The enactive computational basis of cognition and the explanatory cognitive basis for computing

The computational theory of cognition, or computationalism, holds that cognition is a form of computation. Two issues related to this view are comprised by the goal of this paper: A) Computing systems are traditionally seen as representational systems, but functional and enactive approaches support non-representational theories; B) Recently, a sociocultural theory against computationalism was proposed with the aim of ontologically reducing computing to cognition. We defend, however, that cognition and computation are in action, thus cognition is just a form of computing and that cognition is the explanatory basis for computation. We state that: 1. Representational theories of computing recurring to intentional content run into metaphysical problems. 2. Functional non-representational theories do not incur this metaphysical problem when describing computing in terms of the abstract machine. 3. Functional theories are consistent with enactive in describing computing machines not in a strictly functional way, but especially in terms of their organization. 4. Enactive cognition is consistent with the computationalism in describing Turing machines as functionally and organizationally closed systems. 5. The cognitive explanatory basis for computing improves the computational theory of cognition. When developed in the human linguistic domain, computer science is seen as a product of human socionatural normative practices, however, cognition is just an explanatory, not ontological, basis for computing. The paper concludes by supporting that computation is in action, that cognition is just one form of computing in the world and the explanatory basis for computation.     

The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism,Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism

Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goal here is not to evaluate their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism, recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism may or may not legitimately come together.     

GOD AS A COMMUNICATIVE SYSTEM SUI GENERIS: BEYOND THE PSYCHIC, SOCIAL, PROCESS MODELS OF THE TRINITY

With an aim to develop a public theology for an age of information media (or media theology), this article proposes a new God-concept: God is a communicative system sui generis that autopoietically processes meaning/information in the supratemporal realm via perfect divine media ad intra (Word/Spirit). For this task, Niklas Luhmann's systems theory is critically appropriated in dialogue with theology. First, my working postmetaphysical/epistemological stance is articulated as realistic operational constructivism and functionalism. Second, a series of arguments are advanced to substantiate the thesis: (1) God is an observing system sui generis ; (2) self-referential communication is divine operation; (3) unsurpassable complexity is divine mystery; (4) supratemporal autopoiesis of meaning is divine processing; (5) agape is the symbolic medium of divine communication. Third, this communicative model of God is developed into a trinitarian theology, with a claim that this model offers a viable alternative beyond the standard (psychic, social, process) models. Finally, some implications of this model are explored for constructive theology (conceiving creation as divine mediatization) and for science-and-religion in terms of derivative models: (1) God as a living system sui generis and (2) God as a meaning system sui generis .     

Making too many enemies: Hutto and Myin’s attack on computationalism†

We analyse Hutto & Myin's three arguments against computationalism [Hutto, D., E. Myin, A. Peeters, and F. Zahnoun. Forthcoming. “The Cognitive Basis of Computation: Putting Computation In Its Place.” In The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, edited by M. Sprevak, and M. Colombo. London: Routledge.; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2012. Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Hutto, D., and E. Myin. 2017. Evolving Enactivism: Basic Minds Meet Content. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press]. The Hard Problem of Content targets computationalism that relies on semantic notion of computation, claiming that it cannot account for the natural origins of content. The Intentionality Problem is targeted against computationalism using non-semantic accounts of computation, arguing that it fails in explaining intentionality. The Abstraction Problem claims that causal interaction between concrete physical processes and abstract computational properties is problematic. We argue that these arguments are flawed and are not enough to rule out computationalism.     

Rapid processing of letters,digits and symbols: what purely visual‐attentional deficit in developmental dyslexia?

Visual‐attentional theories of dyslexia predict deficits for dyslexic children not only for the perception of letter strings but also for non‐alphanumeric symbol strings. This prediction was tested in a two‐alternative forced‐choice paradigm with letters, digits, and symbols. Children with dyslexia showed significant deficits for letter and digit strings but not for symbol strings. This finding is difficult to explain for visual‐attentional theories of dyslexia which postulate identical deficits for letters, digits and symbols. Moreover, dyslexics showed normal W‐shaped serial position functions for letter and digit strings, which suggests that their deficit is not due to an abnormally small attentional window. Finally, the size of the deficit was identical for letters and digits, which suggests that poor letter perception is not just a consequence of the lack of reading. Together then, our results show that symbols that map onto phonological codes are impaired (i.e. letters and digits), whereas symbols that do not map onto phonological codes are not impaired. This dissociation suggests that impaired symbol‐sound mapping rather than impaired visual‐attentional processing is the key to understanding dyslexia.     

