知觉经验与知觉内容

知觉(perception)是指我们通过视觉、听觉、触觉、嗅觉、味觉等感觉器官而获得的对事物以及外部世界的意识感知.知觉经验(perceptual experience)的一个显著的特点是它具有某种现象特征,即知觉者会体验到一种"那究竟像什么(what it is like)"的感觉.例如,一个人会从红色视觉经验中体验到"红色究竟像什么"的意识感受性(qualia).知觉内容(perceptual content)粗略地讲是指通过知觉经验向知觉者所传递的信息.关于知觉问题在哲学上的重要性,我们可以从以下几点来看:在形而上学方面,知觉是我们了解外部物理世界究竟存在什么的主要手段;在认识论方面,研究知觉是研究我们如何达到关于外部物理世界的知识的主要手段;在语言哲学方面,知觉内容是我们的心灵与外部物理世界的关联及互动在语言实践上的体现;在心灵哲学方面,知觉经验中的现象特征与意识及意向性之间存在着深层的内在联系.     

Unconscious Experience: Relational Perspectives

In this paper I review key principles of contemporary Kleinian technique and relate them to their source in the theories of Klein and Bion. I note that the analyst's subjectivity is undertheorized in this approach. I then present a detailed account of my use of technique in work with a patient who was lacking in affect and found it difficult to engage in the process. I describe how she evoked a flat response in me initially and how we worked together to form an engagement. Her vivid dreams are given as examples of shifts in her state.     

Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low‐level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low‐level properties (textures, shapes, colors), ‘high‐level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high‐level properties (functional properties, causal relations, etc.), while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high‐level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high‐level view.     

Low-Level Properties in Perceptual Experience

Whether perceptual experience represents high-level properties like causation and natural-kind in virtue of its phenomenology is an open question in philosophy of mind. While the question of high-level properties has sparked disagreement, there is widespread agreement that the sensory phenomenology of perceptual experience presents us with low-level properties like shape and color. This paper argues that the relationship between the sensory character of experience and the low-level properties represented therein is more complex than most assume. Careful consideration of mundane examples, like looking at a coin from an oblique angle, show that the low-level properties represented in experience do not necessarily figure in the sensory character of the experience. Furthermore, the sensible properties invoked when characterizing the sensory character of a perceptual experience are not necessarily included in the sensible properties represented in a perceptual experience. On this basis it is argued that perceptual experience has a disunified metaphysics, consisting in distinct sensory and cognitive components. The account is developed in relation to existing unified and disunified accounts, and discussed in terms of its implications for cognitive penetration, the reliability of introspection, the transparency of experience, and cognitive phenomenology.     

The Experience of the Holy: A Relational Psychoanalytic Analysis

The title of this paper, The Experience of the Holy is a direct reference to Rudolf Otto's book Das Heilige. The paper begins with Otto because he lays out many of the important issues involved in a psychological investigation of the experience of the holy, especially the question of whether the sacred is a unique object of experience, or a characteristic of our experience of ordinary objects. The paper then discusses three contemporary relational psychoanalysts (D.W. Winnicott, Hans Loewald, and Christopher Bollas), and the ways in which their theorizing illuminates the psychology of the sacred.     

Redemptive Experience in Relational Family Therapy: A Christian Perspective

We all long for relationships with others, because only in connecting with others can we develop our intrapsychic structure and become functional adults. We are psychologically predisposed to have a constant connection with others and are driven toward relationships with others. Our deepest yearnings are therefore devoted to building solid dialogue as the means of becoming fully human. We, therefore, consciously or unconsciously, long for a relationship where we can experience happiness, satisfaction and, above all, redemption or salvation from our dreads, miseries and unhappiness. In this article we presuppose that a therapeutic relationship, demonstrated in a psychoanalytic setting, namely in relational family therapy, can contain redemptive dimensions in which the inextinguishable longing for salvation is always present.

