Dispositional optimism,self‐framing and medical decision‐making

Self‐framing is an important but underinvestigated area in risk communication and behavioural decision‐making, especially in medical settings. The present study aimed to investigate the relationship among dispositional optimism, self‐frame and decision‐making. Participants (N = 500) responded to the Life Orientation Test‐Revised and self‐framing test of medical decision‐making problem. The participants whose scores were higher than the middle value were regarded as highly optimistic individuals. The rest were regarded as low optimistic individuals. The results showed that compared to the high dispositional optimism group, participants from the low dispositional optimism group showed a greater tendency to use negative vocabulary to construct their self‐frame, and tended to choose the radiation therapy with high treatment survival rate, but low 5‐year survival rate. Based on the current findings, it can be concluded that self‐framing effect still exists in medical situation and individual differences in dispositional optimism can influence the processing of information in a framed decision task, as well as risky decision‐making.     

决策者角色及相关变量对风险偏好的影响

采用IAT技术测查被试的内隐自尊, 并引入收益和损失两种任务框架, 综合探讨了内隐自尊水平、任务得失框架对自我决策和为他人决策时风险偏好的影响。结果发现：(1)在收益框架下, 被试为他人决策时更冒险, 而在损失框架下, 为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (2)与为自我决策相比, 低内隐自尊者为他人决策时更冒险, 而高内隐自尊者为自我和他人决策的风险偏好无显著差异; (3)内隐自尊水平与任务框架的交互作用及内隐自尊水平、任务框架和决策者角色之间的三级交互作用均不显著。依据相关的理论和发现对这种结果进行了分析和讨论。     

认知闭合需要、框架效应与决策偏好

在带有模糊性的决策情境中,决策者个人的认知特征会对其判断决策产生重要影响。通过实验的方法,考察了认知闭合需要和特征框架效应对个体决策偏好的影响。93名工商管理硕士（MBA）参与了实验,研究的结果支持了本研究的3个假设,即认知闭合需要与特征框架效应不仅对被试的决策偏好存在显著的影响,而且二者还存在显著的交互作用。具体来说,研究发现,在模糊情境中：高认知闭合需要的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而低认知闭合需要的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;接收到正向框架信息的被试偏好于立刻做出决策,而接收到负向框架信息的被试偏好于暂缓做出决策;认知闭合需要与特征框架对被试的决策偏好还存在显著的交互作用。研究结论为根据个体认知闭合需要的水平来选拔决策者、利用框架效应来影响个体的信息加工方式进而提高决策质量提供了理论依据     

Emotional processing and emotional memory are modulated by interoceptive awareness

The ability to perceive interoceptive signals plays a central role in many theories of emotions. The present study was designed to investigate the relationship between interoceptive awareness and the conscious processing and memory of emotional information. Heart-rate changes were recorded during baseline and affective picture presentation in two groups of participants, differing in cardiac awareness. After a 60-minute break, a recognition task was conducted. Statistical analyses revealed significantly stronger heart-rate deceleration to pleasant and unpleasant stimuli in participants with high interoceptive awareness. In the subsequent picture recognition task, participants with high interoceptive awareness demonstrated a superior recall of pleasant and unpleasant pictures, while no differences were found between interoceptive awareness groups for pictures of neutral content. Our results demonstrate a strong relationship between the perception of cardiac signals and both the processing as well as the recognition of emotional stimuli. High interoceptive awareness was related to increased physiological responses to emotional stimuli and is therefore an important mediating variable when investigating cardiovascular reactivity both in healthy subjects as well as in clinical populations.     

Fatigue biases the decoy effect in males but not females

Individuals often need to make critical decisions even when they are in a fatigued state. Mental fatigue may lead to increased susceptibility to distraction and poor information processing but it is unclear exactly how fatigue shapes individuals' decision‐making. We studied how mental fatigue influences sensitivity to contextual information, indexed as decoy bias. Mental fatigue was induced using a multi‐source interference task, and decoy bias was assessed using a gambling task, in 124 young adults. Results showed that mental fatigue increased decoy bias through enhanced perceptual salience of contextual cues, but only in males. The findings provide insight into a gender‐specific relationship between fatigue and poor judgments. This study extends the current literature on links between fatigue and poor decision‐making by documenting a possible mechanism of the association. The results may have practical implications for designing optimal working hours and safeguarding people from suboptimal decisions.     

Risky visuomotor choices during rapid reaching in childhood

Many everyday actions are implicit gambles because imprecisions in our visuomotor systems place probabilities on our success or failure. Choosing optimal action strategies involves weighting the costs and gains of potential outcomes by their corresponding probabilities, and requires stable representations of one's own imprecisions. How this ability is acquired during development in childhood when visuomotor skills change drastically is unknown. In a rewarded rapid reaching task, 6‐ to 11‐year‐old children followed ‘risk‐seeking’ strategies leading to overly high point‐loss. Adults' performance, in contrast, was close to optimal. Children's errors were not explained by distorted estimates of value or probability, but may reflect different action selection criteria or immature integration of value and probability information while planning movements. These findings provide a starting point for understanding children's risk‐taking in everyday visuomotor situations when suboptimal choices can be dangerous. Moreover, children's risky visuomotor decisions mirror those reported for non‐motor gambles, raising the possibility that common processes underlie development across decision‐making domains.     