Articulatory organization in digit perception and recall

In two experiments, tape-recorded strings of seven recall digits were preceded by a redundant stimulus prefix containing either one or three digits. The prefix and recall digits (1) were articulatorily continuous, or (2)were made discontinuous by tape-splicing, or (3)were made discontinuous by deliberately spoken prosodic contour. Subjects were instructed to ignore the redundant prefixes and report only the recall digits. The main results were: (1)Compared to strings preceded by no prefix, all prefix conditions reduced recall. (2)Three-digit prefixes reduced recall less than one-digit prefixes. (3) In most cases, spliced prefixes reduced recall less than intact prefixes. Acoustic waveform measurements are presented to provide a partial account for the results.     

Turing redux: Enculturation and computation

Many of our cognitive capacities are shaped by enculturation. Enculturation is the acquisition of cognitive practices such as symbol-based mathematical practices, reading, and writing during ontogeny. Enculturation is associated with significant changes to the organization and connectivity of the brain and to the functional profiles of embodied actions and motor programs. Furthermore, it relies on scaffolded cultural learning in the cognitive niche. The purpose of this paper is to explore the components of symbol-based mathematical practices. Phylogenetically, these practices are the result of concerted organism-niche interactions that have led from approximate number estimations to the emergence of discrete, symbol-based mathematical operations. Ontogenetically, symbol-based mathematical practices are associated with plastic changes to neural circuitry, action schemata, and motor programs. It will be suggested that these practices rely on previously acquired capacities such as subitizing and counting. With these considerations in place, I will argue that computations, understood in the sense of Turing (1936), are a specific kind of symbol-based mathematical practices that can be realized by human organisms, machines, or by hybrid organism-machine systems. In sum, this paper suggests a new way to think about mathematical cognition and computation.     

Cognitive architecture and descent with modification

Against a background of recent progress in developmental neuroscience, some of which has been taken as challenging to the modularity hypothesis of , this article contrasts two competing conceptions of modularity: sui generis modularity, according to which modules are treated as independent neurocognitive entities that owe nothing to one another, and descent-with-modification modularity, according to which current cognitive modules are understood to be shaped by evolutionary changes from ancestral cognitive modules. I argue that sui generis modularity is incompatible with a range of data, from the co-occurrence of deficits to the patterns of activation in neuroimaging studies, but that same range of data is compatible with descent-with-modification modularity. Furthermore, I argue that the latter conception of modularity may have important implications for the practice and conception of fields such as developmental disorders and linguistics.     

Is the Brain a Quantum Computer?

We argue that computation via quantum mechanical processes is irrelevant to explaining how brains produce thought, contrary to the ongoing speculations of many theorists. First, quantum effects do not have the temporal properties required for neural information processing. Second, there are substantial physical obstacles to any organic instantiation of quantum computation. Third, there is no psychological evidence that such mental phenomena as consciousness and mathematical thinking require explanation via quantum theory. We conclude that understanding brain function is unlikely to require quantum computation or similar mechanisms.     

A Credible-World Account of Biological Models

In a broad brush, biological models are often constructed in two general types: (1) as a concrete model; (2) as an abstract model. A concrete model is a material model such as model organisms, while an abstract model is a mathematical or computational model consists of equations or algorithms. Though there are types of biological models that cannot be strictly categorized as either concrete or abstract, they are falling somewhere in between this spectrum. In view of the fact that biological phenomena are sui generis and distinct from physical phenomena in many respects, using the concepts in standard modeling fails to account for the differences between biological sciences and physical sciences. Drawing from the resources of a credible-world account of models in economic modeling, I propose to reinterpret abstract models and concrete models in the light of the credible world account of models.     

