语言和音乐层级结构的加工

语言和音乐在呈现过程中, 小单元相互结合组成更大的单元, 最终形成层级结构。已有研究表明, 听者能够将连续的语流和音乐切分成层级结构, 并在大脑中形成层级表征。在感知基础之上, 听者还能将新出现的语言和音乐事件整合到层级结构之中, 形成连贯理解, 最终顺利地完成交流过程。未来研究应剖析边界线索在层级结构感知中的作用, 考察不同层级整合过程的影响因素, 进一步探索语言和音乐层级结构加工的关系。     

The fluency of social hierarchy: the ease with which hierarchical relationships are seen, remembered, learned, and liked

We tested the hypothesis that social hierarchies are fluent social stimuli; that is, they are processed more easily and therefore liked better than less hierarchical stimuli. In Study 1, pairs of people in a hierarchy based on facial dominance were identified faster than pairs of people equal in their facial dominance. In Study 2, a diagram representing hierarchy was memorized more quickly than a diagram representing equality or a comparison diagram. This faster processing led the hierarchy diagram to be liked more than the equality diagram. In Study 3, participants were best able to learn a set of relationships that represented hierarchy (asymmetry of power)--compared to relationships in which there was asymmetry of friendliness, or compared to relationships in which there was symmetry--and this processing ease led them to like the hierarchy the most. In Study 4, participants found it easier to make decisions about a company that was more hierarchical and thus thought the hierarchical organization had more positive qualities. In Study 5, familiarity as a basis for the fluency of hierarchy was demonstrated by showing greater fluency for male than female hierarchies. This study also showed that when social relationships are difficult to learn, people's preference for hierarchy increases. Taken together, these results suggest one reason people might like hierarchies--hierarchies are easy to process. This fluency for social hierarchies might contribute to the construction and maintenance of hierarchies.     

Event structure in perception and conception

Events can be understood in terms of their temporal structure. The authors first draw on several bodies of research to construct an analysis of how people use event structure in perception, understanding, planning, and action. Philosophy provides a grounding for the basic units of events and actions. Perceptual psychology provides an analogy to object perception: Like objects, events belong to categories, and, like objects, events have parts. These relationships generate 2 hierarchical organizations for events: taxonomies and partonomies. Event partonomies have been studied by looking at how people segment activity as it happens. Structured representations of events can relate partonomy to goal relationships and causal structure; such representations have been shown to drive narrative comprehension, memory, and planning. Computational models provide insight into how mental representations might be organized and transformed. These different approaches to event structure converge on an explanation of how multiple sources of information interact in event perception and conception.     

Vision,knowledge, and assertion

I report two experiments studying the relationship among explicit judgments about what people see, know, and should assert. When an object of interest was surrounded by visibly similar items, it diminished people’s willingness to judge that an agent sees, knows, and should tell others that it is present. This supports the claim, made by many philosophers, that inhabiting a misleading environment intuitively decreases our willingness to attribute perception and knowledge. However, contrary to stronger claims made by some philosophers, inhabiting a misleading environment does not lead to the opposite pattern whereby people deny perception and knowledge. Causal modeling suggests a specific psychological model of how explicit judgments about perception, knowledge, and assertability are made: knowledge attributions cause perception attributions, which in turn cause assertability attributions. These findings advance understanding of how these three important judgments are made, provide new evidence that knowledge is the norm of assertion, and highlight some important subtleties in folk epistemology.     

Making sense of abstract events: Building event schemas

Everyday events, such as making a bed, can be segmented hierarchically, with the coarse level characterized by changes in the actor’s goals and the fine level by subgoals (Zacks, Tversky, &; Iyer, 2001). Does hierarchical event perception depend on knowledge of actors’ intentions? This question was addressed by asking participants to segment films of abstract, schematic events. Films were novel or familiarized, viewed forward or backward, and simultaneously described or not. The participants interpreted familiar films as more intentional than novel films and forward films as more intentional than backward films. Regardless of experience and film direction, however, the participants identified similar event boundaries and organized them hierarchically. An analysis of the movements in each frame revealed that event segments corresponded to bursts of change in movement features, with greater bursts for coarse than for fine units. Perceiving event structure appears to enable event schemas, rather than resulting from them.     

Novelty Categorization Theory

Novelty Categorization Theory (NCT) attempts to predict when people perceive events as novel and how they process novel events across different domains. It is predicted that broad mental categories reduce the perception of an event being novel via inclusion processes, whereas narrow categories increase it via exclusion processes. Furthermore, based on a ‘motive to know’, when preparing for novel events, people broaden both perception and mental categories, because to understand novel information, it is essential to integrate it into pre-existing knowledge structures that are sufficiently broad. Over time, a ‘when-novel-then-process-globally’ routine develops that is automatically elicited when novelty is encountered. Self-protective motives can, however, counteract such processing styles so that threatening novelty leads to local processing. Relations to construal level theory and action identification theory and implications for future research are discussed.     

