Eye Movements in Risky Choice

We asked participants to make simple risky choices while we recorded their eye movements. We built a complete statistical model of the eye movements and found very little systematic variation in eye movements over the time course of a choice or across the different choices. The only exceptions were finding more (of the same) eye movements when choice options were similar, and an emerging gaze bias in which people looked more at the gamble they ultimately chose. These findings are inconsistent with prospect theory, the priority heuristic, or decision field theory. However, the eye movements made during a choice have a large relationship with the final choice, and this is mostly independent from the contribution of the actual attribute values in the choice options. That is, eye movements tell us not just about the processing of attribute values but also are independently associated with choice. The pattern is simple—people choose the gamble they look at more often, independently of the actual numbers they see—and this pattern is simpler than predicted by decision field theory, decision by sampling, and the parallel constraint satisfaction model. © 2015 The Authors. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

MDFT account of decision making under time pressure

In this paper, decision making under time pressure for multiattribute choice alternatives in a risky environment is investigated. A model, multiattribute decision field theory (MDFT), is introduced that describes both the dynamic and the stochastic nature of decision making and accounts for the observed changes in choice probabilities, including preference reversals as a function of time limit. An experiment in which five different time limits were imposed on the decision maker is presented to test the predictions of the model. It is shown that MDFT is able to account for the complex decision behavior observed in the data. Furthermore, MDFT is compared with the predictions of decision field theory (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Roe, Busemeyer, & Townsend, 2001).     

Multi-attribute,multi-alternative models of choice: Choice,reaction time,and process tracing

The first aim of this research is to compare computational models of multi-alternative, multi-attribute choice when attribute values are explicit. The choice predictions of utility (standard random utility & weighted valuation), heuristic (elimination-by-aspects, lexicographic, & maximum attribute value), and dynamic (multi-alternative decision field theory, MDFT, & a version of the multi-attribute linear ballistic accumulator, MLBA) models are contrasted on both preferential and risky choice data. Using both maximum likelihood and cross-validation fit measures on choice data, the utility and dynamic models are preferred over the heuristic models for risky choice, with a slight overall advantage for the MLBA for preferential choice. The response time predictions of these models (except the MDFT) are then tested. Although the MLBA accurately predicts response time distributions, it only weakly accounts for stimulus-level differences. The other models completely fail to account for stimulus-level differences. Process tracing measures, i.e., eye and mouse tracking, were also collected. None of the qualitative predictions of the models are completely supported by that data. These results suggest that the models may not appropriately represent the interaction of attention and preference formation. To overcome this potential shortcoming, the second aim of this research is to test preference-formation assumptions, independently of attention, by developing the models of attentional sampling (MAS) model family which incorporates the empirical gaze patterns into a sequential sampling framework. An MAS variant that includes attribute values, but only updates the currently viewed alternative and does not contrast values across alternatives, performs well in both experiments. Overall, the results support the dynamic models, but point to the need to incorporate a framework that more accurately reflects the relationship between attention and the preference-formation process.     

Decision making under conflict: Decision time as a measure of conflict strength

Conflict and choice are closely related in that choice produces conflict and conflict is resolved by making a choice. Although conflict was invoked in psychological approaches to decision making early on (Lewin, 1931/1964), no generally accepted measure of conflict strength has been established (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). The present study introduces a model (multiattribute decision field theory) that predicts a decision time pattern depending on the conflict situation. In a risky decision-making experiment with multiattribute choice alternatives, decision time is investigated as a possible measure of conflict strength. It is shown that the model can be fitted to a complex choice pattern.     

Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty

Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking and responsibility by drawing a distinction between being responsible for the outcome (R1) versus acting responsibly (R2). Four experiments were performed, in which participants were presented with scenarios describing decision makers facing a choice between a risky (uncertain) option and a riskless (certain) option, framed in terms of losses or equivalent gains. The results showed that decision makers who chose the risky alternative were judged to have acted in a less responsible manner (R2), while still being held equally responsible for the outcome (R1), unless they were ignorant of the risks involved. Choosing risk did not absolve decision makers from blame, despite being less causal and less in control than those who chose the riskless option. Risky decision makers were also judged to be more personally involved. The dissociation between R1 and R2 ratings confirms earlier findings and serves to clarify an alleged relationship between risky choices and responsibility aversion. Framing effects for own choices were found in both scenarios. In contrast, responsibility ratings were only slightly affected by frame. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自我框架、风险认知和风险选择