Becoming a Telepathic Tuning Fork: Anomalous Experience and the Relational Mind

Although we tend to regard telepathic communication as anomalous or uncanny, outside the range of scientific explanation, many paranormal experiences can be understood scientifically as the type of unconscious affective communication about which there is a growing body of scientific research and evidence. An information-processing model illuminates how a patient’s dissociated attempts to communicate through sensory experiences may be converted to the verbal symbolic via the analyst’s use of evoked images in the dissociative process. Understanding projective identification as a dissociative process of communication by which the patient projected his own unacceptable emotions into the analyst, who could then know experientially what the patient was feeling, can be understood scientifically as telepathic communication. When a patient experiences the effects of severe trauma and is very dissociative, as in the case presented, it is difficult to track and reflect upon these processes as they occur, making it virtually impossible to become and remain empathically attuned to his many self states. In the dissociative attunement deconstructed here, the therapist–patient dyad resonated increasingly in a telepathic attunement, despite much discord and confusion.     

The Non-conceptual Content of Perceptual Experience: Situation Dependence and Fineness of Grain

I begin by examining a recent debate between John McDowell and Christopher Peacocke over whether the content of perceptual experience is non-conceptual. Although I am sympathetic to Peacocke's claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual, I suggest a number of ways in which his arguments fail to make that case. This failure stems from an over-emphasis on the "fine-grainedness" of perceptual content -a feature that is relatively unimportant to its non-conceptual structure. I go on to describe two other features of perceptual experience that are more likely to be relevant to the claim that perceptual content is non-conceptual. These features are 1) the dependence of a perceived object on the perceptual context in which it is perceived and 2) the dependence of a perceived property on the object it is perceived to be a property of.     

Nietzsche and Murdoch on the Moral Significance of Perceptual Experience

Abstract: This paper examines a claim defended by an unlikely pair: Friedrich Nietzsche and Iris Murdoch. The claim is that perceptual experience itself—as distinct from perceptually based judgments and beliefs—can be morally significant. In particular, Nietzsche and Murdoch hold that two agents in the same circumstances attending to the same objects can have experiences with different contents, depending on the concepts that they possess and employ. Moreover, they maintain that this renders perception an object of moral concern. This paper explicates these claims, examines the way in which we might distinguish between better and worse perceptual experiences, and argues that if some version of the Murdochian/Nietzschean claim is accepted, then certain influential accounts of moral epistemology and agency must be rejected.     

Representation,Presentation and the Epistemic Role of Perceptual Experience

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the representational theory of perception, on which the world is represented as being a certain way in perceptual experience, cannot explain how there can be a genuinely epistemic connection between experience and belief. I try to show that we are positively required to deny that perceptual consciousness is contentful if we want to make its fitness for epistemic duties intelligible. (So versions of the representational theory on which experience has a merely causal purchase on belief are not considered.) But my aim is not just negative. I try to defeat representationalism in such a way as to motivate a robustly presentational theory of perception. According to such a theory, perceptions are relations not between a subject and a content but between a subject and an ordinary object (such that if the relation holds at t, an appropriate subject and object must exist at t, and the object must be presented to the subject). I end by sketching an account of perceptual experience that is meant to show that, contrary to a very popular misconception, there is a way to conceive perceptual consciousness as relational and presentational (not intentional and representational) that does not succumb to the celebrated ‘myth of the Given’.     

Going Too Far: Relational Heroines and Relational Excess

I consider the evolution of our relational ideal—its implications for our therapeutic goals, our patients, and for ourselves. Who do we aim to be in the consulting room? How do we view our patient—her potential and her limitations? What are the clinical goals of a relational analysis? What might those goals occlude? In this context I address the historical excesses of our ideal and the ways we may have gone too far.     

论自然律与因果知识的知觉经验基础

<正>一、引论自休谟以来,特别是在科学哲学的演进中,自然律理论与因果理论从来是不可分离的。相比而言,自然律理论具有某种优先地位。因为按照休谟的广为接受的论证,人类的知觉经验并不能直接辩     

Perceptual Judgments of Sports Officials are Influenced by their Motor and Visual Experience

We examined the relation between previous motor and visual experience and current officiating experience of expert judges and referees and their judgments from an embodied cognition viewpoint. A total of 370 sports officials from soccer, handball, ice hockey, and trampoline took part in the study. Analyses revealed that cognitive judgments are related to motor, visual, and officiating experience to different degrees in the analyzed sports. Our findings indicate that, depending on the sport, sports officials should either specialize early in officiating, or gather visuo-motor experience as an athlete or spectator first, and then switch roles to become a sports official.