Framing effects in group investment decision making: role of group polarization

Prospect theory proposes that framing effects result in a preference for risk-averse choices in gain situations and risk-seeking choices in loss situations. However, in group polarization situations, groups show a pronounced tendency to shift toward more extreme positions than those they initially held. Whether framing effects in group decision making are more prominent as a result of the group-polarization effect was examined. Purposive sampling of 120 college students (57 men, 63 women; M age = 20.1 yr., SD = 0.9) allowed assessment of relative preference between cautious and risky choices in individual and group decisions. Findings indicated that both group polarization and framing effects occur in investment decisions. More importantly, group decisions in a gain situation appear to be more cautious, i.e., risk averse, than individual decisions, whereas group decisions in the loss situation appear to be more risky than individual decisions. Thus, group decision making may expand framing effects when it comes to investment choices through group polarization.     

Going beyond a positive–negative dichotomy in judgment and decision‐making research: Insights for framing,counterfactual thinking,and ambivalence

Many areas of judgment and decision‐making research have historically relied on a simple positive–negative dichotomy (e.g., positive vs. negative framing). Although this classic assumption about the conceptual space has contributed to some of the field's more impactful findings (e.g., framing effects), it may also have mistakenly led us to believe that these findings told a complete story about biases in processing positive and negative information. Building on a tradition of theoretical accounts outlining how positive and negative information is more complex, the first part of this paper considers how the following three elements jointly help to tell a more complete story about framing effects: (a) regulatory focus theory's concept of the domain (loss vs. gain) of an outcome, (b) the sequencing of positive and negative frames, and (c) the asymmetric influences of positive and negative evaluative processes. Next, the paper reviews research that has contributed to integrating these elements, highlighting opportunities for further integration to generate new insights for framing effects, risky decision‐making, counterfactual thinking, and ambivalence. The reviewed studies suggest that a more sophisticated conceptualization of positive and negative information contributes to a deeper understanding of the basic processes that govern human judgment and decision‐making.     

Are highly numerate individuals invulnerable to attribute framing bias? Comparing numerically and graphically represented attribute framing

Judgments and decisions are frequently biased by attribute framing, presenting either positive or negative attributes of an object. This paper focused on two factors previously shown to moderate the attribute‐framing bias: mode of presentation and participants' numeric ability. Whereas many studies demonstrated that graphical display reduced the bias, recent findings suggest that graphical manipulation can nevertheless elicit significant framing bias. Numeracy has been shown to moderate attribute‐framing bias when the quantitative information was represented by numbers. The present study examined to what extent numeracy would still moderate the framing bias when it is graphically elicited. The results showed a significant framing bias for graphically as well as for numerically represented framing scenarios. Critically, whereas numeracy moderated the framing bias in numerically represented scenarios, it did not have a similar moderating effect when the quantitative information in the scenario was graphically represented. Theoretical and practical implications of the findings are discussed.     

Family conflict shapes how adolescents take risks when their family is affected

Numerous studies have established that the social context greatly affects adolescent risk taking. However, it remains unexplored whether adolescents' decision‐making behaviors change when they take risks that affect other individuals such as a parent. In the current study, we sought to investigate how the social context influences risky decisions when adolescents' behavior affects their family using a formalized risk‐taking model. Sixty‐three early adolescents (M_age = 13.3 years; 51% female) played a risk‐taking task twice, once during which they could make risky choices that only affected themselves and another during which their risky choices only affected their parent. Results showed that adolescents reporting high family conflict made more risky decisions when taking risks for their parent compared to themselves, whereas adolescents reporting low family conflict made fewer risky decisions when taking risks for their parent compared to themselves. These findings are the first to show that adolescents change their decision‐making behaviors when their risks affect their family and have important implications for current theories of adolescent risk taking.     

Consumer Trust and Advice Acceptance: The Moderating Roles of Benevolence,Expertise, and Negative Emotions

I explored advice acceptance for high‐stakes decisions (i.e., those with subjectively important and risky outcomes), focusing on the relative influence of two components of consumer trust—benevolence and expertise—as well as perceived emotional decision difficulty. Participants solicited advice from experts when their decisions were low in perceived emotional difficulty but favored the advice of predominantly benevolent providers when making highly emotionally difficult decisions. Although consumers who faced emotionally difficult decisions were willing to trade off expertise for benevolence, they did not perceive this non‐normative trade‐off to influence decision quality. Instead, the results support a “stress buffering” effect whereby consumers were more confident in the accuracy of predominantly benevolent providers’ advice.     