对行为决策中“框架效应”(Framing Effect)的研究进行了拓展：探讨了自我框架对风险决策的影响及其机制。面对运用图示方法表示的管理,健康,及投资方面的风险决策问题,参与者自主地选择对方案的描述（自我框架）。研究有四个主要发现：1）自我框架对风险选择的效应部分显著,而且对风险选择的影响方向因情境的不同而不同;2）机会威胁认知是自我框架效应的一个中介变量;3）自我框架在情绪语气上的差异对风险决策有显著影响：决策者对一个备选方案（确定性或风险性方案）相对于另一个备选方案的自我描述的情绪语气越积极正面,这个方案被选择的可能性越大;4）决策者的机会-威胁认知是这一自我框架效应的部分中介变量。也就是说,对备选方案的自我描述语气作为一种对决策信息的编码影响了风险（机会和威胁）认知,进而影响决策者的风险偏好和选择     

Conflict and the Stochastic-Dominance Principle of Decision Making

One of the key principles underlying rational models of decision making is the idea that the decision maker should never choose an action that is stochastically dominated by another action. In the study reported in this article, violations of stochastic dominance frequently occurred when the payoffs produced by two actions were negatively correlated (in conflict), but no violations occurred when the payoffs were positively correlated (no conflict). This finding is contrary to models which assume that choice probability depends on the utility of each action, and the utility for an action depends solely on its own payoffs and probabilities. This article also reports, for the first time ever, the distribution of response times observed in a risky decision task. Both the violations of stochastic dominance and the response time distributions are explained in terms of a dynamic theory of decision making called multiattribute decision field theory.     

Linking together different measures of preference: A dynamic model of matching derived from decision field theory

Two frequently used tasks for measuring preferences among gambles are choice and selling price tasks. However, the rank orders observed with these tasks do not agree, and these disagreements are called preference reversals. In this article, we propose an extension of decision field theory that was originally designed to account for choice probability and the distribution of choice response times. In this extension, we show how this same theory can be used to derive predictions for the distribution of values produced by selling price tasks. This model not only accounts for the basic preference reversal results but also can explain the effects of various information processing factors on preference reversals including time, effort, and practice. We conclude by summarizing the advantages of the decision field matching model over two earlier models of choice and selling prices—expression theory and the contingent weighting model.     

Effects of problem frame and gender on principals’ decision making

Research indicates people’s decisions can sometimes be influenced by seemingly trivial differences in the framing (i.e., wording) of alternative options. The tendency to prefer risk averse options when framed positively and risky options when framed negatively is known as the framing effect. The current study examined the susceptibility of school principals to the framing effect. Additionally, analytical and intuitive decision styles, the degree to which one’s typical goal is to maximize (rather than satisfice), gender, and years of experience as a principal were measured to assess whether they are predictive of principals’ choices, and to test whether they moderate the effects of framing on choice. Seventy-one principals completed six decision problems (framed either positively or negatively) and instruments assessing decision style, typical decision goal, gender, and experience. Analyses demonstrated that principals are influenced by framing. Although the positively and negatively framed versions of the decision problems were objectively identical, negative framing resulted in more risky choices. Additionally, regardless of frame, men made more risky choices than women. There was no evidence that experience, decision style, or the degree to which one’s typical decision goal was to maximize, decreased framing effects. Several potential debiasing strategies are described, and limitations are noted.     

