共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
1.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
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Igor DouvenEmail: |
2.
Patrick Maynard 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):111-121
Cynthia Freeland’s investigation of four kinds of ‘fidelity’ in portraiture is cut across by more general philosophical concerns.
One is about what might be called the expression of persons--the persons or ‘inner selves’ of portrait subjects and of portrait
artist: whether either is possible across each of the four kinds of fidelity, and whether these two kinds of expression are
in tension. More fundamental is the problem of telling how self-expression is at all possible in any of these forms. Finally,
she wonders how photography affects all these questions. This comment addresses portraiture not so much in terms of the four
fidelities, but with another quartet of concepts: four ordinary types of ‘display’, in terms of which we see how artists’
self-expression is possible in all these forms, also including photography. Its key idea is that portraits are displays simply
by being pictures or sculptures, which are kinds of artifacts, hence things that we perceive as having intentional affordance:
that is, as being intentionally made ‘for’ something.
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Patrick MaynardEmail: |
3.
Richard Menary 《Topoi》2009,28(1):31-43
Naturalistic philosophers ought to think that the mind is continuous with the rest of the world and should not, therefore,
be surprised by the findings of the extended mind, cognitive integration and enactivism. Not everyone is convinced that all
mental phenomena are continuous with the rest of the world. For example, intentionality is often formulated in a way that
makes the mind discontinuous with the rest of the world. This is a consequence of Brentano’s formulation of intentionality,
I suggest, and can be overcome by revealing that the concept of intentional directedness as he receives it from the Scholastics
is quite consistent with the continuity thesis. It is only when intentional directedness is conjoined with intentional inexistence
that intentionality and content are consistent with a discontinuity thesis (such as Brentano’s thesis). This makes room to
develop an account of intentional directedness that is consistent with the continuity thesis in the form of Peirce’s representational
principle. I also argue against a form of the discontinuity thesis in the guise of the derived/underived content distinction.
Having shown that intentionality is consistent with the continuity thesis I argue that we should focus on intentionality and
representation as bodily enacted. I conclude that we would be better off focussing on representation and intentionality in
action rather than giving abstract functional accounts of extended cognition.
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Richard MenaryEmail: |
4.
Sven Bernecker 《Erkenntnis》2009,71(1):107-121
This paper criticizes the widespread view whereby a second-order judgment of the form ‘I believe that p’ qualifies as self-knowledge only if the embedded content, p, is of the same type as the content of the intentional state reflected upon and the self-ascribed attitude, belief, is of
the same type as the attitude the subject takes towards p. Rather than requiring identity of contents across levels of cognition self-knowledge requires only that the embedded content
of the second-order thought be an entailment of the content of the intentional state reflected upon. And rather than demanding
identity of attitudes across levels of cognition self-knowledge demands only that the attitude of the intentional state reflected
upon and the attitude the subject self-attributes share certain features such as direction of fit and polarity.
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Sven BerneckerEmail: |
5.
Jan Slaby 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(4):429-444
This text addresses a problem that is not sufficiently dealt with in most of the recent literature on emotion and feeling.
The problem is a general underestimation of the extent to which affective intentionality is essentially bodily. Affective intentionality is the sui generis type of world-directedness that most affective states – most clearly the emotions – display. Many theorists of emotion overlook
the extent to which intentional feelings are essentially bodily feelings. The important but quite often overlooked fact is
that the bodily feelings in question are not the regularly treated, non-intentional bodily sensations (known from Jamesian
accounts of emotion), but rather crucial carriers of world-directed intentionality. Consequently, most theories of human emotions
and feelings recently advocated are deficient in terms of phenomenological adequacy. This text tries to make up for this deficit
and develops a catalogue of five central features of intentional bodily feelings. In addition, Jesse Prinz’s embodied appraisal theory is criticized as an exemplary case of the misconstrual of the bodily nature of affective experience in naturalistic philosophy
of mind.
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Jan SlabyEmail: |
6.
