly, but will not actually, exist, are morally irrelevant. I show that the NIP only arises when we concern ourselves
with merely possible people. Once we are careful to restrict our concerns to only those that do or will exist, the NIP is
dissolved. 相似文献
3.
Marc Artiga 《Topoi》2011,30(2):181-193
Teleological Theories of mental representation are probably the most promising naturalistic accounts of intentionality. However,
it is widely known that these theories suffer from a major objection: the Indeterminacy Problem. The most common reply to
this problem employs the Target of Selection Argument, which is based on Sober’s distinction between selection for and selection of. Unfortunately, some years ago the Target of Selection Argument came into serious attack in a famous paper by Goode and Griffiths.
Since then, the question of the validity of the Target of Selection Argument in the context of the Indeterminacy Problem has
remained largely untouched. In this essay, I argue that both the Target of Selection Argument and Goode and Griffiths’ criticisms
to it misuse Sober’s analysis in important respects. 相似文献
4.
Leonard Kahn 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2011,14(2):131-142
In this paper, I present and defend a novel version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness. In Section 1, I introduce the Reactive Attitude account and outline Allan Gibbard’s version of it. In Section 2, I present the Wrong Kind of Reasons Problem, which has been at the heart of much recent discussion about the nature of value,
and explain why a reformulation of it causes serious problems for versions of the Reactive Attitude account such as Gibbard’s.
In Section 3, I consider some ways in which Gibbard might attempt to avoid the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue that all of these
ways fail to achieve their aim and further contend that the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem cannot be solved in a sufficiently
convincing manner by the widely used method of making ad hoc distinctions among kinds of properties, kinds of attitudes, and
kinds of reasons. In Section 4, I sketch my own version of the Reactive Attitude account of moral blameworthiness and show that it simply avoids the Wrong
Kind of Reason Problem rather than attempting to solve the problem on a piecemeal basis. 相似文献
5.
Louis deRosset 《Philosophical Studies》2011,156(2):173-197
A philosophical standard in the debates concerning material constitution is the case of a statue and a lump of clay, Lumpl
and Goliath respectively. According to the story, Lumpl and Goliath are coincident throughout their respective careers. Monists hold that they are identical; pluralists that they are distinct. This paper is concerned with a particular objection to pluralism, the Grounding Problem. The objection is roughly that the pluralist faces a legitimate explanatory demand to explain various differences she alleges
between Lumpl and Goliath, but that the pluralist’s theory lacks the resources to give any such explanation. In this paper,
I explore the question of whether there really is any problem of this sort. I argue (i) that explanatory demands that are
clearly legitimate are easy for the pluralist to meet; (ii) that even in cases of explanatory demands whose legitimacy is
questionable the pluralist has some overlooked resources; and (iii) there is some reason for optimism about the pluralist’s
prospects for meeting every legitimate explanatory demand. In short, no clearly adequate statement of a Grounding Problem
is extant, and there is some reason to believe that the pluralist can overcome any Grounding Problem that we haven’t thought
of yet. 相似文献
6.
7.
Burleigh T. Wilkins 《The Journal of Ethics》2007,11(2):147-159
This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of
states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in
the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the
state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, and
I consider Kant as a teleologist. 相似文献
8.
Internalism about a person’s good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person’s well-being,
that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person’s good should
not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of
it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form of internalism
about one’s good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don’t
end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls ‘two-tier internalism’ would be the best
way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one’s good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In
particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly,
there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one’s good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the
prospects for internalism about a person’s good do not look promising. 相似文献
9.
Sandy Berkovski 《Synthese》2011,181(1):63-77
I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s
view remains at bottom conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s apriorism is the
problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel
to the theory of relative a priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with a cost. 相似文献
10.
