What we epistemically owe to each other

Philosophical Studies - This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how...     

People believe it is plausible to have forgotten memories of childhood sexual abuse

Pezdek, Blandon-Gitlin, and Gabbay (2006) found that perceptions of the plausibility of events increase the likelihood that imagination may induce false memories of those events. Using a survey conducted by Gallup, we asked a large sample of the general population how plausible it would be for a person with longstanding emotional problems and a need for psychotherapy to be a victim of childhood sexual abuse, even though the person could not remember the abuse. Only 18% indicated that it was implausible or very implausible, whereas 67% indicated that such an occurrence was either plausible or very plausible. Combined with Pezdek et al.’s findings, and counter to their conclusions, our findings imply that there is a substantial danger of inducing false memories of childhood sexual abuse through imagination in psychotherapy.     

People believe that they are prototypically good or bad

People have been shown to view their beliefs as being prototypical (modal) but their abilities as (falsely) unique (above or below average). It is possible that these two viewpoints – self as prototypical and self as unique – can be reconciled. If the distribution of ability for a given skill is skewed such that many others have high (low) ability and few others have low (high) ability, it is possible that a majority of peoples’ self-assessments can be above (below) average. Participants in 5 studies demonstrated an understanding that various skills have skewed ability distributions and their self-assessments were related to distribution shape: high when negatively skewed and low when positively skewed. Further, participants tended to place themselves near the mode of their perceived skill distribution. Participants were most likely to think that they were good at skills for which they thought that most others were also good.     

Choosing to believe

This article defends a regulative ethics of voluntary belief. In order to determine the occasion and the scope of such an ethics, the article begins with an examination of the concept of belief in conversation with the view of J. L. Schellenberg. Next, against the dominant position in contemporary epistemology, it argues that some beliefs can be voluntary, in the sense that they are under the immediate control of the believer, and replies to William Alston’s influential objections to doxastic voluntarism. If some beliefs are subject to the immediate control of the believer, then in these cases believers are ethically responsible not only for how they investigate those beliefs, but also for the choice of whether or not to believe them. The article concludes by formulating and defending two types of regulative ethical principles governing voluntary belief.     

Why promises and threats need each other

Despite the pervasive use of promises and threats in social life, very little research has been devoted to examining the effectiveness of these interpersonal tactics in promoting cooperation in social dilemmas. Based on the Goal‐Prescribes‐Rationality principle, we hypothesized that cooperation should be most strongly enhanced when promises and threats are communicated in combination, rather than in isolation. Also, we hypothesized that the combination of promises and threats should be especially effective among individuals with prosocial rather than proself orientations. Two studies provided good evidence for the latter hypothesis, in that the combination of promises and threats was only effective in people with prosocial orientations, people who are concerned with equality and collective interest. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Intuitions are inclinations to believe

Advocates of the use of intuitions in philosophy argue that they are treated as evidence because they are evidential. Their opponents agree that they are treated as evidence, but argue that they should not be so used, since they are the wrong kinds of things. In contrast to both, we argue that, despite appearances, intuitions are not treated as evidence in philosophy whether or not they should be. Our positive account is that intuitions are a subclass of inclinations to believe. Our thesis explains why intuitions play a role in persuasion and inquiry, without conceding that they are evidential. The account also makes predictions about the structure of intuitions that are confirmed by independent arguments.

A dyadic assessment of how couples indicate their commitment to each other

This study investigated the behaviors couples use to indicate their commitment in romantic relationships and explored the complex ways in which these behaviors are interconnected. Survey data were collected from 121 romantically involved couples in the United States. Dyadic analysis of the data revealed that the greater the levels of commitment, the more frequent the use of certain behaviors to indicate commitment. In addition, couples were similar in their use of the indicators, tended to project their self‐perceptions onto their partners, and had a degree of accuracy in perceiving their partners’ use of indicators. The research sheds light on some of the complex ways intimate couples experience and express commitment in the everyday lives.     

The response order effect: People believe the first person who remembers an event

When groups of people remember an event, the order in which they discuss their memories is important. In three experiments, a response order effect was shown in which participants believed the first speaker to be more accurate and more confident than a subsequent speaker. Further, participants were more likely to report as their own memory what the first speaker reported than what a subsequent speaker reported. The experiments showed that the response order effect was not due to intrinsic characteristics of what the first speaker said. Even when participants chose the response order themselves and the speakers’ dialogue was counterbalanced, participants still believed that the first speaker was more accurate and confident than a subsequent speaker. Because in most situations the person who introduces a particular topic into a discussion is more accurate, people may assume that this is true, even when the response order is random.     

Overshadowing and the outcome-alone exposure effect counteract each other

Three conditioned lever-press suppression experiments with rats investigated the interaction between overshadowing and outcome-alone exposure effects. Experiment 1 found in first-order conditioning that combined overshadowing and outcome-preexposure treatments attenuate the response deficit produced by either treatment alone. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated the interaction between overshadowing and outcome pre- and postexposure effects in sensory preconditioning, varying retention intervals to engage recency and primacy effects with respect to treatment order. Contrary to when a solitary cue is conditioned, responding to a cue conditioned in compound appeared positively correlated with the context's associative status. These findings suggested that some of the basic laws of learning applicable to cues conditioned alone do not similarly apply to a component of a compound cue.     

