Theories of Mind in Transition: A Microgenetic Study of the Development of False Belief Understanding

Microgenetic methods were used to document young children's (N = 36; M age = 3;5) acquisition of false belief (FB) understanding and investigate developmental mechanisms. A control group received no experience with FB; 2 other groups received microgenetic sessions designed to promote FB understanding. Over consecutive weeks, microgenetic groups received implicit feedback about their performance on 24 FB tasks and generated explanations for FB events. Only 1 microgenetic group improved. Differences in the schedules of microgenetic experience and in the amount and type of FB explanation children engaged in accounted for these differences. Improving children developed FB understandings gradually and exhibited fluctuating task performance, suggesting slow conceptual restructuring, not sudden insight. This work provides the first microgenetic record of children's transition to a representational theory of mind.     

Representational change and children's numerical estimation

We applied overlapping waves theory and microgenetic methods to examine how children improve their estimation proficiency, and in particular how they shift from reliance on immature to mature representations of numerical magnitude. We also tested the theoretical prediction that feedback on problems on which the discrepancy between two representations is greatest will cause the greatest representational change. Second graders who initially were assessed as relying on an immature representation were presented feedback that varied in degree of discrepancy between the predictions of the mature and immature representations. The most discrepant feedback produced the greatest representational change. The change was strikingly abrupt, often occurring after a single feedback trial, and impressively broad, affecting estimates over the entire range of numbers from 0 to 1000. The findings indicated that cognitive change can occur at the level of an entire representation, rather than always involving a sequence of local repairs.     

表征变化及其影响因素的微观发生研究

Karmiloff-Smith的表征重述理论认为表征重述是人类获取知识的重要途径,并且表征变化的过程包括程序、元程序和概念化三个阶段。采用微观发生法（包括前测、练习和迁移3个阶段,共8个期间）,以数字分解组合任务为研究材料,探讨了120名小学一、二年级儿童问题解决中的表征变化及所受年龄和练习模式等因素的影响。结果表明,前测中存在发展性差异,即二年级儿童达到概念化阶段的人数显著多于一年级儿童,但前测处于程序阶段的儿童接受5次解题练习过程中以及在近迁移题目上都没有表现出年级差异,而在远迁移题目上二年级儿童的完成情况好于一年级儿童。练习模式对表征变化的影响主要体现在三个方面：（1）从变化的路线看,与简单模式相比,复杂模式更能促进儿童的表征发生变化,而且这时儿童表征变化的路线更丰富,表征变化发生循环的人数比例也更高。（2）从变化的速度看,复杂模式下儿童在插入难题的两次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,其余期间变化较小;简单模式下儿童在第二次和第三次练习期间表征变化比较迅速,随后变化比较平稳。（3）从变化的广度看,练习中所获表征能力（在最后三次练习中达到元程序或概念化阶段）的推广,无论是在近迁移题还是远迁移题上两种练习模式之下的被试没有明显差异;但两组被试在近迁移题上的表现均好于远迁移题     

Advanced theory of mind in children with mild intellectual disability and deaf or hard of hearing children: A two-year longitudinal study in middle childhood

The present study investigates the development of advanced theory of mind (AToM) among typically developing (TD) children, children with mild intellectual disability (MID), and deaf or hard of hearing (DHH) children. The 2-year longitudinal study comprised three waves and included a large sample of children from Poland in middle childhood aged around 7.5–9.5 years (N = 779; M = 7.7, SD = 0.92 at wave 1). The analysis of children’s understanding of second-order false belief and the Faux-Pas Recognition Test showed that TD children outperformed children with MID and DHH children on both measures. At 7.5 years, almost 60% of the TD children correctly solved the second-order false belief task; correct performance at 7.5 years in children with MID and DHH children was 27 and 38% respectively. Two years later, correct performance rose to 80% (TD children), 45% (children with MID), and 63% (DHH children). Despite these differences, the speed of AToM development did not differ across the groups. The development of faux-pas recognition followed a non-linear pattern, with TD children showing no further significant development after mid-elementary school. Our findings show differences in AToM development between TD children, children with MID, and DHH children, and they suggest that children’s development of AToM may follow different developmental pathways, depending on the aspect of AToM under study.     

