Factor analytic structure of theScale to Asses World View

This article reports on the factor structure of theScale to Assess World View ^(c) (SAWV). Alpha reliabilities for the factors are presented. Gender differences in world views are also explored to understand how men and women in this sample viewed the world. Recommendations for client assessment, therapy, education and training, and scale revision are discussed. The research reported here is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, August 17, 1992.     

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON TEILHARD PUBLICATIONS

Abstract. Teilhard's texts were published in two complementary publications, the more philosophical-theological ones in the L'Oeuvres (OV), the scientific ones in the L'Oeuvre Scientifique (OS)¹. His letters were published in a nonsystematic way. The publication of the Oeuvres presented thematic compilations. The papers had their own production history, creating different versions. Scientific texts were published by Teilhard in widely dispersed journals and have been collected into L'Oeuvre Scientifique. The scientific status of Teilhard is related to his positions in the scientific world and the continued use of his publications. The influences causing different versions of theological and philosophical papers are analyzed. The present accessibility of the diaries and their importance for a full understanding of Teilhard is elaborated.     

A second-order relevance logic with modality

In this paper a system, RPF, of second-order relevance logic with S5 necessity is presented which contains a defined, notion of identity for propositions. A complete semantics is provided. It is shown that RPF allows for more than one necessary proposition. RPF contains primitive syntactic counterparts of the following semantic notions: (1) the reflexive, symmetrical, transitive binary alternativeness relation for S5 necessity, (2) the ternary Routley-Meyer alternativeness relation for implication, and (3) the Routley-Meyer notion of a prime intensional theory, as well as defined syntactic counterparts, of the semantic notions of a possible world and the Routley-Meyer ^* operator.     

How to Revise a Total Preorder

Most approaches to iterated belief revision are accompanied by some motivation for the use of the proposed revision operator (or family of operators), and typically encode enough information in the epistemic state of an agent for uniquely determining one-step revision. But in those approaches describing a family of operators there is usually little indication of how to proceed uniquely after the first revision step. In this paper we contribute towards addressing that deficiency by providing a formal framework which goes beyond the first revision step in two ways. First, the framework is obtained by enriching the epistemic state of an agent starting from the following intuitive idea: we associate to each world x two abstract objects x ⁺ and x ⁻, and we assume that, in addition to preferences over the set of worlds, we are given preferences over this set of objects as well. The latter can be considered as meta-information encoded in the epistemic state which enables us to go beyond the first revision step of the revision operator being applied, and to obtain a unique set of preferences over worlds. We then extend this framework to consider, not only the revision of preferences over worlds, but also the revision of this extended structure itself. We look at some desirable properties for revising the structure and prove the consistency of these properties by giving a concrete operator satisfying all of them. Perhaps more importantly, we show that this framework has strong connections with two other types of constructions in related areas. Firstly, it can be seen as a special case of preference aggregation which opens up the possibility of extending the framework presented here into a full-fledged framework for preference aggregation and social choice theory. Secondly, it is related to existing work on the use of interval orderings in a number of different contexts.     

INTENTIONALITY AND ONE-SIDED RELATIONS

Intentional states appear to relate thinkers to objects and situations even when these latter do not exist. Given the concern to allow that thought is a mode of engagement between subject and world, many writers have presented relational theories of intentionality and introduced odd relata to account for thought of the non-existent. However there are familiar epistemological and ontological objections to such accounts which give reason to look for other ways of accommodating the appearance of relationality. A little explored possibility is to countenance not odd relata but odd relations, ones not requiring existent terms other than those which ground the relation on the side of the subject. Proposals to this effect by Findlay and Grossmann are underdescribed and not obviously different from more familiar odd relata theories. Here a more developed view is explored, which derives from scholastic accounts of intentionality, in particular that presented by John of St Thomas, as this has been elaborated and defended in recent writings by John Deely. While judging it to fail, I suggest that it leads us towards an older tradition according to which the intentionality of thought is constituted by the occurrence of the forms of things in the mind. ‘Formally and principally the whole difference between a mind-independent relation and a mind-dependent one comes down to this, that a physical relation has a mind-independent fundament with a coexistent terminus while a mental relation lacks such a foundation.’(Joannes a Sancto Thoma, Cursus Philosophicus: Ars Logica; Tractatus de Signis)¹     

Reliability for the law of comparative judgment

A variance-components analysis is presented for paired comparisons in terms of three components:s, the scale value of the stimuli;d, a deviation from the linear model specified by the law of comparative judgment; andb, a binomial error component. Estimates are given for each of the three variances, _s ² , _d ² , and _b ² . Several coefficients, analogous to reliability coefficients, based on these three variances are indicated. The techniques are illustrated in a replicated comparison of handwriting specimens.This research was jointly supported in part by Princeton University, the Office of Naval Research under contract Nonr-1858(15), and the National Science Foundation under grant NSF G-642, and in part by Educational Testing Service. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.Thanks are due to Ledyard Tucker and Frederic Lord for valuable suggestions on the development presented here.     