Introspection and Authoritative Self-Knowledge 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Cynthia Macdonald 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):355-372
In this paper I outline and defend an introspectionist account of authoritative self-knowledge for a certain class of cases,
ones in which a subject is both thinking and thinking about a current, conscious thought. My account is distinctive in a number
of ways, one of which is that it is compatible with the truth of externalism—the view that the contents of subjects’ intentional
states are individuation-dependent on factors external to their minds. It is thus decidedly anti-Cartesian, despite being
introspectionist. My argument proceeds in three stages. A virtue of the position I develop is that the epistemic features
on which it is based also apply to sensations and to non-episodic intentional states, to the extent that one has authoritative
knowledge of them. However, despite the appeal to analogies with observable properties of objects of perception, the account
is not a ‘perceptual’ model of such knowledge in the sense that those such as Shoemaker, Burge and others have in mind. Because
the features on which the analogy is based are abstract and general, they are not tied to cases of observation alone. Those
who appeal to such phenomena as ‘intellectual experience’ (Burge, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96, 91–116, 1996) or ‘intellectual intuition’ (Bealer, Philosophical perspectives, Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 29–55, 1999) in their accounts of authoritative self-knowledge may well appeal to such features. This, amongst other factors, distinguishes
the position from other introspectionist ones in a way that makes it immune to standard objections to perceptual models of
self-knowledge.
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Cynthia MacdonaldEmail: |
7.
Robert Huseby 《Res Publica》2008,14(1):1-18
Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources
of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected
group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility
can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy
for amending this problem.
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Robert HusebyEmail: |
8.
Łukasz Kosowski 《Husserl Studies》2008,24(3):243-259
The present paper is guided by the belief that Edmund Husserl’s concept of noema can be significantly enriched when considered
in light of extreme epistemological instances. These include the phenomena of the absurd and nonsense, but also intentional
conflict and cases of consciousness directed to contradictory objects. The paper shows that the noema, when experienced in
such a context, exhibits interesting characteristics that are rather difficult to note in other circumstances. The paper consists
of five sections. The first interprets and relates concepts from Logical Investigations to those from Ideas I. The second section discloses the noematic ability to assemble senses for which there is no corresponding object. The third
section stresses that the noema must, in some instances, be able to comprise two separate structures of senses through which
two different objects are meant. In the fourth section, all of these characteristics are shown to be restricted by the concept
of nonsense and the laws of meaning-compounding. In this way, the noema is clarified as “possibly thinkable content.” Finally,
in Sect. 5, this idea is brought into dialogue with the most significant interpretations of the noema.
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Łukasz KosowskiEmail: |
9.
David Morris 《Human Studies》2008,31(4):399-421
This article studies the phenomenology of chronic illness in light of phenomenology’s insights into ecstatic temporality and
freedom. It shows how a chronic illness can, in lived experience, manifest itself as a disturbance of our usual relation to
ecstatic temporality and thence as a disturbance of freedom. This suggests that ecstatic temporality is related to another
sort of time—“provisional time”—that is in turn rooted in the body. The article draws on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception and Heidegger’s Being and Time, shedding light on the latter’s concept of ecstatic temporality. It also discusses implications for self-management of chronic
illness, especially in children.
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David MorrisEmail: |
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12.
Anna Mudde 《Human Studies》2009,32(2):183-200
In this paper, I draw on the mutually implicated structures of tragedy and self-formation found in Hegel’s use of Sophocles’
Antigone in the Phenomenology. By emphasizing the apparent distinction between particular and universal in Hegel’s reading of the tragedies in Antigone, I propose that a tragedy of action (which particularizes a universal) is inescapable for subjectivity understood as socially
constituted and always already socially engaged. I consider universal/particular relations in three communities: Hegel’s Greek
polis, his community of conscience, and my reading of certain feminist communities. The position I propose establishes a ground
from which to approach subjects, and implies that all subjects may be understood as the result of relations embodying potential
tragedy. This speaks to contemporary concerns about marginalization, identity articulation, and relations of recognition.
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Anna MuddeEmail: |
13.
Benjamin Mossel 《Philosophia》2009,37(2):307-333
Some philosophers have argued that refraining from performing an action consists in actively keeping oneself from performing
that action or preventing one’s performing it. Since activities must be held to be positive actions, this implies that negative
actions are a species of positive actions which is to say that all actions are positive actions.