幼儿对心理状态的认识

本研究探讨３—５岁儿童对自身和他人心理状态认识的发展过程．借助图片和玩具结合四种作业任务,对１９１名儿童进行了实验和短期追踪实验。结果表明：３岁儿童尚不能对心理状态作出认识,４岁半左右是儿童认识心理状态的转折期,到５岁末能完全把握自身和他人的心理状态．在四项作业任务中,儿童通过的先后次序为他人误念判断和他人未知判断、现象一实在区分、表征变换．这一方面与儿童的认知发展趋势有关,另一方面也与实验的情景和材料有关．     

Young children discover how to deceive in 10 days: a microgenetic study

We investigated how the ability to deceive emerges in early childhood among a sample of young preschoolers (Mean age = 34.7 months). We did this via a 10‐session microgenetic method that took place over a 10‐day period. In each session, children played a zero‐sum game against an adult to win treats. In the game, children hid the treats and had opportunities (10 trials) to win them by providing deceptive information about their whereabouts to the adult. Although children initially showed little or no ability to deceive, most spontaneously discovered deception and systematically used it to win the game by the tenth day. Both theory of mind and executive function skills were predictive of relatively faster patterns of discovery. These results are the first to provide evidence for the importance of cognitive skills and social experience in the discovery of deception over time in early childhood.     

The efficacy of free‐recall,cognitive load,and closed‐ended questions when children are asked to falsely testify about a crime

The current study evaluated the benefits of free‐recall, cognitive load, and closed‐ended questions on children's (ages 6 to 11; N = 147) true and false eyewitness disclosures. Children witnessed an experimenter find a stranger's wallet and were then asked to make a false denial, false accusation, true denial, or true accusation regarding an alleged theft. Overall, the free‐recall question resulted in longer, more forthcoming and more detailed disclosures from older children and those who made a truthful accusation; however, children under the age of 9 and lie‐tellers mostly relied on the closed‐ended questions to discuss the theft. Although the cognitive load questions resulted in newly recalled information, there were no significant narrative differences between true and false statements on these questions. These findings suggest that forensic professionals should consider a child's developmental level, statement veracity, and disclosure‐type (denial vs. accusation) when examining the efficacy of these commonly used questioning strategies.     

Charting the development of representational skills: When do children know that maps can lead and mislead?

This study was conducted to test Perner's (1991) hypothesis that 3-year-olds fail the false belief task because they cannot metarepresent (represent a representation's sense and reference). Preschoolers made and interpreted symbolic maps, and were tested on their understanding of the implications of following an incorrect map (false belief test). Young 3-year-olds showed some ability to make and use maps but performed poorly on the false belief tests. Children were more likely to use an incorrect map to predict behavior if the represented object was missing instead of in a wrong location. Many children were also able to predict that someone who used an incorrect map would not “find” the object. These results contradict Perner's hypothesis and suggest that representational skills develop gradually rather than appearing in a radical conceptual shift at age 4.     

Learning the functional significance of mnemonic actions: A microgenetic study of strategy acquisition

How children learn to use memory strategies in a microgenetic investigation of learning and metacognition is examined. Seven- and eight-year-olds were given two memory trials with 24 pictures on each of 5 consecutive days. Days 1 and 2 were baseline, practice trials; Day 3 included strategy training; and Days 4 and 5 were unprompted tests of strategy maintenance. All children were taught how to label, rehearse, and group the pictures as well as to self-test their own memories and use blocked recall. Half of the children were shown the actions and told to do them; the other half received elaborated feedback on the usefulness and appropriateness of the techniques for remembering. The elaborated instructional group exhibited significantly greater recall, clustering, strategic study behavior, and metamemory regarding the mnemonic techniques than the other group. Path analysis provided evidence of a causal role of training and metacognitive awareness that mediated the use of sorting and higher recall. The study illustrates how learning the significance and utility of mnemonic techniques can influence children's acquisition of the tactics as self-controlled strategies. In addition, the microgenetic method affords patterns of data across time and experience that permit richer interpretations of strategy learning and memory development.     