任务框架、损益值大小对自恋者风险偏好的影响

以234名大学生为被试,探讨了任务框架、损益值大小对显性/隐性自恋者风险偏好的影响。结果表明：(1)框架效应较稳定的出现在中等风险水平情境下,且在大损益值条件下更易出现。(2)在获益框架下,被试为小金额决策更冒险,在损失框架下,则为大金额决策更冒险。(3)在损失框架下,高显性自恋者比低显性自恋者更为冒险,在获益框架下,高隐性自恋者比低隐性自恋者更为保守;高隐性自恋者的风险偏好受到任务框架和损益值大小的共同影响。     

Alexithymia tendencies and mere exposure alter social approachability judgments

ABSTRACT People have a fundamental motivation for social connection and social engagement, but how do they decide whom to approach in ambiguous social situations? Subjective feelings often influence such decisions, but people vary in awareness of their feelings. We evaluated two opposing hypotheses based on visual familiarity effects and emotional awareness on social approachability judgments. These hypotheses differ in their interpretation of the familiarity or mere exposure effect with either an affective or cognitive interpretation. The responses of our 128‐student sample supported the cognitive interpretation. Lower emotional awareness or higher alexithymia was associated with higher approachability judgments to familiarized faces and lower approachability judgments to novel faces. These findings were independent of the Big Five personality factors. The results indicate that individual differences in emotional awareness should be integrated into social decision‐making models. The results also suggest that cognitive‐perceptual alterations may underlie the poorer social outcomes associated with alexithymia.     

A Scanpath Analysis of the Risky Decision‐Making Process

In the field of eye tracking, scanpath analysis can reflect the sequential and temporal properties of the cognitive process. However, the advantages of scanpath analysis have not yet been utilized in the study of risky decision making. We explored the methodological applicability of scanpath analysis to test models of risky decision making by analyzing published data from the eye‐tracking studies of Su et al. (2013); Wang and Li (2012), and Sun, Rao, Zhou, and Li (2014). These studies used a proportion task, an outcome‐matched presentation condition, and a multiple‐play condition as the baseline for comparison with information search and processing in the risky decision‐making condition. We found that (i) the similarity scores of the intra‐conditions were significantly higher than those of the inter‐condition; (ii) the scanpaths of the two conditions were separable; and (iii) based on an inspection of typical trials, the patterns of the scanpaths differed between the two conditions. These findings suggest that scanpath analysis is reliable and valid for examining the process of risky decision making. In line with the findings of the three original studies, our results indicate that risky decision making is unlikely to be based on a weighting and summing process, as hypothesized by the family of expectation models. The findings highlight a new methodological direction for research on decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Early adolescents show sustained susceptibility to cognitive interference by emotional distractors

A child's ability to continuously pay attention to a cognitive task is often challenged by distracting events. Distraction is especially detrimental in a learning or classroom environment in which attended information is typically associated with establishing skills and knowledge. Here we report a study examining the effect of emotional distractors on performance in a subsequent visual lexical decision task in 11- to 13-year-old students (n=30). Lexical decisions about neutral verbs and verb-like pseudowords (i.e., targets) were analysed as a function of the preceding distractor type (pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant photos) and the picture–target stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA; 200 or 600 ms). Across distractor categories, emotionally arousing pictures prolonged decisions about word targets when compared to neutral pictures, irrespective of the SOA. The present results demonstrate that similar to adults, early adolescent students exhibit sustained susceptibility to cognitive interference by irrelevant emotional events.     

Does the feedback from previous trials influence current decisions? A study on the role of feedback processing in making decisions under explicit risk conditions

Decision situations frequently provide information about the amount of gains and losses and winning probabilities. In decisions under these conditions, also called risk conditions, both the use of feedback and executive functions have been shown to influence the decision‐making process, as revealed in different patient populations. However, the influence of offering feedback in tasks examining decisions under risk conditions has not been investigated experimentally, so far. This was the aim of the present study. For this purpose, a sample of healthy individuals was examined with the Game of Dice Task, a decision‐making task that explicitly provides the rules for gains and losses and in which participants receive feedback after each trial. In addition, a modified version of this task was performed, in which the feedback after each trial and all associated feedback components were removed. Results indicate that participants had a lower performance in the modified Dice Task without feedback. They selected the disadvantageous alternatives more frequently, when they did not receive feedback following their choices. Task performance in either version was correlated with executive functioning. Conclusion: In decisions under risk conditions, both executive functions as well as the use of feedback following previous trials are important components for optimal performance. Results have implications for the interpretation of deficient decision making in patients with neuropsychological impairments as both disturbances in categorization and other cognitive processes as well as emotional dysfunctions can compromise decision making in risky situations.     

From individual preference construction to group decisions: Framing effects and group processes

Two choice tasks known to produce framing effects in individual decisions were used to test group sensitivity to framing, relative to that of individuals, and to examine the effect of prior, individual consideration of a decision on group choice. Written post-decision reasons and pre-decision group discussions were analyzed to investigate process explanations of choices made by preexisting, naturalistic groups. For a risky choice problem, a similar framing effect was observed for groups and individuals. For an intertemporal choice task where consumption was either delayed or accelerated, naïve groups (whose members had not preconsidered the decision) showed a framing effect, less discounting in the delay frame, opposite to that observed in individuals. Predecided groups showed a non-significant effect in the other, expected direction. In all cases, process measures better explained variability in choices across conditions than frame alone. Implications for group decision research and design considerations for committee decisions are addressed.