I defend the following claims:
相似文献
(i) | Positive actions necessarily include activity or effort, negative actions may require activity or effort, but never include the activity or effort which may be required. |
(ii) | Unless it is, or was, at some time in P’s power to Q, P does not refrain from Q-ing. |
(iii) | Negative actions are actions, they are causings of negative facts. |
Benjamin MosselEmail: |
14.
K. Brad Wray 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(1):81-89
I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation.
Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world,
the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue
that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing theories are both equally successful.
相似文献
K. Brad WrayEmail: |
15.
Nick Tosh 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):465-482
Historians must be sensitive to the alienness of the past. Insofar as they are concerned with their actors’ reasoning, they
must (through open-minded empirical investigation) find out how their actors thought, and not assume that they thought like us. This is familiar historiographical advice, but pushed
too far it can be brought to conflict with rather weak assumptions about what historians must presuppose if they are to interpret
their actors at all. The present paper sketches those assumptions, and argues that the influential ‘Strong Program’ in the
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) falls foul of them. We do not argue from the correctness of the assumptions to the
falsity of SSK. Rather, we note the incompatibility, and then show how SSK theorists’ tendency to take interpretation for granted blinds them—and perhaps their readers—to the existence of the conflict.
相似文献
Nick ToshEmail: |
16.
Lisa Rivera 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(1):69-87
When a person gives up an end of crucial importance to her in order to promote a moral aim, we regard her as having made a
moral sacrifice. The paper analyzes these sacrifices in light of some of Bernard Williams’ objections to Kantian and Utilitarian
accounts of them. Williams argues that an implausible consequence of these theories is that that we are expected to sacrifice
projects that make our lives worth living and contribute to our integrity. Williams’ arguments about integrity and meaning
are shown to be unconvincing when the content of projects is left open. However, a look at his later arguments suggests a
reason to be concerned about defensible ethical projects as understood through what he refers to as “the morality system”.
The problem for theories of this type turns out to be not merely conflicts between ethical projects and moral demands but
making sense of some of the ethically relevant features of these projects. Accommodations to moral theories that leave room
for ethical projects may be insufficient to explain such features, for example in cases where agents demand more of themselves
than the theories require. Making the theories more demanding is also problematic. Williams’ view about the role ethics plays
in our conception of the life we want to lead provides a better account of these cases.
相似文献
Lisa RiveraEmail: |
17.
Janko M. Lozar 《Human Studies》2009,32(1):19-31
This contribution starts from Max Scheler’s claim that modern philosophy holds two differing views on feelings. The first
view, which Scheler attributes to René Descartes, presents them in their intentional role but rejects their independence;
the other view, which Scheler attributes to Immanuel Kant, holds that they cannot be reduced to the rational part of the soul
and thus affirms their independence, but deprives them of all cognitive powers. After considering both views, I discuss the
views of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. Husserl takes an ambivalent approach to attunement, which opens the possibility
of understanding Martin Heidegger’s thought of fundamental attunement.
相似文献
Janko M. LozarEmail: |
18.
Patrick Hutchings 《Sophia》2007,46(1):79-89
A review of Peter Steele’s Plenty, a book in which each poem is faced by a colour plate of the painting or object which sparked it off. Hollander’s ecphrasis
and Krieger’s ekphrasis are held in – possibly unresolvable – dialectic by Steele’s poems. The only resolution which one can
find is one of wit rather than of philosophy.
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Patrick HutchingsEmail: |
19.
Per Albert Ilsaas 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):313-316
The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment.
It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights
tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.
相似文献
Per Albert IlsaasEmail: |
20.
Michael Blome-Tillmann 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):383-394
The paper discusses approaches to Epistemic Contextualism that model the satisfaction of the predicate ‘know’ in a given context C in terms of the notion of belief/fact-matching throughout a contextually specified similarity sphere of worlds that is centred
on actuality. The paper offers three counterexamples to approaches of this type and argues that they lead to insurmountable
difficulties. I conclude that what contextualists (and Subject-Sensitive Invariantists) have traditionally called the ‘epistemic
standards’ of a given context C cannot be explicated in terms of a contextually specified similarity sphere that is centred on actuality. The mentioned accounts
of epistemic relevance and thus the corresponding accounts of the context-sensitivity (or subject-sensitivity) of ‘knows’
are to be rejected.
相似文献
Michael Blome-TillmannEmail: |