The use of race variables in genetic studies of complex traits and the goal of reducing health disparities: a transdisciplinary perspective

The use of racial variables in genetic studies has become a matter of intense public debate, with implications for research design and translation into practice. Using research on smoking as a springboard, the authors examine the history of racial categories, current research practices, and arguments for and against using race variables in genetic analyses. The authors argue that the sociopolitical constructs appropriate for monitoring health disparities are not appropriate for use in genetic studies investigating the etiology of complex diseases. More powerful methods for addressing population structure exist, and race variables are unacceptable as gross proxies for numerous social/environmental factors that disproportionately affect minority populations. The authors conclude with recommendations for genetic researchers and policymakers, aimed at facilitating better science and producing new knowledge useful for reducing health disparities.     

Race and genetics: controversies in biomedical, behavioral, and forensic sciences

Among biomedical scientists, there is a great deal of controversy over the nature of race, the relevance of racial categories for research, and the proper methods of using racial variables. This article argues that researchers and scholars should avoid a binary-type argument, in which the question is whether to use race always or never. Researchers should instead focus on developing standards for when and how to use racial variables. The article then discusses 1 context, criminology, in which the use of racial variables in behavioral genetics research could be particularly problematic. If genetic studies of criminalized behavior use forensic DNA databanks or forensic genetic profiles, they will be confounded by the many racial biases of the law enforcement and penal system.     

The Cognitive Structure of Scientific Revolutions

For historical epistemology to succeed, it must adopt a defensible set of categories to characterise scientific activity over time. In historically orientated philosophy of science during the twentieth century, the original categories of theory and observation were supplemented or replaced by categories like paradigm, research program and research tradition. Underlying all three proposals was talk about conceptual systems and conceptual structures, attributed to individual scientists or to research communities, however there has been little general agreement on the nature of these structures. Recent experimental research in cognitive science has considerably refined the theory of concepts. Drawing upon the results of that research, philosophers can construct more concrete and empirically defensible representations of conceptual systems. I will suggest that this research supports a modest and useful sense of both normal and revolutionary science, not as epistemological continuities or discontinuities, but as particular patterns of conceptual change.     

On the Methodology of the Race Debate: Conceptual Analysis and Racial Discourse

The traditional debate about whether race should be eliminated from public discourse is often conducted in significant part by examining whether race is real. Whether race is real, in turn, often comes down to whether racial discourse purports to refer to social or natural kinds, which means that analysis of racial concepts is crucial to the question of racial eliminativism. The dominate theory of conceptual analysis in the race debate is that racial concepts should be analyzed according to how those terms have been used by historical experts. It is argued here that this dominant theory is misguided, and that we should therefore analyze racial concepts according to how they are used in contemporary, folk discourse. In addition, and in contrast to the main rival to the dominant theory, I argue that we should analyze folk racial discourse not from the armchair, but instead through empirical research.     

Racial groups and test fairness, considering history and construct validity

According to Helms, "test fairness" is defined as "removal from test scores of systematic variance attributable to experiences of racial or cultural socialization." Some of Helms's reasoning is based on earlier work, which recommended that racial group or category variables be replaced entirely with individual-level constructs, to reflect racial socialization experiences that vary within racial groups. Treatment of the test fairness issue--a social and political issue--will benefit from explicitly considering historical events that contributed to group-level race differences. In light of this history, D. A. Newman et al suggest (a) retaining a group-level conceptualization of race/racial socialization and also (b) focusing on criterion-irrelevant variance in test scores that is attributable to race.     

Racial Discrimination: A Continuum of Violence Exposure for Children of Color

This article reviews and examines findings on the impact of racial discrimination on the development and functioning of children of color in the US. Based on current definitions of violence and child maltreatment, exposure to racial discrimination should be considered as a form of violence that can significantly impact child outcomes and limit the ability of parents and communities to provide support that promotes resiliency and optimal child development. In this article, a conceptual model of the effects of racial discrimination in children of color is presented. The model posits that exposure to racial discrimination may be a chronic source of trauma in the lives of many children of color that negatively influences mental and physical outcomes as well as parent and community support and functioning. Concurrent exposure to other forms of violence, including domestic, interpersonal and/or community violence, may exacerbate these effects. The impact of a potential continuum of violence exposure for children of color in the US and the need for future research and theoretical models on children’s exposure to violence that attend to the impact of racial discrimination on child outcomes are discussed.     

Under the skin: On the impartial treatment of genetic and environmental hypotheses of racial differences

Environmental and genetic explanations have been given for Black-White racial differences in intelligence and other traits. In science, viable, alternative hypotheses are ideally given equal Bayesian prior weights; but this has not been true in the study of racial differences. This article advocates testing environmental and genetic hypotheses of racial differences as competing hypotheses. Two methods are described: (a) fitting means within structural equation models and (b) predicting means of interracial children. These methods have limitations that call for improved research designs of racial differences. One improvement capitalizes on biotechnology. Genetic admixture estimates--the percentage of genes of European origin that a Black individual possesses (independent of genes related to skin coloration)--can represent genetic influences. The study of interracial children can be improved by increasing sample size and by choosing family members who are most informative for a research question. Eventually, individual-admixture estimates will be replaced by molecular genetic tests of alleles of those genes that influence traits.     