Methodological appraisals, advice, and historiographical models

In the paper I examine (Section I) the best defense for the claim that methodologies shouldnot function heuristically (thesis-LW) as it appears in John Worrall. I then evaluate (Section II) his proposal of a criterion^* M which is offered as a criterion for evaluating competing methodologies such as falsificationism, conventionalism, methodology of research programmes. etc. Finally, I consider (Section III) the consequences of arguments presented earlier (Section I and II) as they bear on the problem of selecting a historiographical model.I argue, among other things, (I) that thesis-LW is defended on some very dubious assumptions; (II) that Worrall's criterion^* M falters under three clear cases two of which at least^*M should accomodate, and that part of^* M's failure can be linked to its being hooked to thesis-LW. By arguments analogous to the ones which serve^* M, I show thatcontra John Worrall and John Watkins, thesis-LW is testable; finally, (III) if we accept arguments for thesis-LW and^* M we are left with a skeptical conclusion with respect to the choice of a historiographical model which Worrall by parity of reasoning should accept, but does not.     

Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility

In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.     

The Future of Lutheran Confessional Studies: Reflections in Historical Context

Abstract: The Augsburg Confession of 1530 inaugurated a new form of ecclesial self‐definition: confession binds the church together. The compilation of confessional documents that make up the Book of Concord of 1580 bind Lutherans around the world today, even though the historical paths from the 16^th to the 21^st century have been quite various. As Lutherans face the future, they find themselves in a pluralistic world where they enjoy no cultural privilege, or even shared understanding of fundamental theological commitments. The task of confession and apologetic mission will be most challenging.     

A defense of contingent logical truths

A formula is a contingent logical truth when it is true in every model M but, for some model M, false at some world of M. We argue that there are such truths, given the logic of actuality. Our argument turns on defending Tarski’s definition of truth and logical truth, extended so as to apply to modal languages with an actuality operator. We argue that this extension is the philosophically proper account of validity. We counter recent arguments to the contrary presented in Hanson’s ‘Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth’ (Philos Stud 130:437–459, 2006).     

The world in itself: Neither uniform nor physical

Since Hume, philosophers of induction have debated the question of whether we have any reason for assuming that nature is uniform. This debate has always presumed that the uniformity hypothesis is itself coherent. In Part 1 of the following I argue that a proper appreciation of Nelson Goodman's so-called grue-green problem¹ should lead us to the conclusion that the uniformity hypothesis, under its usual interpretation as a strictly ontological thesis, is incoherent. In Part 2 I argue that further consideration of the grue-green problem leads to the conclusion that certain popular versions of the thesis of physical supervenience/the primacy of physics, under their usual interpretation as strictly ontological theses, are false. In Part 3 I argue that the notions of natural kinds and nature's joints should not be taken as ontologically objective notions but as interest relative. Together Parts 1, 2, and 3 provide support for the Nietzsche-Goodman thesis that philosophers are prone to mistakenly identify as absolute, mind and language independent, features of the world which are in fact only features of a particular discourse, or of the world relative to a particular discourse.     

Discovery algorithms for hierarchical relations

Two algorithms based on a latent class model are presented for discovering hierarchical relations that exist among a set ofK dichotomous items. The two algorithms, stepwise forward selection and backward elimination, incorporate statistical criteria for selecting (or deleting) 0–1 response pattern vectors to form the subset of the total possible 2 ^k vectors that uniquely describe the hierarchy. The performances of the algorithms are compared, using computer-constructed data, with those of three competing deterministic approaches based on ordering theory and the calculation of Phi/Phi-max coefficients. The discovery algorithms are also demonstrated on real data sets investigated in the literature.     

Conduction-electron mediated 1H nuclear spin-lattice relaxation in Ti45Zr38Ni17H x icosahedral quasicrystals

Nuclear magnetic resonance spin-lattice relaxation rates for ¹H in quasicrystalline Ti₄₅Zr₃₈Ni₁₇H _x are presented as a function of temperature and hydrogen concentration x. The temperature dependence demonstrates that the relaxation is via interaction with conduction electrons. The relaxation rate is extremely sensitive to hydrogen content, with the rate changing by a factor of as much as two for samples that differ in x     

Predictors of Quantitative and Qualitative Halstead Finger-Tapping Scores in Low Socioeconomic Status School-Age Children

Two hundred and thirteen low socioeconomic school-age children in grades 1 through 8 were administered the Halstead Finger Oscillation (or Tapping) Test (HFTT). All children were age appropriate for their grade in school and were not requiring special education services. Hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that a composite age/grade classification score, gender, and estimated level of intelligence accounted for approximately 40% of the variability in dominant and nondominant hand scores for these children (multiple R?=?.627, R ²?=?+.393 for the dominant and multiple R?=?+.607, R ²?=?+.368 for the nondominant hand). Only the age/grade level of the child (R ²?=?.168) predicted the ability to inhibit adjacent finger movements when performing the HFTT task. Regional normative data for low socioeconomic school-age children are presented. Neurodevelopmental changes in the cortical and subcortical systems underlying finger movement may account for some of the variability observed in children when performing the HFTT.     