Stability of choices in a risky decision‐making task: a 3‐year longitudinal study with children and adults

In a 3‐year follow‐up to Levin and Hart's ( 2003 ) study, we observed the same children, now 9–11 years old, and their parents in the same risky decision‐making task. At the aggregate level the same pattern of means was observed across time periods. At the individual level the key variables were significantly correlated across time periods for both children and adults. Taken together with the results from the original study and earlier studies, these results solidify the following conclusions: children utilize both probability and outcome information in risky decision‐making; the tendency to make more risky choices to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain of equal magnitude, which is a major tenet of the leading theories of risky decision‐making, occurs for children as well as adults; children make more risky choices than adults; temperamental predictors of risky choice are valid for children as well as for adults. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Framing effects in group investment decision making: role of group polarization

Prospect theory proposes that framing effects result in a preference for risk-averse choices in gain situations and risk-seeking choices in loss situations. However, in group polarization situations, groups show a pronounced tendency to shift toward more extreme positions than those they initially held. Whether framing effects in group decision making are more prominent as a result of the group-polarization effect was examined. Purposive sampling of 120 college students (57 men, 63 women; M age = 20.1 yr., SD = 0.9) allowed assessment of relative preference between cautious and risky choices in individual and group decisions. Findings indicated that both group polarization and framing effects occur in investment decisions. More importantly, group decisions in a gain situation appear to be more cautious, i.e., risk averse, than individual decisions, whereas group decisions in the loss situation appear to be more risky than individual decisions. Thus, group decision making may expand framing effects when it comes to investment choices through group polarization.     

心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响

解释水平理论是一种解释心理距离怎样影响个体的思维决策的社会认知理论。研究基于解释水平理论,探查了心理距离对风险决策框架效应的影响。实验从心理距离的四个维度入手,每个维度均采用2（解释水平高、低）×2（正框架、负框架）的被试间设计,用于检验解释水平是否调节框架对被试决策任务的选择。结果表明,当心理距离越远,解释水平越高时,被试产生明显的框架效应;而当心理距离越近,解释水平越低时,框架效应明显减弱。除了大概率情况下的框架效应削弱至不显著,其余维度的高、低解释水平下的框架效应均显著。     

行为决策理论之父：纪念Edwards教授2周年忌辰

著名心理学家W ard Edwards对行为决策的学科形成与理论发展作出了巨大贡献。文章简要介绍了Edwards的生平,以主观期望效用模型和贝叶斯决策为核心回顾了Edwards的决策理论、主要成就及其对行为决策研究的学术贡献。文章并从行为决策领域的研究、科普、应用及人才培养等方面总结了中国行为决策研究的发展历程,以及Edwards的学术思想对中国行为决策研究的主要影响。文章展望了行为决策研究的前景,并呼吁更多的中国心理学工作者投身于行为决策研究。     

Multialternative decision field theory: a dynamic connectionist model of decision making

The authors interpret decision field theory (J. R. Busemeyer & J. T. Townsend, 1993) as a connectionist network and extend it to accommodate multialternative preferential choice situations. This article shows that the classic weighted additive utility model (see R. L. Keeney & H. Raiffa, 1976) and the classic Thurstone preferential choice model (see L. L. Thurstone, 1959) are special cases of this new multialternative decision field theory (MDFT), which also can emulate the search process of the popular elimination by aspects (EBA) model (see A. Tversky, 1969). The new theory is unique in its ability to explain several central empirical results found in the multialternative preference literature with a common set of principles. These empirical results include the similarity effect, the attraction effect, and the compromise effect, and the complex interactions among these three effects. The dynamic nature of the model also implies strong testable predictions concerning the moderating effect of time pressure on these three effects.     

风险决策过程验证：补偿/非补偿模型之争的新认识与新证据

风险决策是人类赖以生存和发展的重大决策。如何进行风险决策是人类不断认识和改造世界过程中遇到的未解之谜。主流风险理论认为, 风险决策是一个补偿性的、期望值最大化的过程; 而非主流的风险理论则认为, 风险决策是非补偿性的, 并不遵循期望法则所假设的加权求和等过程。这一谜团为何一直没有得以破解, 或许是因为我们未找到揭示其心理过程的令人信服的证据。近10年来, 我们针对风险决策过程, 借助行为实验、眼动记录法、事件相关电位、功能磁共振成像等技术, 系统探索风险决策的心理和神经机制, 为回答“风险决策是否遵循补偿性规则”这一问题提供了汇聚性证据。本文依据期望法则所假设的概率函数推导、加权过程、加权求和过程、总分最大化等步骤, 对这些研究进行梳理与回顾, 以期加深人们对风险决策机制的理解, 并为建立、健全与风险决策相关的政策、法律法规提供理论依据。