Selective exposure and information quantity: how different information quantities moderate decision makers' preference for consistent and inconsistent information

Empirical evidence on selective exposure to information after decisions is contradictory: Whereas many studies have found a preference for information that is consistent with one's prior decision, some have found a preference for inconsistent information. The authors propose that different available information quantities moderate these contradictory findings. Four studies confirmed this expectation. When confronted with 10 pieces of information, decision makers systematically preferred decision-consistent information, whereas when confronted with only 2 pieces of information, they strongly preferred decision-inconsistent information (Study 1). This effect was not due to differences in processing complexity (Study 2) or dissonance processes (Study 3) but could be traced back to different salient selection criteria: When confronted with 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was information direction (consistent vs. inconsistent), which caused a preference for inconsistent information. In contrast, when confronted with more than 2 pieces of information, the salient selection criterion was expected information quality, which caused a preference for consistent information (Study 4).     

Uncertainty forecasts improve weather-related decisions and attenuate the effects of forecast error

Although uncertainty is inherent in weather forecasts, explicit numeric uncertainty estimates are rarely included in public forecasts for fear that they will be misunderstood. Of particular concern are situations in which precautionary action is required at low probabilities, often the case with severe events. At present, a categorical weather warning system is used. The work reported here tested the relative benefits of several forecast formats, comparing decisions made with and without uncertainty forecasts. In three experiments, participants assumed the role of a manager of a road maintenance company in charge of deciding whether to pay to salt the roads and avoid a potential penalty associated with icy conditions. Participants used overnight low temperature forecasts accompanied in some conditions by uncertainty estimates and in others by decision advice comparable to categorical warnings. Results suggested that uncertainty information improved decision quality overall and increased trust in the forecast. Participants with uncertainty forecasts took appropriate precautionary action and withheld unnecessary action more often than did participants using deterministic forecasts. When error in the forecast increased, participants with conventional forecasts were reluctant to act. However, this effect was attenuated by uncertainty forecasts. Providing categorical decision advice alone did not improve decisions. However, combining decision advice with uncertainty estimates resulted in the best performance overall. The results reported here have important implications for the development of forecast formats to increase compliance with severe weather warnings as well as other domains in which one must act in the face of uncertainty.     

Decision making and confidence given uncertain advice

We study human decision making in a simple forced-choice task that manipulates the frequency and accuracy of available information. Empirically, we find that people make decisions consistent with the advice provided, but that their subjective confidence in their decisions shows 2 interesting properties. First, people's confidence does not depend solely on the accuracy of the advice. Rather, confidence seems to be influenced by both the frequency and accuracy of the advice. Second, people are less confident in their guessed decisions when they have to make relatively more of them. Theoretically, we develop and evaluate a type of sequential sampling process model—known as a self-regulating accumulator—that accounts for both decision making and confidence. The model captures the regularities in people's behavior with interpretable parameter values, and we show its ability to fit the data is not due to excessive model complexity. Using the model, we draw conclusions about some properties of human reasoning under uncertainty.     

Attending to multiple sources of information: I. The integration of information in decision making

Information relevant to a decision is often available from several sources, such as different sensory modalities or different spatial locations. Processing or utilization of such information is often selective in that some sources seem to have more influence on a decision or response than others. Many different theoretical mechanisms have been proposed to account for such selective (i.e., attentional) aspects of human information processing. This paper considers theoretical mechanisms which operate to integrate separate sources of information in order to make a binary decision. In particular, these mechanisms are studied in simple visual and auditory detection tasks as well as a Bayesian decision problem. Data from these experiments reject the idea that one integrates the relevant information from several sources prior to making a decision. Rather, one seems to form separate decisions about the information from each source and then integrate these decisions in order to select a response.     

Hyteresis and Uncertainty: The Effect of Uncertainty on Delays to Exit Decisions

The effects of feedback variability and the availability of information on exit decisions in a nonprofitable venture were investigated in a computer simulated marketing scenario. Half of subjects received feedback relatively low in variability and half of subjects received feedback substantially higher in variability. Half of subjects in each variability condition had the opportunity to purchase additional information regarding their investment. Subjects receiving feedback higher in variability delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often, and invested more resources than subjects receiving feedback lower in variability. Subjects with no opportunity to purchase information delayed exit decisions longer, invested more often, and invested more resources than subjects with the opportunity to purchase information. The results are consistent with Dixit's (1992) theory of uncertainty and hysteresis and indicate that an uncertain environment can affect whether a decision maker continues to invest when costs are higher than profits.     