Islamic mission and call: The case of the International Islamic University,Islamabad

The following paper begins with an outline of the motives for da^cwah as presented by the du^cat themselves, followed by a discussion of the significance of mission in Pakistan. The International Islamic University and its da'wah wing is documented in detail, with a focus on its ideological foundations and its objectives. The main part of the paper is devoted to how the Da^cwah Academy tries to conduct its programmes among different target groups, especially students, and how it acts at the international level using workshops and various media.     

Books received

This paper argues against the realization principle, which reifies the realization relation between lower-level and higher-level properties. It begins with a review of some principles of naturalistic metaphysics. Then it criticizes some likely reasons for embracing the realization principle, and finally it argues against the principle directly. The most likely reasons for embracing the principle depend on the dubious assumption that special science theories cannot be true unless special science predicates designate properties. The principle itself turns out to be false because the realization relation fails the naturalistic test for reality: it makes no causal difference to the world.1 ¹This paper resulted from work done at John Heil's 2006 Mind and Metaphysics NEH Summer Seminar at Washington University in St. Louis. An early version of it was presented in a special symposium on realization at the 2007 meeting of the Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. I owe thanks to all the participants in both events for helpful discussions, and I owe particular thanks to Ken Aizawa, Torin Alter, Jason Ford, Carl Gillett, John Heil, Nicholas Helms, Pete Mandik, John Post, Gene Witmer, Michelle Wrenn, Tad Zawidzki, and two anonymous referees for the AJP. ? This is the author’s current affiliation. However, the author conducted some research for the paper at Department of Philosophy, Brown University.     

The Hubris of Transcendental Idealism

Jan Pato?ka’s early phenomenology, as presented in The Natural World as a Philosophical Problem, does not merely adopt Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. The paper demonstrates the originality of Pato?ka’s appropriation of this concept, but also its internal tensions and difficulties. Seeking to elaborate a concept of a phenomenology allowing for a theory of the lifeworld stricto sensu, i.e. of the life of the world, Pato?ka’s book effectively shows that there is no ahistorical, absolute or “natural” starting point for phenomenology. Truth, as approachable through phenomenology, is not (pre)given, but must rather be developed. Elaborating on the concept of transcendental idealism, Pato?ka’s early phenomenology thus suggests a vivid idea of “intermeshing” monads ontologically grounding the world.     

Syntactical results on the arithmetical completeness of modal logic

In this paper the PA-completeness of modal logic is studied by syntactical and constructive methods. The main results are theorems on the structure of the PA-proofs of suitable arithmetical interpretationsS of a modal sequentS, which allow the transformation of PA-proofs ofS into proof-trees similar to modal proof-trees. As an application of such theorems, a proof of Solovay's theorem on arithmetical completeness of the modal system G is presented for the class of modal sequents of Boolean combinations of formulas of the form p _i,m _i=0, 1, 2, ... The paper is the preliminary step for a forthcoming global syntactical resolution of the PA-completeness problem for modal logic.     

The Worlding of Addiction

Addiction can be partially seen as a worlding; as a lived-out set of ecological relations. Based on existential-phenomenology, the lived-world of the addict is described as a particular way of being in the world. Although attained through active addiction, this way of being endures beyond active addiction into recovery. Active addiction is characterized by narrowness and withdrawal from the world; recovery from addiction entails an embrace of the world. This movement into recovery is described as broadening and reaching out, a way in which the world is opened up to be experienced in all its breadth and spiritual significance. The clinical implications of this perspective are described and explored.     

A Logic for Multiple-source Approximation Systems with Distributed Knowledge Base

The theory of rough sets starts with the notion of an approximation space, which is a pair (U,R), U being the domain of discourse, and R an equivalence relation on U. R is taken to represent the knowledge base of an agent, and the induced partition reflects a granularity of U that is the result of a lack of complete information about the objects in U. The focus then is on approximations of concepts on the domain, in the context of the granularity. The present article studies the theory in the situation where information is obtained from different sources. The notion of approximation space is extended to define a multiple-source approximation system with distributed knowledge base, which is a tuple (U,R_P)_{Pßf N}(U,R_P)_{P\ss_f N}, where N is a set of sources and P ranges over all finite subsets of N. Each R _P is an equivalence relation on U satisfying some additional conditions, representing the knowledge base of the group P of sources. Thus each finite group of sources and hence individual source perceives the same domain differently (depending on what information the group/individual source has about the domain), and the same concept may then have approximations that differ with the groups. In order to express the notions and properties related with rough set theory in this multiple-source situation, a quantified modal logic LMSAS ^D is proposed. In LMSAS ^D , quantification ranges over modalities, making it different from modal predicate logic and modal logic with propositional quantifiers. Some fragments of LMSAS ^D are discussed and it is shown that the modal system KTB is embedded in LMSAS ^D . The epistemic logic S5^D_nS5^D_n is also embedded in LMSAS ^D , and cannot replace the latter to serve our purpose. The relationship of LMSAS ^D with first and second-order logics is presented. Issues of expressibility, axiomatization and decidability are addressed.