《家谱宝卷》表征

《家谱宝卷》是中国民间秘密宗教经卷中的稀世珍本,被中外学者所看重。本文对该部宝卷的不同版本、所属教派、问世年代以及形式与内容,作了较为全面系统的考证与论述,并揭示了该部宝卷在中国民间秘密宗教发展史中继往开来的历史地位,和对封建社会下层民众信仰世界与世俗斗争的深远影响。     

论大众道德

大众道德是指既满足个人自身的基本心理需求、价值需要和个人正当利益诉求,同时主观上没有损害他人、社会的故意,客观上没有造成他人、社会的损害后果的行为方式,在某种程度上该行为方式也常常是对他人和集体有利的。大众道德是时代的需要,也是道德榜样的基础。它非常重视道德义务与道德权利有效整合,并将其融汇在个体的工作和生活之中。     

Nietzsche,Nature, Nurture

Nietzsche claims that we are fated to be as we are. He also claims, however, that we can create ourselves. To many commentators these twin commitments have seemed self‐contradictory or paradoxical. The argument of this paper, by contrast, is that, despite appearances, there is no paradox here, nor even a tension between Nietzsche's two claims. Instead, when properly interpreted these claims turn out to be intimately related to one another, so that our fatedness (and our acknowledgement of our fatedness) emerges as integral to our capacity to become self‐creators. The paper also offers, in the course of undermining a false alternative that is deeply entrenched in the philosophical tradition, a reading of Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati that actually – and perhaps uniquely – makes full sense of section 276 of The Gay Science, the chief source for this aspect of his thought.     

Nietzsche,intention, action

Nietzsche sometimes writes as if we are not in control—at least not in conscious control—of our actions. He seems to suggest that what we actually do is independent of our intentions. It turns out, though, that his understanding of both intention and action differs radically from most contemporary treatments of the issue. In particular, he denies that our actions are caused by their intentions, whose role is hermeneutical in a sense that this essay develops. How then is responsibility to be assigned, since its moral variety, at least, depends, on several views, on the intention with which an action is performed? Nietzsche, of course, is not interested in making attributions of moral responsibility. Still, his views on the relationship between an individual action, its intention, other actions by its agent, and the agent's character, as this essay presents them, provide a reasonable account of action generally and a different, broader account of responsibility for oneself.     

面对基督教:克尔凯郭尔和尼采的不同取向——兼论尼采对克尔凯郭尔的批判

本文以互读的方法试图揭示克尔凯郭尔与尼采面对基督教信仰所采取的截然相反的态度。克尔凯郭尔坚持生存者需要一个"全知全能"的上帝,而尼采认为上帝的"全知全能"性正是上帝要被杀死的原因;克尔凯郭尔极力张扬基督教人本主义思想,而尼采则批判基督教人本主义的虚妄性和奴隶本性。尼采认为,克尔凯郭尔的基督教上帝正是形而上学式思想的残余,因此克尔凯郭尔的哲学在根本上是一种"基督教哲学";是尼采彻底颠覆了形而上学,真正使哲学的关注点落实到了人的"生活世界"。     

Blameworthiness, Vice, and The Objectivity of Morals

Abstract: The following thesis is defended: whether actions are morally required is an objective matter – that is, independent of the beliefs, intentions, etc. with which the actions are preformed. This thesis needs defending because it seems vulnerable to certain counterexamples. One approach to dealing with these counterexamples centers on the concept of blameworthiness, but this approach is flawed. An alternative approach is developed that relies on the concept of a vicious action. And although it too centers on the concept of blameworthiness, it lacks the flaws that are present in the original approach.     

Nietzsche,Democracy and Transcendence

Abstract

Socialism, utilitarianism and democracy, are according to Nietzsche secularised versions of Christianity. They have continued the monomaniac one-sidedness of the Christian idea of what a human being is and should be, and they have even strengthened this monomania through its ‘immanentisation’. The article shows that this ‘immanentisation’ has a crucial importance for Nietzsche’s critique of democracy. This critique may suggest that Nietzsche’s alternative for the disappeared Christian faith is not only a more radical nipture from the religious past, but also a re-interpretation or recreation of the notion of transcendence that was implied in that faith.