Selecting a new technology strategy using multiattribute,multilevel decision trees

Research indicates that selecting a strategy to best exploit a new technology is a complex decision-making process. The task involves making a series of decisions with multiple alternatives, each to be evaluated by multiple criteria whose values have high levels of uncertainty. This paper presents a methodology for modelling a new technology decision using decision trees and an optimizing algorithm. A problem of a mining company considering the adoption of new technology is used to illustrate the decision-making task and modelling methodology. A numerical solution to the case demonstrates the potential of the optimizing technique in strategy selection.     

Sensitivity to Affective Information and Investors' Evaluation of Past Performance: An Eye‐tracking Study

In the present work, we used the eye‐tracking methodology to investigate how affective reactions influence investment decision making. In addition, we looked at individual differences in terms of people's sensitivity to affective information and how efficiently they regulate it, that is, trait emotional intelligence. We demonstrated that people who are more sensitive to affective information have larger pupil dilation when looking at the past performance of a stock fund. In addition, we also found that participants' larger pupil dilation had an impact on their investment decisions (whether people were more likely to sell their shares, hold on to the investment, or buy more shares). A larger pupil dilation led people to be more consistent and willing to invest more money on a fund regardless from its past performance (positive or negative). We also tested the hypothesis that individuals with a larger pupil dilation should be more influenced by a fund's past performance (e.g., selling their shares more often when the past performance of the fund was negative and buying additional shares more often when the past performance was positive). However, results did not support this explanation. Finally, our data revealed that the effect of individual differences in trait emotional intelligence on investment decisions was significantly mediated by pupil dilation. In the discussion, we explored the relationship between our results and previous evidence on the role of pupil dilation in processing information under uncertainty and the role of affect in decision making. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Analytic Confidence and Political Decision‐Making: Theoretical Principles and Experimental Evidence From National Security Professionals

When making decisions under uncertainty, it is important to distinguish between the probability that a judgment is true and the confidence analysts possess in drawing their conclusions. Yet analysts and decision‐makers often struggle to define “confidence” in this context, and many ways that scholars use this term do not necessarily facilitate decision‐making under uncertainty. To help resolve this confusion, we argue for disaggregating analytic confidence along three dimensions: reliability of available evidence, range of reasonable opinion, and responsiveness to new information. After explaining how these attributes hold different implications for decision‐making in principle, we present survey experiments examining how analysts and decision‐makers employ these ideas in practice. Our first experiment found that each conception of confidence distinctively influenced national security professionals' evaluations of high‐stakes decisions. Our second experiment showed that inexperienced assessors of uncertainty could consistently discriminate among our conceptions of confidence when making political forecasts. We focus on national security, where debates about defining “confidence levels” have clear practical implications. But our theoretical framework generalizes to nearly any area of political decision‐making, and our empirical results provide encouraging evidence that analysts and decision‐makers can grasp these abstract elements of uncertainty.     

The Path of Least Resistance: Using Easy-to-Access Information

Abstract— Recent work on judgment and decision making has focused on how people preferentially use cues, or pieces of relevant information, that are easy to access when making decisions. In this article, we discuss a framework for understanding the ways that cues become accessible. We begin by identifying two components of cues and show how these components can become accessible during different parts a decision process. We highlight evidence for the use of accessible information and discuss implications for future research on heuristics.     

The path or the goal? Decision vs. information focus in biased information seeking after preliminary decisions

Research on the phenomenon of selective exposure to information demonstrates that after preliminary or final decisions, people show a preference for supporting rather than conflicting information (confirmation bias). In this article, we examine conditions that increase or decrease distortions in the search for information. We report on four experiments indicating that the confirmation bias is influenced by whether people focus on their decision or on the presented pieces of information during the information search. Focusing on the decision, for example, because a reward for a correct decision is promised or simply because participants repeatedly think of it, increases the confirmation bias. On the other hand, if participants focus on the available pieces of information because they have to invest money in order to search for information or because they have to evaluate the individual pieces of information, the confirmation bias decreases. Implications for theoretical understanding and interventions for decision-making situations are discussed.     