Patrick McGivern 《Synthese》2008,165(1):53-75
I discuss arguments about the relationship between different “levels” of explanation in the light of examples involving multi-scale
analysis. I focus on arguments about causal competition between properties at different levels, such as Jaegwon Kim’s “supervenience
argument.” A central feature of Kim’s argument is that higher-level properties can in general be identified with “micro-based”
properties. I argue that explanations from multi-scale analysis give examples of explanations that are problematic for accounts
such as Kim’s. I argue that these difficulties suggest that some standard assumptions about causal competition need to be
revised. 相似文献
11.
Billy Dunaway 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(3):351-371
James Dreier (Philos Perspect 18:23–44, 2004) states what he calls the “Problem of Creeping Minimalism”: that metaethical
Expressivists can accept a series of claims about meaning, under which all of the sentences that Realists can accept are consistent
with Expressivism. This would allow Expressivists to accept all of the Realist’s sentences, and as Dreier points out, make
it difficult to say what the difference between the two views is. That Expressivists can accept these claims about meaning
has been suggested by Simon Blackburn on behalf of his “quasi-realist”. I argue against the assumption that there is a way
to interpret the Realist’s sentences in a way that renders them consistent with Expressivism. 相似文献
12.
Gary Hatfield 《Erkenntnis》2007,66(1-2):133-168
This paper argues for the reality of qualia as aspects of phenomenal experience. The argument focuses on color vision and
develops a dispositionalist, subjectivist account of what it is for an object to be colored. I consider objections to dispositionalism
on epistemological, metaphysical, and ‚ordinary’ grounds. I␣distinguish my representative realism from sense-data theories
and from recent ‚representational’ or ‚intentional’ theories, and I argue that there is no good reason to adopt a physicalist
stance that denies the reality of qualia as phenomenally available intentional contents in Brentano’s original sense of ‚intentionality’. 相似文献
13.
Stephan Torre 《Philosophical Studies》2010,150(1):97-114
I suggest a way of extending Stalnaker’s account of assertion to allow for centered content. In formulating his account, Stalnaker
takes the content of assertion to be uncentered propositions: entities that are evaluated for truth at a possible world. I
argue that the content of assertion is sometimes centered: the content is evaluated for truth at something within a possible
world. I consider Andy Egan’s proposal for extending Stalnaker’s account to allow for assertions with centered content. I
argue that Egan’s account does not succeed. Instead, I propose an account on which the contents of assertion are identified
with sets of multi-centered worlds. I argue that such a view not only provides a plausible account of how assertions can have
centered content, but also preserves Stalnaker’s original insight that successful assertion involves the reduction of shared
possibilities. 相似文献
14.
William Hasker 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2007,61(3):151-160
It is widely held that the logical problem of evil, which alleges an inconsistency between the existence of evil and that
of an omnipotent and morally perfect God, has been solved. D. Z. Phillips thinks this is a mistake. In The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, he argues that, within the generally assumed framework, “neither the proposition ’God is omnipotent’ nor the proposition
‘God is perfectly good’ can get off the ground.” Thus, the problem of evil leads to the problem of God. Phillips goes on to
provide an alternative response to the problem of evil, expounded by means of his Wittgensteinian analyses of various concepts
drawn from the Christian tradition. I argue that his criticisms of the traditional conception of God either fail outright
or are at best inconclusive. I also point out that the religious concepts analyzed by Phillips are not and cannot be the same
concepts as those employed in the Christian tradition from which they are supposedly drawn. For the concepts as traditionally
employed presuppose the actual existence and activity of precisely the sort of being that, according to Phillips, “God cannot
be.” 相似文献
15.
Sungho Choi 《Synthese》2006,148(2):369-379
Lewis claims that Martin’s cases indeed refute the simple conditional analysis of dispositions and proposes the reformed conditional
analysis that is purported to overcome them. In this paper I will first argue that Lewis’s defense of the reformed analysis
can be understood to invoke the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. I will go on to argue that advocates
of the simple analysis, just like Lewis, can also defend their analysis from alleged counterexamples including Martin’s cases
by invoking the concepts of disposition-specific stimulus and manifestation. This means that Lewis’s own necessary defense
of the reformed analysis invalidates his motivation of it. Finally, I will argue that we have a good reason to favor the simple
analysis over Lewis’s analysis. 相似文献
16.
