Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Differences in Theory of Mind and Pretend Play Associations in Children with and Without Specific Language Impairment

Children with specific language impairment (SLI) have difficulty engaging in social pretend play, which cannot be explained exclusively by their deficient language skills. Alternatively, the ability to represent mental states (Theory of Mind [ToM]) might be important in appreciating peers' perspectives during pretend play. This study investigated whether ToM was associated with pretend play abilities in children with and without SLI. Forty‐four children (22 with SLI, 22 with typical development [TD]) between 4 and 6 years of age participated in ToM tasks and a dyadic role play activity. Children with SLI performed significantly more poorly on ToM tasks than children with TD; however, there were no significant group differences in children's role play abilities. Partial correlations revealed a positive and significant association between ToM and social pretend play in children with TD but a negative and not significant association in children with SLI. These findings suggest that not all forms and aspects of pretend play require mental representation in order to understand or engage in pretend play. Further, children with SLI may differ in their mental representational abilities from children with TD. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preschooler's Understanding of the Role of Mental States and Action in Pretense

This research investigated 3- to 5-year-old's understanding of the role of intentional states and action in pretense. There are two main perspectives on how children conceptualize pretense. One view is that children understand the mental aspects of pretending (the rich interpretation). The alternative view is that children conceptualize pretense as "acting-like" and do not appreciate that the mind is crucial to pretense (the lean interpretation). The experiments in this article used a novel approach to test these two interpretations. Children were presented with two types of videotaped scenarios. In Experiment 1, children were presented with a scenario in which people wanted to be like something else (e.g., a kangaroo) and either acted like it or did not act like it. Children were asked whether the protagonists were pretending and whether they were thinking about the pretend entity. In Experiment 2, children were presented with the Experiment 1 scenarios and also with a scenario in which a person had the intention to do something else (e.g., look for her keys) but whose actions were similar to those of a pretend entity (e.g., a bear). Children were asked about the pretense, thoughts, and the intentions of the protagonists. Experiment 3 tested for the effect of asking an open-ended versus a forced-choice question on the Experiment 2 tasks. The results of this study suggest that in certain facilitating conditions (e.g., intention information salient, forced-choice question) children have an early understanding of the role of mind in pretense.     

Developmental Changes in Pretend Play from 22- to 34-Months in Younger Siblings of Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder

Developmental trajectories of children’s pretend play and social engagement, as well as parent sensitivity and stimulation, were examined in toddlers with an older sibling with autism spectrum disorder (ASD, high risk; HR) and toddlers with typically-developing older siblings (low risk; LR). Children (N = 168, 97 boys, 71 girls) were observed at 22, 28, and 34 months during free play with a parent and elicited pretend play with an examiner. At 28 and 34 months, children were asked to imagine the consequences of actions pantomimed by the examiner on a pretend transformation task. At 36 months children were assessed for ASD, yielding 3 groups for comparison: HR children with ASD, HR children without ASD (HR-noASD), and LR children. Children in all 3 groups showed developmental changes, engaging in more bouts of pretend play and obtaining higher scores on the elicited pretend and transformation tasks with age, but children with ASD lagged behind the other 2 groups on most measures. Children with ASD were also less engaged with their parents or the examiner during play interactions than either LR or HR-noASD children, with minimal developmental change evident. Parents, regardless of group, were highly engaged with their children, but parents of HR-noASD children received somewhat higher ratings on stimulation than parents of LR children. Most group differences were not accounted for by cognitive functioning. Instead, lower social engagement appears to be an important correlate of less advanced pretend skills, with implications for understanding the early development of children with ASD and for early intervention.     

Imitation and representational development in young children with Down syndrome

Competence in object search and pretend play are argued to reflect young children's representational abilities and appear delayed in children with Down syndrome relative to social and imitative skills. This paper explores the effects on object search and play of this social strength in children with Down syndrome. Three experiments compared performance on traditional tasks with modified tasks designed to assess the role of imitation in object search and pretend play. Children with Down syndrome, relative to typically‐developing children, were able and willing to imitate hiding actions when no object was hidden (Experiment 1). When imitation was prevented in object search, children with Down syndrome searched less effectively than typically‐developing children (Experiment 2). In play, children with Down syndrome expressed more willingness to imitate a counter‐functional action, modelled by the experimenter, despite apparent competence in spontaneous functional play (Experiment 3). These findings indicate that object search and play behaviours of children with Down syndrome rely more heavily on imitation than is the case for typically‐developing children. The implications for the development of children with Down syndrome and models of representational development are discussed.     