The Influence of Values, Information, and Decision Orders on a Public Policy Decision

An experiment was conducted to determine the influence of personal values, information, and decision order on choice and commitment to choice when the decision involved a complex matter of public policy. Findings indicated that values determined piorities, but not decisions; information did not influence choice, but had a curvilinear effect on the commitment to the choice; the decision order did not influence the components of the decision process, but did determine the proportion of value-consistent decisions. The significance of these findings to public policy and the need for future research are discussed.     

Rapid decisions from experience

In many everyday decisions, people quickly integrate noisy samples of information to form a preference among alternatives that offer uncertain rewards. Here, we investigated this decision process using the Flash Gambling Task (FGT), in which participants made a series of choices between a certain payoff and an uncertain alternative that produced a normal distribution of payoffs. For each choice, participants experienced the distribution of payoffs via rapid samples updated every 50 ms. We show that people can make these rapid decisions from experience and that the decision process is consistent with a sequential sampling process. Results also reveal a dissociation between these preferential decisions and equivalent perceptual decisions where participants had to determine which alternatives contained more dots on average. To account for this dissociation, we developed a sequential sampling rank-dependent utility model, which showed that participants in the FGT attended more to larger potential payoffs than participants in the perceptual task despite being given equivalent information. We discuss the implications of these findings in terms of computational models of preferential choice and a more complete understanding of experience-based decision making.     

Recognition Decisions From Visual Working Memory Are Mediated by Continuous Latent Strengths

Making recognition decisions often requires us to reference the contents of working memory, the information available for ongoing cognitive processing. As such, understanding how recognition decisions are made when based on the contents of working memory is of critical importance. In this work we examine whether recognition decisions based on the contents of visual working memory follow a continuous decision process of graded information about the correct choice or a discrete decision process reflecting only knowing and guessing. We find a clear pattern in favor of a continuous latent strength model of visual working memory–based decision making, supporting the notion that visual recognition decision processes are impacted by the degree of matching between the contents of working memory and the choices given. Relation to relevant findings and the implications for human information processing more generally are discussed.     

Synergistic Information Processing Encrypts Strategic Reasoning in Poker

There is a tendency in decision‐making research to treat uncertainty only as a problem to be overcome. But it is also a feature that can be leveraged, particularly in social interaction. Comparing the behavior of profitable and unprofitable poker players, we reveal a strategic use of information processing that keeps decision makers unpredictable. To win at poker, a player must exploit public signals from others. But using public inputs makes it easier for an observer to reconstruct that player's strategy and predict his or her behavior. How should players trade off between exploiting profitable opportunities and remaining unexploitable themselves? Using a recent multivariate approach to information theoretic data analysis and 1.75 million hands of online two‐player No‐Limit Texas Hold'em, we find that the important difference between winning and losing players is not in the amount of information they process, but how they process it. In particular, winning players are better at integrative information processing—creating new information from the interaction between their cards and their opponents’ signals. We argue that integrative information processing does not just produce better decisions, it makes decision‐making harder for others to reverse engineer, as an expert poker player's cards act like the private key in public‐key cryptography. Poker players encrypt their reasoning with the way they process information. The encryption function of integrative information processing makes it possible for players to exploit others while remaining unexploitable. By recognizing the act of information processing as a strategic behavior in its own right, we offer a detailed account of how experts use endemic uncertainty to conceal their intentions in high‐stakes competitive environments, and we highlight new opportunities between cognitive science, information theory, and game theory.     