The neuropsychology of religious experience. A review of different scientific approaches to the phenomenon / Neuropsicología de la experiencia religiosa. Una revisión de distintas aproximaciones científicas al fenómeno

Abstract

The current article is a critical review of the neuropsychological study of religious experience. First, we analyse the philosophical and theological roots of the term and its characterization as a sui generis and unique phenomenon. We subsequently describe the adoption of the concept in psychology, as well as the emergence of alternative approaches that emphasize the role of categorization of experiences as religious. We then move on to explore how both approaches have influenced the neuropsychological study of religious experience, consequently producing different models: sui generis, attributional and others that consider the variety of factors and the heterogeneity of experiences associated with religious practices.     

Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science

This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call "non-sentential computationalism"; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call "dynamical cognition." Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.     

Radical views on cognition and the dynamics of scientific change

Radical views on cognition are generally defined by a cluster of features including non-representationalism and vehicle-externalism. In this paper, I concentrate on the way radical views on cognition define themselves as revolutionary theories in cognitive science. These theories often use the Kuhnian concepts of “paradigm” and “paradigm shift” for describing their ambitions and the current situation in cognitive science. I examine whether the use of Kuhn’s theory of science is appropriate here. There might be good reasons to think that cognitive science is in a situation of foundational crisis, but that does not entail that the classical paradigm (computationalism) is currently displaced to the benefit of a new paradigm. Larry Laudan’s theory of research traditions is more enlightening than Kuhn’s theory for describing the scope and ambitions of radical views on cognition, and their relations with an anti-intellectualist tradition in philosophy.

     

Color primitivism

The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available – if the colors are primitive sui generis properties – this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind–body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-reductive physicalism are staples, realist primitivism is by and large a recent addition to the color literature. And it remains a minority position, although one that is perhaps gaining support. In this paper, we investigate whether it should be accepted, and conclude it should not be.     

On the Structure of Bioethics as a Pragmatic Discipline

This article analyzes certain aspects of the structure of bioethics as a discipline. It begins by arguing that bioethics is an academic discipline of a pragmatic nature and then puts forward a classification of the main problems, issues, and concerns in bioethics, using this classification as a way to outline the limits and framework of the field. Pushing further, it contends that comprehensive treatment of any topic in bioethics requires that three normative dimensions (the ethical, the moral, and the political) be taken into account. It concludes that the classification of the issues and analysis of each issue's normative dimensions can provide valuable contributions toward understanding the sui generis structure of bioethics as a pragmatic discipline.     

Editorial: Culture and religion

Based on theories of category formation (Baird) and genealogy (Foucault and Asad), and writing myself reflexively into the field, I question the consensus view that there is (or ever was) a viable social or religious ‘movement’ called ‘New Age’. Through a brief review of secondary sources, I disaggregate and historicise the field, drawing attention to signs of incompleteness, heterogeneity and cultural diffusion in preference to the dominant argument for a sui generis phenomenon. Within the field, I trace connections between Alice Bailey's discourse and Findhorn colony practice to illustrate one particular ‘New Age’ genealogy. I argue that ‘New Age’ is better represented as an expression of contemporary Anglo-American ‘popular religion’, a (re)conceptualisation that encourages more fruitful comparative historical and ethnographical analyses. Finally, I identify an emergent ‘second wave’ of ‘New Age’ studies, characterised by a concern for localised and contextualised representations.     

Dispositional implementation solves the superfluous structure problem

Consciousness supervenes on activity; computation supervenes on structure. Because of this, some argue, conscious states cannot supervene on computational ones. If true, this would present serious difficulties for computationalist analyses of consciousness (or, indeed, of any domain with properties that supervene on actual activity). I argue that the computationalist can avoid the Superfluous Structure Problem (SSP) by moving to a dispositional theory of implementation. On a dispositional theory, the activity of computation depends entirely on changes in the intrinsic properties of implementing material. As extraneous structure is not required for computation, a system can implement a program running on some but not all possible inputs. Dispositional computationalism thus permits episodes of computational activity that correspond to potential episodes of conscious awareness. The SSP cannot be motivated against this account, and so computationalism may be preserved.