‘Mommy,You are the Princess and I am the Queen’: How Preschool Children's Initiation and Language Use During Pretend Play Relate to Complexity

The present study investigated the relationship between complexity of pretend play, initiation of pretense activities, and mental state utterances used during play. Children 3 to 4 years of age were videotaped while engaging in pretend play with a parent. The videotapes were coded according to mental state utterances (i.e. desire, emotion, cognitive, and modulations of assertion), and pretend play complexity (i.e. interaction with parent, object use, theme, and role transformation). Children who initiated the pretend activities exhibited more complex play behaviours than those whose parents initiated the activities. Children's increased use of cognitive mental state terms was related to increased pretend play complexity, while parents' increased use of cognitive terms was related to decreased levels of complexity. The results provide support for using a guided participation approach to interacting with preschool children to enhance independence and complexity in play. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The development of landmark and beacon use in young children: evidence from a touchscreen search task

Children ages 2, 3 and 4 years participated in a novel hide-and-seek search task presented on a touchscreen monitor. On beacon trials, the target hiding place could be located using a beacon cue, but on landmark trials, searching required the use of a nearby landmark cue. In Experiment 1, 2-year-olds performed less accurately than older children on landmark trials but performed equivalently on beacon trials. In Experiment 2, the number of items on the screen was reduced and 2-year-olds' performance improved. Use of the landmark transformation technique in Experiment 3 revealed that older children formed a more precise landmark-target spatial relationship than 2-year-olds. Experiment 4 showed that the transformation itself was not responsible for the youngest participants' decreased accuracy in Experiment 3. Overall, beacons were utilized effectively by all participants, but the use of landmark cues is refined between the ages of 2 and 4.     

The Development of Representations of Pretend Object Substitutions

Many theories of how pretense is mentally represented have been posited, but none have been effectually empirically tested to date. This research is the first to explore how children and adults mentally process simple pretend actions, specifically pretend object substitutions, and whether this representation changes with age. Preschoolers, older children, and undergraduates heard or read about a variety of pretend object substitutions, and their reaction time to name an image related to the object's real identity, pretend identity, or an unrelated image was measured. To test what is unique to pretense, these reaction times were compared to those from participants who responded to the same images after reading about nonpretend versions of the same actions. Results suggest that preschoolers inhibit reality when representing a pretend action, older children activate an object's real and pretend identities equally, and adults activate the object's real identity more than the pretend one. Implications for current theories of pretense representation are discussed.     

The development of ordinal numerical competence in young children

Two experiments assessed ordinal numerical knowledge in 2- and 3-year-old children and investigated the relationship between ordinal and verbal numerical knowledge. Children were trained on a 1 vs 2 comparison and then tested with novel numerosities. Stimuli consisted of two trays, each containing a different number of boxes. In Experiment 1, box size was held constant. In Experiment 2, box size was varied such that cumulative surface area was unrelated to number. Results show children as young as 2 years of age make purely numerical discriminations and represent ordinal relations between numerosities as large as 6. Children who lacked any verbal numerical knowledge could not make ordinal judgments. However, once children possessed minimal verbal numerical competence, further knowledge was entirely unrelated to ordinal competence. Number may become a salient dimension as children begin to learn to count. An analog magnitude representation of number may underlie success on the ordinal task.     

Experimenter's Pantomimes Influence Children's Use of Body Part as Object and Imaginary Object Pantomimes: A Replication

Young children asked to pretend to use a series of absent objects typically pantomime by using a body part as the object (BPO) rather than by acting as if using an imaginary object (IO). This replication of Lyons's work (1983, 1986) examines whether different pretend contexts when requesting pantomimes influence children's use of IO and BPO pantomimes. Forty-three children aged 3;6 to 6;6 were asked to pretend to use 8 objects in 1 of 3 contexts: request, request after participating in an experimenter-provided imaginary context, and request after seeing the adult model the requested pretend action. The experimenter used IO pantomimes in the last 2 contexts. Children produced, on average, the most IO pantomimes in the modeling context, fewer in the imaginary context, and the fewest in the request context. Older children overall produced more IO pantomimes than did younger children; however, when pretend contexts were examined separately, ontogenetic differences in IO pantomimes were present for the request condition only. Externally directed actions resulted in more IO pantomiming than self-directed actions for only the youngest children.     