Evaluating the Meta-Slope: Is there a Slippery Slope Argument against Slippery Slope Arguments?

Slippery slope arguments (SSAs) have often been viewed as inherently weak arguments, to be classified together with traditional fallacies of reasoning and argumentation such as circular arguments and arguments from ignorance. Over the last two decades several philosophers have taken a kinder view, often providing historical examples of the kind of gradual change on which slippery slope arguments rely. Against this background, Enoch (2001, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 21(4), 629–647) presented a novel argument against SSA use that itself invokes a slippery slope. Specifically, he argued that the very reasons that can make SSAs strong arguments mean that we should be poor at abiding by the distinction between good and bad SSAs, making SSAs inherently undesirable. We argue that Enoch’s meta-level SSA fails on both conceptual and empirical grounds.     

Psychometric Evaluation and Revision of Carver and White's BIS/BAS Scales in a Diverse Sample of Young Adults

The psychometric properties of the Behavioral Inhibition System and Behavioral Activation System (BIS/BAS) scales (Carver & White, 1994) were evaluated in a large, racially diverse sample of undergraduate students. Findings from this study indicate that the BIS/BAS scales work differently (i.e., are multidimensional and lack configural invariance) when assessing BIS and BAS in a diverse sample. Numerous model modifications were needed to obtain adequate fitting models for the total sample and individual racial groups. The findings suggest that this is due to items that assess multiple constructs differently across self-reported race categories. As part of this research, a revised version of the BIS/BAS scales was constructed that appears to be invariant across self-reported race category and simultaneously addresses the other psychometric concerns associated with the original scale. Caution should be used when applying the BIS/BAS scales as originally specified to assess behavioral inhibition and activation in a racially diverse sample. Researchers might want to use this revised version of the scale as an alternative.     

Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism

Though it enjoys widespread support, the claim that perceptual experiences possess nonconceptual content has been vigorously disputed in the recent literature by those who argue that the content of perceptual experience must be conceptual content. Nonconceptualism and conceptualism are often assumed to be well-defined theoretical approaches that each constitute unitary claims about the contents of experience. In this paper I try to show that this implicit assumption is mistaken, and what consequences this has for the debate about perceptual experience. I distinguish between two different ways that nonconceptualist (and conceptualist) proposals about perceptual content can be understood: as claims about the constituents that compose perceptual contents or as claims about whether a subject’s undergoing experiences with those contents requires them to possess the concepts that characterize those contents. I maintain that these ways of understanding conceptualism and nonconceptualism are orthogonal to one another. This is revealed by the conceptual coherence of positions in which the contents of experiences have both conceptual and nonconceptual features; positions which possess their own distinctive sources of philosophical motivation. I argue that the fact that there is a place in conceptual space for such positions, and that there may be good reason for theorists to adopt them, creates difficulties for both the central argument for nonconceptualism and the central argument for conceptualism. I set out each of these arguments; the Argument from Possession-Independence and the Epistemically-Driven Argument. I then try to show how the existence of mixed positions about perceptual content derived from a clear distinction between compositional and possessional considerations constitutes a significant obstacle for those arguments as they stand. The takehome message of the paper is that unless one clearly acknowledges the distinction between issues about the composition of perceptual content and issues about how subject’s capacities to undergo certain experiences relates to their possession of concepts one runs the risk of embracing unsatisfying philosophical arguments in which conclusions relevant to one conception of nonconceptual and conceptual content are grounded on arguments that concern only the other; arguments that cannot, in themselves, sustain them.     

Prototypicality in sentence production

Three cued-recall experiments examined the effect of category typicality on the ordering of words in sentence production. Past research has found that typical items tend to be mentioned before atypical items in a phrase—a pattern usually associated with lexical variables (like word frequency), and yet typicality is a conceptual variable. Experiment 1 revealed that an appropriate conceptual framework was necessary to yield the typicality effect. Experiment 2 tested ad hoc categories that do not have prior representations in long-term memory and yielded no typicality effect. Experiment 3 used carefully matched sentences in which two category members appeared in the same or in different phrases. Typicality affected word order only when the two words appeared in the same phrase. These results are consistent with an account in which typicality has its origin in conceptual structure, which leads to differences in lexical accessibility in appropriate contexts.     

