Het Wonder

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Celtic Wonder

One of the most important lessons in Jungian psychology is that we each have to contain the tension of opposites within ourselves, long past the point of comfort. Early in The Lord of the Rings, Tolkien tells us of the natural antipathy that Dwarves and Elves have toward each other, an antipathy that goes back millennia. The representatives of both can hardly stand to be in the company of each other at the great Council of Elrond in Rivendell, the Council that begins the initially awkward Fellowship of the Ring. Yet, over the course of this greatest of all quests, Gimli the Dwarf and Legolas the Elf grow from uneasy allies to inseparable friends, offering all of us an example of the reconciliation of opposites that has to take place in each of our souls.     

Creativity and Wonder

The experience of wonder is often said to be at the origin of acts of creativity, both historical and mundane, from big breakthroughs in science to the everyday discoveries of children at play. And yet, wonder and wondering have rarely been theorized until now, at least in the psychology of creativity. Understood as one of the main ways in which we engage with the possible, wonder presents us, upon closer inspection, with a paradox typical for creativity—experiencing what is present (the here and now) through the lenses of what is absent (the not‐yet‐here). Wondering is grounded in the possibility of adopting multiple perspectives on a certain reality; many of which are yet unknown to the creator while anticipated and actively looked for. In this paper, the creative process fuelled by the experience of wonder is described as a cyclical interplay between awareness, excitement, and exploration of the possible. Thus, one of the main consequences of reflecting on wonder and wondering is not only a renewed focus on process in creativity research but, most of all, a new emphasis on the less “visible” and yet essential aspects of creative action as it bridges the actual and the possible.     

The Spectacular Showing: Houdini and the Wonder of Ethnomethodology

This essay is about Houdini’s escapes and ethnomethodology’s studies.¹ By accomplishing what appears to be impossible, Houdini leaves his audience considering not only how did he manage to do that, but also just what is it that we consider to be possible. Magicians and escapologists warn us off an interest in the mechanics of their tricks that might spoil the thrill of what they dramatically present to us: a sense of the limits to whatwe can apprehend as an audience. While marking out the differences in their projects, this essay brings out the sharedurge of escapologists and ethnomethodologists to question our senses, openmembers to particular phenomena, and awaken us tothe wonder of the world.In reflecting on what happens when magicians reveal the devices that constitute their tricks, I ask whether the purpose of studying methodologies canonlyreside in revealing how they are practically produced as intelligibleactions. What more might ethnomethodology’s invitation be?     

Wonder and the clinical encounter

In terms of intervening in embodied experience, medical treatment is wonder-full in its ambition and its metaphysical presumption; yet, wonder’s role in clinical medicine has received little philosophical attention. In this paper, I propose, to doctors and others in routine clinical life, the value of an openness to wonder and to the sense of wonder. Key to this is the identity of the central ethical challenges facing most clinicians, which is not the high-tech drama of the popular conceptions of medical ethics but, rather, the routine of patients’ undramatic but unremitting demands for the clinician’s time and respectful attention. Wonder (conceived as an intense and transfiguring attentiveness) is a ubiquitous ethical source, an alternative to the more familiar respect for rational autonomy, a source of renewal galvanizing diagnostic imagination, and a timely recalling of the embodied agency of both patient and clinician.     

Wonder,Mystery, and Meaning

Abstract

This paper explores the connection between wonder and meaning, in particular ‘the meaning of life’, a connection that, despite strong intrinsic connections between wonder and the (philosophical) search for meaning has not yet received any sustained attention. Does wonder ‘merely’ inspire our search for meaning, or does it also point the way towards meaning? In exploring this question I first engage with Hannah Arendt, then examine the suggestion (by Josef Pieper and Rachel Carson, among others) that the meaning wonder points us to lies in connecting us with the mystery of existence. Can there be meaning in mystery, or is wonder––as a state of being lost for words in the face of mystery––rather antithetical to meaning? This discussion leads to the idea, emphasized in recent writing on wonder, that wonder (also) depends on the meaning we ascribe to things. In the final section I discuss wonder as a potential source of meaning in life, then return to the question whether it can also point towards a deeper meaning of life. I conclude that no purely rational justification can be given for this view, but that this need not detract from the importance of wonder in our lives.     

The Varieties of Intrinsicality

Intrinsicality is a central notion in metaphysics that can do important work in many areas of philosophy. It is not widely appreciated, however, that there are in fact a number of different notions of intrinsicality, and that these different notions differ in what work they can do. This paper discusses what these notions are, describes how they are related to each other, and argues that each of them can be analysed in terms of a single notion of intrinsic aboutness that relates states of affairs to the things they are intrinsically about.     

Absolute Goodness,Wonder and the Evildoer

Raimond Gaita affirms absolute goodness as the only thing with the power to keep fully among us the worst kind of evildoer. At issue in this goodness is a wonder that he ties to joy. Yet Gaita does not, perhaps cannot, imagine this power with respect to the evildoer concretely enough for it to move us in the way his account requires. An aspect of his writings that resists the emphasis on a joyous wonder may assist our thinking about the relation to the evildoer.     

Wonder,Guarding Against Thoughtlessness in Education

Studies in Philosophy and Education - Hannah Arendt has a particular notion of thinking that both is and is not (in her sense of the term) philosophical. While not guided by the search for meta...     

Science, Wonder and the Lust of the Eyes

ABSTRACT Is a scientific attitude to the natural world an obstacle to an appreciation of its value? This paper argues that it is not. Following Aristotle and Marx, it maintains that, properly pursued, science has value because it enables us to contemplate that which is wonderful and beautiful. However, the paper concedes that, as actually practised, science can foster a vice described by Augustine as ‘the lust of the eyes’: knowledge is sought not to open us to the world, but merely to satisfy the itch of curiosity. If scientific knowledge is thus pursued, no limits to the means to it nor to its objects are recognised. Those who thus seek knowledge fail to understand its value.     

The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality

It is a mistake to think that instrumental rationality fixes a single standard for judging or describing actions. While there is a core conception of instrumental rationality, we appeal to different elaborations of that conception for different purposes. An action can be instrumentally rational in some sense(s) but not in others. As we learn more about behavior, it is possible to add useful elaborations of the core conception of instrumental rationality. In this paper, I propose a new elaboration based on Frederic Schick's work on understandings.