Dyadic association between aggressive pretend play and children’s anger expression

This study investigates the association between children’s peer-reported expression of anger and their pretend play with aggressive/negative themes observed during spontaneous play with classmates. Participants comprised 104 Chinese children (M_age = 8.98 years, SD = 0.97, 49% girls) and were filmed playing in peer dyads with toys. Aggressive and non-aggressive negative pretend themes were coded at five-second intervals for 10 minutes. Children’s expression of anger in real situations was reported by peers. Analysis using actor–partner interdependence modelling (APIM) revealed significant partner effects, indicating that children were more likely to engage in pretend play with aggressive themes when they were playing with a partner who was perceived by their peers as more easily angered. It was also found that boys were more likely to engage in pretend play with both aggressive and non-aggressive negative themes compared with girls.     

Japanese and British Children's Understanding of the Social Function of Pretend Crying

The purpose of this study was to investigate cross-cultural differences in children's understanding of pretend crying. Five- and 6-year-olds from Japan and the United Kingdom (N = 71) heard two hypothetical stories in which the protagonist of each story pretended to cry in front of another person. Children were asked about the appearance–reality distinction of pretend crying, the other character's thoughts and behavior, and the children's own moral judgment of pretend crying. Cultural differences were found in their understanding of the social function of pretend crying. Japanese children judged that pretend crying elicited another's concern and prosocial behavior more than British children. There were no significant differences in appearance–reality distinction or moral judgments between Japanese and British children. All participants successfully discriminated between pretend crying and real crying, and most participants judged pretend crying as “not good” behavior. These results suggested that Japanese children might be more expected to be sensitive to others’ feelings, and that such cultural differences in communication and socialization lead to different patterns in expectations of the social consequences of pretend crying.     

The Ability of Face Viewpoint Transformation Remains Immature at Age of 12: Evidence from Recognition of Faces with Different Familiarity in Children

Children are immature in face recognition, particularly in face configural decoding. This study examines the developmental difference of face recognition in another mechanism: viewpoint transformation processing. Adults and sixth‐grade children were instructed to match a series of one‐tone black face silhouettes to their corresponding front‐view faces. This task involves sophisticated calculation in pictorial information, precise viewpoint transformation, and most probably a 3‐D face representation. The results showed that although the performances were well above chance level in the recognition of familiar faces, for children, they were at chance level in the recognition of unfamiliar faces. The results indicate that children, at least to the age of about 12 years, are still immature in the processing of face viewpoint transformation compared to adults.     

Children’s conception of heroes,villains, the self,and others in China: A developmental study

ABSTRACT

Children learn about good and bad people from storybooks and cultural representations of heroes and villains. To probe their ideas about good and bad people, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, 8-year-olds in China proved able to conceptualize goodness and badness in a graded rather than a dichotomous fashion. They located heroes at the upper end of a vertical scale, villains at the lower end, and ordinary children in between. In Experiment 2, a wider age range of children evaluated five figures (a hero; a villain; the self; a best friend; and an ordinary child). Children again showed a non-dichotomous scaling. They positioned the hero at the upper end and the villain at the lower end. In the intervening space, children positioned a best friend above the self and the self above an ordinary child. With age, children’s differentiation between the self and an ordinary child decreased.     

Young children understand multiple pretend identities in their object play

This set of studies examined the ability of 3‐year‐olds to conceptualize multiple pretend identities with objects. Rather than relying on verbal response measures, as has been done in the past, children's creative and inferential pretend actions were used as indicators of their understanding. The common structure to all four studies was that children were confronted with one pretend scenario, moved to a second pretend scenario and then back again to the first. Children proficiently tailored their pretence to an object whose pretend identity changed between scenarios despite being less able to name each identity. Thus, using an inferential action methodology, these studies provide early and particularly convincing evidence that children can track the multiple pretend identities of objects.     