Transcendental Arguments and the Problem of Dogmatism

Abstract

Transcendental arguments have been described as undogmatic or non‐dogmatic arguments. This paper examines this contention critically and addresses the question of what is required from an argument for which the characterization is valid. I shall argue that although transcendental arguments do in certain respects meet what one should require from non‐dogmatic arguments, they – or more specifically, what I shall call ‘general transcendental arguments’ – involve an assumption about conceptual unity that constitutes a reason for not attributing to them the status of non‐dogmatic arguments. As a solution to this problem I distinguish general transcendental arguments from what I shall call ‘specific transcendental arguments’ and seek to explain how by limiting the use of transcendental arguments to the latter type it would be possible to avoid dogmatism. This methodological adjustment also opens up a possibility of re‐interpreting transcendental arguments from the past in a novel non‐dogmatic fashion.     

On radical conceptual revolutions in social science

The paper considers arguments for and against correction and elimination of the basic conceptual categories as well as theories of social science. It is argued that some correction of at least some basic social notions is called for. A great part of the paper consists in a conceptual investigation of such notion of correction in terms of different notions of corrective explanation.     

Considerations Relating to the Study of Group Differences in Intelligence

ABSTRACT— There are signs that the debate over racial and gender differences in intelligence is about to begin again. In this article we will be concerned primarily with racial differences but will make remarks about gender differences where applicable. Previously there have been bitter arguments over whether or not races exist, over whether it is either important or proper to study racial and gender differences in intelligence, and over the conclusions that have been drawn about environmental and genetic causes as determinants of these differences. We argue that races do, indeed, exist and that studying differences in cognitive competence between groups is a reasonable thing to do. We also point out that past research on both racial and gender differences in intelligence has been marked by methodological errors and overgeneralizations by researchers on all sides of the issue. We propose ten principles of design, analysis, and reporting that ought to be considered carefully when doing or evaluating research in this area.     

Using Racial Identity Theory to Explore Racial Mistrust and Interracial Contact Among Asian Americans

The purpose of this study was to examine the use of racial identity attitudes as predictors of racial mistrust (perceived interpersonal racism) of African Americans and other racial contact variables among Asian Americans. A packet consisting of the Visible Racial/Ethnic Group Members (VREG) Identity Attitudes Scale, Cultural Mistrust Inventory, Marlow‐Crowne Social Desirability Scale, Racial Contact Scale, and a demographic data sheet was administered to 160 participants. Hierarchical regression analyses showed that racial identity attitudes significantly predicted racial mistrust, overall group impression, 4 racial stereotypes, and 2 quality of racial contact variables in ways consistent with racial identity theory. Implications of the findings for Asian American psychology, counseling, and race relations research are discussed.     

CONCEPTUAL EVIDENTIALISM

Two recent arguments purport to find a new and firmer foundation for evidentialism in the very nature of the concept of belief. Evidentialism is claimed to be a conceptual truth about belief, and pragmatism to be ruled out, conceptually. But can the conclusion of such conceptual arguments be regarded as the denial of pragmatism? The pragmatist traditionally conceived belief through its motivational role. Therefore, when confronted with conceptual evidentialism, the pragmatist should cede the term ‘belief,’ but insist that pragmatism be understood as a claim about another attitude, a motivational duplicate of belief. Thus, the original dispute is simply relocated terminologically.     

White Men’s Fears, White Women’s Tears: Examining Gender Differences in Racial Affect Types

This investigation extends research on White students’ affective costs of racism. Consistent with previous research that identified distinct costs of racism (or racial affect) types, the authors used cluster analysis to examine unique patterns in White empathy, guilt, and fear among White undergraduate women (n?=?227) and men (n?=?175) from a large university in the Midwestern United States. Extending prior research and building on conceptual scholarship concerned with intersections of race and gender, the authors separated the sample by gender to determine whether different affective costs of racism types emerged for women and men. The authors found the same five cluster solution for both women and men in the present study, and these solutions were consistent with previous research conducted among combined samples of women and men. Findings suggested that women were significantly more likely than men to be in the most desirable, Antiracist type, compared to the least desirable, Insensitive and Afraid type. Additionally, the authors examined whether support for affirmation action differed by racial affect type for women and men. Partially supporting their hypothesis, the authors found that racial affect types with different levels of White empathy distinguished levels of support for affirmative action among White women. Among White men, the authors found that racial affect types with different levels of White fear explained differing levels of affirmative action support. Implications for future research and diversity education interventions are discussed.     

The protective role of ethnic and racial identity and aspects of an Africentric orientation against drug use among African American young adults

In this study, the authors examined (a) the protective potential of multiple components of ethnic and racial identity and (b) the aspects of an Africentric orientation for moderating psychobehavioral risk and protective factors for drug use among a sample of 333 urban low-income African American young adults. Ethnic and racial identity and Africentric variables moderated the relationship between psychobehavioral variables and drug stage in 32.5% of the cases. Ethnic and racial identity and Africentric values for African American young adults seemed to be important as moderators of the association between psychobehavioral factors and young adult drug use. The authors suggested implications for future research and interventions.