Frontotemporal Dementia and the Reactive Attitudes: Two Roles for the Capacity to Care?

People who have a particular behavioural variant of Frontotemporal Dementia (bvFTD) suffer from a puzzling early set of symptoms. They appear to caregivers to cease to care about things that they did before, without manifesting certain other significant deficits that might be expected to accompany this change. Are subjects with bvFTD appropriate objects of reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation that seem to presuppose responsible agency? I explore two possible routes to answering this question in the negative that both appeal to the role of the capacity to care in accounts of responsible agency. The first appeals to the capacity to care as fundamental in determining the aptness of moral demands and appraisals; the second appeals to the capacity to care as required for the very possibility of being someone who could in principle receive deserved praise or blame. In order to assess these lines of reasoning, it will be necessary to settle on a plausible account of caring, and the case of subjects with bvFTD can help in illuminating the relevant capacities. I suggest that the two routes, when clarified, are promising, but that interesting questions about the nature of desert and its relationship to caring remain open.     

Contingently Existing Propositions?

It is fairly common, among those who think propositions exist, to think they exist necessarily. Here, I consider three arguments in support of that conclusion. What I hope to show is not that that claim is false, but, rather, that the arguments used in its defense tend to presuppose a certain kind of approach to modality: a roughly Plantingian view. What the arguments show, then, is that one cannot accept that approach to modality and accept contingently existing propositions. But there are other approaches to modality – I discuss three such approaches – into which contingently existing propositions fit perfectly well. This suggests that disputes over, for example, singular propositions, must be conducted within a broader agreement over modal matters if they are to be at all productive.     

Are Propositions Essentially Representational?

Jeffrey King argues that nothing has truth conditions except by being taken to be true or false by rational agents. But – for good reason – King claims that propositions possess truth conditions essentially and intrinsically. I will argue that King cannot have both: if the truth conditions of a proposition depend on the reactions of rational agents, then the possession of truth conditions can't follow from the intrinsic nature or existence of the proposition. This leaves two options. Either, nothing can do the job that motivates positing propositions. Or, there is no need to explain what bestows a truth condition on a proposition.     

Is Divorce Promise-Breaking?

Wedding vows seem to be promises. So they go: “I promise to love, honour, and cherish ....” But this poses a problem. Divorce is not widely seen as a serious moral wrong, but breaking a promise is. I first consider, and defend against preliminary objections, a ‘hard-line’ response: divorce is indeed prima facie impermissible promise-breaking. I next consider the ‘hardship’ response—the hardship of failed marriages overrides the prima facie duty to keep promises. However, this would release promisors in far too many cases. I resolve the triad by considering the content of the vows. Vows concerning love are not promises at all. We cannot promise to do acts the performance of which is outside our control, and love involves states of mind outside our control. Vows concerning spousal roles are complicated by diverse social understandings of marriage and the centrality of emotion to the roles.     

How Can Pictures be Propositions?

Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of language holds that one fact can represent another, and that propositions are pictures of states of affairs. What makes a fact into a picture of a given s tate of affairs are the correlations between picture elements and objects and the correlations between relations among picture elements and relations among objects. But a problem sometimes raised is that propositions can't be pictures, as pictures—unlike propositions—do not say anything. An interpretation (e.g. Anscombe's) holds that the above-mentioned correlations do make the picture into a proposition. But this neither handles the objection, nor is it Wittgenstein's view. Further, Wittgenstein's own account faces serious difficulties in addressing these issues, and the Anscombe-type interpretation obscures this fact.     

Mother-to-Daughter Disclosure After Divorce: Are There Costs and Benefits?

To investigate the association between post-divorce mother-to-daughter disclosure regarding sensitive topics and adolescent daughters' adjustment and closeness to mother, we collected data from 62 adolescent girls within the first two years after their mother's divorce. Analyses revealed that most mothers in the current sample have disclosed to their daughters to some degree about the five sensitive topic areas studied. In accordance with structural family systems theory, we found that detailed mother-to-daughter disclosures regarding financial concerns, negativity toward ex-husband, job ups-and-downs, and personal concerns were clearly associated with greater daughter psychological distress, but not with greater feelings of mother-daughter closeness, as existing retrospective research would have predicted. Daughters' worrying about their mothers explained (mediated) the link between maternal disclosure and daughter's distress to some extent. We discuss methodological issues as well as the valuable contributions that future, more contextualized research could make to understanding the conditions under which detailed mother-to-adolescent disclosure may be more or less risky.     

Grandparents Affected by Parental Divorce: A Population at Risk?

When parents divorce, grandparents who have bonded with grandchildren may be affected, particularly when denied visitation. In this article the author reviews normative aspects of grand-parenthood and how grandparents are affected by parental divorce. Legal and ethical issues and counseling interventions are discussed.     