Empathy as a buffer: How empathy moderates the emotional effects on Preschoolers’ sharing

This study experimentally investigated how empathy moderated the influence of external emotional stimuli on preschoolers’ subsequent sharing behaviour. Children aged 4–6 (N = 218) were randomly presented with one of the video clips that elicited sad, happy, or neutral emotion, and were then asked to play a dictator game with puppet partners. Results revealed that compared to the neutral condition, children with higher empathy increased sharing after induced happiness but did not change sharing after induced sadness; by contrast, children with lower empathy decreased sharing after induced sadness. It appears that empathy may enhance the positive effect of happiness while reducing the negative effect of sadness on sharing behaviour. These findings provide experimental evidence in early childhood to support approaches that emphasize the role of immediate emotions in moral decision-making; critically, such emotional effects vary with individual differences in dispositional empathy.     

Knowledge,adequacy, and approximate truth

Approximation involves representing things in ways that might be close to the truth but are nevertheless false. Given the widespread reliance on approximations in science and everyday life, here we ask whether it is conceptually possible for false approximations to qualify as knowledge. According to the factivity account, it is impossible to know false approximations, because knowledge requires truth. According to the representational adequacy account, it is possible to know false approximations, if they are close enough to the truth for present purposes. In this paper, we adopt an experimental methodology to begin testing these two theories. When an agent provides a false and practically inadequate answer, both theories predict that people will deny knowledge. But the theories disagree about an agent who provides a false but practically adequate answer: the factivity hypothesis again predicts knowledge denial, whereas the representational adequacy hypothesis predicts knowledge attribution. Across two experiments, our principal finding was that people tended to attribute knowledge for false but practically adequate answers, which supports the representational adequacy account. We propose an interpretation of existing findings that preserves a conceptual link between knowledge and truth. According to this proposal, truth is not necessary for knowledge, but it is a feature of prototypical knowledge.     

Précis of 'The Origin of Concepts'

A theory of conceptual development must specify the innate representational primitives, must characterize the ways in which the initial state differs from the adult state, and must characterize the processes through which one is transformed into the other. The Origin of Concepts (henceforth TOOC) defends three theses. With respect to the initial state, the innate stock of primitives is not limited to sensory, perceptual, or sensorimotor representations; rather, there are also innate conceptual representations. With respect to developmental change, conceptual development consists of episodes of qualitative change, resulting in systems of representation that are more powerful than, and sometimes incommensurable with, those from which they are built. With respect to a learning mechanism that achieves conceptual discontinuity, I offer Quinian bootstrapping. TOOC concludes with a discussion of how an understanding of conceptual development constrains a theory of concepts.     

图形推理任务中儿童策略获得的微观发展过程

运用微观发生学设计,对30名6岁儿童在矩阵填充任务中的策略获得过程进行了研究。结果发现:从策略获得的来源看,实验处理(教育干预)是图形推理策略获得的重要来源;从策略获得的个体差异看,儿童遵循的是学习领会或半学习领会的策略获得发展方式;从策略获得的路径看,快速组儿童在达到策略获得标准后正确率不高,而标准组和延迟组则能保持较高的正确率;从策略获得的速率看,在实验前3个阶段正确率有快速的变化,而到后期则保持正确率稳定不变。     

Can Children Detect Conceptual Information Conveyed Through Other Children's Nonverbal Behavior's

Research suggests that children produce nonverbal behaviors when interacting with adults and peers. This study investigates how well other children can detect 1 specific type of nonverbal behavior: representational gestures. Eighteen children (12 Caucasian girls and 6 Caucasian boys; M = 7 years, 11 months) watched videotaped stimuli of children verbally and gesturally explaining a conceptual problem. Multiple methods were used to assess whether children could detect information conveyed through the stimulus children's speech and gesture. Results show that these multiple methods converge to demonstrate that children attend not only to other children's speech but also to their gestures. Implications of nonverbal detection for peer interactions and cognitive development are discussed.     

Drawing what lies ahead: False intentions are more abstractly depicted than true intentions

The aim of this study was to examine how people mentally represent and depict true and false statements about claimed future actions—so‐called true and false intentions. On the basis of construal level theory, which proposes that subjectively unlikely events are more abstractly represented than likely ones, we hypothesized that false intentions should be represented at a more abstract level than true intentions. Fifty‐six hand drawings, produced by participants to describe mental images accompanying either true or false intentions, were rated on level of abstractness by a second set of participants (N = 117) blind to the veracity of the intentions. As predicted, drawings of false intentions were rated as more abstract than drawings of true intentions. This result advances the use of drawing‐based deception detection techniques to the field of true and false intentions and highlights the potential for abstractness as a novel cue to deceit.     