Evidence for Implicit Risk: Delay Facilitates the Processing of Uncertainty

Humans and other animals discount the value of rewards over time. One explanation for this is that delayed rewards may be less certain than immediate rewards, what has been referred to as the implicit risk hypothesis. Although this explanation is widely accepted, little research has directly assessed the validity of the implicit risk hypothesis. In the current study, we present two experiments in which participants made decisions about rewards involving both delay and uncertainty. By manipulating the order in which information was presented, we were able to investigate whether delay information facilitates beliefs about uncertainty and vice versa. It was found that participants were more likely to prefer larger, delayed rewards when information about delay was presented before information about uncertainty than when the information was presented in the opposite order. Additionally, we describe a process model that implements the implicit risk hypothesis and show that it is consistent with the observed patterns of data. These results support the implicit risk hypothesis and suggest that information about delay facilitates the processing of information about uncertainty. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

决策者的认知特征对决策过程及企业战略选择的影响

在不确定环境下,企业的最高决策者的个人特性和行为对于企业的战略决策起着关键的作用。本研究探讨决策者的认知特征对于战略决策的过程以及最终形成的战略决策的影响。研究采用情境实验法,根据某企业的实际情形编写了一个商业案例,案例提供了决策者所需要的信息,并制造出高不确定的情境。148名来自大学管理学院的学生被要求对于该案例进行分析并填写有关量表。对数据进行结构方程模型的分析后得到如下结果：决策者的认知复杂性和认知需要与他们对企业内外环境的周密分析具有显著的正向关系,而且通过后者影响到对于环境中蕴含的机会的判断,并最终影响是否进入某项业务的决策。     

The distortion of criteria after decision-making

The results of two experiments indicate that decision-makers separately distort their interpretations of decision criteria and evaluations of information in a manner that justifies their decisions. In Study 1, participants reported a yes/no decision either before or after they rated the applicable decision criterion and problem information. Participants distorted their criterion and information ratings more when they reported their decisions before, rather than after, they rated the decision criterion and problem information. Study 2 demonstrated that distortion of decision criterion ratings occurred after a decision had been made whereas distortion of information evaluations occurred during the process of reaching a decision. These results are consistent with a two-stage model of decision-making in which the distortion of decision criteria is distinct from the distortion of decision information.     

Linguistic–Numeric Presentation Mode Effects on Risky Option Preferences

In this study, we examine preferences between lotteries with chances presented either numerically or linguistically. Presentation mode is predicted to affect preferences due to the perception of linguistic chance as skewed distributions of risk. Based upon weighting functions incorporating risk/uncertainty aversion from ambiguity theory and cumulative prospect theory, we predict that presentation mode effects on risky choices will be detectable in very small risks and in large risks. In two experiments, subjects chose between both gain and loss lotteries with constant payoffs and equivalent numeric and linguistic chances. Presentation mode affected choices when chances were above 50%, where lotteries with numeric chances were more frequently preferred in gains while lotteries with linguistic chances were more often preferred in losses. The effect of presentation mode for low-chance lotteries (5% and less) also affected choices such that numeric choices were generally preferred more frequently in losses and linguistically expressed choices were generally preferred more often in gains. Overall, these results suggest that theories of the effects of second order uncertainty on risky choice may be used to model decisions involving linguistic risk. They also suggest that the study of the perception of linguistic risk assessments can provide insight into the cognitive processing behind the weighting functions proposed to depict decision under risk and uncertainty. Finally, the results have practical implications since information providers can affect decision makers’ choices by controlling presentation mode in such a way as to alter the relative attractiveness of uncertain events.     

Memory of psychodiagnostic information: biases and effects of expertise

Problem-solving expertise has been associated with enhanced memory of domain-specific information. This enhanced memory is thought to play an important role in expert decisions. Meanwhile, research on psychodiagnostic decision making has found consistent limitations in experienced clinicians' ability to make optimal decisions. To what extent are these limitations associated with suboptimal memory processes? We compared memories of expert clinicians and novice graduate students for information learned while viewing a videotaped psychodiagnostic interview. Results of 3 tests suggest that expert clinicians exhibit enhanced memory that is flexible, selective, and accurate but with limitations that might contribute to poor decisions. Experts exhibited superior memory of personal criteria and disconfirmatory information. However, a framing manipulation induced performance in experts consistent with suboptimal decision making, and both groups needed exhaustive prompts for optimal memory search. Implications of these findings for expertise models are discussed.