聋童与正常儿童对假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装的认识

本研究认为,对假装的认识包含理解假装表征、模仿性假装和欺骗性假装。选取了86名3-5岁的学前儿童和122名3-12岁的聋童,考察他们对假装上述内容的认知情况及差异。结果表明：（1）当假装任务中涉及的事物特征不符合儿童经验时,9岁前的聋童和正常学前儿童难以理解假装表征和模仿性假装。反之若符合儿童的经验,大部分3岁正常儿童及7岁聋童就能正确理解上述内容;（2）5岁正常儿童和7岁聋童已能正确理解欺骗性假装,这比他们在同样情境下理解假装的表征和模仿性假装的年龄要迟。（3）聋童理解假装问题要比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但他们正确理解这些问题的年龄起点及达到的程度与正常儿童可能是一致的,而且发展的趋势也是相似的。（4）手语聋童理解假装问题的成绩好于口语聋童,那些父母会手语或父母是聋人的聋童的成绩好于其他聋童。本研究的结论是：低龄正常儿童和聋童还难以真正理解假装表征;聋童对假装的认识比正常儿童滞后2-4年,但发展趋势相似;聋童自身的手语水平及其父母的手语水平是影响他们理解假装的主要因素。     

Let's pretend: The role of motoric imagery in memory for sentences and words

A number of theories suggest that for young children, concepts should have an important motoric (or sensory-motor) component. A levels-of-processing theory is proposed which predicts that processing on motoric imagery should facilitate memory for both isolated words and for sentences. Experiment 1 examined the effects of motoric enactment (viz., pretend play) of sentences on memory for the sentences. Motoric imagery facilitated memory for both children (5 to 7 years of age) and adults, though, contrary to expectations, the effects were weaker for the children than for the adults. Further, it was found that motoric imagery affected the initial acquisition, but was not important as a retreival cue. Experiment 2 examined the effects of motoric imagery on free recall of lists of unrelated words. Under these conditions, motoric imagery facilitated memory for both children (7 to 9 years of age) and adults equally; in contrast, visual imagery instructions had no effect on memory. These results indicate that motoric imagery may facilitate memory under conditions in which visual imagery has no effect. Theoretical implications are explored for previous experiments on pretend play which suggest that training for pretent enactment can facilitate cognitive development.     

Is young children’s recognition of pretense metarepresentational or merely behavioral? Evidence from 2- and 3-year-olds’ understanding of pretend sounds and speech

When young children observe pretend-play, do they interpret it simply as a type of behavior, or do they infer the underlying mental state that gives the behavior meaning? This is a long-standing question with deep implications for how “theory on mind” develops. The two leading accounts of shared pretense give opposing answers. The behavioral theory proposes that children represent pretense as a form of behavior (behaving in a way that would be appropriate if P); the metarepresentational theory argues that children instead represent pretense via the early concept PRETEND. A test between these accounts is provided by children’s understanding of pretend sounds and speech. We report the first experiments directly investigating this understanding. In three experiments, 2- and 3-year-olds’ listened to requests that were either spoken normally, or with the pretense that a teddy bear was uttering them. To correctly fulfill the requests, children had to represent the normal utterance as the experimenter’s, and the pretend utterances as the bear’s. Children succeeded at both ages, suggesting that they can represent pretend speech (the requests) as coming from counterfactual sources (the bear rather than the experimenter). We argue that this is readily explained by the metarepresentational theory, but harder to explain if children are behaviorists about pretense.     

Young children's understanding of pretend crying: The effect of context

Reasoning about another's pretend and real crying is related to ma'ny important social cognitive abilities (e.g., emotional understanding, appearance–reality, and theory of mind). This study investigated whether children aged 6 years and younger could distinguish between instances of pretend crying and real crying as presented in stories. Sixty‐five Japanese children aged 4–6 years were given stories within two contexts (Play and Non‐play). In the Play context, the protagonist of the story was pretending to cry or really crying during a pretend play activity. In the Non‐play context, the protagonist was also pretending to cry or really crying after his/her toy had been hidden by another child. The children answered questions about these crying events. The results showed that the 4‐ and 5‐year‐olds showed significantly better understanding of pretend crying in the Play context compared to the Non‐play context. In the Non‐play context, they were significantly less likely to understand the cause of pretend crying compared to the 6‐year‐olds. The results suggest that the context of pretend play facilitates the children's understanding of pretend crying.     

Learning to Align Relations: The Effects of Feedback and Self-Explanation

Relational similarity connects superficially dissimilar objects and events. In 2 experiments, the ability to recognize and respond to similar relations was studied in children ages 3 to 5 with 2 comparison tasks. Children interpreted illustrated pictures that shared perceptual or relational aspects and then made 2 comparison choices and explanations of these choices. Results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that when given explicit feedback regarding the relations depicted in the pictures, children learned to respond quickly to this type of similarity in subsequent trials, which involved novel relations. In Experiment 2, the effect of re- explanation on relational understanding was examined. Children age 4.5 to 5 years, but not 3- to 4-year-olds, showed relational learning when asked to explain the experimenter's relational choice.