外表真实区别、表征变化和错误信念的任务分析

自20世纪80年代以来,“心理理论”已成为发展心理学的研究热点和最活跃、最多产的领域。为了分析和比较“心理理论”的实验任务,该研究以济南市3所幼儿园中的233名3—6岁儿童为有效被试。进行了“意外转移。和“欺骗外表”两种心理理论实验任务。得出如下主要结论：(1)意外转移任务中内隐错误信念显著难于标准错误信念,易化错误信念与标准错误信念的难度不存在显著差异。(2)欺骗外表任务中外表真实区别难度显著低于表征变化和错误信念。(3)意外转移任务的错误信念显著难于欺骗外表任务的错误信念。     

Children's understanding of human and super-natural mind

Barrett, Richert, and Driesenga [Barrett, J. L., Richert, R. A., & Driesenga, A. (2001). God's beliefs versus mother's: The development of nonhuman agents concepts. Child Development, 72(1), 50–65] have suggested that children are able to conceptualize the representational properties held by certain super-natural entities, such as God, before they achieve representational understanding of the human mind. The two experimental conditions of the present study aimed at cross-checking the above suggestion. One hundred and twenty children aged from 3 to 7 years were involved in both conditions. In the first, a modified perspective-taking and appearance-reality task, similar to that adopted in Barrett et al.'s study, was used. The task in the second addressed another aspect of representational understanding of the human mind, that is, the early emerging of the rule that knowledge is constrained by perception. The results of the study showed that younger children systematically treat God as a human protagonist regarding the representational properties they possess. Moreover, it was found that children are able to reason, accurately, about God's representational properties, only upon reaching their 5th year of age, when their representational understanding of the human mind becomes stable and robust.     

Understanding Systems Change in Early Implementation of Housing First in Canadian Communities: An Examination of Facilitators/Barriers,Training/Technical Assistance,and Points of Leverage

We present interim findings of a cross‐site case study of an initiative to expand Housing First (HF) in Canada through training and technical assistance (TTA). HF is an evidence‐based practice designed to end chronic homelessness for consumers of mental health services. We draw upon concepts from implementation science and systems change theory to examine how early implementation occurs within a system. Case studies examining HF early implementation were conducted in six Canadian communities receiving HF TTA. The primary data are field notes gathered over 1.5 years and evaluations from site‐specific training events (k = 5, n = 302) and regional network training events (k = 4, n = 276). We report findings related to: (a) the facilitators of and barriers to early implementation, (b) the influence of TTA on early implementation, and (c) the “levers” used to facilitate broader systems change. Systems change theory enabled us to understand how various “levers” created opportunities for change within the communities, including establishing system boundaries, understanding how systems components can function as causes of or solutions to a problem, and assessing and changing systems interactions. We conclude by arguing that systems theory adds value to existing implementation science frameworks and can be helpful in future research on the implementation of evidence‐based practices such as HF which is a complex community intervention. Implications for community psychology are discussed.     

Spontaneous analogical transfer in 4-year-olds: a microgenetic study

The purpose of the current microgenetic study was to examine children's spontaneous application of analogical problem solving from story problems to physical tasks. Thirty-six 4-year-olds (M=54.7 months), randomly assigned to an experimental or a control condition, participated. The results indicate that 4-year-old children did, with varying success, spontaneously apply analogical solutions to physical problems across sessions. A positive effect over time on children's spontaneous analogical problem solving was found. Additionally, a few children even gave an analogical strategy-related explanation for their own physical behavior. There was much inter- and intra-individual variability, which may indicate that 4 years of age is a period of change in the development of analogical reasoning.     

Normative Social Role Concepts in Early Childhood

The current studies (N = 255, children ages 4–5 and adults) explore patterns of age‐related continuity and change in conceptual representations of social role categories (e.g., “scientist”). In Study 1, young children's judgments of category membership were shaped by both category labels and category‐normative traits, and the two were dissociable, indicating that even young children's conceptual representations for some social categories have a “dual character.” In Study 2, when labels and traits were contrasted, adults and children based their category‐based induction decisions on category‐normative traits rather than labels. Study 3 confirmed that children reason based on category‐normative traits because they view them as an obligatory part of category membership. In contrast, adults in this study viewed the category‐normative traits as informative on their own (not only as a cue to obligations). Implications for continuity and change in representations of social role categories will be discussed.