Seemings: still dispositions to believe

According to phenomenal conservatism, seemings can provide prima facie justification for beliefs. In order to fully assess phenomenal conservatism, it is important to understand the nature of seemings. Two views are that (SG) seemings are a sui generis propositional attitude, and that (D2B) seemings are nothing over and above dispositions to believe. Proponents of (SG) reject (D2B) in large part by providing four distinct objections against (D2B). First, seemings have a distinctive phenomenology, but dispositions to believe do not. Second, seemings can provide a non-trivial explanation for dispositions to believe, which wouldn’t be possible if seemings were dispositions to believe. Third, there are some dispositions to believe that are not seemings. Fourth, there are instances of seemings which are not dispositions to believe. I consider and reject each of these objections. The first and third objections rely on a misunderstanding of (D2B). The second objection fails because there are contexts in which an appeal to a previously unknown identity can provide an interesting explanation. The fourth objection overlooks the possibility of finkish and masked dispositions, phenomena which are widely accepted in the dispositions literature. I conclude that (D2B) escapes these common objections unscathed.     

Being present for each other: long-distance video-linked seminars

This paper describes technical issues in setting up and using long-distance learning equipment. It also describes aspects of long-distance learning during stages of the learning process and evaluations of the method. The use of the countertransference is also discussed as an important aspect of the work.     

All things considered duties to believe

To be a doxastic deontologist is to claim that there is such a thing as an ethics of belief (or of our doxastic attitudes in general). In other words, that we are subject to certain duties with respect to our doxastic attitudes, the non-compliance with which makes us blameworthy and that we should understand doxastic justification in terms of these duties. In this paper, I argue that these duties are our all things considered duties, and not our epistemic or moral duties, for example. I show how this has the surprising result that, if deontologism is a thesis about doxastic justification, it entails that there is no such thing as epistemic or moral justification for a belief that p. I then suggest why this result, though controversial, may have some salutary consequences: primarily that it helps us make some sense of an otherwise puzzling situation regarding doxastic dilemmas.     

The duty to believe according to the evidence

‘Evidentialism’ is the conventional name (given mainly by its opponents) for the view that there is a moral duty to proportion one’s beliefs to evidence, proof or other epistemic justifications for belief. This essay defends evidentialism against objections based on the alleged involuntariness of belief, on the claim that evidentialism assumes a doubtful epistemology, that epistemically unsupported beliefs can be beneficial, that there are significant classes of exceptions to the evidentialist principle, and other shabby evasions and alibis (as I take them to be) for disregarding the duty to believe according to the evidence. Evidentialism is also supported by arguments based on both self-regarding and other-regarding considerations.     

Object representations are biased toward each other through statistical learning

The visual system is remarkably efficient at extracting regularities from the environment through statistical learning. While such extraction has extensive consequences on cognition, it is unclear how statistical learning shapes the representations of the individual objects that comprise the regularities. Here we examine how statistical learning alters object representations. In three experiments, participants were exposed to either random arrays containing objects in a random order, or structured arrays containing object pairs where two objects appeared next to each other in fixed spatial or temporal configurations. After exposure, one object in each pair was briefly presented and participants judged the location or the orientation of the object without seeing the other object in the pair. We found that when an object reliably appeared next to another object in space, it was judged as being closer to the other object in space even though the other object was never presented (Experiments 1 and 2). Likewise, when an object reliably preceded another object in time, its orientation was biased toward the orientation of the other object even though the other object was never presented (Experiment 3). These results demonstrated that statistical learning fundamentally shapes how individual objects are represented in visual memory, by biasing the representation of one object toward its co-occurring partner. Importantly, participants in all experiments were not explicitly aware of the regularities. Thus, the bias in object representations was implicit. The current study reveals a novel impact of statistical learning on object representation: spatially co-occurring objects are represented as being closer in space, and temporally co-occurring objects are represented as having more similar features.     

Worry and working memory influence each other iteratively over time

Little research has examined whether the relationship between working memory (WM) and anxiety/worry remains stable or changes over time; and, if changes occur, the factor(s) influencing change. Claims about influence are typically inferred from data collected at a single time point, and may misrepresent the nature of influence. To investigate the iterative influence of WM and Worry and/or vice versa, 133 fourteen-year-olds completed WM and Worry measures several times over the course of a single day as they prepared for a math test. We used a bivariate latent difference score model to analyse possible changes in WM–Worry relationships. The best fitting model indicated high Worry predicts decreases in WM, and low or decreased WM predicts increases in Worry; high WM with low Worry predicts accurate problem solving; low WM with high Worry predicts inaccurate problem solving. Findings show relationships between WM and Worry varies considerably over a single day, and initial disadvantages become worse over time.