Alan Haworth 《Res Publica》2007,13(1):77-100
Philosophers have tended to dismiss John Stuart Mill’s claim that ‘all silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility’.
I argue that Mill’s ‘infallibility claim’ is indeed open to many objections, but that, contrary to the consensus, those objections
fail to defeat the anti-authoritarian thesis which lies at its core. I then argue that Mill’s consequentialist case for the
liberty of thought and discussion is likewise capable of withstanding some familiar objections. My purpose is to suggest that
Mill’s anti-authoritarianism and his faith in thought and discussion, when taken seriously, supply the basis for a ‘public
interest’ account of ‘freedom of expression as the liberty of thought and discussion’ which is faithful to Mill in spirit,
if not to the precise letter. I outline such an account, which – as I say in conclusion – can serve as a valuable safeguard
against ad hoc, reactive legislation, and the demands of a spurious communitarianism. 相似文献
17.
Øystein Linnebo 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(3):545-574
Since Benacerraf’s “Mathematical Truth” a number of epistemological challenges have been launched against mathematical platonism.
I first argue that these challenges fail because they unduely assimilate mathematics to empirical science. Then I develop
an improved challenge which is immune to this criticism. Very roughly, what I demand is an account of how people’s mathematical
beliefs are responsive to the truth of these beliefs. Finally I argue that if we employ a semantic truth-predicate rather
than just a deflationary one, there surprisingly turns out to be logical space for a response to the improved challenge where
no such space appeared to exist. 相似文献
18.
Nikk Effingham 《Philosophical Studies》2011,154(2):241-250
The Vagueness Argument for universalism only works if you think there is a good reason not to endorse nihilism. Sider’s argument
from the possibility of gunk is one of the more popular reasons. Further, Hawley has given an argument for the necessity of
everything being either gunky or composed of mereological simples. I argue that Hawley’s argument rests on the same premise
as Sider’s argument for the possibility of gunk. Further, I argue that that premise can be used to demonstrate the possibility
of simples. Once you stick it all together, you get an absurd consequence. I then survey the possible lessons we could draw
from this, arguing that whichever one you take yields an interesting result. 相似文献
19.
Bart Streumer 《Philosophical Studies》2010,151(1):79-86
Ulrike Heuer argues that there can be a reason for a person to perform an action that this person cannot perform, as long
as this person can take efficient steps towards performing this action. In this reply, I first argue that Heuer’s examples
fail to undermine my claim that there cannot be a reason for a person to perform an action if it is impossible that this person
will perform this action. I then argue that, on a plausible interpretation of what ‘efficient steps’ are, Heuer’s claim is
consistent with my claim. I end by showing that Heuer fails to undermine the arguments I gave for my claim. 相似文献
20.
Barbara Gabriella Renzi 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2009,40(2):311-336
In this paper I propose a type-hierarchy approach to provide an intersubjective framework for the evaluation of evolutionary
analogies. This approach develops David Hull’s and others’ attempts to provide full generalisation for selection processes,
in order to show that sociocultural development and, particularly, scientific change can be considered as an instance of Darwinian
selection. I argue that the recent work by Eileen Cornell Way on type hierarchies can offer the kind of generalisation needed
to solve the main problems that still affect Hull’s theory and to show that the evolutionary analogy is, after all, only a
particular way of grouping phenomena together. If Hull’s main objective is a unified theory of selection, which supports the
idea that science selection and natural selection obey the same laws, I also argue that the type hierarchy approach to models
shows that this objective is unsustainable as it stands, and is in need of further development. I will firstly introduce the
general outline of the type hierarchy approach to models. Then, after a brief recapitulation of Hull’s main points and difficulties,
I will try and construct a hierarchy for a general abstraction of selection processes. Finally I will introduce the main criticisms
that Hull’s work has faced from philosophers and scientists, and show how they compare with my proposal. 相似文献