More of a Cause?

Does a person's liability to attack during a war depend on the nature of their individual causal contribution to the (unjust) threat posed? If so, how? The recent literature on the ethics of war has become increasingly focused on questions of this kind. According to some views on these matters, your liability hinges on the extent of your causal contribution: the larger your contribution to an unjust threat, the larger the amount of harm that we can impose on you in order to avert the threat. Some philosophers have suggested that we can ground a quite general principle of civilian immunity on this basis. But, do causal contributions really come in degrees? Can we make sense of a graded notion of causal contribution that can be relevant to debates about liability in war? I argue there is good reason to be sceptical. The appearance that causal contributions come in degrees is just an illusion that can be explained away.     

Spiritual But Not Religious? Evidence for Two Independent Dispositions

Some psychologists treat religious/spiritual beliefs as a unitary aspect of individual differences. But a distinction between mysticism and orthodox religion has been recognized by scholars as well as laypersons, and empirical studies of "ism" variables and of "spirituality" measures have yielded factors reflecting this distinction. Using a large sample of American adults, analyses demonstrate that subjective spirituality and tradition-oriented religiousness are empirically highly independent and have distinctly different correlates in the personality domain, suggesting that individuals with different dispositions tend toward different styles of religious/spiritual beliefs. These dimensions have low correlations with the lexical Big Five but high correlations with scales (e.g., Absorption, Traditionalism) on some omnibus personality inventories, indicating their relevance for studies of personality.     

Following the Leader? Mormon Voting on Ballot Propositions

Why did Utah voters—most of whom are Mormons—vote in favor of repealing Prohibition in 1933, and against a modest relaxation of Utah's liquor laws in 1968? In answering this question, we illuminate some important facets of the political behavior of members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints. We hypothesize that Mormons are likely to “follow their leaders” on political questions when two conditions hold: (1) official endorsement of a position by LDS church leaders; and (2) internal agreement among those leaders. Each is necessary, but neither is sufficient alone. In 1933, only one of these two conditions held; in 1968 both did. Using ecological inference to generate estimates of individual‐level behavior of Mormon and non‐Mormon voters in Utah, we find that Mormon voters were significantly more likely to vote in accordance with the Mormon Church's official position in 1968 than in 1933. We further test our hypothesis by examining other referenda in states with a large Mormon population. We conclude with a discussion of when and how contemporary Mormon leaders get involved in political issues.     

Two cheers for Tanhā

The central character in Sartre's 1938 novel La Nausée, Antoine Roquentin, has lost his sense of things, and now the world appears to him as utterly unstable. Roquentin suffers from what he calls ‘nausea,’ a condition caused by an ontological intuition that the self, as well as the world through which that ‘self’ moves, lacks a substantial nature. The novel portrays Sartre's own philosophical account of the self in La transcendence de l'égo. Here Sartre argues that Husserl's account of consciousness is not radical enough; the ‘I’ or ego is a pseudo-source of activity (and Sartre thus draws very close to a particularly Buddhist account of personal identity). My essay questions Roquentin's response to his ontological insight: why is this the occasion for ‘nausea’? Why doesn't Roquentin (as King Milinda famously does) celebrate and embrace his ‘non-self’? I argue that Sartre's depiction of Roquentin's ailment, and the unsatisfactory solution he provides, misunderstands both the aggregate nature of things as well as authentically rendered consciousness-only (vijñaptimātra).     

Employment Roles of College Graduates: How Important Are They?

For this study, the qualification data of 217 business majors at a large state university were collected just before graduation. The respondents' roles were evaluated prior to graduation and they were recontacted 3 months later to determine employment status and job satisfaction. Discriminant analysis of 187 responses was used to determine the relative impact of the various factors studied.     

Security Technologies Versus Citizen Roles?

The idea of securitization holds that perceived threats and the ensuing need for security measures are mobilized in speech acts to legitimate bypassing of normal practices of democratic politics and justification. Citizens, as members of the political community, are thus effectively deprived of their agency. Attempts at securitization gain clout from the severity of the mobilized threat: the more convincingly a threat is argued to cause disruptions in the functioning of society and ultimately the loss of human life, the more acceptable it will become to bypass democratic governance in order to prevent the threat. Accordingly, security technologies can be conceived of as those technologies that are constructed and mobilized in such attempts at securitization and depoliticization. However, security technologies can also be thought of as technologies that are mobilized in face of existential threats more generally, regardless of whether their mobilization has a depoliticizing effect or not. Yet, as case studies on airport security scanners and security in smart grids show, not all implementations of security, even against existential threats, show this tendency of depoliticization as essential in securitization and in technologies of security. This article further demonstrates that the agency of citizens in the governance of these technologies importantly depends on whether or not the threat is perceived as internal or external to the referent object of the security programme.