How children perceive fractals: Hierarchical self-similarity and cognitive development

The ability to understand and generate hierarchical structures is a crucial component of human cognition, available in language, music, mathematics and problem solving. Recursion is a particularly useful mechanism for generating complex hierarchies by means of self-embedding rules. In the visual domain, fractals are recursive structures in which simple transformation rules generate hierarchies of infinite depth. Research on how children acquire these rules can provide valuable insight into the cognitive requirements and learning constraints of recursion.     

Hierarchical encoding of behavior: translating perception into action

People encode goal-directed behaviors, such as assembling an object, by segmenting them into discrete actions, organized as goal-subgoal hierarchies. Does hierarchical encoding contribute to observational learning? Participants in 3 experiments segmented an object assembly task into coarse and fine units of action and later performed it themselves. Hierarchical encoding, measured by segmentation patterns, correlated with more accurate and more hierarchically structured performance of the later assembly task. Furthermore, hierarchical encoding increased when participants (a) segmented coarse units first, (b) explicitly looked for hierarchical structure, and (c) described actions while segmenting them. Improving hierarchical encoding always led to improvements in learning, as well as a surprising shift toward encoding and executing actions from the actor's spatial perspective instead of the participants' own. Hierarchical encoding facilitates observational learning by organizing perceived actions into a representation that can serve as an action plan.     

Knowledge, expectations, and inductive reasoning within conceptual hierarchies

Previous research (e.g. Cognition 64 (1997) 73) suggests that the privileged level for inductive inference in a folk biological conceptual hierarchy does not correspond to the “basic” level (i.e. the level at which concepts are both informative and distinct). To further explore inductive inference within conceptual hierarchies, we examine relations between knowledge of concepts at different hierarchical levels, expectations about conceptual coherence, and inductive inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 5- and 8-year-olds and adults listed features of living kind (Experiments 1 and 2) and artifact (Experiment 2) concepts at different hierarchical levels (e.g. plant, tree, oak, desert oak), and also rated the strength of generalizations to the same concepts. For living kinds, the level that showed a relative advantage on these two tasks differed; the greatest increase in features listed tended to occur at the life-form level (e.g. tree), whereas the greatest increase in inductive strength tended to occur at the folk-generic level (e.g. oak). Knowledge and induction also showed different developmental trajectories. For artifact concepts, the levels at which the greatest gains in knowledge and induction occurred were more varied, and corresponded more closely across tasks. In Experiment 3, adults reported beliefs about within-category similarity for concepts at different levels of animal, plant and artifact hierarchies, and rated inductive strength as before. For living kind concepts, expectations about category coherence predicted patterns of inductions; knowledge did not. For artifact concepts, both knowledge and expectations predicted patterns of induction. Results suggest that beliefs about conceptual coherence play an important role in guiding inductive inference, that this role may be largely independent of specific knowledge of concepts, and that such beliefs are especially important in reasoning about living kinds.     

Interpersonal hierarchy expectation: introduction of a new construct

The goal of these series of studies was to introduce a new individual difference construct, interpersonal hierarchy expectation (IHE), and to show that it predicts interpersonal perception. IHE means expecting social interactions and relationships to be hierarchically structured. I developed a self-report questionnaire to measure IHE (IHE Scale [IHES]). In 5 studies, 581 undergraduates took the IHES together with an array of self-report personality measures. Three studies included a measure of hierarchy perception. According to prediction, people who expected interpersonal hierarchies were prone to perceive hierarchies in interactions and relationships. The IHES is an easy to apply, short, self-report measure that might prove useful in personnel training and selection as well as in other studies of personality and social behavior.     

Event perception: a mind-brain perspective

People perceive and conceive of activity in terms of discrete events. Here the authors propose a theory according to which the perception of boundaries between events arises from ongoing perceptual processing and regulates attention and memory. Perceptual systems continuously make predictions about what will happen next. When transient errors in predictions arise, an event boundary is perceived. According to the theory, the perception of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures that represent previously learned information about event parts and inferences about actors' goals and plans. Neurological and neurophysiological data suggest that representations of events may be implemented by structures in the lateral prefrontal cortex and that perceptual prediction error is calculated and evaluated by a processing pathway, including the anterior cingulate cortex and subcortical neuromodulatory systems.     

The fast and the dangerous: the speed of events influences risk judgements

A risk-as-feelings approach suggests that factors irrelevant to the potential risk can influence risk perception. This investigation focused on the speed of events as one such factor. Negative events that occur relatively quickly were judged as more likely to occur than events that occur more slowly. Speed influenced risk perception when it was salient and differences in risk perception were reduced when it was not salient. Further, the likelihood of a negative outcome was judged to be more likely when the same event was described as occurring relatively quickly compared to slowly. Even when only the speed at which information was presented changed, faster events were judged to be riskier than slower events. Theoretically, these findings suggest that speed of an event contributes to risk judgements and suggest speed may be the reason people fear fast but low incidence events and fail to fear slower but higher incidence events.